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Preface
When almost five years ago I came to London to study British public law, I had no specific 
topic in mind that might form the basis for my Ph.D. course. I came with no particular 
background in British law, but having studied American constitutional law, the oldest 
written constitution in the modem world, I have decided it would be of considerable 
interest to further my understanding of modem constitutionalism by looking at the oldest 
example of an unwritten constitution.
My knowledge of British public law was, then, extremely shallow and came almost 
exclusively from translating into Korean A.V.Dicey’s classic work, An Introduction to the 
Law o f the Constitution. While studying during my LL.M. year in London the 
contemporary issues concerning the UK government and constitution together with the 
underlying social, intellectual and legal history of Britain, I realised that the British 
constitution was in a state of flux and that constitutional reform would be likely to play an 
increasingly important part in the future of British politics and public law. The British 
constitution has come under attack mainly because the political conventions, which sustain 
it, have become both outmoded and unworkable in the pluralised society of today. 
Constitutional reform is an attempt to modernise the British constitution in such a way as to 
enhance democratic governance in both theory and practice. In studying this new trend, my 
interest has shifted somewhat from a model which was once widely admired to the question 
of how a new system of government might best be conceived, corresponding to Britain’s 
present and future needs.
This dissertation is intended as an attempt to substantiate this new concern. It focuses on 
a single institutional element, which runs right through every important aspect of the 
constitutional reform agenda in Britain. This element is political parties. The system of 
parliamentary government in Britain is one of party government. Political parties are “the 
chief motivating force of our main governmental institutions” (Crowther-Hunt and Peacock 
1973 [Cmnd 5460-1]: para.311) so that any scheme for constitutional reform must concern 
itself with political parties. In this dissertation, I attempt in the context of Britain to 
thematise a third way of democracy beyond liberalism and communitarianism and to
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outline the proper nature and role of political parties in this new paradigm. It will be 
obvious to the reader that I try to defend the classical notion that democratic governance is 
unthinkable without political parties, while redefining their nature and role in the 
democratic process.
Just before the 1997 general election, I finished an early draft of this dissertation, 
concluding that there is a need for the constitutionalisation of political parties as part of the 
modernisation of the British constitution. Happily, since ‘new’ Labour’s victory in that 
election, movement towards the constitutionalisation of political parties is gaining 
momentum in British politics. A series of referenda and supporting legislation confirm that 
there will be a separate Scottish Parliament and a separate assembly for Wales to be elected 
by the Additional Member System. A commission chaired by Lord Jenkins of Hillhead was 
set up to recommend the acceptable alternative to the present first-past-the-post system in 
general elections. The European Election in June 1999 will adopt the party list system. The 
remit of the Committee on Standards in Public Life was extended to cover a study of the 
funding of political parties and it is most likely that the Committee will recommend the 
introduction of regulation of party finances. In addition, since the debacle of the 1997 
election, the Conservative Party has discarded its archaic, informal structure, which 
reflected the British constitution in miniature. All these changes make the 
constitutionalisation of political parties indispensable to the process of political 
modernisation of Britain.
I believe that this study of British constitutional reform will also have some significance 
for other democracies, especially those countries, like my homeland, the Republic of Korea, 
which are in transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Lessons from another country, 
of course, must be seen through the prism of the political, legal and cultural specificity of 
the countries concerned.
I owe the greatest thanks to my supervisor, Mr. W. Tim Murphy of the London School 
of Economics and Political Science (LSE) for his continual support and constructive 
guidance since my LL.M. year in London. Indeed, his recognised command of both socio­
political theory and law was the major reason for my decision to turn down a place at an 
equally distinguished institution and continue my studies at LSE. I am greatly happy to 
acknowledge that his invaluable supervision of this study and generous encouragement has 
proved that decision to be the right one. I should like to thank Professor Gunther Teubner 
for his insightful suggestions and encouragement on various occasions regarding my
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project for constitutionalised democratic autonomy and its implication for the 
democratisation of political parties. I should also like to thank Professor Carol Harlow for 
her general comments on parts of an early draft of this dissertation.
I am greatly indebted to Professor Kyong Whan Ahn of Seoul National University for his 
heartfelt concern and encouragement, which since my LL.M. years in the Seoul Law 
School has been more than that of a teacher, though I suspect gratitude will not be enough. 
I must also express my gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Korea for funding 
the first three years of my research with a National Government Scholarship and to the 
British Government for covering my tuition fees over the first two years of my study with a 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Scholarship.
I should like especially to thank the Rt. Revd. John A. Hardy for showing me throughout 
this research friendship and tolerance. John also helped me edit and correct the late draft of 
this dissertation. In addition, Philip Chang has proofread a couple of chapters of an early 
draft and Neil Weston has kindly provided me with some important materials published by 
the main political parties. I am deeply grateful to them all.
Finally, I should like to thank my mother, my in-laws, my wife Nan Kyoung, and last, 
but not least, our beloved son and daughter, Tae-Hyoung and Hyojin, for all their support 
and patience.
4
Abstract
Although Britain has developed a reasonably successful model of party democracy, there is 
little legal recognition of political parties in the constitutional order. My hypothesis is that 
the legal status of political parties relates to deep-seated political and social theories 
subsisting in British society.
Britain’s self-regulating political parties still adhere to the liberal theory of parliamentary 
democracy. However, there is increasing dissatisfaction with this status quo, which tends to 
ignore the pluralist reality. Therefore, demands are now being made for the creation of a 
new theory of democracy and for a range of constitutional reforms which such a theory 
requires. I propose to adopt a model of double democratisation which implies a refocusing 
of the liberal distinction between state and society. This model develops an equilibrium 
between state and society within a constitutional framework which can be called 
‘constitutionalised democratic autonomy’. I seek to argue that all agencies of power should 
be regulated within a constitutional framework which allows public scrutiny of the political 
system as a whole while affording, on the one hand, the greatest measure of freedom to 
civil society and, on the other, parity of autonomy to the state.
The fact that political parties now play a powerful role within the state adds additional 
urgency to the task of reformulating the democratic agenda. In connecting a new 
perspective on political parties to the reformulated theory of democracy, the dual 
relationship of political parties to the state and civil society, i.e., their character both as a 
social sphere and as a political sphere, will be stressed.
Based on these theoretical arguments, this dissertation critically analyses British law 
relating to political parties and maintains that there is a need for the legal 
institutionalisation of political parties. It discusses various possibilities for the 
constitutionalisation of political parties, which are envisaged to encourage in a balanced 
way inter- and intra- party democracy. This constitutionalisation will require, inter alia, (a) 
intra-party democracy, (b) electoral reform and (c) the juridification of the financial affairs 
of political parties.
This dissertation concludes that the constitutionalisation of political parties is part and 
parcel of the modernisation of the British political system in the direction of correcting a 
divergence between the pluralist reality and the liberal constitutional ideal.
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Chapter 1
Themes and Scope of the Thesis
1 “The People's Government” and constitutional reform
Since ‘new’ Labour’s "historic" victory in the 1997 general election, few phrases of 
political rhetoric have become more popular than "The people are the masters". The chief 
advocate of this mantra is the new Prime Minister, Tony Blair. He in fact claims that in the 
drive towards a radical modernisation of the country, it is the British people themselves 
who are leading the way.1 This stance on the part of new Labour, summed up by its slogan, 
"People's Government", was dramatically symbolised when Tony Blair characterised the 
funeral of the late Princess of Wales as the "People's Funeral". Furthermore, in the face of 
the largely tabloid-inspired “people's rage”, a longstanding royal protocol was abandoned 
and the Union Jack on Buckingham Palace lowered to half-mast. Thus, the British people, 
while remaining legally the subjects of the Queen, would appear to have become the real 
masters of the realm.
However, the tension between political rhetoric (or theory) and legal reality has yet to be 
resolved. The general and almost instinctive response to this tension is embodied in the 
ongoing search for constitutional reform. This search touches upon a wide range of issues: a 
Bill of Rights; a separate Parliament for Scotland and assemblies for Wales and Northern 
Ireland; the direct election of a Mayor for London; Freedom of Information; reform of the 
upper and lower chambers; and electoral reform.
This task of resolving the longstanding tension between political theory and legal reality 
cannot be a one-way movement from archaic to modem constitutional arrangements, for 
example, by merely transplanting onto the British political scene certain formal 
constitutional devices, most of which have been developed in continental Europe or the
1 E.g., Blair’s speech to his party conference in 30 September 1997. See The Times, 1 Oct 97, p.8.
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USA. If the “People’s Government” is nothing but another alias for democracy, we need to 
formulate an acceptable notion of democracy, one which can, among a number of 
competing versions, set reasonable parameters for the modernisation of the British 
constitution.
The quest for a new democratic, constitutional paradigm has over the past two decades 
become the subject of wide-ranging debate among political and social scientists, lawyers 
and practising politicians. Charter 88 has played an important role in rekindling public 
interest in constitutional reform after nearly twenty years of relative quiescence.2 Also, 
since 1995, the independent Constitution Unit has contributed greatly to setting out the 
practical aspects of constitutional reform. (See the Constitution Unit 1997; Shell 1997)
The Liberal Democrats, of all the political parties, have over the past two decades shown 
massive commitment to the modernisation of the British constitution and have constantly 
pushed it to the forefront of their political programme. (See Liberal Democrats 1990; Idem 
1993; Idem 1997) Since the late 1980s, the Labour Party has abandoned its ‘historic 
conservatism’ in major3 constitutional affairs and now embraces a wide-ranging agenda for 
reform.4 The Labour-sponsored Institute for Public Policy Research has played an important 
role in advancing this constitutional debate by publishing an example of a written 
constitution. (See IPPR 1993) In 1996, Tony Blair agreed with Paddy Ashdown to set up a 
joint consultative committee on constitutional reform. In 1997, this Committee published 
its report in which a wide range of constitutional reforms were proposed to “renew 
democracy and to bring power closer to the people”. (See Joint Consultative Committee on 
Constitutional Reform 1997: 3) In the wake of the 1997 general election, the new Labour 
government has made constitutional reform, in Robert Alexander’s phrases (1997: vi), a 
“flagship of its plans for government”. Indeed, during the 1997-98 parliamentary session 
certain reforms, such as devolution to Scotland and Wales, a regional government of 
London and the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights, either have 
already been decided by referenda or are in the final stage of legislation. Preparation for 
Freedom of Information was promised in the first Queen’s speech of the new government,
2 For various perspectives on constitutional reform proposed by participants in Charter 88, see Barnett, Ellis & 
Hirst 1993.
3 One notable exception is Labour’s persistent commitment to the abolition of hereditary peers in the House of 
Lords.
4 For a concise history of Labour’s transition in relation to constitutional reform, see Brazier 1998: Ch.2.
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though its precise scope is proving controversial. Consideration of political reforms, 
especially ones relating to the electoral system and the funding of political parties, is 
currently being undertaken by individual committees. (See Committee on Standards in 
Public Life 1998)
Britain’s old model of parliamentary democracy, once widely admired, both at home and 
abroad, is thus now being severely challenged. This challenge stems largely from two 
dimensions. On the one hand, ever-increasing external pressures from European integration 
and wider global economic and political trends towards interdependence all pose threats to 
the conventional Parliamentary sovereignty. (See, e.g. Harden 1997; Andersen & Eliassen 
1996; Waldegrave 1995; MacCormick 1993; Held 1993) On the other hand, increasing 
demands for change are now being made at national level. (See, e.g. Brazier 1998; 
Alexander 1997; Oliver 1991; Wade 1989) The British people are now familiar with the 
criticism of “elective dictatorship” (Hailsham 1978: Ch. XX) directed against the 
Westminster system of government. Modem British democracy has been denounced as “a 
flawed democracy” in which the absolute power of the monarch prior to 1688 merely 
shifted into the hands of a parliamentary oligarchy. (See Charter 88- A  Flawed Democracy 
[1988] in Lively 1994: 32) What has become ever less prominent is that defense of British 
parliamentary democracy which assumes that it is still “the envy of the world” and that 
those who are losing faith in it are like “weevils in the woodwork”. (Thomas 1982: 353)
2 Two themes: Democracy and political parties
The current political mood in favor of constitutional change does not guarantee the 
creation of a political consensus around possible and desirable alternatives. Nor has debate, 
though extensive, about the need for a new democracy and the resulting constitutional 
reform been exhaustive. Usually, it has involved either specific arguments about a 
particular reform package5 or superficial comparative studies about competing theories and 
practices of democracy. Cogent and consistent theoretical studies which help make sense of 
specific arguments or substantiate comparative studies have so far seldom been attempted.
5 See, e.g. The University of Cambridge Centre for Public Law 1998.
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In particular, few attempts have been made to address the question of what the status and 
role of political parties should be in the new political settlement.
In this dissertation, I hope to help fill this gap in the legal literature. Two general 
interrelated themes will be taken into account.
2.1 Democracy
The first theme centres on what kind of new paradigm of democracy is appropriate as a 
guide for the modernisation of the British constitution. I will try to synthesise some of the 
strengths of the traditional liberal theory of representative democracy with those of 
participatory democracy, the most popular alternative system. I will begin by exploring the 
nature of modem British democracy as a liberal elitist democracy, with special reference to 
the Diceyan vision of representative democracy. I will then move on to an analysis of the 
theory of participatory democracy as a leading alternative to this, concluding that the former 
has as many defects as the latter. In particular, I will suggest that participatory democracy 
tends to generate a monolithic understanding of contemporary society, which cannot 
account for its complexity. I will also criticise the post-modem understanding of politics 
which places too much emphasis upon the complexity of modem society, thereby ignoring 
the normative significance and usefulness of the liberal distinction between state and 
society. My own alternative will be a model of double democratisation in which the liberal 
distinction between state and society is refocused in a post-modern pluralised context. In 
particular, I will suggest that all agencies of power should be regulated within a 
constitutional framework which allows public scrutiny of the political system as a whole 
while affording the greatest measure of freedom to civil society, on the one hand, and parity 
of autonomy to the state, on the other.
2.2 Political parties
The second theme is concerned with political parties. The study of political parties in the 
context of constitutional reform is significant both descriptively and prescriptively. Firstly, 
such a study has descriptive significance because dissatisfaction with the current system of 
British parliamentary democracy is centred on political parties. The problems of both 
elective dictatorship and civil passivity in Britain are imputed to the rigid working of the
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party machine through which the government controls Parliament. (See, e.g., Bogdanor 
1997)
If the rigidity of the party system is at the root of the malaise of the British political 
system, there are two competing remedies to the problem. One is to bolster more thoroughly 
the liberal individualistic ideal, which has been encroached upon by the establishment of 
party government, by way of building up institutional barriers to the exercise of political 
power by political parties. This can, for example, be achieved by an electoral reform 
designed to maximise the choice of the voter rather than that of the party. The Single 
Transferable Vote System could well aid in the renewal of any political system which 
depends for its vigour upon strong governing parties. By contrast, the alternative remedy is 
to rationalise party government by legally institutionalising political parties. Underlying this 
approach is the belief that the actual cause of the malfunctioning of the British constitution 
is not a collectivist practice, which is in conflict with liberal constitutional theory, but the 
lack of proper control of the activities of political parties.
I am sympathetic to the second approach, believing that the first, liberal way ignores the 
usefulness of political parties in the democratic process. In my view, it is problematic that 
despite the actual power of political parties, the law in Britain largely neglects their 
existence given that there is little room for them in the traditional liberal theory of 
parliamentary democracy. Almost the sole statutory provision that assumes the existence of 
political parties in constitutional arrangements is the Ministerial and other Salaries Act 
1975, which acknowledges the Leader of the Opposition and grants state financial 
subventions to the opposition parliamentary parties. Therefore, the status and working of 
political parties rest almost entirely on convention or merely political fact. This situation 
can be attributed in part to the unique but “curiously unsatisfactory” tradition of public law 
in Britain. The dominant idea has been that "legality is a singular and universal concept and 
the state and its officers are subject to the ordinary processes of law in much the same 
manner as all other persons are governed by law." (Loughlin 1992: l)6 It is also indebted to 
the intellectual tradition of British political thought which shows little interest in the 
question of the distinctive character of 'public power' or in the idea of a unitary public
6 With the recent establishment of judicial review of the administrative actions, the distinction between private 
and public law has been taken on board both in the courts and in law schools. See Harlow & Rawlings 1997: 
7-9; Lord Woolf 1995; Allison 1992.
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interest transcending particular loyalties. (See Dyson 1980:230. Cf. Harris 1996: 17) 
However, this does not mean that this unique nature of the British political tradition -  an 
interpenetration of the public and the private -  can be used to obliterate the need for the 
legal institutionalisation of political parties. If the modernisation of the whole system of 
political institutions is on the political and constitutional agenda, there would seem to be no 
clear reason why the rationalisation of political parties should not be included.
Secondly, the study of political parties is significant because the changed nature of 
political parties in a pluralised society requires further examination of their potential within 
a new paradigm of democracy. Political parties now play a powerful role within the state. 
Thus, the conventional perspective on party organisations, which highlights their origins in 
civil society and stresses their corollary private legal personality, should be reconsidered. In 
particular, in seeking for an equilibrium between state and society within a constitutional 
framework as our model of double democratisation envisages, I will focus on the duality of 
political parties which stand at the crossroads of state and civil society. I believe that our 
search for new perspectives on party organisations within a new paradigm of democracy 
will provide a theoretical rationale for the legal institutionalisation of political parties in 
Britain.
This position contrasts with the politics of ‘anti-partyism’, which argues that the major 
problems of parliamentary democracy can be traced back to one source, namely, the 
privileged status of political parties in the democratic process. Anti-partyism accuses the 
professional politicians and their instrument, the political party, of fettering or distorting the 
will of the people. Two interrelated trends have helped this position. On the one hand, the 
growing pressures of competitive individualism bring party government under strain. In the 
more fragmented world which is manifested in a pluralisation of forms of social life and an 
individualisation of life plans, the importance of single-issue groups and new social 
movements increases in terms of the representation of public opinion. As a result, political 
parties can no longer claim the monopoly of mass representation. On the other hand, the 
information technology revolution holds great promise for anti-partyists by providing them 
with the necessary technical procedures for reintroducing the ideal and practices of 
Athenian primitive democracy at the dawn of the twenty first century. One option is a 
cyber-democracy which allows the people to participate in the decision-making process by
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computers. However, this new form of participation tends to undermine already fragile 
democratic institutions by confusing plebiscitarianism with democracy itself. I will suggest 
that rational will formation in which an organised public plays an important role is crucial 
for the healthy working of democracy and that therefore the politics of the unorganised 
public should be compromised by political organisation, especially political parties.7
3 Constitutionalising political parties in Britain
My development of the above two general themes, which run right through this 
dissertation, will inevitably be largely theoretical. However, I have no intention of putting 
forward yet another sweeping programme for the democratic renewal of the British 
constitution since there are, it seems to me, already enough programmes of that sort. As 
Martin Loughlin (1992: 258) succinctly points out, the value of any theory is revealed by 
how well it can be utilised rather than its innate sophistication. Therefore, we need to keep 
the role of theory in perspective and seek to substantiate theoretical assertions within the 
context of practical politics.
I will pursue this further task by critically analysing current British law relating to 
political parties and then stressing the need for their constitutionalisation. I believe that both 
our project for a new democracy, which I will call ‘constitutionalised democratic 
autonomy’, and our understanding of political parties in a pluralised society provide a 
fruitful programme for such constitutionalisation. The rest of this dissertation will discuss 
various possibilities for the constitutionalisation of political parties. These are envisaged as 
encouraging in a balanced way inter- and intra- party democracy. I will consequently 
suggest that this constitutionalisation will require, inter alia, (a) intra-party democracy, (b) 
electoral reform and (c) the juridification of the funding of political parties.
7 So the Houghton Committee Report was correct to assert that "effective political parties are the crux of
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4 Scope and limits
Since democratic governance and the rationalisation of political parties are the themes 
chosen to draw together the discussion in later chapters of particular issues in the current 
constitutional debate, it is natural that the scope of my thesis is limited to that extent. 
Specifically, I will be focusing in this dissertation on constitutional reform at national level, 
particularly in relation to the legal institutionalisation of political parties. Inevitably, 
therefore, some issues which could have a significant bearing on each of our themes will 
only be discussed in a cursory fashion and largely in the footnotes. Such issues include 
international dimensions in the constitutional debate, devolution and local democracy.
4.1 International dimensions 
As mentioned above, one challenge to the British Westminster system of government 
emanates from the international dimension. Debates about the British constitution and its 
ongoing reforms cannot be isolated from at least two international contexts. First, since its 
affiliation to the European Economic Community in 1973, Britain is already part of a wider 
system of government which is arguably more supra-national than trans-national or inter­
governmental in character. (See Harlow & Rawlings 1997: 23-25; Corbett 1993: 157) 
Although it is far from being a centralised ‘superstate’, the European Union does impact on 
a whole range of policy areas and the policy-making process as a whole. (See Harden 1997; 
Harlow & Rawlings 1997: Ch.7) This inevitably raises questions about the democracy of 
the European Union(EU) which exercises considerable power and is of great consequence 
for British people. Indeed, the ‘democratic deficit’8 in the European Community has been a 
source of conflict between Britain and the EU and between Euro-sceptics and pro- 
Europeans within British domestic politics. (See Baker & Seawright 1998)
Secondly, the working of the internal constitution of Britain is also subject to wider 
global economic and political trends towards interdependence. In drawing upon the growing
democratic government" (Houghton 1976 [Cmnd 6601]: para.9.1).
8 This is most markedly manifested in the limited and secondary role of the European Parliament in the 
decision-making process in the EC. (See Lodge 1996) Although the European Parliament cease to be a mere 
advisory and supervisory institution and is given important new decision-making and other powers by the 
Treaty on European Union 1992, the dominant role of the EC Council of Ministers in the legislative process is 
open to the criticism of the lack of accountability. (For a review of the actual conditions and problems of 
European democracy, see Andersen & Eliassen 1996)
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importance of complex, intergovernmental and transnational power structures which are all 
part of what is now called ‘globalisation’, David Held (1993; 1995a; 1995b) argues for a 
‘cosmopolitan model of democracy’. This model goes beyond the creation of regional 
parliaments like the European Parliament and aims at creating a federation of states and 
civil societies. Above all, this model presumes that, in the era of globalisation, the 
conventional conception of democracy which depends on the territorial boundaries of the 
modem nation state is no longer viable.
However, increasing external pressures do not necessarily rule out a focussed discussion 
about the modernisation of the political system at national level. Although the impact of 
external pressures should not be underestimated, neither should it be overestimated. This 
growth of regional or global interdependence cannot totally obliterate the importance of the 
modem nation state through and in which we may realistically capitalise on the ideal of 
democratic government. As far as European dimensions are concerned, the European 
Community (EC) is still very much in the hands of its own member states. Although the 
major EU policies -  the single market, monetary union and common European citizenship -  
all have centralising tendencies, the effect of the EC on national administration is still 
largely indirect. (See Harlow and Rawlings 1997: 25) Under EEC Treaty, Art. 3 (b), the EC 
can take action “only if and in so far as the objectives of the action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States”. The main policy making institution of the EU, the Council 
of Ministers, is made up of ministers of national governments, and it is normal for these 
ministers to maintain a margin of national manoeuvre over and above what might be 
deemed necessary. (See Corbett 1993: 158) Under such circumstances, the democratisation 
of political institutions at national level will rectify any democratic deficit at European 
level.
Focussing on the global arena, many of the current attempts to develop creatively the 
effects of globalisation are certainly deserving of our attention. Indeed, our project of 
‘constitutionalised democratic autonomy’ has the potential for such a development since it 
identifies the importance of civil society, which may go beyond the boundary of the nation 
state in the process of democratisation. However, the other pole of constitutionalised 
democratic autonomy -  the need for an effective and efficient power and authority centre -  
may be in conflict with the full adoption of the cosmopolitan model of democracy. For one
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thing, the formation of an authoritative assembly of all democratic states and agencies, such 
as this model assumes, may be unrealistic. The present uncertain future of the United 
Nations verifies this claim. At any rate, since an ideal of a global democracy is unthinkable 
without the democratisation of all constituent states, our focus on the democratisation of the 
British constitution should go someway to substantiating a general theory of global 
democratisation.
4.2 Devolution
The creation of a Scottish Parliament, a Welsh Assembly and a London regional 
government, which was now decided by referenda, will undoubtedly change the political 
face of Britain. As Gerry Hassan (1997) indicates, such changes potentially mean the 
destruction of Britain as a unitary state. The rationale for devolution is related to our 
concern for greater democracy. The Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973 
(publicly known as the Kilbrandon Commission) concluded that the remoteness and 
unresponsiveness of Westminster and Whitehall is one reason for the rising demand for 
devolution. (Kilbrandon 1973: chs. 8-10) In fact, the British constitution is highly 
centralised and local government has up to now been the only elected tier below 
Westminster. Even the autonomy of this tier has been eroded in the last decade or so. (See 
Loughlin 1994) The creation of another tier between local government and Westminster 
raises a number of profound issues: sovereignty, a possible imbalance between Scotland 
and the rest of Britain, the right allocation of power among local, regional and national 
governments, not to mention the degree to which this process might change the structure of 
political parties and other political institutions. Clearly, the effect of devolution on party 
organisations is one that concerns both of our general themes. For example, a concern with 
the autonomy of regional parties vis-a-vis both national and local parties has certain 
implications for our attempt to institutionalise the value of political pluralism within a 
constitutional boundary. However, I will not here discuss this issue in any great depth but 
merely make use of this development as evidence for the necessary emergence of a new 
party model, i.e., the cartel party, in Britain. The reason for this limitation is not so much 
theoretical as practical. My wide-ranging analysis, covering the new paradigm of 
democracy, the new perspectives on party organisation together with application of both to
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current constitutional debate, does not allow space to consider all the issues that could be 
relevant to this dissertation. This analysis will focus particularly on one aspect of the 
modernisation of the British constitution, i.e. the rationale for the constitutionalisation of 
political parties, especially at national level. The implications of this process at lower levels 
will require further study.
4.3 Local democracy
The role and nature of political parties in local government have potential implications 
for our themes. Because the influence of party affiliation varies so greatly at local and 
national level, the approach to the nature and role of political parties at each level may well 
vary. However, for reasons already given in the previous section, the role of political parties 
in local government, which may require a different analysis from that of national politics, 
will not figure to any great extent in this dissertation.
5 Outline and points of reference
Discounting this introductory chapter, this dissertation has eight chapters. Chapter 2 
examines the nature of modem British democracy, which underpins the British constitution. 
It looks at the Diceyan model of parliamentary democracy, still regarded as vital to an 
understanding of British public law, and the implications of this model for Britain’s 
pluralist version of party government. My underlying hypothesis which permeates the 
whole dissertation and this chapter in particular, namely, that an understanding of political 
theory is vital for a proper understanding of public law, is inspired by the works of two 
public lawyers: Martin Loughlin’s Public Law and Political Theory (1992) and Paul 
Craig’s Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States o f  
America (1990). I also make use of these writers’ analyses of Dicey,9 but attempt to further 
develop their understanding in ways that focus on the elitist tendency inherent in the 
Diceyan vision of democracy.
9 For different conclusions that the two academics reach in this respect, see, e.g. Loughlin 1993; Craig 1993b.
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Chapter 3 is concerned with the important but controversial question of what democratic 
paradigm is best suited to replace the existing elitist form of democracy. I will attempt to 
develop my own project, a third way of democratisation more suited to our post-modern 
situation, one that is geared to going beyond the traditional ideals of liberalism and 
communitarianism. It will be obvious to the reader that my project heavily relies on the 
work of Jurgen Habermas. Habermas’s commitment to the public sphere and a discourse
theory of democracy has greatly stimulated my intellectual development. From such 
seminal works as The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere (1989[1962J), The 
Theory o f Communicative Action (1984[1981J; 1987[1981]) and, of course, Between Facts 
and Norms (1996[1992]), I have gleaned many answers but, far more important, I have 
learned how to formulate questions that are at the heart of this dissertation. Apart from 
Habermas, a number of post-liberal theorists, including David Held, John Keane, Clause 
Ofife, Jean Cohen, and Andrew Arato, furnished me with both a method of analysis and 
conceptual resources that have enabled me to develop my project of two-track 
democratisation. However, though indebted to the work of these theorists, I also seek to 
incorporate into my project a number of Luhmann-Teubner’s autopoietic insights, for 
example, their emphasis on complexity and contingency in modem society.10
The discussion in Chapter 4 is concerned with a new perspective on political parties with 
reference to my project of constitutionalised democratic autonomy. It examines, in the light 
of both the division of labour within the political system and the “cartelisation” of political 
parties, the paradigmatic consequences of conventional perspectives on party organisations 
and the transformed nature of political parties in general. In this chapter, I rely on Richard 
Katz and Peter Mair’s11 analysis of four “ideal types” of party, in particular, the emergence 
of ‘the cartel party’, but while criticising some of the insights of these theorists, I endeavour 
to further develop the potential democratic value in their model.
10 My heavy dependence on German and American political and sociological theories, rather than those 
emanating from British intellectual tradition, may give rise to the question of whether such foreign ‘grand 
theories’ can provide a useful, practical framework within which the democratisation of the British 
constitution can be envisaged. Oliver (1991a: 624) maintains that British public lawyers should heed 
“pragmatic, incremental Anglo-Saxon attitudes”, rather than the more “ideological, theoretical, abstract” 
American and Continental European approaches to constitutional issues. (Cf. Posner 1996) However, given 
the rationalisation of the British political institutions that is at present taking place, I doubt that such a 
sceptical view, relying on a brand of cultural particularity, can deter a general theoretic analysis of the British 
constitution.
11 “Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party” (1995).
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Chapter 5 is concerned with the present legal system governing political parties. It 
examines the legal status, the constitutional basis, and the legal regulation, of political 
parties. In particular, vis-a-vis the legal regulation of political parties, I consider the legal 
control of civil society that has direct bearing on them, including the control of the media 
and restrictions on the activities of interest groups. The final section of this chapter 
criticises the present system and, given the transformed nature of political parties generally 
discussed in Chapter 4, argues for their legal institutionalisation.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are concerned with the question of how political parties are to be 
legally institutionalised. In Chapter 6 ,1 tackle the question of what internal party structural 
devices this institutionalisation requires. Here I consider the issue of intra-party democracy 
with special reference to the modernisation of the Labour Party and stress the need for the 
constitutionalisation of intra-party democracy. Chapter 7 considers why electoral reform is 
necessary and what alternative to the present first-past-the-post system best suits both the 
transformed nature of political parties and the British political tradition. Chapter 8 examines 
whether, given the constitutionalisation of political parties, their funding should be 
juridified and thus their finances be subject to legal control while at the same time 
benefiting from greatly increased public subsidies.
Chapter 9 concludes the study by reasserting its basic themes in the light of three 
approaches to constitutional reform that are prevalent in Britain today. It is hoped that my 
project of ‘constitutionalised democratic autonomy’ together with its concomitant proposals 
for the constitutionalisation of political parties can contribute to the current public law 
debate concerning the comprehensive modernisation of the British constitution.
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Chapter 2
Modern British Democracy and Political Parties: 
Liberal Ideal, Pluralist Reality
1 Introduction
The British constitution, having developed gradually over centuries, does not embody 
any single general constitutional theory. As Colin Turpin (1990: 19) puts it, the British 
constitution is "the product of a long period of kingly rule, parliamentary struggle, 
revolution, many concessions and compromises, a slow growth of custom, the making and 
breaking and alteration of many laws." However, this is not to say that there is no British 
version of constitutionalism which manifests itself in a number of constitutional ideas and 
principles. Despite the origin of the diffuse, piecemeal, pragmatic process of accretion, with 
no revolutionary introduction of a written constitution built upon an ideological, theoretical 
and abstract blueprint, the British constitution has developed certain fundamental principles 
concerning the nature of a democratic society. Among these, the conventions and principles 
of parliamentary democracy have undoubtedly become the cornerstone of British 
constitutional order. Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688 whereby the royal prerogative 
became subject to the will of Parliament, the British system of government has developed 
the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty as "the dominant characteristic of [British] 
political institutions". (Dicey 1982[1915]: 3; Dicey 1940[1914]: 59) In the wake of the 
Great Reforms in the nineteenth century which extended the franchise, this parliamentary 
system has been supplemented by the principle of democracy. Indeed, in this century the 
idea of democracy has permeated into the foundations of the British constitution and 
political culture. As a result, most of the constitutional issues have related to the question of
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how to accommodate effectively the idea of democracy within the existing parliamentary 
form of government.
This chapter will explore briefly what has generally12 been considered the dominant 
theory of modem British democracy, namely, that of A.V. Dicey, and some of the 
implications it has shed on the development of British constitutional arrangement. Despite 
the growing efforts of many, if not most, commentators to distance themselves from Dicey, 
his terms of debate still constitute the ruling paradigm and occupy the high ground of 
British constitutional theory.13 (See Jacob 1996: 2; Harden and Lewis 1986: 3)
In taking Dicey's theory as our point of departure, it will not be our aim to canvass all the 
features of the British constitution elaborated by this theory. Rather, the aim is confined to 
the discussion of the implications of his vision as it relates to the conception of democracy 
and the role of political parties in British democracy. Therefore, Dicey's constitutional 
theory is selectively analysed to this extent. Being "selective", of course, does not mean 
Dicey's conceptual whole is in any way distorted. It may be useful for this narrowed 
purpose to utilise some public lawyers' particular analyses -  especially Paul Craig’s14 - of 
his ideas undertaken in terms of its relevancy for the theory of democracy. This approach 
has certain clear advantages. First, we can benefit from the valuable insights suggested in 
those analyses and thus, in turn, clarify the really relevant points without having to provide 
a time-consuming 'list' of varying critical opinions which can be found in the already 
enormous literature. Secondly, by accommodating certain useful aspects of these analyses 
while at the same time criticising their perhaps more problematic aspects, we may more 
easily reach a target paradigm, from which we can start to explore the main topic15 of this 
dissertation.
12 See, e.g., Loughlin 1992: ch.7; Craig 1990: ch.2.
13 Anthony Birch (1989: 89-90) points out an interesting contrast between academia and real politics in their 
treatment of British constitutional arrangements. On the one hand, since the post-war period academic 
commentators have placed less and less emphasis on the conventions and principles of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law as codified by Dicey, while at the same time placing more emphasis on the 
operation of the political system. On the other, both the press and practising politicians have come to regard 
the same principles as vital to the constitution, especially in context of European integration.
14 E.g., Craig 1990; Idem 1993a; Idem 1993b.
32
2 The dominant view of modern British democracy: Diceyan parliamentary 
democracy
2.1 Dicey's view o f democracy: A "unitary, self-correcting" representative democracy?
Dicey (1982[1915]: 3, 24) had made the traditional view of British parliamentary 
democracy "an undoubted legal fact". In his Law o f the Constitution,16 Dicey (1982[1915]: 
cxlviii) elaborated three pillars of the British constitution: the legal sovereignty of 
Parliament, the rule of ordinary law, and the dependence of the conventions, in the last 
resort, upon 'the law of the constitution'. For some, this interpretation was integrally related 
to a particular conception of both society and representative democracy. One view of this 
kind which deserves our close attention is Paul Craig's (1990: ch.2). Craig identifies the 
Diceyan vision of the British constitution as a model of "unitary", "self-correcting", 
"majoritarian" democracy. Firstly, it is "unitary" because the Crown-in-Parliament is the 
'sole' centre of constitutional power, with the ability to make and unmake government, and 
there is no "competing" legislative power. (See Dicey 1982[1915]: 4-18) By the same 
token, there are no validity in the allegedly "legal" limitations on the legislative sovereignty 
of Parliament, such as moral law, prerogative and preceding Acts of Parliament. (See Dicey 
1982[1915]: 18-25)
Secondly, the Diceyan vision clearly has a majoritarian aspect. The affairs of the nation is 
entrusted to those approved by a majority of the House, each of whom is regarded as a 
representative of the whole nation rather than a delegate of either a particular constituency 
who elected him or the party to which he belongs. Thus, the will of a majority drawn from 
parliamentary debates is simply equated with the will of nation. It is well known, however,
17that this positivist and elitist outlook is compromised not only by the "self-correcting" 
character of representative democracy, as the third characteristic of Dicey’s vision
1 Q
(discussed below), but by his "normativist" conception of law. (See Loughlin 1992:
15 Namely, the possibility of establishing a new, more appropriate, conception of democracy, the nature and 
role of political parties in this new framework and concomitant institutional devices which would promote this 
conceptual framework.
16 The first edition was published in 1885.
17 For a discussion of the relationship between English elitism and positivism in English law, see Atiyha and 
Summers 1987: 226.
18 Loughlin (1992: esp. 58-61) suggests that there are two styles of public law thought, normativist and 
functionalist. For the normativist, law precedes legislation whereas for the functionalist, legislation, as an
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141,142-146; Craig 1990: 14-18) Apart from the actual limitations on the power of 
Parliament which is converged in the principle of representative government, in Dicey's 
view (1982[1915]: 268-269), two features embodied in the British version of parliamentary 
democracy make ‘mighty’ Parliament respect the supremacy of the law and “distinguish" it 
from other sovereign powers. The first of these is the 'consensual' character of legislation, 
which, to use Dicey’s own terms, is both "formal and deliberate". The second is the 
"indirect" control of government in the sense that the executive power is in the hands of the 
government rather than Parliament itself. Underlying this view is Dicey's belief in the 
separation of powers within a sovereign Parliament. Indeed, the idea of the separation of 
powers is evident in the conceptual structure of this theory, for example, in his depreciation 
of a French-style administrative law. In comparing droit administratif with the English 
version of the rule of law, what Dicey supposedly had in mind is the historic achievement 
of a liberal regime, i.e. the principle of a limited government. According to this principle, 
the Crown itself came under the law, and thereby no arbitrary power could now be 
exercised by the government; special courts under royal prerogative were repealed, and 
thereby the rule of the ordinary court and the equal protection of law were established, and 
while the executive was responsible to Parliament for what it carried out, Parliament did not 
appoint the officials of the executive government. This implies that actual constitutional 
confrontation, especially concerning encroachment on liberty, is most likely to arise 
between an alliance of Parliament and the judiciary, on the one hand, and the executive, on 
the other, rather than between Parliament and the judiciary.19 An amiable relationship 
between Parliament and the judiciary was also to be found in the institutional structure of 
the British constitution. Indeed, Parliament - in particular the House of Lords - is part of the 
judicial system. (See Stevens 1979) Of course, there would be a number of cases where 
statutory authority, especially those seeking particular social ends in the public interest, is 
implemented at the expense of certain traditional liberties. However, as T.R.S. Allan (1985: 
143) suggests, it is a matter of policy to decide, in the light of the needs and traditions of a
embodiment of the democratic will, is the highest form of law. He sees Dicey's conception of law as a 
‘conservative’ variant of the normativist style, pointing to the fact that Dicey felt that "a real limit to the 
exercise of sovereignty is imposed not by the laws of man but by the nature of things" and views the intrinsic 
connection between law and morality as a vital part of the rule of law. (Loughlin 1992: 139,144,155) For a 
comment on Loughlin’s distinction and labels, see Craig 1993b.
19 A historical fact may help explain this, Parliament and the court were allies in the seventeenth century 
struggles against the Crown. See Atiyah & Summers 1987: 227.
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society, how to reconcile popular sovereignty and individual liberty, and in this the British 
approach has long been to impose "careful" limits on the role of the judiciary at the final 
stage in favour of the democratic demands. In other words, the British approach is one 
seeking a pragmatic harmony between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, 
allowing the latter to constitute a "constraint" on, but not a "barrier" to, the enforcement of 
governmental schemes which "restrict" (not abolish) traditional liberties, and thus it can be 
characterised as liberal, as opposed to either absolutist or authoritarian.
Finally, by "self-correcting" it is meant that such a sovereign Parliament, which is duly 
elected on the extended franchise, is conceived to represent the most authoritative 
expression of the will of the nation. One implication of this is that there is no need for a 
scheme of external checks and balances, such as a bill of rights or constitutional review. 
The logic employed here is as follows. Dicey (1982[1915]: 34-35) presumes that although 
political and legal sovereignty should be distinguished, the former power is always reflected 
in the latter through the principle of representative and responsible government. The 
problem with the supposition that the political sovereignty resides in the hands of the 
electorate is that the electorate is a body which "does not, and from its nature hardly can, 
itself legislate, and which, owing chiefly to historical causes, has left in existence a 
theoretically supreme legislature". (1982[1915]: 286) Accordingly, one natural way in 
which legislation is carried out in accordance with this diffused will of the electorate is 
through a representative institution. Political conventions are supposed to play a key role in 
securing the conformity of this legal sovereign to the will of the political sovereign: "Our 
modem code of constitutional morality secures, though in a roundabout way, what is called 
abroad the 'sovereignty of the people'". (1982[1915]: 286) It is explained that the principle 
of ministerial responsibility and the convention of the confidence vote are designed for this 
purpose. (1982[1915]: 210-212)
2.2 Under-inclusiveness o f Paul Craig's analysis
It is difficult to discount Craig's analysis of the traditional Diceyan view of the British 
constitution as a "unitary, self-correcting, majoritarian" democracy.20 However, Craig's 
approach neglects at least one important theme embedded in the Diceyan vision. Dicey
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defined his vision of democracy as a form of government among a variety of possible 
polities, structured by a particular political ideology/philosophy. Craig’s neglect of the 
ideological mark would seem to be both deliberate and the result of his problematic 
analytical method. It is probably deliberate, because in the later chapters of his Public Law 
and Democracy (1990), Craig tries to relocate the "neglected" idea or tradition of the 
English pluralism supposedly underlying the British constitution. He implies that this 
'pluralist' idea has its own merit as an alternative to the 'monolithic', 'self-correcting' 
character of the status quo. In thus setting aside the liberal colouring of the Diceyan vision, 
Craig probably intended that the elitism inherent in both the Diceyan and the early English 
Pluralist vision, as analysed later in this chapter, can be masked.21
Craig's problematic method of analysis is also to be criticised. As Loughlin (1993: 54-55) 
points out, Craig's effort to carry out an objective analysis led him to an analytical method 
rooted in the positivist separation of fact and value.22 Ironically, this is the same method 
employed by Dicey in articulating the principles of the British constitution. In the first 
chapter of his The Law o f the Constitution, Dicey (1982[1915]i cxxvii ff) made clear what 
the role of a constitutional lawyer really should be: a constitutional lawyer should be "an 
expounder" rather than "a critic", "an apologist", or "eulogist"23 when dealing with 
constitutional resources. Dicey went on to contrast this role with those of traditional 
lawyers (for whom, the real factors were of less importance), historians (prone to 
antiquarianism) or constitutional theorists (inclined to conventionalism). In his eagerness to
20 Even O’Leary’s harsh review (1992: 410 ff) of Craig's treatment of Dicey agrees that Craig’s key arguments 
are "perfectly orthodox".
21 Craig's real mind can be found in his review of Loughlin's Public Law and Political Theory (1992), which 
criticises Loughlin's categorisation of Dicey as one variant of 'conservative normativism'. Interestingly, Craig 
(1993b: 282) argues that there would be more reason to categorise Dicey as a example of'liberal' normativism. 
Craig seems to be unaware that, as shall be argued in the next section, 'conservatism' in Loughlin's terms can 
accommodate a 'liberal' content.
22 In his review of Craig's Public Law and Democracy (1990), Loughlin (1993: esp. 55) points out that the 
method employed by Craig is rooted in the Austin’s positivist approach and, more specifically, in the 
categorical distinction between public law, political science, and political philosophy. While exploring the 
coupling of political science and public law on the one hand (e.g. Dicey's view of democracy and its legal 
implications) and, on the other, the coupling of public law and political philosophy (e.g. liberalism and 
individual rights/distributive justice), Craig, in his book, neglects the relationship between science and 
philosophy (e.g. liberalism and a unitary democracy).
23 It would be interesting to compare this attitude with Bentham's view that the law reformer should be a 
"censor" who principally devotes himself to the instruction of what law "ought to be", rather than an 
"expositor" who depicts what law "is". See Bentham 1990: 7-8,15.
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be objective, Craig focuses only on the structure of Dicey's argument and ignores its 
underlying political ideology.
My argument is that the traditional vision of modem British democracy only becomes 
clear if we take a more comprehensive view which acknowledges that it is based on certain 
political ideologies.24 Following Loughlin (1992: 77), one may identify the ideology 
underlying Dicey's vision with a particular brand of'conservatism', namely, "an autonomous 
system of ideas defined in terms of universal values such as justice, order, balance, and 
moderation". Loughlin (1992: 76-79) argues that such an ideology differs conceptually from 
either "a historically specific movement" - associated with feudalism, landed interest, and in 
opposition to industrialism, democracy and individualism, or "a situational conception" - 
the passionate affirmation of the value of existing institutions. To be more specific, in 
Loughlin’s view (1992: 148, 156-159), Oakeshottian conservatism is the political ideology 
which contains certain elements which can be seen to play a major role in Dicey's theory. 
Those elements are, firstly, epistemologically speaking, the valuing of practical experience 
or 'rationality' (as opposed to rationalism); secondly, in terms of the issues of authority and 
law, an anti-rationalist blending of 'will' and 'reason' and the prizing of tradition; thirdly, in 
terms of the nature of judiciary, scepticism vis-a-vis a scientific approach to adjudication; 
and, fourthly, in terms of the nature of liberty, a traditional negative conception of liberty as 
opposed to a positive, functional, one.
We must now turn our attention to the question of how these particular elements figured 
in Dicey’s vision of government and law. Loughlin argues that Dicey’s vision, despite its 
positivism and rejection of the vulgar Whig ideas concerning the ancient constitution, was, 
nevertheless, deeply suffused with the Coke-Blackstone tradition, which still lives on in 
Oakeshott's conservative normativist vision of politics and law. In articulating the principles 
of the English constitution, Dicey attempted to reconcile two seemingly competing 
principles, i.e. Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. He sought this reconciliation 
in such a way that a positivist formalism, which is manifest in the conception of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, is realised not only in a process of consensual will formation but
24 In writing this section, I have found Loughlin's approach very helpful, particularly in his explanation of the 
relationship between political theory and public law thought in which he highlights "the centrality of 
interpretation, of relating text to context, and of achieving understandings by relating the parts to the whole". 
(See Loughlin 1992: 50-51) McEldowney (1985: esp.61) and Sugarman (1983) also acknowledge the 
importance of political influence on the work of this Victorian jurist.
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equally in harmony with practical knowledge of the common law. These elements render 
the conception of law dependent, though not entirely, upon tradition (or the "common" 
past). The importance of political conventions as a pillar of the British constitution, which 
is demonstrated in particular in the third regime of Dicey's concept of the rule of law - 
regarding the residual nature of individual liberties -, is the explicit evidence of his anti­
formalist tendency.
2.3 Dicey's vision o f democracy as a liberal democracy
However, what should be made clear here is the nature of "tradition", embedded in 
Dicey's conceptual structure at the time of writing The Law o f the Constitution, and still 
taken as normative by many British public lawyers. What were the traditional, 
constitutional values in British society, which Dicey saw? In answering this question, so 
far as the issue of democratic representation is concerned, we can benefit from Samuel 
Beer's analysis of various strands in the theory of representation which have developed over 
the past three hundred years in Britain. Beer claims that by and large the modernisation of 
British politics has taken five principal forms: the Old Tory, the Old Whig, the Liberal, the 
Radical, and the Collectivist. (See Beer 1982a: 3-102)
2.3.1 The underlying political philosophy of the Diceyan vision: Individualistic liberalism 
In a nutshell, Dicey's understanding of 'tradition', envisaging an identity of the British 
constitution, is very much in the spirit of "the mid-Victorian era"26 which he himself terms 
'the era of Benthamism or individualism'. Ivor Jennings (1935) points out that political 
influence has significant effect on the work of any lawyer,27 saying that
A public lawyer, like the philosopher, is the child of his age. His ideas are affected not only by his own up­
bringing, but also by the floating ideas of the time at which he writes. In appraising the work of Dicey, 
therefore, it is essential to remember the environment in which he wrote, (at 124) .... [It] supplies the 
background in which the book was written, and that it could not fail to influence the ideas which the book
25 It should be pointed out that tradition in this context has a particular sense and it is, to quote W.T.Murphy 
(1991: 201), "a common point of orientation for the present, a common world around which community can 
form" or "widely shared [present] beliefs about the past" rather than a series of objective historical "facts".
26 In several passages, Dicey implied that the heyday of parliamentary government and the glory of English 
constitutional history was the period from 1830 to 1865. For example, see Dicey 1982[1915]: ex.
27 Dicey's persistent, though unsuccessful, participation in political life has been put forward as circumstantial, 
though not wholly convincing, evidence of this argument. See generally Ford 1985; Cosgrove 1980.
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expresses, (at 127) ... [In] spite of all his efforts, his subjective notions, the product of his time and 
circumstances, peeped out through his principles.(at 128)
The spirit of Dicey was essentially a complex amalgam of, in Beer's terminology, the Old 
Tory, the Old Whig and the Liberal theories of representation. Dicey's theory of a sovereign 
Parliament is rooted in an amalgam of the Old British political ideologies. The Blackstonian 
Old Tory tradition in Dicey's theory is still traceable in the fact that Dicey adopted the 
conception of a Sovereign as representative of the community as a whole, which the Old 
Toryism ascribed to a monarch. While criticising Blackstone's distorted view of the ancient 
constitution by ascribing the idea of absolute sovereign to "a modem and constitutional 
King", Dicey himself went on simply to replace, as the sovereign, the "King" with 
"Parliament". Before moving on to the consideration of Old Whig's influence on Dicey, it 
needs to be noted that part of Dicey's conception of the mle of law was also rooted in that of 
the Old Tory’s. Utilising Judith Shklar's two distinct conceptions of the rule of law, 
Loughlin (1992: 148-153) suggests that Dicey's belief in the common law tradition, 
especially as reflected in his third pillar of the mle of law, was rooted in the Coke-Hale- 
Blackstone tradition whereby the mle of law means the mle of "artificial reason" identified 
by the judge-made law, as opposed to the rule of the 'formalised' modem conception of 
law.28
Dicey was indebted to the Old Whig view for his notion of the independence of MPs. 
MPs were regarded as representatives of the whole community as well as of its component 
interests. Another sign of the Old Whig influence on Dicey is his basic assumption that 
“parliamentary deliberation” was the best way of deciding the great question of state. Any 
form of “authoritative instruction” or “mandate” from the electorate was mled out. Dicey's 
persistent distrust of the party machine was linked to this tradition which saw political 
parties as evil in the sense that, being factions, they damaged the national interest as a 
whole. (See Beer 1982a: 22. Cf. Robbins 1958; Campbell 1955) Dicey (1982[1915]: lx) 
said that "the mle of a party cannot be permanently identified with the authority of the 
nation or with the dictates of patriotism." (Emphasis added)
Yet, parliamentarism also formed part of the Liberal view of representation. (Beer 1982a: 
19-20, 33) What Liberals were discontent with, under the Old Whig rule, was not
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parliamentarism but the intolerable status quo, i.e., what has been called the “Old 
Corruption” of the Georgian and early Victorian period.29 Therefore, the reform under the 
influence of liberal utilitarianism was focused on eradicating the negative side effects of 
what Bentham called “cold, selfish, priest-ridden, lawyer-ridden, lord-ridden, squire-ridden 
England.” (Bentham, Works, vol.x, p.595 quoted in Clark 1985: 63) Bentham’s agenda 
envisaged a more democratic, representative government - the crucial component of which 
is an “omnicompotent” legislature.30 The difference between the Old Whig and the Liberal 
lay in their differing answers to the question of who or what was being represented. While 
the former centred on corporate bodies, ranks, orders, or “interests”, the latter gave a new 
stress to the representation of discrete individuals. (Beer 1982a: 34)
Indeed, political liberalism, rooted, as it is, in individualism, was the essential part of 
Dicey's political ideology. Several passages from another of his principal texts, Law and 
Public Opinion (1940[1914]), clearly demonstrated Dicey's temperament, particularly 
inclined him to favour Mill's individualistic liberalism. For example, referring to Mill's 
On Liberty, Dicey (1940[1914]: xxvii-xxxii) claimed that the doctrine of laissez faire is the 
predominant opinion of the mid-Victorian era, and went on to lament that with the advent 
of an ever-growing collectivism, "jealousy of interference by the State which had long 
prevailed in England" had lost much of its ground.
Yet his liberal individualist inclinations are also to be found even in his Law o f the 
Constitution which, unlike Law and Public Opinion, he claimed to have written with the 
help of an analytical method based on the separation of fact from value. The way in which 
he dealt with the idea of the rule of law reveals Dicey's liberal individualist inclinations at 
their best. Jennings (1935: 131) was quite correct in pointing out that in dealing with the 
general application of the rule of law in England, Dicey approached his theme from the
28 This is not to deny the modernity of his conception of the rule of law. It is also important to note that 
Dicey’s first and second pillars of the rule of law embodied the modem notion of limited government.
29 For the historical significance of “Old Corruption” in this period, see generally Rubinstein 1983.
30 For an illustration of Bentham’s thought and its influence upon the modernisation of British government, see 
Ahn & Kim 1994; Perkin 1969:319-339; Perkin 1977 ; Hume: 1981.
31 Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century. This 
book is based on a series of lectures on the History of English Law in the Harvard Law School in 1898.
32 Following Cosgrove (1980), McEldowney (1985: 45,47) attributes this, among other factors, to Dicey's 
evangelical family and his membership of the individualistically oriented Old Mortality Society in Oxford.
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“angle of limitations upon power” rather than the “angle of powers”. This can be inferred 
from his generalisation of materials concerning constitutional guarantees of individual 
rights34 and his conscious omission of certain governmental powers which existed even at 
the time of writing. David Sugarman (1983: 110) suggests that Dicey's Law o f the 
Constitution was an attempt to reduce Britain's unwritten constitution to a partially written 
code in order to ensure the principle of a limited government which has already been 
achieved in the United States by way of a written constitution. In short, as Jennings (1935: 
132) says, the Constitution was for Dicey an instrument for promoting liberal individualism 
as a fundamental doctrine.
2.3.2 Dicey's rejection of radicalism and collectivism
Leaning to individualistic liberalism, Dicey rejected the Radical and the Collectivist 
views that had emerged as rival ideologies to three traditional views of representation. But 
ironically, it was these two ideologies that, contrary to his expectations, were to become the 
norm in the twentieth century. The Radical and the Collectivist views had this in common: 
they both challenged in one way or another the view that Parliament was the best 
mechanism for the representation of the various interests of the sovereign people. While 
being sympathetic to liberal individualism, the Radicals tended to veer away from 
parliamentarism towards a more direct form of democracy. (Beer 1982a: 80) Interestingly, 
in his later years when party government was becoming an ever more irresistible trend, 
Dicey (1982[1915]: cxiv-cxvii) with some reservations supported the introduction of 
referenda mainly because he believed that it could heal the obvious defects of party 
government.
However, this cannot be regarded as a sign of Dicey's adopting a radical democratic 
view. He made it clear that his suggestion was put forward only in the hope that it might, 
“by checking the omnipotence of partisanship, revive faith in that parliamentary 
government which has been the glory of English constitutional history". (Dicey 1982[1915]: 
cxvii) That is, his aim was to complement parliamentarism by employing a less problematic
33 In his The Republican Crown, Joseph Jacob (1996, esp. p.24 and ch.7) confirms that the Diceyan view of 
the rule of law, based on "the fear of an all-powerful state", led to the creation of a British state.
34 In The Law o f the Constitution, Dicey (1982[1915]) generalised the principle of the rule of law from such 
deliberately selected areas as the right to personal freedom, the right to freedom of discussion and the right of 
public meeting.
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constitutional device, i.e. referenda, in order to cope with the more uncomfortable trend - 
that of collectivist partisan rule. Therefore, this selective adoption of certain radical 
democratic devices does not mean that Dicey gave up his life-long belief in Whig-cum- 
Liberal parliamentarism. His belief in the independence of MPs from extra-parliamentary 
pressures remained intact and the Radicals' demand for the mandatory instruction of MPs 
was rejected.
It is the Collectivist theory of representation that Dicey disliked most and always 
rejected. Jennings (1935: 132) suggests that his dislike of collectivism partly stemmed from 
the fear that the collectivist trend would break the hegemony of lawyers (highly 
"competitive and individualistic"35 group) by diminishing the power of the courts in the 
administration of justice. However, there is more to it than that. Collectivist democratic 
thought presumes that the popular will has to be mediated by political groups, especially 
parties which, unlike direct democracy, were able to achieve a unity of state policy thanks 
to their greater authority and tighter discipline. (Beer 1982a: 70,79) It is hardly surprising 
that this conflicted with Dicey's political individualism and parliamentarism, which tended 
to base parliamentary representation on individuals and public opinion, rather than on 
partisan collective interests. In 1915, Dicey lamented that with the increasing rigidity of the 
party machine,
the authority of individual MPs who neither sit in the Cabinet nor lead the Opposition has suffered 
diminution.... The spectacle of the House of Commons which neither claims nor practices real freedom of 
discussion, and has no assured means of obtaining from a Ministry in power answers to questions which 
vitally concern the interest of the nation, is not precisely from a constitutional point of view, edifying or 
reassuring.... the reason for alarm is ... that our English executive is, as a general rule, becoming more and 
more the representative of a party rather than the guide of the country. (1982[1915]: lxxiv)
Characterising the Diceyan vision of democracy simply as a unitary and self-correcting 
one has a danger of leading the reader to overlook that its essential character lies in its 
choice of individualism as opposed to collectivism. A comparison of the similarities and 
differences between Dicey and Bagehot can perhaps throw some lights on this issue. In 
attributing the Diceyan conception of representative democracy to a conception of unitary 
and self-correcting majoritarian democracy, Craig appeals to Bagehot in order to justify his
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assessment. In Craig's view (1990: 43-44), Bagehot was a thinker who fully aware that 
power did not flow in one direction only and therefore was not self-correcting in the way 
adumbrated by Dicey. In one sense this is true, if only because, unlike Dicey, Bagehot dealt 
directly with the realities of political power and, in rejecting the cause of the extended 
franchise due to his dislike of working class dominance, showed little concern with genuine 
democratic representation. But in a more real sense, it is untrue. By rejecting the separation 
of powers and focusing on cabinet government as a product of political manoeuvre between 
party political elites, Bagehot (1993: 216, 220-221) constructed a 'fused' or 'unitary' image 
of the English constitution: "[the English constitution] has only one authority for all sorts of 
matters ... the English is the type of simple Constitutions, in which the ultimate power upon 
all questions is in the hands of the same persons. The ultimate authority in the English 
Constitution is a newly-elected House of Commons". Furthermore, by dwelling on the 
nation's political character, in particular the gentle spirit of the English statesmen, Bagehot 
portrayed the English constitution to be self-correcting. In his own words:
Indeed, the dangers arising from a party spirit in Parliament exceeding that of the nation, and of a 
selfishness in Parliament contradicting the true interest of the nation, are not great dangers in a country 
where the mind of the nation is steadily political, and where its control over its representatives is constant.
A steady opposition to a formed public opinion is hardly possible in our House of Commons, so incessant 
is the national attention to politics, and so keen the fear in the mind of each member that he may lose his 
valued seat. (Bagehot 1993: 231)
Therefore, the outstanding difference between Dicey and Bagehot lay, not in their vision of 
the “unitary, self-correcting” English constitution, but in their differing view about the 
constitutional role of political parties. As was indicated above, Dicey was reluctant to 
accept the constitutional role of political parties as intermediaries between rulers and ruled, 
whilst Bagehot (1993: 160) regarded political parties as the backbone of the House of 
Commons.
35 David Sugarman (1983: 108) recognises this aspect and suggests that the form and content of the law tends 
to be inherently individualised because it tends to define relevant actors for legal purposes as individuals.
36 Carol Harlow (1985: 70) regards his discovery of unitary cabinet government as Bagehot's "outstanding" 
contribution to the study of the constitution. However, Vile (1967: Ch. VIII, esp. 213 ff) argues that Bagehot's
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2.3.3 A form of liberal democracy 
We have sought to demonstrate that the substance of the Diceyan version of democracy is 
rooted in individualistic liberalism while its institutional arrangement stems from the 
Parliamentary tradition linked to the Old British politics since the seventeenth century. From 
this perspective, it would be safe to say that his vision of parliamentary democracy can be 
characterised as a form of 'liberal democracy' in the sense that it is a historically specific 
form of democracy, defined and structured within the limits set by liberalism. To see 
Dicey's vision in this way is not at all insignificant because it sheds some light on the 
problematic nature of his vision. Craig's one dimensional approach to Dicey, focusing upon 
its self-correcting nature, either fails to grasp or deliberately skates over an crucial 
dimension of the Diceyan vision. In other words, Craig at best trivialises the fact that 
Dicey's view embraces the dilemma of liberalism. The central question which arises here is: 
how to the liberal elitism with its preference for representative government can be 
reconciled with the democratic principle conceiving popular participation as essential to the 
political process? An analysis of this question will be central to our whole dissertation. But, 
before moving on, we need to understand that despite a number of attempts to resolve this 
dilemma, the British constitution has paid little real attention to this issue.
3 The maintenance of the dominant view of democracy: the collectivist content in the 
form of liberal democracy
3.1 The emergence o f collectivism
Few can seriously deny that Dicey’s liberal vision of democracy has played a major role 
in shaping the dominant tradition relating to the British constitution, though, as Loughlin 
(1992: 159) warns, it is not to be equated with the tradition itself. Clearly, the conventions 
and principles of parliamentary democracy have survived major changes in British society 
which was already apparent in Dicey's time. In his Law and Public Opinion, Dicey 
(1940[1914]: 211-302) himself illustrated a passing of individualism and the emergence of 
a new “era of collectivism”. This emergence began somewhere between 1865 -  1870 and
characterisation of English government with a negation of the separation of powers is yet another
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resulted in "an extraordinary decline" of faith in parliamentary government. (Dicey 
1982[1915]: cx; Dicey 1940[1914]: 440-443) Dicey pointed to two interconnected causes 
for this transformation: the extension of franchise and the increasing rigidity of the party 
system. (Dicey 1982[1915]: cxvii) Firstly, the extended franchise led to the growth of mass- 
oriented parties which went hand in hand with a tightening of party discipline. Secondly, 
the advent of the era of collectivism manifested itself in the advent of party government. 
Dicey argued that Palmerston was the last Premier appointed not by the party machine but 
as the favourite of the electorate and since his death in 1865, British government has 
become more and more "the representative of a party" rather than "the guide of the 
country", (lxxiv, cxviii) For him, the last and greatest triumph of party government over 
parliamentary government was the Parliament Act of 1911 whereby the authority of the 
House of Commons was immensely increased, while the authority of the House of Lords 
was gravely diminished. By increasing the power of the Commons, this Act gave rise to the 
present by-partisan adversarial system of government.
3.2 The triumph o f collectivism: the establishment o f the British version o f party 
government
This trend towards collectivism was reinforced during the two world wars and became 
dominant in British politics subsequent to 1945, and it is generally accepted that what is 
called the “post-war settlement” was provided and implemented by two highly disciplined 
parties representing government and opposition. (See Tant 1993: 108 ff; Birch 1989: 90; 
Beer 1982a: 70) Samuel Beer (1982b: 10) identified this post-war settlement with a 
"collectivist" consensus, mainly because the political formations through which the main 
political forces at least until 1970s acted, stood in marked contrast to those of the 
individualistic nineteenth-century. In short, with mass democracy, British parliamentary 
democracy became one of “party” government.
One effect of this transformation was in the changed meaning and role of the general 
election. The election of entirely independent parliamentary representatives was no longer 
the sole aim of general elections. General elections had became a public choice mechanism 
whereby the electorate was asked to choose the government from one of main political
unnecessarily extreme depiction.
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parties. Party dualism was strengthened both by the increased use of manifestos to present 
party programmes and by the consolidation of the whipping system. Underlying this 
particular form of parliamentary government, i.e. party government, is a social dynamic 
rooted especially in the class system, which has played a dominant role in determining the 
scope of public choice. It is not surprising, therefore, that in this post-war period the Liberal 
Party was superseded as one of the two main parties by the Labour Party, a party of working 
class origin. The Conservative Party, the descendants of seventeenth century Tories, has 
also helped establish the collectivist tradition. According to Beer (1982b: 12), the Old Tory 
element of the Conservative Party, by focusing on authority and hierarchy, contributed 
towards this trend. Its leaders encouraged an ideal of strong government, best exemplified 
perhaps by Disraeli's notion of a 'one nation' party, representing "all classes, all interests". 
That is, the Party embraced a theory of 'functional' representation, which regards the various 
strata of society as collective units and looks to them for political action. This growing 
dependency of the party system on class cleavage was, as we have already noted, closely 
associated with the strengthening of party discipline. This, with its consolidated whipping 
system, undoubtedly undermined that independence of MPs which was the basis of the 
traditional parliamentary democracy. (See Ganz 1994: 24-27)
3.3 A divergence between reality and ideal: liberal form, collectivist content
This trend away from political individualism was, however, limited. Whatever 
encroachment on MP's independence by the party machine, it took place without any 
constitutional change. On the one hand, in theory, an MP was and remains still independent 
and free from any external pressures. In other words, the doctrine of mandate derived from 
the constituent's views and opinions was rejected. Even judicial cases have confirmed this 
principle. In Conservative and Unionist Central Office v. Burrellflnspector o f Taxes) ([1982] 
1 W.L.R.522; [1980] 3 All E.R. 42), the court held that "Once elected members of the House 
of Commons, they become representatives of the constituency for which they have been 
elected, not delegates of the local constituency associations which may have put them up as 
candidates." ([1982] 1 W.L.R. 525) In Bromley L.B.C. v. Greater London Council ([1983] 2 
W.L.R. 62), Lord Diplock held that "a council member once elected is not the delegate of
37 For a twentieth century Tory apology of one nationism, see Macleod & Maude 1950.
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those who voted in his favour only: he is the representative of all the electors." ([1983] 2 
W.L.R. 107) On the other hand, the public status of political parties has not been legalised. 
In short, the establishment of party government has come about not as a result of legislation 
but as a gradual process whereby political individualism has been abandoned in Parliament.
It is worth noting that this felicitous union of the ideal of political individualism and 
collectivist reality has come about because of two important factors. The first factor is the 
relatively early established parliamentary tradition. Parliamentary leaders were fortunate in 
that they had to hand a workable model of sovereignty which protected from external 
pressures and allowed for adversarial form of party interaction. This is to say that 
constitutional transformation towards party government could be, and was achieved, within 
an existing institutional system that was constructed out of the Old Whigism and its heir, 
Liberalism.
Secondly, the British version of party government has gone hand in hand with a politically 
neutral and relatively autonomous civil service. (Turpin 1990: 203, 209) Under the 
constitutional principle of ministerial responsibility, it was and remains the case that civil 
servants advise ministers on policy and then execute it without bearing any political 
responsibility. (See Note by the Head of the Home Civil Service, in Turpin 1990: 208) They 
are therefore normally protected by anonymity and expected to serve governments of 
whatever political complexion. Senior civil servants, using their accumulated departmental 
experience and expert knowledge, are often in a position to induce ministers to follow what is 
called the “departmental view”. Unlike the United States, at least before the seventies, the 
rotation of the civil service offices with that of the governing party has been restrained. As 
Ralph Miliband (1982: 102, 108) points out, a supposedly politically neutral civil service, 
based on an “air of civilised scepticism”, has been a very powerful “braking mechanism” 
against radical party penetration of the state administration.
An important lesson can be derived from the fact that the impact of the collectivist 
change on the basic ideas of parliamentary democracy was very limited. The movement 
towards any constitutional reform, especially that relating to political parties, should begin 
with an examination of the normative foundations of the British constitution.
38 Thus, Nicholas Ridley has described ministers as the public and parliamentary relations officers of their 
departments which are under control of the civil service. See Ridley’s Industry and the Civil Service, pp.3-5 
quoted in Theakston & Fry 1994: 384.
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4 Some implications of the British version of parliamentary democracy
4.1 Reluctant recognition o f political parties
The implications of individualistic liberalism for political parties will be dealt with in 
detail in other chapters (See Chapters 4 and 5), but some brief mention here is warranted. 
Taking individuals as the basic unit of actions implies that individuals are seen as prior to 
society, and thereby any attempt to allow intermediaries to assume rights and duties 
conferred on the individual is rejected. Based on this individualistic view, the liberal theory 
of parliamentary democracy lacks an account of the positive role of political parties in a 
democratic system of government. This is not to deny that there is a strong need for 
political associations to facilitate the rights of individuals. But, it should be noted that 
political intermediaries are welcome per se, but they were "tolerated" merely as a useful 
means of achieving greater individual representation. Although the essence of liberalism is 
based on the diversity and autonomy of the individual life, it does not deny that individuals 
share several vital interests derived from their common nature. They include such things as 
the security of life, liberty, and property, which are often called “inalienable natural 
rights”. They create vital bonds between otherwise ‘selfish’ and unrelated individuals. 
‘Civil society’ as the realm of interest and choice par excellence stands for “the totality of 
relationships voluntarily entered into by self-determining individuals in the pursuit of their 
self-chosen goals.” (Parekh 1992:163) Ontologically, political parties are perceived as 
belonging to this realm and thereby they are regarded as private associations.
However, it is important to see that origin of political parties within civil society does not 
negate their public, though non-legal, duties. The reality that political parties, especially 
parliamentary parties, play an important role in forming government and uniting the opinion 
of MPs has necessitated that they behave differently to other private associations. The 
premise is that the activities of political parties must further the national interest. This is 
reflected in Burke's classical definition of a political party as "a body of men united for 
promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principles in
39 All liberals, of course, can not be identified as advocates of natural rights. Bentham, the champion of 
utilitarian liberalism, is famous for his fierce attack on the themes of natural rights and natural law. See 
Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in Waldron 1987:46-69; Hart 1982:79-104; Rosen 1983:55-75; Craig 1989.
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which they are all agreed. ... [They] will easily be distinguished from the lean and 
interested struggle for place and emolument.” (Burke, quoted from Robbins 1958:510. 
Emphases added) This community-wide nature of the political party is what justified the 
ironic title of "Her Majesty's Opposition" or "the loyal opposition".40 The unique feature of 
modem British democracy, its unwritten constitution, has played a major part in bringing 
about this reconciliation between the organisational ‘privateness’ of political parties and 
their functional ‘publicness’.
4.2 Political, not legal, constitution
One salient feature of the British constitution is that this requirement of neutrality on the 
part of political parties is conceived to be a matter of politics, and not of law. This is mainly 
because of an inherent fear of oppressive tendency of human organisations. The state is the 
only organisation that is legally constituted to maintain order by legitimate use of force. The 
state is thus perceived as a necessary evil. Craig (1990: 142 ff) was wrong to assume that 
the distinction between state and society is the unique character of the English pluralism, as 
opposed to the Diceyan unitary vision of representative democracy. As a liberal vision of 
democracy, the Diceyan vision is based on the same dichotomy. In fact, the individualism 
on which it is based is ontologically pluralist. Both have in common the belief that diversity 
or plurality of interest or opinion is an end in itself and the highest expression of human 
society. As a result, scepticism vis-a-vis the state is essential to both liberalism and 
pluralism.
By the same token, for both ideologies, democracy is a means to achieve this pluralist 
environment rather than the end itself. The fundamental difference between the liberal ideal 
and pluralist ideal can be found in the different ways they answer the question of how to 
achieve the goal of a limited, non-monolithic, and anti-totalitarian government. Liberalism, 
based on laissez-fairism or methodological individualism, believes that the best answer lies 
in non-recognition of the 'public' entity of private organisations in that despite their positive 
contribution to the ultimate ends, no public right or duties for those committed to group- 
specific interests are recognised. In contrast, pluralism perceives the role of such groups as 
essential to the realisation of its goal and its response is to endow groups with legal rights,
40 It was John Cam Hobhous, later Lord Brougham, who styled for the first time this expression in the House
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associated with an obligation to follow legal norms subject to public supervision and in 
some circumstances state intervention. That is, in solving any problems with political 
associations, liberalism prefers a political approach, finding legal constraints unattractive. 
Pluralism, on the other hand, relies on legal as well as political solutions. The problem of an 
excessive reliance on political solution, as opposed to more legal solution, will be critically 
analysed in Chapter 5, Section 6.1~2. Here it is sufficient to point out that if there is 
anything which a liberal regime can learn from the pluralist political ideology, it is the 
pluralisms pursuit of a realistic balance between legal and socio-political realms.
4.3 Elitist democracy as opposed to participatory democracy 
A major feature of modem British democracy which reflects this combination between 
liberal ideal and pluralist reality is its elitist character in the sense that the role of the people 
in political decision-making is a passive, legitimising one. (See Kavanagh 1990: 61-62)
4.3.1 The defeat of radicalism
The maintenance of parliamentarism associated with political individualism within the 
British constitutional settlement was at the expense of the Radical view of political 
representation. In challenging parliamentary tradition, the Radical view was more 
fundamental than the Collectivist view. As was indicated earlier, the main institutional 
product of the Collectivist theory of representation - the British version of party government 
- was compatible with the concept of a sovereign Parliament, though in theory there is a 
tension between them. In contrast, the Radical view, by stressing the importance of popular 
participation, accountability and a concomitant delegatoiy understanding of representation, 
challenged the very foundation of parliamentary sovereignty. The Radical vision of political 
representation sought a fundamental change in the relationship between government and 
governed in favour of the latter. Unlike the orthodox political tradition, it demanded more 
than a narrow sense of democracy that relies on indirect representation of interests and 
collective responsibility of government. It aimed at improving the quality of popular 
representation in ways that would lead to the creation of institutions that, in turn, would 
maintain continuous accountability and responsiveness on the part of government.
of Commons inl826. See Lively 1994:150-152.
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4.3.2 Responsible and representative government
Indeed, attempts have been made to justify British democracy in terms of it being a 
'responsible and representative government' rather than 'rule by the people'. L.S. Amery 
(1947: 20-21) described the British system of democracy as one of "Government of the 
people, for the people, with, but not by, the people." In clarifying this aspect of British 
tradition, we may benefit from Parekh's method of separating representative government 
from representative democracy. (See Parekh 1992:167) The basic implication of this 
separation is that a system can be said to be “representative” without encouraging 
participation. That is, liberal political theory can provide two possibilities for determining 
the relationship between the people and their representatives. The difference lies in the 
extent to which the people can take the initiative in decision-makings vis-a-vis their 
representatives. While in a representative 'democracy' the representatives are treated as 
delegates of the people, representative 'government' means a government of the people by 
their representatives. The former view, which was taken up by the Radicals, implies popular 
self-rule through the mediating agency of the elected representatives and thus requires to 
some extent a participatory culture. On the other hand, the central feature of the latter is that 
rulers should be responsive to an electorate but without being accountable to them.41 What 
triumphed in the history of modem British politics is the traditional view of representative 
government rather than radical representative democracy in Parekh's sense. The advent of 
the ideal of democracy encouraged English Liberals to transform the aristocratic settlements 
of the Old Tory and Whigs but the result was compromised by other liberal principles. 
Liberal fear of a majoritarian tyranny on the part of uneducated lower classes, which would 
threaten individual freedom - especially the right of property, played a major role in 
maintaining of this anti-participatory tradition 42 The ancient equation "democracy equals 
mob rule", thus, deterred liberal reformers from wholly discarding Whig parliamentarism. 
Indeed, English liberal individualism which inherited parliamentarism from the Old Whigs 
was ‘middle class liberalism’. This envisaged a particular type of individual, the propertied
41 An example of representative government, as opposed to representative democracy, lies behind current 
arguments in defence of the second parliamentary chamber, e.g.. the present House of Lords. Supporters of the 
Lords claim that the wisdom embodied in that institution is valuable in checking the “excesses” of the 
Commons based on the adversarial politics. But the House of Lords is criticised by many as undemocratic and 
privileged since its basis lies in wealth and status rather than in free election.
42 This desire was explicitly expressed in Madison’s famous No. 10 of The Federalist Papers (1987).
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and educated middle class individual, and only such individuals were to be the basic unit of 
representation.
Therefore, in Dicey's (1940: 57-58) view, "democracy in England", thanks to the unique 
English snobbishness, "has to a great extent inherited the traditions of the aristocratic 
government, of which it is the heir", in that there has been no successful radical attempt to 
replace parliamentary government and the rule of law with the radical democratic principle. 
As we have seen earlier, it became the norm in the name of parliamentary sovereignty that 
representatives were elected by the people, but, once elected, were to remain free to manage 
public affairs as they saw fit.43 This turned out to be a highly effective way of insulating the 
government against the full impact of universal franchise. In other words, liberal principles 
were closely tied to existing constitutional settlements, rooted in the independence and the 
deliberative role of MPs, the supremacy of Parliament at government level, and a passive, 
legitimising role for the people.
4.3.3 Party government as the continuation of elitist rule
Despite unceasing attempts towards more participatory democracy from the nineteenth 
century onwards, this elitist conception of democracy was reinforced by the development of 
the party democracy which eventually emerged in the post-war period as a result of the 
continuous collectivist challenge against the liberal paradigm. The establishment of party 
government maintained and manipulated, rather than constitutionally transformed, the 
parliamentary tradition and a concomitant conception of responsible and representative 
government. As a result, highly disciplined political parties, associated with the supremacy 
of parliamentary parties over their extra-parliamentary wings, have been criticised for 
potentially hindering the people from participating in the process of government. It has been 
claimed that political parties in reality became, to use Finer's metaphor, 'the sovereign King' 
by replacing both an absolute monarch and parliament.44 Jack Lively (1975: 43-44, 49)
43 Bentham, as a liberal thinker, provided this view with a useful theoretical base by reconciling representative 
democracy and the sovereignty of the people. According to his Constitutional Code, the ‘omnicompetence’ of 
the legislature is not incompatible with popular sovereignty. Frederick Rosen (1983:41-54) seeks to 
demonstrate that Bentham has a flexible view of sovereignty different with the ‘classical view’ of unitary, 
unlimited, supreme sovereignty, which has developed since Bodin and Hobbes, in that the sovereignty of the 
people is limited to the time of election. See also Craig 1989.
44 In “Law and Democracy”, Sir John Laws points to the ironical aspect of parliamentary sovereignty, though 
without highlighting the role of political parties: “The result of the constitutional settlement of the seventeenth
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suggests that the British version of responsible government “depends largely upon the 
existence of, and free competition between, political parties.” (at 44)45 This is in accordance 
with the Schumpeterian conception of democracy as an “institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide via a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1943: 269) In this view, 
democracy is not a set of ideals which must be realised for their own sake but a method of 
choosing political leaders and organising governments.46 From this perspective, Dicey 
(1940[1914]: 51-52) argued that "'Democracy' in its stricter and older sense, in which it is 
generally employed by English writers, means, not a state of society, but a form of 
government."
This elitist model of democracy claims to be ‘realistic’ in the sense that it no longer seeks 
a utopia in which there is no gap between rulers and ruled 47 The thrust of democratic 
elitism is that whilst a universal suffrage is regarded as the fundamental feature of 
democratic order, its role is limited: it functions only to legitimise the rule of competing 
political parties which now become recognised as essential structures for bridging the gap 
between state and society by means of electoral competition.
4.3.4 The supremacy of parliamentary parties over their extra-parliamentary wings
The clearest evidence of the elitist character of British democracy can be found in the 
primacy of parliamentary parties over extra-parliamentary bodies. Under the banner of
century ... was to establish the supremacy of Parliament over the King. ... When the government was in the 
possession of the Monarch personally, the ideal of Parliamentary sovereignty amounted to a claim that the 
ultimate political power should rest in the hands of the people’s elected representatives, not those of an 
unelected autocrat. But the function of Executive government has passed from the Sovereign to Her ministers, 
who are members of Parliament; and the very convention that requires command of a majority in the House of 
Commons as a condition of the right to rule has, in fact though not in name, given back the final power to the 
Crown, at least for most of the time; though it is exercised not by the Monarch but by others in Her name.” 
(Laws 1995:91)
45 It is important to note that Lively does not say that competing parties will be an inevitable consequence of 
responsible government but merely the most likely outcome. See Lively 1975:44.
46 This instrumental view of democracy is not novel. In his letter to Robert Michels in 1908, Max Weber 
points out that the question of democracy and its ordinances is not a matter of moral ends, presuming a 
political animal but rather a “state-technical” matter: “Concepts like ‘the will of the people,’ ... no longer exist 
for me - they are fictions. It is just as if one were to speak of the will of the purchaser of a pair of boots as 
being authoritative for how the cobbler ought to pursue his craft. The buyer may know how the shoe pinches - 
but never how to make a better shoe.” (Slagstad 1993:125-126, quoted from W.Mommsen’s Max Weber). 
Giddens (1972:55-56), unlike other recent theorists, argues that this point must not be overemphasised in an 
attempt to identify Weber’s political ideas with Machiavellian anti-liberalism. Cf. Slagstad 1993:125.
47 For a useful summary o f ‘democratic elitism’, see Parry 1969, ch.6.
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parliamentary sovereignty, British parliamentary parties have enjoyed a privileged position 
vis-a-vis extra-parliamentary bodies. Even in today’s radically altered situation in which 
government became highly complex and functionally differentiated, it is institutionally still 
parliament that wields a monopoly of public power within the existing constitutional 
framework. What Dicey had originally in mind in suggesting the separation of legal and 
political sovereignty was that this could fill the gap between democratic and liberal 
parliamentary ideas. (See Dicey 1982[1915]: 26-35). However, as already discussed, it is 
parliamentary parties, sheltering behind the traditional constitutional framework, that wield 
the very power which supposedly belongs to parliament.
In Britain, parliamentary democracy, as an amalgam of democratic and parliamentary ideas, 
is achieved by eliminating outside interference in the deliberations and activities of 
parliament. This desire to eliminate such influence has been seen as contributing to the 
development of a constitutional monarchy, the essence of which is either the limitation or 
removal of royal powers. Nevertheless, since parliament is said to represent the “national 
interest” and the “public good”, these wider aspects of the community have, of course, never 
been wholly excluded from representation. British conception of democracy is a very 
particular and narrow one in which parliament has come to be seen as virtually the sole 
representative institution of democracy. As Dicey says:
The sole legal right of the electors under the English constitution is to elect members of Parliament. ...
[the opinion of the electorate] can be legally expressed through Parliament, and through Parliament alone.
(Dicey 1982[1915]:17. Emphasis added.)
Focusing on the fact that extended suffrage necessitated both an improvement and an 
expansion of political organisations which were called upon to mobilise votes for a particular 
party, Ostrogorski (1964[1902]), writing at the turn of this century48, predicted that the extra- 
parliamentary centres of power, what he called the 'English caucus', would undermine the 
foundations of parliamentary government. On the contrary, however, all the evidence points to 
the predominance of the parliamentary parties vis-a-vis their supporting organisations. Thus, 
the general view among parliamentarians “certainly after 1832” was, in the words of
48 His Democracy and the Organisation o f political Parties, which originally written in French, was published 
in English in 1902.
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McKenzie (1964:7), that “the new extra-parliamentary party organisations must not be 
allowed to become Frankenstein's monsters which might destroy (or at best enslave) their 
creators." This general view is confirmed by the actual development of the two main political 
parties of the twentieth century.
(i) The Conservative Party 
Historically, so far as the Conservative Party is concerned, the role of extra-parliamentary 
organisations has always been to serve the parliamentary party rather than represent the views 
of ordinary members. Indeed, in the case of the Conservative Party, the penetration of party by 
society, i.e. the voluntary membership, has been relatively weak. The Party’s professional 
component, i.e. the Central Office, consists of salaried officials operating under the direct 
control of the party leader. While certain powers were given to the parliamentary party, the 
most important, i.e. that of defining policy or appointing personnel, were vested in the leader. 
Until 1965, the selection of the Conservative leader was undertaken by a small “aristocratic” 
conclave, what Iain Macleod termed 'the magic circle', the ordinary members are being asked 
simply to rubber stamp their decision. (See Stark 1996: ch.2) Even the party conferences have 
never played a key role in determining either the party's policies or priorities, though, as 
Richard Kelly (1994) argues, few can seriously deny their indirect influence and growing 
importance since the Thatcher years. Nor have they had any executive power. Although, as we 
shall see in Chapter 6, the ‘supreme’ power of the conference cannot be seen as the sine qua 
non of democratic party rule, it can hardly be denied that a system which allows the party 
leadership to have almost absolute power to determine the party's policy and practice was 
highly elitist. Moreover, such concentration of powers in the hands of the party leadership 
made for an essentially authoritarian structure. The National Union too was primarily a 
deliberative and advisory body and the party leadership was not subject to its demands. It is 
plausible that informal talks between the officers of the National Union or the chairman of the 
Executive committee and the party leadership might have had some influence on policy 
making. (See Ball 1994a: 202-203) However, it would not be too wrong to say that the role of 
the National Union was limited to drawing the leadership's attention to an issue, and often in 
very general terms.
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Indeed, it is scarcely surprising that the Conservative Party has reflected the elitist 
conception of democracy, given that from the time of its foundation by a parliamentary 
group, it has been without a formal, written constitution, regulating affairs of the Party 
(especially those between the parliamentary party and the extra-parliamentary wings). The 
national organisation was later set up on the initiative of the party leaders to support an 
already well-established parliamentary party.49 Despite several attempts50 to "democratise" 
the party, the basic relationship between the two components of the party remained almost 
unchanged until 1998 when the new leader William Hague launched a “root and branch” 
review of its entire structure.
John Barnes (1994: 315-318) suggests that, despite its pragmatic adoption of various 
political theories, which makes it ‘the adaptable party' or party of'creative opportunism', the 
most distinctive aspect of the Conservative creed is the Old Tory idea of order, authority 
and good government which underpins both the elitist structure of the Conservative Party 
and the British government. At the centre of this creed known as 'Toiy democracy' are, 
firstly, the old fear of 'mob rule' which was believed to be synonymous with democracy, 
and, secondly, the equally ancient demand for autonomous, strong leadership responsible, 
but not necessarily accountable, to its supporting associations.51 “Etonian and Oxbrigian 
elitism” (Seyd 1975: 219), rather than radical democracy, has had an immense influence on 
the working of the party. Sir Ian Gilmour stresses, as we have already noted, that:
49 The main national party organisations, i.e. the National Union and the Central Office, were established in 
the wake of the Second Reform Act. See Ball 1994b: 297.
50 No proposal for party reform has never urged that the virtual autonomy of the parliamentary party. Past 
proposals have included Joseph Chamberlain's "Birmingham Plan" of 1877, Lord Randolph Churchill's 
campaign of 1881 (See McKenzie 1964:166-173), the Maxwell-Fyfe Committee of 1949 (See McKenzie 1964: 
199-231), and the Chelmer Committee of the National Union of 1970/73 inspired by the late 1960s’ Young 
Conservative movement for intra-party democracy. (See Seyd 1975; Rose 1974:265-266) Even the most 
recent and comprehensive review of the party organisation initiated by the then Party chairman Sir Norman 
Fowler in 1993 chose not to challenge the status quo. It did, however, set out some proposals for building 
"one, integrated, Party", but showed less interest in the democratisation of party structure and largely focused 
on the issue of how to construct a more effective, efficient supporting mechanism for the central party. See 
Ball 1994b: 303; Conservative Party 1993a; Idem 1993b.
51 For some (See Birch 1986: 63-66; Beer 1982b: 175-180), the emergence of Thatcherism meant a decisive 
break with these traditional Conservative doctrines because it embraced old-fashioned liberal ideas especially 
in the crucial sphere of economic policy and to that extent exhibited what Beer (1982b: ch.5) called 'new 
populism'. It also developed what is generally termed 'conviction politics', distinct from both conservative 
sceptical pragmatism and Disraelian paternalistic tradition of'one nation'. However, to the extent that this was 
combined with the idea of'a  strong state' alongside 'a free economy' and that its policies were implemented in 
a top-down fashion, it would be true to say that it remained very close to the Tory tradition.
52 Despite recent setback, public school and Oxbride graduates still consists of 51% of total MPs elected in the 
1997 election. See Gamer & Kelly 1998: 85, table 4.2.
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"Conservatives do not worship democracy. For them majority rule is a device ... The 
majority do not always see where their best interests lie and then act upon that 
understanding. For Conservatives therefore, democracy is a means to an end not an end in 
itself... And if it is leading to an end that is undesirable or is inconsistent with itself, then 
there is a theoretical case for ending it." (quoted in Tant 1993: 114) Expressing his doubts 
about the onset of popular government, Stanley Baldwin also warned that "democracy's 
tendency is to concentrate on the immediate appeal and not on the ultimate reality", (quoted 
in Barnes 1994: 328)
Yet it should be pointed out that the elitist workings of the Conservative party 
organisation went hand in hand with the autonomy of the local constituency associations 
that made up the National Union. As Stuart Ball (1994b: 262) points out, this autonomy of 
local parties was a powerful "totem" in Conservative politics and seen as vital to the overall 
health of the party and the maintenance of the moral of its grassroots. Basically, this 
autonomy meant that the constituency parties had an exclusive say in the selection of their 
parliamentary candidates. Despite a power of veto by the Standing Committee on 
Candidates (See Blackburn 1995: 217-218), provided that the rules had been properly 
followed and a candidate did not publicly go against party policy, the leadership had no 
alternative but to give its support to the local parties' choice. (Ball 1994b: 266)
However, this balance of autonomy between central and local parties is from a number of 
points of view suspect, which current moves towards reform by the Conservative Party 
would seem to confirm. This reform aims to create a single party by drawing together three 
components of the old party into a single structure. This seeks to include voluntary 
organisations in national party affairs, e.g. policy making and leadership selection54, but in 
return for the central party having more control over constituency business. (See
53 Despite the fact that “sleaze” played such an important and disadvantageous part in the 1997 election, the 
party leadership, nevertheless, recognised the power of the Tatton constituency to decide whether Neil 
Hammilton MP who was at the centre of “cash for question” scandal should be reselected as its candidate.
54 As Patrick Seyd (1975: 219-220) suggests, the limited franchise implies that Etonian elitism has survived, 
though diluted by a spirit of meritocracy combined with the "inverted snobbery" of the masses. (The quotation 
is from Enoch Powell. See Stark 1996: 16) The anomalous character of this old system from a perspective of 
democratic governance was most dramatically illuminated in the election of William Hague as the new 
Conservative leader in 1997. As a result of Labour’s landslide, only 164 MPs out of total 659 constituencies 
were eligible to vote for the new party leader. Even worse, there were no representatives from Scotland and 
Wales or such major cities as Liverpool, Coventry, Manchester, and Wolverhampton. This means that 495 
constituencies could not have even an indirect say in the leadership election. This lack of representation raises
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Conservative Party 1998a) All of this represents a major advance towards the 
modernisation of the party. However, whether it will also mean the abandonment of the old 
elitism remains, as in the case of the Labour Party, to be seen.
(ii) The ‘parliamentarisation’ of the Labour Party
There is a strong argument that notwithstanding their organisational, historical and 
ideological differences55, both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party have been 
contaminated by the elitism of the modem British constitution. No better example of the 
prestigious status of parliamentary parties can be found than in what we may call the 
‘parliamentarisation’ of the Labour Party. It is well known that the issue of intra-party 
democracy, which also forms the most practical part of criticisms of the dominant conception 
of democracy, has emerged largely because of the ideological differences between the left and 
right wings of the Labour Party. As a theoretical analysis of the issues relating to intra-party 
democracy, with particular focus on recent developments within Labour's modernising 
movement, will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 6, here it is probably enough to describe 
briefly those aspects of Labour practice which have been criticised as reflecting British 
constitutional elitism.
One may argue that, unlike the Conservative Party, the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) 
no longer has a privileged role in decision-making at least since Labour's constitutional 
reforms of the 1980s. First of all, in the decision-making process, Labour MPs, unlike those of 
the Conservative Party, are not in the dominant position.56 The PLP, constituency parties, 
affiliated unions, individual members, the National Executive Committee, and the party 
conference are linked together by the party constitution, which is contractually binding on 
them all. (See In re Grant's Will Trusts, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 373) McKenzie pointed to an 
interesting, though now redundant, difference in terminological usage: "The term "The 
Conservative Party" applies strictly only to the party in Parliament; it is supported outside 
Parliament by its creation, "The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations". 
The term "The Labour Party" is properly applied only to the mass organisation of the party
questions not only vis-^-vis the problem of elitism but also, and more seriously, regarding the democratic 
foundation of the party. See Chapter 6, Section 5.
55 These include their different views over the function of party and the meaning of democracy.
56 For an illustration of the difference in organisational structure between the Conservative and Labour parties, 
see Rose 1974:133-166.
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outside Parliament; it supports in Parliament a distinct and separate organisation, "The 
Parliamentary Labour Party" ". (McKenzie 1964:12 fii. 2) This different use of terminology is 
understandable when we consider historical origins of the two parties. While the Conservative 
Parliamentary Party created its mass organisation in the nineteenth century for the purpose of 
strengthening support for its MPs, the PLP was created by the Labour movement to represent
* 7
its interests in parliament. Thus, what the doctrine of free mandating means to Labour MPs 
is different from what it implies to Conservative MPs. Indeed, a series of constitutional 
reforms within the Labour Party successful resulted in achieving greater measure of control 
over its MPs. The ideal of collective policy-making led the Labour party to regard the 
conference as the "Parliament" of the party (Attlee quoted in McKenzie 1964:10), and party 
members are all constitutionally bound to accept and conform to party policy.
In practice, however, the Labour Party has refrained from following this ideal too strictly. 
At least since the 1945 landslide election victory, Labour has become one of the two major 
players within Parliament, which has led not only to the enhanced prestige of the PLP vis-a- 
vis the wider party but also to its adoption of the attitudes and stance as a governing party. For 
example, when the 1960 Annual Conference endorsed unilateral nuclear disarmament, Hugh 
Gaitskell as leader of the PLP could declare that the conference had no right to dictate to 
popularly elected MPs. (See Rose 1974:163) As pragmatism became more influential than 
ideology, the raised prestige of PLP became more and more associated with its claims to 
autonomy and a rapidly developing principle of leadership.58 However, as early as 1907, a 
resolution was passed which recognised the autonomy of the parliamentary group in the 
following terms:
That resolutions instructing the Parliamentary Party as to their action in the House of Commons be taken
as the opinions of the Conference, in the understanding that the time and method of giving effect to these
57 For a general account for the origin of the Labour Party, See Wright & Carter 1997: ch.l.
58 In this regard, it is worth noting Pizzomo's account of how new "external" parties (in Duverger's sense), 
representing interests that had formerly been excluded, tend to emphasise, by affirming their separate 
identities, the differences between them and older parties that constituted the "system". However, once 
recognised and accepted by other parties, they felt a lesser need to affirm their unique identities. According to 
Pizzomo, this trend reflects the mood connected with "the end of ideology" mood: “If ideology means 
differentiated proposals for long-term goals, there is no doubt that the political forces are more inclined to 
abandon this kind of message the longer they stay in parliament". What is inevitable in this process of 
parliamentarisation is an increase in conflict between inside and outside parliamentary organisations. See 
Pizzomo 1981:270-1. We shall thematise this fact as the emergence of a “cartel” party system in Chapter 4.
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instructions be left to the Party in the House, in conjunction with the National Executive. (1907 Labour 
Annual Conference Report, p.49 quoted in McKenzie 1964: 394)
Over many years, on the basis of this formula, the PLP has successfully defeated repeated 
attempts by the party conference to give specific instructions to it, concerning, for example, 
the course of action it ought to pursue either in Parliament or in office. For instance, when 
Harold Laski, as chairman of the National Executive Committee, claimed in 1945 that the 
party organisation would expect some control over the future Labour foreign policies, Attlee, 
leader of the PLP, refused to accept his claim. Subsequently, Attlee, then Prime Minister, was 
to rebuke Laski with the oft-quoted words, "a period of silence on your part would be 
welcome." (K.Martin, Harold Laski (1953), p. 182 quoted in Birch 1989:89)
The primary justification for the autonomy of the PLP is the constitutional principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. In the 1960 conference debate about unilateral nuclear 
disarmament, Hugh Gaitskell made it clear that Labour MPs, according to the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty, would have to consider what they did in the House of Commons as 
a matter of conscience and honour. (See Rose 1974:266-7) The main institutional device 
employed by the PLP to resist pressure from participatory labourism has been the 
"parliamentary veto". The leader of the PLP and his Cabinet can, in drawing up the manifesto, 
veto even the important commitments of the party conference and the NEC. In the 1977 and 
1979 Clause V meetings between the parliamentary committee and the NEC, Callaghan, as 
leader of the PLP, effectively vetoed a number of strong proposals relating to the abolition of 
the House of Lords. Despite subsequent populist changes, including the extended franchise for 
the election of the party leader, and ongoing proposal for mandatory reselection of MPs, it 
seems unlikely that attempts to abolish the parliamentary veto and the mandating of MPs to 
comply with party policy will be implemented. From this perspective, Richard Kelly (1994: 
259), adapting phrases employed by Bagehot (1993), discounts the formal supreme powers of 
the Labour conference as a merely the "dignified" part of the party constitution while seeing 
the Conservative conference which has no formal power as far more "efficient" conference. 
As we shall see in detail in Chapter 6, the current Labour drive towards the modernisation of 
its policy and organisation confirms the weakness of this formal power. In the wake of 
organisational reforms since 1983, the dominant role of the parliamentary leadership vis-a-vis 
the NEC in the party's policy-making process became institutionalised. (See generally Fisher
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1996: 67) Although the formal constitutional status of the conference was left basically intact, 
in practice it was relegated in favour of a Policy Forum. (See Mandelson & Liddle 1996: 221) 
This means that the Labour Party, initially armed with a participatory or instrumentalist 
rationale, associated with a delegatory sense of representation, shifted to the right by 
assimilating liberal political culture relying on the idea of parliamentary party autonomy.
As a conclusion, from initially representing a threat to the British constitution, namely, the 
parliamentary sovereignty, the Labour Party has come to be one of its major guarantors by 
gradually opting for parliamentary principles and their elitist tradition.
5 Conclusion
British liberal democracy which denotes representative, more specifically party, 
government in the name of responsible government, does not exactly accord with the ideal 
concept of a democratic society as one in which the people participate continuously and 
actively in political affairs. (McLennan 1984: 245) On the contrary, the salient of this elitist 
model is that it has to be shielded from too much participation on the part of the electorate 
as a whole. This is to say that British democracy is a from of political professionalism in 
which there is a clear division of labour between the electorate and its representatives59, in 
other words, it represents, in Weber’s terms (1993: 77-128), “politics as a vocation”. Thus, 
political disputes have been largely limited to the claims of competing elites: The role of the 
people has been essentially a passive, legitimising one. (See, e.g. McLennan 1984: 242-252) 
Political parties under the aegis of a sovereign Parliament is located at the centre of this 
picture.
Given this ongoing state of affairs, it is not surprising that there have always been efforts 
from opposing side of British politics to open the political process up to more people. 
Although, as we shall argue later60, lack of participation per se is not, in our opinion, a 
priori a problem, there is no doubt that the British version of parliamentary democracy 
needs a critical review if it is to cope with the rapid change of modem society. The most
59 This is a feature of the Schumpeterian elitist view of democracy. Schumpeter (1943:295) stresses that the 
voters must “respect the divisions of labour between themselves and the politicians they elect”.
60 See Chapter 3, Section 4.2.2, (iv) (a).
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serious problem is that it is unable to create an organisational force which can adequately 
regulate power centres outside the traditional concept of the state. In other words, any 
project for constitutional reform in Britain has to realise, inter alia, that in reality there are 
power centres outside Parliament, and thereby transform a unitary conception of 
representative democracy into a more pluralist one. A reappraisal of the nature and legal 
status of political parties should, at least from the perspective of this dissertation, form the 
core of any such agenda.
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Chapter 3
Towards a New Democracy:
Constitutionalised Democratic Autonomy
1 Introduction
This chapter will have three main sections. The first will critically analyse the theory of 
participatory democracy as a powerful alternative to the existing elitist model, (sec. 5-2) 
The thrust of its main argument is that participatory democracy has as many defects as the 
elitist model so that the former cannot simply replace the latter. It will, therefore, be 
suggested that we need a third way of democratisation accommodating the merits of both 
the elitist and participatory conceptions of democracy. The second section will elaborate 
this new project, which I will call "constitutionalised democratic autonomy". My arguments 
underlying this project are by and large three-fold. Firstly, the liberal-pluralist separation 
between the state and civil society should be maintained in a constructive manner, (sec. 3- 
4.1) It will be argued that excessive stress on participation can expose equally important 
individual and group autonomy to the unstable and unpredictable ebb and flow of political 
negotiation. Any attempt to encourage civil society's direct encroachment on the state as 
well as the colonisation of civil society by the state must be cautiously avoided. Secondly, 
the maintenance of the state-society distinction and the recognition of limited participation 
do not necessarily leave the role of the people in the political process to be stuck in 
passivity. Constitutionally protected and regulated social autonomy could provide 
appropriate opportunities for anyone to become involved in the political process, thereby 
introducing a greater flexibility into the forms of popular participation. The enhanced focus 
on social autonomy is not only a reflection of the pluralisation of social life but also a key 
device for promoting and maintaining reasonable public participation, (sec. 4.2.1) While 
voluntary non-participation will be distinguished from de facto exclusion from the political
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process, the form of participation will be diversified and multiplied to a variety of social 
forums at micro level. It means that social autonomy, which used to be conceived only as a 
private law matter among supposedly equal actors, should now be treated in the context of 
public law as well. This theme leads to the third limb of the proposed project. It is 
important to recognise that some aspects of the dynamics of civil society need to be 
constitutionalised. (sec. 4.2.2) This aspect of constitutionalisation aims not only to promote 
an ethos of civic autonomy or participation but also to regulate some negative potential 
effects of social autonomy.
2 Participatory democracy as an alternative vision?
The salient problem with the elitism embedded in modem British democracy is that this 
qualified democracy tends to encourage public apathy about politics and civil privatism. As 
Cohen and Arato (1992: 6) point out, the elitist model of democracy necessitates shielding 
the political system from “excess”, and, more importantly, presumes that the meaning of 
“excess” is to be determined by the elites alone. The criticism of this view centres on the 
fact that it potentially reduces the principles of democratic legitimacy, which should 
connote the ideas of self-determination and the influence of autonomous public opinion on 
decision making, to merely a formalistic ritual.
One obvious way, we are told, of circumventing this problem and its inherent dangers is 
to increase popular participation in the political process -  a measure for which there is, of 
course, already widespread support. The argument against the elitist model assumes, 
therefore, that a decisive narrowing, and eventual abolition, of the gap between government 
and governed, is essential if polities are to be called democratic.
However, an excessive emphasis on popular decision-making, generally understood as 
having its roots in Rousseau’s theory of a “general will”, is also open to criticism. In what 
follows, we shall explore two problems - one minor, one major - of participatory 
democracy.
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2.1 A minor limitation o f participatory democracy: the uncertain outcome ofparticipation
The first, less important, problem is the lack of certainty and efficiency of democratic
politics. Interestingly, one argument for participatory democracy is that it would strengthen 
the implementation of public policy by enhancing flow of necessary information. (See Birch 
1993: 81-82) However, we cannot easily discount Luhmann's (1990: 223-226) assertion that 
greater political participation can result in a burdensome increase of bureaucracy and 
unnecessary infringement of individual options rather than actual improvement of people's 
lives. (See also Murphy 1990: 157-158)
Considering the increasing complexity of political institutions, participation cannot be 
regarded as a universal panacea any more than non-participation cannot be regarded a priori 
as a problem. The legitimacy of the political system or the validity of all levels of 
governmental policies and private decisions should not be dealt with solely in terms of 
whether or not the process is “participatory” or “non-participatory”. For each level performs 
various functions in line with its own particular standards and, thus, is too complex for 
decisions to be taken purely on the participatory basis. As Michael Walzer (1983: 304) 
argues, political inclusiveness does not alone make for democratic government, equally 
necessary to it is what he calls “the rule of reasons”. One great advantage of representative 
democracy is that it can create more fruitful and predictable systems of communication. 
Representative bodies are subject to what Offe (1996: 94) called the "law of re-encounter": 
"Every participant in the parliamentary body or its committees must expect to be 
continually subject to the scrutiny of all the other participants with regard to all the 
statements he or she makes, and to be assessed on credibility, knowledge of the material, 
sincerity, consistency, and dedication." In addition, in representative democracy participants 
can not only say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ but also can rationalise the terms and conditions of the 
negotiative discourse as well as bring about compromises where necessary.
2.2 The fundamental problem o f de-differentiation o f the state-society distinction
The problem of enhanced participation can be most clearly explained in terms of a de­
differentiation of the distinction between the state and society, which has characterised 
(western) modem societies. Cohen and Arato (1992: 7) point out that whatever alternatives 
the participation model offers - an idealised model of the Greek polis, the republican
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tradition of the late medieval city-state, or the new forms of democracy generated within the 
milieus of the worker’s movement such as revolutionary syndicalism, they tend to be 
presented as the single organisational principle for society as a whole. Carl Schmitt's theory 
of a total state is a good example for this holistic view of society particularly because he 
predicted the crisis of parliamentary democracy directly in terms of the state-society 
polarity.
2.2.1 Schmitt's theory of a total state
So far as the conception of democracy is concerned, there are two things worth noting in 
this German jurist's constitutional and political theory. First, Schmitt argues that the advent 
of mass democracy means the emergence of the total state. He regards the identification of 
the citizen's will with the state as the essence of democracy. One consequence of this is the 
irreconcilable tension between liberalism and democracy. In the transition from the ancien 
regime to liberal society, what wets unnoticed was the contradiction between liberal
parliamentarism and radical democracy, both of which confronted a common target - 
absolute monarchy. Once the constitutional liberal state was established, the competing 
visions emerged as antagonistic to each other. (Schmitt 1985a: 2) While parliamentarism, 
the political expression of liberalism, is the pursuit of limited government dependent upon 
rational reason which is produced by unrestricted discussion, democracy is understood to be 
based upon the principle of equality of homogeneous citizens and the sovereignty of their 
collective will. (See Schmitt 1985a: 9-10) Therefore even though parliament still exists in a 
democratic era, its function is changed. Parliament has been transformed, from a locus for 
the free deliberation of independent representatives seeking unity, into an arena where the 
plurality of divided yet highly organised social forces meet and clash. In this process, all the 
old claims for “publicity” (Offentlichkeit) have collapsed:
Parliament is in any case only “true” as long as public discussion is taken seriously and implemented.(at 4) 
...[But]The situation of parliamentarism is critical today because the development of modem mass 
democracy has made argumentative public discussion an empty formality. .. The masses are won over 
through a propaganda apparatus whose maximum effect relies on an appeal to immediate interests and 
passions. (1985a: 6)
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One crucial issue which clearly shows the contradiction between liberalism and democracy 
is that of the protection of fundamental rights. For liberalism, an individual’s rights to 
property and free speech are inalienable and essential to protecting society from any form of 
tyranny. Every attempt by political rulers to circumvent constitutional limits and to misuse 
their prerogatives to the detriment of these basic liberties is seen as eo ipso evil and unjust. 
Given, on the other hand, that Schmitt's democracy presupposes that the citizens’ will, 
expressed by majority rule, is sovereign, a government relying on this will is free to do 
whatever it sees fit61: “All other institutions transform themselves into insubstantial social- 
technical expedients which are not in a position to oppose the will of the people, however 
expressed, with their own values and their own principles.” (Schmitt 1985a: 16) In other 
words, as the people are the state, any system of law purporting to defend the people against 
the state is deemed both unnecessary and absurd. For Schmitt, the whole system of freedoms, 
such as those of speech and assembly, are derived from his essential principle of 
parliamentarism, i.e. “publicity”. From this perspective, if parliament were ever to become 
merely a facade, such freedoms would equally become meaningless. (Schmitt 1985a: 49)
It is important to see that the exclusion theory underlies this extreme view of democracy. 
The first principle of democracy, as Schmitt insists via Aristotle,62 is that “not only are 
equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally.” (Schmitt 1985a: 9) Therefore, 
according to this view, the eradication of heterogeneity is essential to democracy. The 
extension of suffrage, which appeared to provide modem parliamentarism with the 
democratic mask, is in fact not associated with a democratic principle but rather with a 
liberal idea. Universal suffrage was understood to mean no more than that “Every adult 
person, simply as a person, should eo ipso be politically equal to every other person”. 
(Schmitt 1985a: 10-11) However it is not compatible with the democratic notion of equal 
suffrage as the consequence of a substantial equality "within the circle of equals.” (Schmitt 
1985a:10-ll) Schmitt’s predication was that as the process of democratisation, whatever 
path specific countries might take, was accelerated, parliament as the sole field of 
interpenetration between society and the state would degenerate into “a mere facade”, and 
thus bring about the emergence the total state. (Schmitt 1985a: 49) The total state which is
61 For an early English criticism on this view, see Barker 1942:3-7, 34-38'
62 Aristotle, Politics (1280): “In democracies ... justice is considered to mean equality.... It does mean equality 
- but equality for those who are equal, and not for all.” See Schmitt 1985a:89, note 23.
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equated with the people via various mechanisms (referenda and elections) then absorbs civil 
society into its bureaucratic structures. (See Keane 1988a: 159-163) In short, in a 
democratic era, the state and society are fused with each other.
Interestingly, Schmitt makes the organisational change of political parties a key element in 
his analysis of the contradiction between democracy and liberalism. He takes England as his 
model. Schmitt points out that political parties in the liberal era took shape as part of the 
institutionalisation of parliament as the sovereign body and sphere of public opinion. They 
were bodies made up of well-off like-minded individuals bent on enhancing national interest. 
The basis of liberal parliament was supposed to be free discussion among its independent 
members. But with the extension of suffrage, what actually emerged was mass, highly 
competitive party, sociologically linked to a specific constellation of interest, and heavily 
bureaucratised with numerous paid functionaries. What collapsed was the liberal assumption 
that parliament was an area for rational debate on national policy, independent of any 
external pressure of private interests. Political parties in a democratic era, on the other hand, 
are totalistic in so far as they seek frill possession of the state apparatus, which is seen as an 
instrument for carrying out their social goals. In the “total” state, which later became known 
as “totalitarian” or “unitarian”, a monopolistic, single party is placed in the centre of power 
which “at once animates the State and inspires the People”.63 The state governed by political 
parties of totalistic character no longer relies on the dualism of “state and society”, which is 
essential to the liberal constitutional state.
2.2.2 A critique of the theory of a total state: the end of holistic worldview
It would not be wrong to claim that although current liberal democracies are certainly not 
on the verge of collapse, the enormous literature on both the crisis of legitimacy in recent 
decades and the growing preoccupation with the massive disaffection from politics indicate 
that the problems of parliamentary democracy pointed out by Schmitt have not yet found a 
solution. (See, e.g. Mouffe 1993: 182) It is all the more so in that, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, many British public lawyers regard a unitary conception of parliamentary 
democracy as a given legal and constitutional fact. In other words, Schmitt’s attack on
63 Sir Ernest Barker dismisses Schmitt’s defence of the total state or a single party system as a mere reflection 
of the particular intellectual tradition of Germany which emphasises merely certain aspect of the modem state. 
See Barker 1942: 289-292.
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parliamentarism (i.e., Parliament is no longer capable of regulating the relations of power 
within and between civil society and the state) can be accepted without any difficulty. 
However, Schmitt’s view regarding the total state and its peculiar and narrow conception of 
democracy together with his concomitant theory of a necessary fusion between state and 
society is far less acceptable.
Schmitt’s advocacy of unbridled majority rule is nothing but a veiled form of despotism. 
It is self-evidently not the case that the will of outvoted minorities can be equated with that 
of the majority seen as reflecting the general will. As Habermas (1992b: 445-446) points 
out, Rousseauian democracy of “non-public opinion” in which the general will is conceived 
as a “consensus of hearts rather than of arguments” cannot be warranted in our highly 
pluralised post-liberal society.
The simple identification of rulers with ruled at the macro level of politics via the 
negation of representative institutions is not, of course, wholly impossible. It can at the very 
least stimulate concern about political responsiveness to social demands, the importance of 
which tends to be neglected under liberal neutrality. However, excessive stress on the 
importance of "input" politics which regards the close relationship between governors and 
governed as the centrepoint of politics needs to be treated with as much caution as does the 
opposition standpoint which tends to ignore “input” politics altogether. In other words, any 
attempt to deduce organisational models solely from the democratic principle of legitimacy 
is just as much questionable as the elitist model which tries to dissolve normative 
proceduralism into procedures for winning power.
What in the end makes Schmitt’s belief in the absoluteness of political will identified 
with that of the majority is his view that democracy depends upon the homogeneity of 
citizens and the restriction of equality. This ideal clearly emerged, like the most monistic 
ideas, within the context of the logic of identity that seeks to reduce differences to unity. 
Apparently, any critique of the politics of ‘non-identity’ leads all too easily to an obsession 
with the politics of ‘extreme identity’. As we shall see in detail in the next section, 
however, the de-centring tendency of modem societies is generally acknowledged by 
modem scientists including the majority of socio-legal theorists, (e.g. Luhmann 1982; 
Habermas 1992b) A simplified image of society as a political totality has thus become
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largely untenable.64 It is now generally accepted that a homogeneity of background 
convictions cannot be assumed and thus any simple one-dimensional hierarchical model of 
rulers and ruled has to be ruled out. (See, e.g. Habermas 1992b: 444-445; Teubner 1993a: 
555-556; Luhmann 1982)
3 Complexity of modern society and the distinction between state and civil society
As we sought to show in the previous section, a monolithic understanding of modem 
society hinders any theory of participatory democracy from becoming a workable model in 
a highly pluralised and complex modem society. A fundamental question, thus, arises: can 
the complexity of modem society justify any attempt to deny the usefulness of the 
fundamental liberal notion that the separation of the state from society must be a central 
feature of any democratic political order? In this section, we shall critically analyse Niklas 
Luhmann's systems theory which questions the feasibility of any representation of society as 
a whole. We acknowledge that this theory provides us with many useful points in 
understanding the essential nature of modem societies such as their growth in complexity, 
their decentring tendency and last, not least, the limitations of any purely normative 
paradigm of social problem-solving. However, we shall argue, via Habermasian critical 
theory, that, despite its tantalising analytical power, Luhmann's theory runs the danger of 
brushing aside any possibility of critical and rational reconstruction of human society and, 
therefore, serves in reality to maintain an undesirable status quo.
3.1 Niklas Luhmann's theory o f modern society: the complexity o f society and the 
impossibility o f representation o f society as a whole
Niklas Luhmann’s attempt to understand the nature of modem society from the 
perspective of systems theory provides us with an important weapon with which to attack the 
Schmittian fusion theory. For Luhmann (1982: 232-233), the ‘modernisation’ of society is a 
process of increasing system differentiation and pluralisation. Modem societies consist not of 
a single social system but of many, each trying, “at the level of society”, to fulfil its own
64 This view is not new. We can find many good arguments against fusion theory in English pluralist writings
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special functions. (Luhmann 1982: 236) Each system is autonomous, self-referential, and 
autopoietic, even though not “isolated” from its environment. (See Luhmann 1990: 39-45; 
Luhmann 1982:142)
Consequently, Luhmann (1990: 38) recognises that such institutions as the welfare state do 
not necessarily raise the problem of “totalisation” or “dedifferentiation”. However, he is 
unsympathetic to those trying to revive the old semantics, central to the whole European 
political tradition, of “the social” and “the political”, i.e. societas civilis, politike koinonia. 
Thus, as Cohen and Arato (1992: 311) point out, Luhmann, rejecting the traditional concept 
of state and society, draws the lines of differentiation in the light of his much more complex 
and abstract social model. For Luhmann, such ancient terminology, notwithstanding its 
noble simplicity, cannot possibly correlate with the complexities of today’s multi­
dimensional society.
3.1.1 Obsoleteness of the state-societv polarity
For Luhmann, the state-society distinction can at best claim a historical significance 
having played a part in the early transitional stage in the evolution of modem society. It 
provided perhaps a useful conceptual apparatus by means of which the shift of the dominant 
subsystem in the eighteenth century from politics to the economy could be thematised. 
(Luhmann 1982: 340) Before the emergence of this distinction, western societies were 
politically constituted, in that a normative style of expectation was dominant to which all 
sectors of society looked unquestioningly. At the turn of the nineteenth century, this power- 
mediated political society began to collapse thanks to the advent of a money-oriented 
economy. One feature of this new market economy is its cognitive style of expectation in 
which values can be challenged and modified in the light of experience. The cognitive 
critical approach meant that every social structure were now subject to “selectivity” and 
doubt. This evolutionary transition meant that the society as a whole could no longer be 
seriously seen as a “body” capable of acting in the same way as an individual. The compact, 
total quality of the world was dissolved by the emergence of an opposite, relative to the 
subject, and thereby society began to be viewed in terms of “difference”. (Luhmann 
1995 [1984]: xxxix) Luhmann states,
from the first half of this century, e.g., Barker 1942: 25-29.
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Through the “emancipation” of the economic system and its consequences, society was fundamentally 
changed. It became much more heterogeneous and complex than ever before. ... The pronounced 
functional differentiation of society, the diversity of its special perspectives, as well as the remaining 
distinctions between regional cultures compelled a possibilisation of the world. (Luhmann 1982: 354. 
Original emphasis)
The real, which up until this great transition to the bourgeois society had been regarded as a 
perfect order established by the “Creation”, began to be regarded as a realm of possibilities. 
Given this new ‘possibilisation’ of the world, the old state-society distinction has lost 
gradually its analytical power: “The state has remained a very vague category of little 
analytical use; it runs the danger of being amplified and constricted by various traditions 
and prejudices.” (Luhmann 1982: 138)
3.1.2 The illogical character of the semantics of the state and civil society 
Apart from its vagueness, leading to a loss of analytical power, what is problematic about 
the state-society distinction is that it is one of those “illogical” dichotomies to which 
functionally specialised subsystems appeal in attempting to articulate their relationship to 
other systems, i.e. what systems theory terms their “environment”. (Luhmann 1982: 236) 
One major problem is that there is a general tendency to exaggerate the normative value of 
the semantics of the state. (Luhmann 1990:143) Thus, the modem state, with an as yet not 
“completely trivialised concept” of positive law, was treated like a “national shrine”. 
Eventually, as Luhmann (1990: 143) points out, the constitutional state is seen as the 
guardian of freedom and thus “can require one to bring it sacrifices; to die for it.” 
Underlying this value-laden theory of the state is a naive nostalgia for the old politia in 
which politics was regarded as the “essence” of society. The romantic ideal of the 
normative integration of human beings, usually associated with such slogans as 
“emancipation”, “participation”, and “representation”, is a tenacious one and allures those 
still intent on pursuing “man’s highest good” via an appeal to zoonpoliticon. For Luhmann, 
however, any attempt to rehabilitate “public man” in the political sphere is misdirected: “To 
characterise the State as the ‘self-organisation of society’ is not only false empirically; it is 
equally mistaken as an assumption about latent tendencies.” (Luhmann, Grundrechte als 
Institution(\965), p. 14, quoted in “Translators’ introduction” in Luhmann 1982, xvii fii. 4 at
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364-5.) Luhmann also warns of the totalitarian consequence saying that “another reason to 
reject such a definition is that it led Carl Schmitt to embrace ‘the total state’” (Ibid.)
Most importantly, Luhmann points out that in the state-society dichotomy, the concept of 
society is too diffuse. Such a simplistic polarisation runs the danger of overlooking the 
internally dynamic and differentiated social environment in which the political system 
operates. This deduction becomes apparent from a reading of Luhmann’s depiction of social 
differentiation, especially his emphasis on evolutionary perspectives. Functional 
differentiation, as opposed to other forms of differentiation, i.e. stratification and 
segmentation, provides more complex environments for subsystems than. (Luhmann 1982: 
244) The transition from the political society to the bourgeois society, as we have noted 
above, made it possible to expand the differentiation among various social spheres such as 
religion, science, education, art and the like. As these spheres cannot be reduced to a single 
“organisation”, “collectivity” or “logic”, Luhmann argues that to lump them together and 
label them civil society is analytically worthless. Furthermore, Luhmann rejects the notion 
that one of these differentiated spheres, namely, that of politics, can in any sense be held to 
either represent or replace civil society, the social, or normative integration. (Luhmann 
1990: 32)
‘Society’, in Luhmann’s analysis, stands only for ‘the whole’, and, occasionally, the 
global society: “Indeed, society is almost no longer definable in its unity and .. can no 
longer integrate its subsystem through shared territorial borders. From this point on, society 
was only possible as world society.” (Luhmann 1982: 354) According to Luhmann (1990: 
30), society, in its broadest terms, is the “all-encompassing social system that orders all 
possible communication among human beings.” The underlying premise here is that the 
basic unit for analysing modem society is, not actors such as individuals, or social groups, 
but, the system which consists only of communication. The state as a self-description of the 
political system is, alongside religion, science, economy, education, law and so on, merely 
one of society’s subsystems. The state is nothing apart from society. (Luhmann 1990: 30) 
According to Luhmann, any attempt to revive the old conceptual apparatus is doomed to 
failure as it is simply not “abstract” enough, to hold open the future and keep its openness 
steadily in view, and thereby needs radical transformation. What is called for is, not 
“political” radicality, but “theoretical” radicality. (Luhmann 1982: 333; Luhmann 1990: 29)
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3.1.3 The decentred image of society and impossibility of representation of global society
In Luhmann’s view, modem society is a type of society that is relatively stable even 
though, thanks to a gradual process of increasing pluralisation, it has no single centre and 
no subsector that can claim unchallenged supremacy. (Luhmann 1990: 31-32) One of his 
basic theoretical arguments, the self-misunderstanding of the part for the whole, proffers an 
explanation in this regard. In modem society, the question facing politics is whether a part 
can really represent the whole. (Luhmann 1990:14-19) Luhmann’s answer is in the 
negative. The problems of the legitimacy of political power, which some contemporary 
theorists pursue by counterpoising civil society against the state, are linked to this 
impossibility of representation. Luhmann’s argument is that the capacity of the entire 
system to be self-representing within the system is the essence of legitimisation. But, he 
maintains, as the parliamentarism of particular interests acquired absolute sovereignty, the 
representation of difference replaced that of unity. Luhmann explained this latter change in 
terms of a modification of his primary principle of societal differentiation: the 
reorganisation of the social system of stratification into functional differentiation. Given 
that modem society is characterised by its functional differentiation, the logical 
consequence is:
All differentiated systems share the problem that they function as a unity in relation to their surroundings. 
But at the same time they are differentiated internally into partial systems, none of which as partial system 
can represent the unity of the whole system. For, as everything within, be it a subsystem, a process or an 
operative element, is only a part, they lack the ability to be what they are. (Luhmann 1990: 15. Original 
emphasis)
It is a paradox that a society cannot help but misunderstand itself by way of conceiving the 
whole as its own part. This paradox gives modem society its character. Modem men live in 
a society which cannot represent its unity within itself, in a society without a top and 
without a centre. (Luhmann 1990: 16) Therefore, legitimisation under modem conditions 
can only be self-legitimisation. (Luhmann 1990: 18) In other words, no system can 
legitimate another.
In a centerless society, what would be unnecessary and methodologically wrong is to 
attempt to revitalise the public sphere which presupposes the society-state distinction and
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attempts to mediate between them. The liberal model of the public sphere, relying on 
rational-critical discourse, is to be confined to a single historical epoch. Any proposal, 
based on a scheme that, under the slogan of democratisation or greater social efficiency, 
conceives civil society or the public sphere to be normative central, would be vain. For in a 
functionally differentiated society, rational communication, stemming from a functionally 
undifferentiated public, is a logical impossibility; “One cannot functionally differentiate 
society in such a way as to make politics its centre without destroying society.” (Luhmann 
1990: 33)65
3.1.4 A project of "methodological anti-humanism"
It is apparent that Luhmann’s basic strategy is primarily based on his critique of the 
subject-critical tradition of western thought, i.e. it represents what Habermas called 
“methodological anti-humanism”. (Habermas 1987[1985]: 378. Cf. Luhmann 1995[1984]: 
210-213) For Luhmann (1982: 325), the anthropomorphic character of western practical 
philosophy, with its emphasis on the subject, must be abandoned. He submits that in this 
tradition the subject has been largely seen as an independent, self-sufficient, episto- 
sociological unit divorced from an awareness of the wider social environment. Having 
regard to the fact that empirical individuals experience and act very differently, Luhmann 
sees such an independent conception of the subject as nonempirical, or transcendental. 
However, this is not to say that Luhmann rejects all the historical implications of the 
semantics of the subject. In his view, the subject was part of a semantics of transition trying 
to grapple with a situation which essentially defied adequate description, namely, a society 
moving from feudal to modem structures. (Luhmann 1995[1984]: xlii)
Furthermore, Luhmann argues that placing human beings outside society yields more 
humane results than otherwise; “[The] distinction between system and environment offers 
the possibility of conceiving human beings as parts of the societal environment in a way 
that is both more complex and less restricting than if they had to be interpreted as parts of 
society, because in comparison with the system, the environment is the domain of
65 For the same reason, Murphy points out the problem in the appropriation of Habermas by lawyers: "[this] 
has taken the form of an appeal to the criteria embedded in the lifeworld in order to deal with, modify or 
regulate the disfunctionalities or pathological tendencies of the system.” (See Murphy 1990:153-157. 
Quotation at 157 and emphasis added) We will critically deal with this point later.
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distinction that shows greater complexity and less existing order. The human beings is thus 
conceded greater freedom in relation to his environment, especially freedom for irrational 
and immoral behaviour.” (Luhmann 1995[1984]: 212-213. Original emphasis) For 
Luhmann, therefore, the idea of “humanism” which sees human beings as the measure of 
society cannot continue. As the subject is nothing but “contingent selectivity”, and actions 
are artefacts of processes of attribution, the task of sociologists should be to refer, not to the 
actors in the situation, but to the foundation of all processes and systems within which 
“meaning” plays an essential role. Hence, the action theory, which goes hand in hand with 
the concept of the subject, relies on the corpus mysticum of the subject. (Luhmann 
1995 [1984]: xliv) It is apparent that this conclusion, leading to the hidden contingency of 
“intersubjectivity”, is indebted to the theory of deconstruction, with its rejection of any 
grounding metadiscourse. (See Luhmann 1993a; Derrida 1990; Teubner 1992a: 457; 
Teubner 1992b: 1443-1444)
3.2 A critique o f an overemphasis on systemic complexity and operational closure
Must this radical challenge to the traditional normative conception of society be 
accepted? Why should society be presented exclusively as a boundary-maintaining system?
3.2.1 "No wav out" from the iron cage?
Habermas and other like-minded theorists, while acknowledging the value of the 
systemic integration of society, persistently refuse to give up entirely the possibility of an 
intersubjective context of life, the lifeworld of society. To avoid the “dehumanisation of 
society”, it is necessary to admit, they argue, that individuals or social groups do not belong 
only to the environment of their social systems, but, in terms of societal integration, are also 
involved in “the communicative force of production”. (See McCarthy 1985: 30, 33-34; 
Habermas 1992b: 444) It is true that there is a commonality between Luhmann and 
Habermas, in that both believe that the first task of modem social theory is “management of 
the complexity” which may cause societal disintegration. For both of them, any cmde 
attempt to build a monolithic image of society is unrealistic and unworkable.
However, when it comes to putting forward a workable answer to the issue of managing 
complexity, a serious difference can be seen between the two leading theorists. Luhmann
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claims, as we have seen in his critique of the concept of the subject and action theory, that it 
is a vain effort or, at best, a “time consuming” strategy to focus on human beings in infinite 
face-to-face interactions from which sequential forms has to be abstracted. Such an 
approach can never attain a “stable” mechanism of societal integration because of a lack of 
“time” and the impossibility of “co-ordinating” the many and various communicated 
messages. (Luhmann 1982: 72, 143) Luhmann’s advice is to concentrate on the ‘systemic 
integration of society’ which takes on an objectivity that can no longer be brought into a 
system of interaction, as it pertains only to communication, meaning and such media as 
power and money. This implies that the problem of reducing “environmental” complexity 
while expanding systemic complexity is the sole determining feature of societal 
development. (See Habermas 1988[1973]: 139) Apparently, such a strategic approach is 
sceptical of the effects of conscious political planning and participation together with the 
normative definition of democracy. (See Luhmann 1990: chs. 7-9)
While drawing on Luhmann’s depiction of the decentred nature of modem society, 
Habermas is dissatisfied with, and repeatedly opposed to, this sceptical, “anti-humanist” 
approach, and profounds a two-level concept of society, embracing functional systems and 
the lifeworld, together with a balance between two ways of societal integration, i.e. 
systemic and social (communicative) integration. (See Habermasl987[1981]: Ch. VI)
As Habermas (1987[1985]: 353-354, 368-378) points out, Luhmann’s systems theory 
takes on the philosophy of the subject simply by replacing the subject with system. What is 
lost in systems theory is the possibility of any self-critique on the part of modernity. Above 
all, systems theory seeks, via its system-environment distinction, to avoid examining the 
painful, oppressive aspect of societal functional differentiation and to concentrate on a 
sociological analysis of system alone. Habermas argues,
Considered historically, the establishment of the status of wage-labour and the rise of an industrial 
proletariat, as well as the inclusion of the populace under centralised administrations, were by no means 
painless processes. But even if systems theory could formulate the problems connected with such 
processes, it would have to dispute the possibility of modem societies having a perception of crises that 
could not be scaled down to the perspective of a special subsystem. (Habermas 1987[1985]: 375)
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3.2.2 A disguised inclusion of the public in the political system 
The main concern of this dissertation is to define the political system. Luhmann (1990: 
98) sees the political system as including within it all politically relevant associations and 
publics. Therefore, he submits that as the political system is also governed by the principle 
of functional differentiation, it can be differentiated into the bureaucratic administration, 
party politics, and the public. (Luhmann 1982: 153) The internal functional differentiation 
first manifests itself in the separation of party politics from administration (which includes 
parliamentary representation). In connection with this separation, the pubic takes on a 
number of distinct roles, which eventually becomes a third element of the political system. 
The fundamental differentiation of roles can no longer allow the citizen to stand as the 
“subject” of an “undifferentiated” authority. (Luhmann 1982: 154) The citizen begins to be 
conceived in terms of a number of specialised roles: tax payer, client, complaint, voter, 
writer of letters to the editor, the professional and the like. As a holistic being, the 
individual lives outside the function systems. But, every individual has to have “access” to 
“every function system” if, and insofar as, his or her mode of living requires the use of the 
functions of society. (Luhmann 1990: 35) To the extent that the comprehensive role of the 
public is broken down into a number of specialised fragmentary roles, the public which was 
once the essential element of civil society is now placed within the political system and 
thereby becomes subject to systemic logic or the medium of power. Luhmann states,
These roles are divided up in accord with the requirements of the political system, and especially with its 
channels of communication. They are roles for complementary behaviour and, as such, belong within the 
political system and not its social environment. Hence, the exercise of influence comes to depend on 
behaviour’s conforming to these roles.... Their specific function of converting experience with the results 
of binding decisions into new motives for decision-making can then be fulfilled largely within the system. 
But this will depend on the political system’s being able to create enough alternatives and maintain a 
complexity that corresponds to that of society. (Luhmann 1982: 154)
It is apparent that this predominance of systemic logic over the intersubjective context of 
life is quite contrary to the critical-theoretic strand of western thought which tended to 
favour the public sphere closely identified by it with the lifeworld over the political system, 
or at least a balance between them. The critical strand of thought admits the uncoupling of 
the public from the administrative system, but not as a subsystem within the political 
system. Rather, it places the public in those particularised forms of life, lifeworlds, that are
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intertwined with concrete “traditions” and “interest constellations” in the “ethical” sphere 
primarily “outside” the influence of systemic logic and medium. (Habermas 1992b: 444) In 
Habermas’s view, “public spheres” can be conceived of as “higher-level 
intersubjectivities”, within which identity-forming self-ascription can be articulated. 
Habermas believes that, through this highly aggregated public, a consciousness of the total 
society can be articulated; “In virtue of this common consciousness, ... the society as a 
whole can gain normative distance from itself and can react to perceptions of crisis ....” 
(Habermas 1987[1985]: 376-377) As we shall see later, this critical conception of the 
public sphere forms the basis of our new paradigm of democracy, ‘constitutional 
democratic autonomy’, that overcomes the scepticism raised both by Schmitt's 
"decisionism" and Luhmann's systems theory.
3.2.3 An "unintended" political conservatism?
Differing ways of defining the political system give rise to different notions of 
democracy. Luhmann claims that any normative idea of democracy has to be abandoned. In 
a highly complex society characterised by the autopoiesis of its many subsystems, as seen 
above, any normative style of expectations is unfeasible. The fact that the political system 
operates under its own timetable, its own regulative standards, with a particular function, 
unparalleled elsewhere in society, does not allow for any "input" in the form of generalised 
motivations, values, or interests. From this point of view, it is not only undesirable but also 
impossible to envisage any democratic control over the economic and administrative system 
that would increase the reflexivity of administration and market vis-a-vis civil society. One 
result of this view is that the political system is shielded from the critical public. The 
political code no longertests merely on the distinction of government and governed but on 
that of government and opposition. (Luhmann 1990: 217) In this respect, not surprisingly, 
Luhmann aligns himself with the Schumpeterian elitist tradition.66 According to Luhmann, 
the view which sees public opinion as an external reference influencing politics, the 
“puissance invisible” of the visible, or a centralised echo of political activity, is no longer 
feasible. Rather, public opinion, Luhmann argues, must serve the self-referential closure of
66 E.g., “Stability becomes a permanent problem. Therefore, politics can no longer be conducted haphazardly, 
by amateurs, or on the basis of a heterogeneous status-system. It must be organised through political parties as 
a form of professional work.” Luhmann 1982: 96.
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the political system, the reflection of politics upon itself: “[T]he mirror of public opinion, 
just like the system of market prices, makes possible an observation o f observers.” 
(Luhmann 1990: 216. Original emphasis)
On the other side of the debate, the critical-theoretic strategy retains a normative idea of 
democracy in that it gives the greatest weight to the social-integrative power of solidarity 
which must prevail, if only indirectly , over other control resources such as money and 
administrative power, if the “practically oriented” demands of the lifeworld are to be 
articulated. (Habermas 1992b: 444) From this critical-reconstructivist point of view, 
Luhmann’s indifference to a rational constitution of society and preference for systemic 
integration is a fundamentally “opportunistic” world view; “universal functionalism must 
suppose - that is, prejudge at the analytical level - that this change in the mode of 
socialisation and the “end of the individual” have already come to pass”. (See Habermas 
1988[1973]: 140-142) Or, more generously, its status can be viewed as “pragmatic”; 
“systems research itself is part of a life-process subject to the law of increasing selectivity 
and reducing complexity.” (Ibid.) Such generosity can in effect be seen in Habermas’s 
analysis of economic and political administration at least since the publication of his Theory 
o f Communicative Action. (Habermas 1987 & 1984 [1981]; Idem 1996[1992]. See also 
Habermas 1987[1985]: 363-364.)
However, certain critics advance a number of convincing reasons for regarding this 
concession as an unnecessary submission, of the critical-theoretic strategy, to the 
“seducements” of Luhmann’s systems theory. While acknowledging the importance of the 
distinction between behaviours within organisational settings and outside of them, 
McCarthy (1985) argues that there is no reason why this distinction should pertain to one 
between a system and its environment. In McCarthy’s view, systems-theoretic concepts, 
precommitted to “comprehensive, non-participatory” political planning together with a 
concomitant Schumpeterian definition of democracy, are not suitable for drawing the kind 
of distinction that need to be made; “the ‘utopian’ idea of self-conscious self-determination 
must retain a regulative idea, in light of which we might at least recognise when we are
67 According to Habermas, as we shall see, the social integrative power of communicative action must not 
directly carry over into democratic procedures for settling power claims on the political level because such an 
approach runs the danger of damaging the systematically integrated action fields. The student movements 
which hit the western democracies in the 1960s were criticised by Habermas for having this tendency.
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compromising and why”. (See McCarthy 1985: 45) One question which McCarthy raises in 
connection with Habermas’s adoption of the theory of systemic integration in the filed of 
political administration is: “Is interaction in the political sphere systematically rather than 
socially integrated?” (McCarthy 1985: 38) In McCarthy’s view, as far as power needs, in 
the light of Habermas’s theory, to be “legitimised” and therefore requires more demanding 
“normative” anchoring than money, and as the contrast between “normatively” authorised 
and “simple” imperatives is presented as a paradigm for the difference between 
“communicative” and “strategic” action, there is no reason why interaction, mediated by 
legitimised power, should be regarded as systematically and not socially integrated. 
(McCarthy 1985: 39) As we shall see later in our proposal for constitutionalised democratic 
autonomy, this possibility of social integration within systemic integration can be 
manifested in a "reflexive" mode of social structure that opens a way for public scrutiny of 
the political system while reducing it to constitutionally regulated procedures.
3.2.4 Is systemic autonomy unaccountable self-regulation?
Critical theorists also suggest, contrary to Luhmann's belief in systemic self-regulation 
and operational closure, that there can be no autonomy of the political system without the 
realisation of democracy in the critical-theoretic sense. As Cohen & Arato (1992: 316) 
argue, to focus on the medium-steering capacity of the political system would remove any 
motives for reform based on the “extension of politically consequential communication”. 
(See also McCarthy 1985: 45) If, as systems theory proposes, “domains of action 
neutralised against lifeworlds” are extended to the public sphere and politics is thereby 
divorced from society, there would be no room for the creation of any new form of social 
control over state. In other words, focus on the self-referentiality of society in general and 
the political system in particular does not leave any room for "strategic" human action. 
(Jessop 1992: 242-260)
Excessive emphasis on the autopoietic aspect of the political system, with its steering 
capacity not only in the determination of its boundaries and tasks but also in the selection 
and formation of its environment, does give rise to a number of side effects. Luhmann 
(1990: 81) himself is fully aware of such problems and would further admit that they justify 
his critics in setting up normative research projects into the adequacy of objective
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“indicators for the boundaries of state activity”. However, not surprisingly, Luhmann claims 
that more desirable way to investigate and resolve these problems is to find ways and means 
of better articulating the self-limiting mechanism of the political system.
In stressing self-limiting character of the political system, Luhmann persistently attempts 
to reduce it to the single dimension of functional differentiation with its concomitant self- 
referential autonomy. For him, the sole way to perceive the self-limitation of the political is 
to understand the historical fact that the modem political system is bom of social 
differentiation. The implications of this fact are two-fold. The first implication is that the 
political system is, of necessity, more or less generally accepted by its social environment; 
“As a system, [the political system] must enjoy political credit, which does not rest upon its 
making specific promises about what its decisions will be. This credit is not created by a 
continued bartering, or taken back after every failure.” (Luhmann 1982: 143) Hence, the 
self-referential order of political communication “binds” the system to “openness” with 
regard to “every politicisable” theme. (Luhmann 1990: 34-39, 98) Moreover, legislation and 
financing, while providing the political system with premises for its decisions and 
transferring the binding effect of these, are essentially extraneous factors belonging to the 
legal and economic systems. (Luhmann 1990: 82-85,101)
Secondly, Luhmann also sees subjective fundamental rights as a safeguard against any 
overextension of the political. Fundamental rights, in Luhmann’s view (1982: 96), are what 
make rapid fluctuations within political administration basically tolerable. However, 
Luhmann makes it clear that such rights cannot be deduced from highest-order principles 
originating from some mysteriously pregiven dimension of natural rights. Nor can a single 
principle such as “society against state” justify the structure of rights. Rather, it is claimed 
that they are simply products of the highly differentiated nature of modem society, their 
function being to maintain and protect this differentiation. The rights of free speech, press, 
assembly and association, for example, cannot, of themselves, guarantee rational will 
formation. Their function is to transfer the self-observation of the political system into the 
“reflexive mode of the observing of observers” and thus by helping prevent any suppression 
of societal communication. (Luhmann 1990: 217) In other words, Luhmann trivialises the 
societal centre of normative integration and reduces associational life to merely by-product
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of the self-limitation of the political system. (See Luhmann 1990: 101-101. See also Cohen 
& Arato 1992: 326-341)
One might assume that as Luhmann regards the legal system as a subsystem, 
characterised, by nature, by a normative style of expectation, it alone, as a “differentiated 
residue” of the concept of civil society in the old European political semantics, can form a 
locus for normative integration. (See Cohen & Arato 1992: 333) However, Luhmann’s 
rigid conception of “operational closure” does not allow such an interpretation. Luhmann 
doubts any possibility of modification of ‘system subjectivity’. As the movement of legal 
autopoiesis is an “all or nothing” process, in his view, the recognition of any supra- 
regulation of society by law would be tantamount to conceding the primacy of the legal 
subsystem over other spheres. This would be incompatible with the ideal (or reality) of a 
centreless society and the inevitable “system relativity” of all perspectives and is, therefore, 
inconceivable without destroying society. (See, e.g. Luhmann 1992b, 1992c)
However, in Habermas’s view, this version of the single-front character of societal 
modernisation overlooks the fact that such media as money and power, via which functional 
systems set themselves off from the lifeworld, have in turn to be “institutionalised” in the 
lifeworld. (Habermas 1987[1985]: 355, 362) The colonising effects of media-steering 
systems has been camouflaged by the old structures of compromise, developed in advanced
/ o
capitalist societies. Such compromises can be conceived of as reactions on the part of the 
lifeworld to systemic logic, on the one hand, and growth in complexity, on the other, both 
of which are proper to the capitalist economic process and a state apparatus. However, as 
the crisis of the social-welfare state has deepened, with the advent of “risk society” in 
Beck’s (1992) sense, it is not only system imperatives but also lifeworld imperatives that 
spark new conflicts which cannot be dealt with by the existing compromise structures. The 
old expectation that society could exercise an influence over itself by the “neutral” means of 
political-administrative power has proved wrong. (Habermas 1987[1985]: 361) Therefore,
68 Habermas depicts the background of the emergence of the old political compromise as follows: “The 
rationalisation of the lifeworld had to reach a certain maturity before the media of money and power could be 
legally institutionalised in it. The two functional systems of the market economy and the administrative state ... 
destroyed the traditional life forms of old European society to begin with. The internal dynamic of these two 
functionally intermeshed subsystems, however, also reacts back upon the rationalised life forms of modem 
society that made them possible, to the extent that processes of monetarisation and bureaucratisation penetrate 
the core domains of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialisation. Forms of interaction shaped by
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the central question today is whether a new compromise can be arranged that accords with 
the old rules of system-oriented politics. (Habermas 1987[1985]: 357) Habermas 
persuasively argues for the reconstructed concept of a public sphere as a fragile and diffuse 
network. Public spheres are now arena within which processes of opinion and consensus 
formation get institutionalised and thereby erect a “democratic dam” against the 
“colonialising encroachment” of “system imperatives” upon areas of the lifeworld. (See, 
e.g. Habermas 1992b: 444; Habermas 1987[1985]: 357ff, esp. 362) Yet, it should be bome 
in mind that the solidarity-generating energies of the public sphere, which arise 
spontaneously out of micro-domains of everyday practice, may not directly cross over into 
the self-steering mechanisms of state.69 (Habermas 1992b: 444-445; Habermas 1987[1985]: 
364-465)
More specifically, Luhmann's insistence on keeping his theoretic interests within the 
boundary of the horizontal relationship between sub-systems is ahistorical. One may argue 
that the idea of law as an autopoietic system does not exclude the middle way of societal 
development. That is, if one, unlike Luhmann, sees autonomy and autopoiesis as a matter of 
“degree”, societal guidance through the rule of law is not always unthinkable, though it 
could be a highly difficult, risky task. (See, e.g., Teubner 1993b: ch.3; Willke 1992) If one 
sees the legal system not as a purely intellectual system incapable of performing functions 
for the rest of society but as a hinge between various subsystems, especially those of 
politics and the economy, and their environment (or between system and lifeworld), societal 
guidance through law is not always an illusion. In this regard, we can have recourse to 
Habermas’s new version of the rule of law in his project of discursive democracy and 
Teubner’s social regulation through reflexive law. (See, e.g., Habermas 1996[1992]: esp. 
chs. 3-4, 7-9; Idem 1992b: 448-450; Teubner 1983 & 1993b) This strategy inevitably 
presupposes the constitutive or regulative function of law in terms of societal integration. 
Finally, this line of thought provides, both implicitly and explicitly, not only a justification 
for the reconstruction of an independent institutional context, on which autonomous law
these media cannot encroach upon realms of life that by their function are dependent on action oriented to 
mutual understanding without the appearance of pathological side effects.” Habermas 1987[1985]: 355.
69 Therefore, Habermas prefers to the model of society influencing itself (i.e., systems theoiy) the model of 
boundary conflicts between the lifeworld and the two far more complex subsystems of the state and the 
economy. These subsystems can only be indirectly influenced by the lifeworld which, however, depends upon 
their performance. Habermas 1987[1985]: 365.
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can rely (i.e., the still useful distinction between state and society), but equally a basis and 
orientation for the legal regulation of the political and public spheres (i.e. the required 
constitutionalisation of politics).
4 Towards a new paradigm of democracy: constitutionalised democratic autonomy
Interestingly, Schmitt's fusion theory and Luhmann's theory of a decentred society both 
argue that the state-society polarity is only relevant to the emergent liberalism in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Both theories claim, for different reasons,70 that the 
framework which this polarity provides is anachronistic. What we have argued in the previous 
sections, however, is that both these approaches (i.e. the vulgar fusion theory of state and 
society and excessive stress on the growth in complexity) fail, the former in not recognising 
the full reality of modem social development, the latter in neglecting to provide a 
constructive democratic paradigm in contemporary conditions. Thus, the one remaining 
option is to restructure the liberal system, in particular its old state-society distinction, by 
realigning it to the normative merits of participatory democracy. In so doing, we can focus 
on one central question, namely, how can popular sovereignty be accommodated within the 
present liberal system?
In this section, we shall try to answer this question by developing a new socio-political 
vision of ‘constitutionalised democratic autonomy’. It will be argued that this new project 
can extend democracy to a wide range of social relations within existing liberal-democratic 
regimes by providing a coherent interpretative framework that will, against a background of 
growing complexity, offer a common normative fabric, linking rights, associations, and 
publics. Three themes are to be identified within such a constitutionalised democratic 
autonomy. First, the liberal separation of society from state will be restructured, stress being 
given to the need for an interdependent and balanced relationship between the two. This 
refocused state-society distinction will pave the way for a two-tiered conception of politics 
together with a two-track proposal for democratisation. (Sec.3-4.1) Secondly, in an attempt
70 While Schmittian theory stresses the inevitable refusion of society and the state, Luhmannite theory 
concentrates, with reference to the growth of complexity in modem societies, on the logical absurdity of a 
grand discourse reviving the semantics of the state and civil society.
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to retain the possibility of a self-critique on the part of society as a whole, we shall try to 
thematise the independent space, the public sphere, vis-a-vis both state and civil society. 
(Sec. 3-4.2.1) Thirdly, the first two themes should, it will be suggested, be 
constitutionalised. (Sec. 3-4.2.2)
4.1 Reconstruction o f the state-society distinction
The recent revival of the state-society polarity among a number of political scientists and 
sociologists can be ascribed to two things. Firstly, this dual concept provides a useful tool 
for analysing the nature of modernity or modem society per se. Secondly, it has potential 
value as an ideological weapon with which those seeking an agenda either of political 
revolution or constitutional reform can attack the present political order arising out of 
modernity, while at the same time suggesting a new vision of the future. In fact, as Cohen 
and Arato (1992:vii) point out, this now quite fashionable usage has arisen out of 
“struggles” against communist and military dictatorships in many parts of the world. Yet 
even in Western democracies, some academics and political campaigners, whether 
progressive or conservative, make use of this polarity in thematising the case for reform. 
(See, e.g. Habermas 1992b: 454; Keane 1988a: 2-5; Walzer 1992: 89-90; Lipow 1996: 64)
Interestingly, with reference to this state-society distinction, a new paradigm embracing 
political policies, strategies and institutional arrangements, is being sought across the 
political spectrum today. On the one hand, the New Right has capitalised the centrality of 
this distinction in its attempt to overcome the failures of the welfare state. On the other 
hand, a number of New Left theorists, while acknowledging the importance of that 
distinction, criticise the Right's indifference to democracy as the organisational principle of 
society. Our new vision of democracy is sympathetic basically to the latter.
4.1.1 A critique of neo-conservatism
(i) The basic tenet of neo-conservatism
Neo-conservatism (or the New Right)71 gives prominence to the realm of freedom in 
attacking the interventionist welfare state. This theoretical starting point is indebted to
71 Usage varies, thus the same phenomenon may be styled neo-conservatism, the New Right, or neo­
liberalism. However, these terms do, on occasion, indicate theoretical differences of opinion. Here we shall 
focus mainly upon the policies pursued by a particular political force, namely, Thatcherism.
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certain aspects of the socialist critique of late-capitalist social formations. As Offe 
(1984:66) points out, the “renaissance of the conservative theories of crisis” began by 
taking over the Marxist assumption that bourgeois democracy and the capitalist mode of 
production constitute a precarious, yet indissoluble, relationship of tension. But while 
adopting certain positions and approaches derived from the tradition of a critical theory of 
advanced capitalism, neo-conservatism polemically removes from it any element of 
economic reductionism. Neo-conservatives try to locate the cause of the crisis within the 
welfare state in problems resulting from the democratic political process, such as the 
overload of state and the ungovernability of society. (See Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987: 66- 
68) Consequently, attempting to redress this situation, they redraw the boundaries between 
state and civil society in a way that gives priority to the latter. The first target of this 
strategy is an increase in efficiency, which is achieved by introducing an apolitical market 
system into both government and the economy, and thus reducing the political domain to a 
minimum. (See Offe 1985: 818) Underlying this approach is the view that political life, like 
economic life, is a matter of individual freedom and initiative.
(ii) A British version of neo-conservatism: "free economy, strong state"
In Britain, the New Right, which can generally be styled ‘Thatcherism’, has taken on an 
ambivalent character in that it embraces both state centrism and libertarianism. Andrew 
Gamble (1994, esp. 35ff) depicts the policies of this British New Right as a vision of a 
strong state alongside a free economy. John Keane (1988a: 9) points out that the neo­
conservative recipe in Britain is simultaneously to restrict the scope of state and increase its 
power. What made this seemingly contradictory policy possible was, as David Held (1989: 
140) notes, the separation of the instrumental, or performative, dimension of state from the 
idea of the state as a powerful, prestigious and enduring representative of the people or 
nation. Thatcherism may be seen as having sought to draw upon and reinvigorate the 
symbols and agencies of the latter while systematically attacking the former. In short, the 
British New Right is a mixed ideology of nationalism and capitalism, which Walzer (1992: 
90, 94-97) saw as separate rival ideologies.
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(iii) A distorted distinction between state and society
It could, of course, be argued that reform programmes require a strong state for their 
implementation. Defeating one’s opponents is, after all, an essential preliminary stage of 
any radical reorganisation. However, for many reasons, the neo-conservative attempt to 
redraw the boundaries between state and civil society can be seen as misdirected.
One major contradiction resulting from neo-conservative attempts to alter the post-war 
political settlement can clearly be seen in the field of central-local government relations. 
Martin Loughlin (1989; 1994) analyses a number of negative impacts which Thatcherite 
policies have had over the past two decades on this area. The thrust of all these ‘reforms’ 
was to reduce the political capacity of local government to govern. This reduction has been 
achieved, on the one hand, by transferring a significant part of local government services to 
the private sector, and, on the other, by strengthening the central control of local authority 
finance. Loughlin argues that the juridification of central-local relations, via which these 
changes have been implemented, has resulted in an entrenchment of the hierarchical, 
authoritarian power of the central government. The problem with this juridification, in his 
view, is that it was not backed by a competent ideology that could not only fill the 
normative gap between administrative reality and legal ideal but adequately reflect the 
complexity of the political-administrative system as a whole. Furthermore, this ill- 
conceived juridification has, in turn, resulted in the loss of an essential aspect of the “self- 
correcting” mechanism of the traditional system of government, i.e. the co-operative 
pluralist central-local government relations.
Another area equally affected by neo-conservative policies is that of civil and political 
liberties. As Gamble (1994: 43) maintains, strong Thatcherite state did not necessarily lead 
to the establishment of a free market: “The authority of the state is all important and no 
principles or policy goals, such as the sanctity of individual rights or the need to maximise 
economic efficiency, can be allowed to override it.” Increased emphasis on “law and order”, 
almost inevitably, went hand in hand with the selective revival of diffuse and general 
symbols of the British nation-state, and thus tended to avoid general domestic 
confrontation.
There is ample evidence for a massive reorganisation of the state apparatus for 
maintaining law and order in the era of Thatcherism. This tough policy has undermined the
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value of opposition by allowing greater concentration and centralisation of the state power, 
in such areas as the storage of information, surveillance and pre-emptive control of, among 
other things, industrial conflict, social movements and political dissent. (See Ewing & 
Gearty 1990: v-vi) A number of new laws that give greater powers to the police and law 
enforcement authorities, such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Public 
Order Act 1986 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, are merely the tip of an iceberg. 
All this development shows that the neo-conservative strand of New Right thought cannot 
easily be aligned with its neo-liberal strand which stresses the value of individual freedom 
of choice and minimal government. Many political commentators and sociologists have 
noted that the neo-conservative strand, which rests upon a recovery of traditional nationalist 
symbols coupled with hard line policies, has made the task of preserving or creating public 
spheres of reciprocity and solidarity more difficult. (See, e.g. Keane 1988a: 9-10; Held 
1989: 141-143) Therefore, the capital, which neo-conservatives have gained in their attempt 
to attack the plethora of bureaucracy inherent in the welfare state, was offset by the side 
effects of their leanings to arrogant nationalism, rampant egoism and a spirit of mistrust. 
Apparently, this new movement and theory is at root concerned to advance the cause of 
classical liberalism against democracy by limiting the potential capacity of state power to 
encourage social equality. (See Held 1989: 175; Fraser 1992: 133)
4.1.2 Towards a new equilibrium between state and civil society: double democratisation 
The above critique of neo-conservatism does not necessarily imply advocacy of the 
conventional ideal of political left, which relies on the myth of monolithic collective 
decision-making. We have already sought to demonstrate that the growth of complexity in 
modem societies makes it impossible to maintain a holistic view of popular sovereignty. 
What is called 'postliberal political theory' tries to provide an alternative approach in that 
attempts are made to reconcile liberal political institutions with participatory democracy. 
The thrust of this postliberal theory is that both the ideal of mutual aid and the taming and 
restriction of state power must be sublimated in a new model of democracy, yet without 
prejudice to democratic accountability. This view can best be thematised in a project of 
double democratisation involving not only the state but also civil society. We may start with 
the nature of the politics underlying this new project.
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(i) The possibility of a normative paradigm of democracy: the reconstruction of the political 
in a decentred society
(a) Post-modern political theory - The end of a normative paradigm of the political?
Neo-conservatism and systems theory are correct in asserting that the view of society as 
centred in the state does not fit modem societies which are functionally differentiated. 
However, they are wrong in denying altogether the usefulness and the possibility of rational 
government planning, control, and intervention. Underlying this denouncement of the state, 
or the central role of the political as the organising principle of modem societies, is their 
obsession with the societal effect of the capitalist economic development. The emergence of 
these effects, they believe, has changed the gravitational point of modem societies from the 
political (i.e. a normative paradigm) to the economy (i.e. a cognitive paradigm). Neo­
conservatism argues that the failure of the welfare state can be ascribed to the failure of the 
interventionist belief that civil society, as a sphere of an economy regulated via labour, 
capital and commodity markets, can be controlled by the political system. Luhmann argues 
that in complex societies, the politically constituted society has become redundant and the 
state can only be viewed as the self-description of the political system, merely one 
subsystem of global society. In this view, politics is and should be no longer responsible for 
problems that concern society as a whole. The result is what is generally styled ‘postmodern 
politics’.
In a nutshell, postmodern politics relies on two premises. First, it presupposes the 
impossibility of a metanarrative, or superdiscourse, that could make intersubjective 
discourse possible. Second, it is based on the conviction that ‘society’ is not the kind of 
holistic ‘object’, that is open to either representation or strategic manipulation. This post­
modern stance is, therefore, characterised by a number of distinct features: the dissolution 
of social realities into discursivity; the closure of multiple discourse; advocacy of anti- 
foundationalist theories whether moral, political or legal; a preference for ‘difference’; the 
decentred (and decentring) image of society as a whole. Taken together, these features add 
up to the impossibility of any meaningful rational reconstruction of social practice. What is 
left for the (postmodern person is only the endless, unpoliceable plurality of the political 
and the social.
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However, if we strictly follow this line, we almost inevitably end up with agnosticism or 
nihilism coupled with single-minded relativism. Despite the strengths of such a 
deconstructive analysis , it lacks reconstructive power and is devoid of strategic and 
institutional proposals. It is the end of a story rather than the beginning of something that 
can be a foundation for self-governing social practices. (See, e.g., Teubner 1992b: 1444- 
1445; McLennan 1995: 94; Jessop 1992) It confronts us with another ontological or 
methodological “absolute”, what McLennan called a new “big picture”, namely, the 
principle of difference or multiplicity: “Instead of everything always being assumed to 
reveal an underlying, integrated logic of totality and integration, everything is now forever 
to be conceived as necessarily multiple, separate and differentiated.” (McLennan 1995: 
83,98) As the list of groups with an apparent claim to separate mention grows almost 
endless, and any concept of identity becomes self deconstructing and contingent, we now 
face the dilemma of what may be called the “vacuum of power”. However, the absence of 
any dominant metanarrative and the collapse of sovereignty and constitutionalism into an 
amorphous fragmentation imply the perpetuation of social inequality and put the stability of 
the modem state at risk. For example, we cannot ignore the risk of oppression in that large 
organisations or groups can seek to limit or end the very order of pluralist society itself. 
Criticism of normative politics and the prevailing concept of identity is, therefore, not only 
the strength but equally the weakness of post-modem legal and political theory.
(b) A balanced conception of the political - The importance and limit of a normative 
politics 
A reflexive mode of politics 
To avoid the weakness of postmodern politics, we have no choice but to recognise, inter 
alia, that despite being a functionally specified system, politics must nevertheless still 
continue to address the problems of society as a whole. However, as Habermas 
(1996[1992]: 385) suggests, politics should carry on such tasks only at a reflexive level and 
then only "when other action systems are no longer up to the job". "At a reflexive level" 
implies that the state can no longer claim the hopeless burden of total responsibility for the 
entire society while continuing to establish itself as the initiating and steering through the
72 For example, its attack on that bureaucratic, statist conception of politics that for many years has been the
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constitutionalised democratic procedures of rational will formation for settling competing 
interests and establishing methods of societal integration. According to Habermas 
(1996[1992]; 1992a), all genuine rational will formation, at the practical level, presupposes 
a belief in a discourse-centred approach anchoring morality, not in a set of “objective” 
norms, but in the “possibility” of a consensual agreement. Hence, the main focus of politics 
is, not substantive regulations based on norms embedded in the "non-public opinion", but 
the procedural control of will formation by means of the institutionalisation of rational 
public debate.
The reconstruction of the political dimension in a decentred society involves two 
seemingly contradictory processes: a shrinkage in the power of the state and an expansion 
of its scope. On the output side of government activity, the powers of the state are to be 
confined to designating institutional boundaries, though with a possible threat of the future 
intervention. Moreover, insofar as the state abandons its claim to responsibility for the 
entire society, the state has to hand over its institutional structures, procedures, participative 
competencies to hybrid agencies which while accepting certain public responsibilities, 
relinquish aspects of their private autonomy. Having established these changes, the state is 
then, once more, in a position to reclaim its role of overarching actor and capable of 
influencing the political and social process via its policies and patterned relationship to 
social groups.
The above programme does not necessitate any fundamental change to the nature of the 
state. Some socio-legal theorists argue, however, that the state no longer can be conceived, 
in this way, as a unitary actor. It is, in their view, merely the self-description of a loose, and 
essentially fluid, network made up of the governmental apparatus per se together with a 
range of para-governmental agencies, the inter relationship of which is horizontal rather 
than vertical. (See, e.g., Teubner 1993a: 557-558, 569-570) They, basically relying on 
systems theory's understanding of modem societies, confine the boundary of politics to such 
a network that the state becomes the self-description of an autonomous, recursively closed 
circuit of communication working to its own code. The reduction of the state to a 
contingent, self-referential form of politics relieves it of the problem of legitimisation since
principal alternative of the Left to existing liberal democracy.
3 Obviously, this is the opposite of neo-conservative approach which pursues the limited scope of the state 
while strengthening its powers.
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it can draw everything it needs for legitimacy from itself. In this self-referential form of 
politics, the general public functions as a dependent variable within the power process 
operating as an autopoiesis. (Luhmann 1990: 178) This implies that politics is conceived 
only from the point of view of its output, that is, its chosen policies. One outcome of this is 
that central focus is given to steering problems and what Teubner (1987) called the 
"regulatory trilemma". What this autopoietic understanding neglects is the traditional input- 
side politics together with the concomitant problems of legitimisation. For instance, as 
Habermas (1996[1992]: 352) points out, this distorted view of the traditional versus the 
new tasks of the political system tends to ignore the importance of the state for social 
integration. For example, in this perspective, the state is required to distance itself from 
such traditionally important functions as maintaining order, income redistribution and 
social welfare, the protection of collective identities and the transmission of a shared 
political culture.
The conception of the state as a network made up of independent, private components 
contributes to shaking off the communitarian idea of a politically constituted global society 
and the principle of popular sovereignty. While denying the usefulness of the boundaries 
between state and society, which form the core of the liberal conception of the modem 
state, it exalts the non-normative connotations of the liberal model to the highest level. In 
the liberal model, the state is conceived as the neutral guardian of civil society. It implies, 
as Habermas (1996[1992]: 297) rightly notes, that the democratic will-formation of self- 
interested citizens has comparatively weak normative connotations and thus forms only one 
element along with other individual liberties in a complex constitution. Therefore, politics 
is conceived as the business constitutionally assigned solely to the state of taking adequate 
account of societal interests and value orientations. In short, the state as a series of private 
networks follows the liberal model in terms of this "state-centred understanding of politics".
Dual politics
By contrast, Habermas's view of deliberative democracy provides a more acceptable 
understanding of politics that is concerned with both the input of the political process and 
the output of government activities. According to Habermas (1996[1992]: 296-302, 354- 
356), politics should be seen as two-tiered. One tier is the politics governed by the formal
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procedures of institutionalised opinion- and will-formation, the other is the politics that 
occurs only informally in the various networks of the public sphere. The former is related to 
the constitutionally organised area, which forms the core of the political system. In 
Habermas's (1996[1992]: 354-355) view, despite its ordered retreat from its once primary 
position of representing society as a whole, the core of the state still remains in "the familiar 
institutional complexes of administration, judicial system, and democratic opinion-and will- 
formation" embracing parliamentary bodies, political elections, and inter-party competition. 
Hybrid institutions "equipped with rights of self-governance or with other kinds of 
oversight and lawmaking functions delegated by the state" form a kind of "inner periphery" 
at the edges of the administration. "Inner periphery" is understood as implying two things. 
First, it is "inner" because insofar as the activities of such hybrid institutions involve state 
policies, they should be subject to direct, though mainly procedural, constitutional 
regulation. Second, it is "peripheral" because despite their partial incorporation in the 
political system, the nature of these institutions as centres of "civil" power cannot be 
sharply differentiated from the "outer periphery" of the political system which branches into 
a type of clientele bargaining insofar as the implementation of state policies and the 
informal opinion-forming associations are concerned.
This approach sublimates in a refined way the liberal separation of state and society by 
adjusting it to the principle of democracy, which is symbolised by popular sovereignty. The 
Habermasian discourse theory of politics distinguishes civil society, as the social basis of a 
number of autonomous public spheres, from public administration. This means that the 
liberal state-centred understanding of politics is transformed into a two-tier conception of 
politics involving both the state and “society” 74 as part of the lifeworld.
This connection of politics to the lifeworld is not incompatible with the image of a 
decentred society. The area that takes charge of society-wide problems is that of the 
informal public sphere which, unlike the political system, is unable to formulate decisions 
that are collectively binding. Thus, the state as the core area of the political system is 
relieved of the direct pressure of society-wide problems. But, on the other hand, for its own
74 According to Habermas (1987[1981]: 119-152), the lifeworld has three components, which are culture, 
society, and personality.
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sake, the state should endeavour to be as sensitive as possible to public opinion "filtered" by 
the govemmentalised public sphere.75
The constitutionally regulated area of decision-oriented deliberations {i.e. the 
constitutionalised public sphere) plays two intermediaiy roles in this dual politics. First, it 
functions as a major "sluice" for discursively rationalising the decisions taken by the 
administrative complex. It transforms communicative power, which springs from the 
interactions between itself and culturally mobilised publics, into political power that will be 
implemented only through administration. Second, it functions as a "brake" for preventing 
social power from directly imposing its collectively binding decisions. Only by means of 
this constitutionally organised democratic will-formation, can "the unorganised public" 
deliver political influence to the political apparatus. As we have seen, the rational 
democratic will formation is reduced to the institutionalisation of democratic procedures 
that are believed to best guarantee right political decisions. Popular sovereignty, which can 
no longer be conceived as a macrosocial subject, remains in discourse theory of politics as a 
form of "subjectless communications" and is envisaged as merely “point[ing]” the way for 
administrative power. (See Habermas 1996[1992]: 136)
(ii) Democratisation as a double-sided process 
The implications of the dual-politics approach are profound: “democratisation ... would 
mean attempting to maintain and to redefine the boundaries between civil society and state 
through two interdependent and simultaneous processes: the expansion of social equality 
and liberty, and the restructuring and democratising of state institutions.” (Keane 1988a: 14. 
See also Held 1989: 182)
It is apparent that this approach keeps its distance from the traditional Marxist orthodoxy, 
which is geared to the ultimate abolition of the state. In the view of the proponents of such 
double-sided democracy, the state with its institutions is not necessarily merely an 
instrument of the ruling class. Rather, it is an essential device for, among other things,
75 I.e. the parliamentary complex that is, in comparison with the administrative complex, conceptually the 
most open for "perceiving and thematising" social problems at the expenses of a more capacity to "deal" with 
problems.
6 In examining Macpherson’s theory of democracy and possessive individualism, Keane (1993: 118-124) 
makes it clear that theories of state abolitionism and expressivism (as a form of extreme individualism) must 
be sublated. See also Keane 1988a: 25.
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enacting legislation, enforcing rights, co-ordinating new policies and containing the 
conflicts that inevitably arise between particular interest groups. Representative electoral 
institutions, including parliament and the competitive party system, must be seen as 
indispensable elements for authorising and co-ordinating these activities. (See Held 
1989:181; Keane 1988a: 14-15, 21-24. See also Habermas 1996[1992]: 134; Walzer 1992: 
102ff)
At the same time, the absorption of civil society by the state and visa versa is also denied. 
Civil society, as opposed to the state, consists of “areas of social life - domestic world, the 
economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction - which are organised by 
private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct control 
of the state.” (Held 1989: 181)77 But as Keane (1988a: 14) suggests, this realm, contrary to
77 Yet it is important to see that in reconstructing the terminology of civil society, there is among many 
theorists a strong bias against a two-part framework of state and civil society, such as that proposed by Keane 
and Held. While not denying that the liberal/pluralist state-society distinction is to be the essence of a new 
model of democracy, critics of the two-part model propose a further division between civil society, in the 
narrow sense, and a sphere of economy, which is regulated via labour, capital, and commodity markets. 
(Habermas 1992b: 453) The rationale of the three-part model is that “as we know from the history of the 
West, the spontaneous forces of the capitalist market economy can represent as great a danger to social 
solidarity, social justice, and even autonomy as the administrative power of the modem state.” (Cohen & 
Arato 1992: viii, 476-477) Three party theorists define civil society as “a sphere of social interaction between 
economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of 
associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication.” 
(Cohen & Arato 1992: ix) This conception of civil society, they add, is “created through forms of self­
constitution and self-mobilisation. It is institutionalized and generalised through laws, and especially 
subjective rights, that stabilise social differentiation.” (Cohen & Arato 1992: ix) It is apparent that under this 
definition, all of social life outside the administrative state and economic processes, in the narrow sense, 
cannot be identified with civil society. On the back of Habermas’s two level conception of society, they 
attempt to confine the scope of civil society to the extent that the systemic media of the political and economic 
systems cannot interfere with the normative integration and open-ended communication that are characteristic 
of the lifeworld. In this sense, the political role of civil society is also limited to the generation of indirect 
influence through democratic associations and unconstrained discussion in the cultural public sphere. In 
Cohen and Arato’s view of civil society is not opposed to the economy and state by definition. (See Cohen & 
Arato 1992: x-xi) Their notions of economic and political society refer to mediating spheres through which 
civil society can gain influence over political-administrative and economic processes. Antagonism arises 
among these spheres only when such mediations fail or when systemic institutions hinder them. However, the 
difference between a two-part model and a three-part model should not be exaggerated, at least as far as 
political modernisation (or rationalisation) is concerned. Having regard to the essential similarities between 
the two, the difference between them surrounding the nature of economy in modem society is trivial. It should 
be stressed that both criticise a single standpoint from which the totality of society is both visible and 
transformable. They have also a common voice in preventing the idea of a constitutional state or rule of law 
from being deconstructed by a far-fetched functionalist initiative for the self-organising of society. (See 
Habermas 1996[1992]: esp. chs.3-4; Habermas 1988; Held 1989: 182-185, ch.7. Cf. Ladeur 1997) Both sides 
stress the importance of formal political democracy, i.e. political, administrative and legal mechanisms for 
managing conflict, of restricting and actively reducing the bitter consequences which are generated by the 
multiplicity of life. The existing liberal democracy is not the target of subversion but rather the starting point 
for an expanded democracy.
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neo-conservative presumption, is neither conceptually “innocent” or “sacred” because it 
cannot be simply synonymous with a non-state, legally guaranteed sphere dominated by 
capitalist corporations and patriarchal families. The structure of civil society itself must be 
reorganised to create conditions for effective participation, proper political understanding 
and equal control of the political agenda. As Habermas (1996[1992]: 175) puts it, “civil 
society is expected to absorb and neutralise the unequal distribution of social positions and 
the power differentials resulting from them, so that social power comes into play only 
insofar as it facilitates the exercise of civic autonomy and does not restrict it.” (Original 
emphasis) Indeed, in complex societies, the most important threat to individual freedoms is 
the absence of any “regulatory” mechanisms through which private power centres can be 
adequately controlled. Therefore, Held (1989:182) suggests:
for democracy to flourish today it has to be reconceived as a double-sided phenomenon: concerned, on the 
one hand, with the form of state power and, on the other hand, with the restructuring of civil society. This 
entails recognising the indispensability of a process of ‘double democratization’: the interdependent 
transformation of both state and civil society.
That is to say that civil society and the state must furnish the condition of each other’s 
democratisation. As Walzer (1992: 104) puts it, “Only a democratic state can create a 
democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state.” 
(See also Held 1989: 184; Keane 1988a: 15) In short, the ideal of “double democratisation” 
- what Held (1989: 182-187) called “democratic autonomy”, or what Walzer (1992: 105) 
termed “critical associationalism” - is basically grounded on the idea of the equilibrium of 
state and society, the regulated balance of the political and the social. (See Keane 1988a: 
22)
4.2 Towards constitutionalised democratic autonomy
We now recognise that a reconstructed separation of civil society and state is a necessary 
condition for the successful functioning of democracy. In what follows, we shall seek to 
demonstrate in detail how simultaneously to achieve the demands for representation of civil 
society in the political decision-making process together with its autonomy vis-a-vis the state 
which equally presupposes its own autonomy. In so doing, we shall propose what may be
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called ‘constitutionalised democratic autonomy’ as a desirable method of achieving such 
reconciliation.
4.2.1 The public sphere as the intermediary structure between state and civil society
To smoothly reconcile a demand for the differentiation of state and civil society with their 
interdependence, our project of constitutionalised democratic autonomy needs a conceptual 
resource offering a coherent interpretative framework for the state-society distinction. As 
we have seen above, the concept of "the public sphere", first, in 1962, thematised by 
Habermas and restructured in a number of his later works, can provide such a resource.78
According to Habermas (1996[1992]: 360), the public sphere is "a network for 
communicating information and points of view". This means that it cannot be conceived as 
an "institution" and certainly not an "organisation" but a "space" in which social actors, 
individual or collective, deliberate about their common affairs. In the following, we shall 
elaborate the meaning and implications of this space in the light of its relationship with the 
state and civil society.
(i) The public sphere and the state: Towards a reflexive mode of societal integration
The public sphere is conceptually distinct from the state but, insofar as mediates its 
specialised 'public' opinion to the state, is involved in state policy making. The conceptual 
distinction of the public sphere from state permits the former to be critical of the latter. While 
this distinction provides the public sphere, and civil society as its social basis, with autonomy 
and legitimacy, the orientation of the state to the public sphere implies a minor loss of 
differentiation.
This minor loss is not only inevitable but also desirable. For it is a price we should pay in 
seeking an acceptable, realistic paradigm of democracy by institutionalising a reflexive 
learning system which can make it possible to compare the consequences of different 
solutions to social problems. In other words, any loss of differentiation can be camouflaged by 
the benefit of an intellectualising effect embedded in democratic will formation. Moreover, 
the indirect nature of the relationship between the public sphere and the state can minimise the 
effect of this loss. The public sphere is not a ‘physically’ present social order that can operate
78 For a concise evaluation of Habermas’s public sphere, see Nancy Fraser 1992.
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with the notion of a social whole, centred in the state and imaged as a goal-oriented subject 
writ large. Rather, it is a loose network of communication, separate from the dense 
interactions of the lifeworld, and coupled with the image of a "decentred" society. Here we 
take heed of Habermas's suggestion regarding the legitimate role of the public sphere within 
the political process. Habermas (1996[1992J: 364) says, although the public is constitutive for 
the internal structure and reproduction of the public sphere, the political role of the public 
does not lie in decision-making but in political "influence" over state policy. It means that the 
political influence of the general public can be transformed into political power only through 
"institutionalised political procedures". Therefore, the democratisation of the state is, not to 
increase participation per se, but to create structures of sensitivity to the results of 
participation. The institutionalisation of rational democratic debate, especially in the form of 
constitutional norms, can serve to reduce social complexity, evident in the culturally 
motivated public sphere, in such a way as to prevent the ‘direct’ transmission of 
communicative power to the political system. Such institutionalisation, in this sense, 
constitutes what Offe (1996: ch.2) calls "brakes" or "filters", or what Habermas (1996[1992]: 
170, 300) terms "sluices", which are envisaged as protecting the state from uncontrollable 
public pressures. With this public sphere, a realistic alternative to other democratic models 
could emerge, namely, a reflexive model of democratisation allowing for latent processes of 
"societal integration" to come forward within the political system, however, in a very limited 
manner.
It is important to see that this approach, unlike systems theory, does not endorse the classic 
liberal notion that the public functions as a dependent variable within the power process. 
Individual and collective actors make up the peripheral networks of the political public sphere 
which, in turn, provides the core networks of the political public sphere (that become arms of 
state) with their legitimacy as well as critical scrutiny. Furthermore, as Habermas 
(1996[1992J: 383-384; 1992a: 223-227) notes, the fact that given certain circumstances,79 the 
‘unorganised public’ can turn into a revolutionary force, seriously calls into question the 
systems theoretic notion that the general public is an essentially dependent entity. The 
assumption of potential "civil disobedience" implies that the peripheral role of the public in
79 I.e. what Habermas calls “an extraordinary crisis situation” when the normal circuits of communication in the 
political system cease to operate.
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ordinary situation is the result of its own strategies of "self-limitation". Such strategies80 are 
designed to minimise those risks which would emerge were the general public to be regarded 
as "physically present, participating, and jointly deciding members of a collectivity" 
(Habermas 1992b: 451. See also Offe 1996: ch.2; Cohen & Arato 1992: 453-456.) Again, 
such analysis best reflects both the decentred structures of modem society and the necessary 
interdependence of state and civil society as different action fields, and therefore provides a 
theoretical basis for the kind of procedural democracy exemplified by Habermas's deliberative 
democracy and our own constitutionalised democratic autonomy.
(ii) The public sphere and civil society 
The public sphere is also conceptually distinct from civil society. As we have seen, civil 
society is composed of voluntary, non-state associations and connections. The spontaneous 
character of civil society means that it forms the core part of the lifeworld. However, this 
conceptual distinction does not imply that even at a functional level, these two spheres do not 
interrelate. The associational network of civil society provides opportunities for the public 
sphere to be rooted in the lifeworld in Habermas's sense. This means that the communicative 
channels of the public sphere link it to those of private domains - the dense networks of social 
interaction in the private sectors of both the lifeworld and functional systems. It is in the nexus 
of voluntary or secondary associations that the connection between the two spheres becomes 
manifest. Civil society, as "a body of the private persons assembled to form a public", 
provides the social basis on which the public sphere can be conceived as a third action field of 
the "noninstitutional political". This informal political public sphere forms an "intermediary 
structure" between the political system, on the one hand, and the private sectors of both the 
lifeworld and functional systems, on the other. (See Habermas 1996[1992]: 373) As we shall 
see, the political significance of civil society persuades us to rethink the importance of its 
democratic organisation which forms one pillar of democratic governance.
80 Of course, as Offe (1996: 33-37) correctly points out, the other side of such self-limitation strategies is a 
high "risk" that civil disobedience against the established order will impose on individual and collective 
actors. Habermas gently reminds us of the very strict conditions to any successful civil disobedience. The 
temporary, contextual, contingent character of the public sphere also imposes a form of limitation on the 
sovereign will. Therefore Habermas (1996[1992J: 359) makes it clear that "What ultimately enables a legal 
community's discursive mode of sociation is not simply at the disposition of the members' will."
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4.2.2 Institutional conditions of democratic autonomy
What institutional conditions are called for in order to secure democratisation in the form of a 
double-sided process? Drawing on Habermas's discourse theory of democracy, the answer is a 
new version of constitutionalism providing for both the self-regulation of civil society and the 
reflexive accountability of the state.
(i) A new version of constitutionalism
Constitutionalism is a main tenet of the liberal mode of democracy. Hinging on the 
constitutional framework that focuses on the ideal of limited government, the liberal mode 
undervalues the democratic self-determination of citizens. However, this does not mean that 
constitutionalism is incompatible with popular sovereignty. From the perspective of 
constitutionalised democratic autonomy, if properly reconstructed, the liberal idea of limited 
government can remain fundamental to democratic governance based upon the equilibrium of 
state and civil society. In short, what is needed is a reorientation of the liberal version of 
constitutionalism that would bring it into line with postmodern conditions characterised by the 
image of a decentred society. There are two basic themes for reorientation: first, the nature of 
the basic rights and scope of the public, and, second, the meaning of the rule of law, especially 
in its relationship with politics. The first theme is related to the question of who is to 
participate in the process of will-formation while the second theme gives rise to question of 
how such a system of rights with the ongoing dynamic of rational debate can or should be 
stabilised.
(ii) Flexible and contextual concepts of basic rights and the public
One problem of liberal constitutionalism lies with its narrow, rigid conception of rights 
which focuses on the ‘negative’ freedom from external intervention and private autonomy. 
This problem is particularly apparent where a unitary construct of citizenship prevails. 
Citizenship based on liberal political theory relies upon a “logic of identity” that seeks to 
reduce differences to unity. The rights-oriented liberal citizenship thesis presupposes that 
the human subject can be conceived as a unitary agent who, being rational and autonomous, 
and thus inherently in a privileged position, can create criteria necessary for determining 
what is good or right. Whether a polity has democratic legitimacy is determined by its
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respect for individual rights, which are essential if a capacity for self-realisation is to be 
developed. One caveat, however, is that although citizenship is conceived as pertaining to 
participation within the political realm, the unity of the basic structure of society can be 
achieved only by the exclusion of those subjects lacking political significance. Thus, in 
practice, a qualified construct of citizenship prevails in which citizens are regarded as 
“autonomous, not heteronomous; unified, not plural; static, not shifting; individual, not 
collective; abstract, not material.” (Barron 1993: 95)
It is apparent that this unitary conception of citizenship cannot include and accommodate 
all perspectives and all claims which come up in complex modem societies. For example, it 
tends to pay little attention to the significant role of intermediary groups that provide 
forums by way of which citizens can more effectively enjoy their rights not merely in 
principle but in practice. Anne Barron points out that group rights fall victim to a unitary 
and qualified construct of citizenship which differentiates those who belong within the 
realm of politics from those who do not:
To attribute the status of citizenship to the individual rather than to the group, for example, is to refuse the 
notion that identity is an achievement of intersubjective negotiations: it is to represent the individual as 
prior to any groups to which s/he belongs, the group as, at most, the result of an act of choice that leaves 
the self intact, and the needs that groups take to be definitive of their shared identity as nothing more than 
claims of right asserted by their individual members. (Barron 1993: 96)
Habermas also suggests that in complex pluralised societies, rights cannot be primarily things 
individuals possess but "relations" that have their basis in a form of mutual recognition:
At a conceptual level, rights do not immediately refer to atomistic and estranged individuals who are 
possessively set against one another. On the contrary, as elements of the legal order they presuppose 
collaboration among subjects who recognise one another, in their reciprocally related rights and duties, as 
free and equal citizens. This mutual recognition is constitutive for a legal order from which actionable 
rights are derived. In this sense "subjective" rights emerge co-originally with "objective" law, to use the 
terminology of German jurisprudence. (1996[1992]: 88-89. Original emphasis)
This relation-oriented concept of rights has, inter alia, two implications.
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(a) Autonomy as the end and a condition of rights 
As Habermas (1996[1992]: 419) suggests, the relation-centred concept of rights assumes 
that, unlike the liberal paradigm of a system of rights, rights cannot be assimilated to goods 
that one can divide up and possess or can consume in common. Rights are conceived as 
"institutionally defined rules specifying what people can do in relation to one another". 
(Young 1990: 25) Basic rights based on mutual recognition are conceived as "unsaturated 
placeholders” (Habermas 1996[1992]: 126) in the sense that they do not exist in a determinate 
form over against state. The specific rights, traditionally known as the classic liberal rights, 
are also "context-dependent" in that they emerge as a result of interpretations of what 
Habermas called a "general right to individual liberties" by a political legislature in response 
to changing circumstances. (See Habermas 1996[1992]: 125-129) From this perspective, it is 
recognised that the familiar liberal notion of rights, namely, that individual liberties can 
restrict the scope of a citizen’s public autonomy, has to be abandoned. This is not to say, 
however, that the individual’s private autonomy has to be instrumentalised in the name of 
popular sovereignty. Rather, the thrust of the relation-centred concept of rights lies in the "co­
originality" of private and public autonomies. While private autonomy cannot restrict popular 
sovereignty, popular sovereignty has to, in turn, continually redefined in the form of political 
rights and according to circumstances. Public autonomy is manifested in the political right to 
participate in processes of opinion-and will-formation, in other words, by citizen’s exercising 
political autonomy and thus simultaneously changing and expanding both their private and 
civic autonomy. This is to say, therefore, that the classic liberal rights are derived from the 
private autonomy of citizens which, in turn, goes hand in hand with their public autonomy. 
The normative key in this concept of rights is not the negative autonomy of atomistic citizens 
from any external intervention but the positive autonomy of free and equal consociates 
participating in the political process which affects their lives. This positive autonomy grounds 
the status of free and equal active citizens, and is "self-referential" in that citizens themselves 
deliberate, and decide, on how to fashion rights that simultaneously define their private and 
public autonomy.
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(b) Flexible concept of the public and the case for the public sphere 
One advantage of the radical contextual conception of rights conceived as, and integral to, 
the very notion of democratic rule is that it does not seek the unity of citizens by virtue of 
homogeneous interests, their altruism or their good nature, and that thus it accepts a 
plurality of forms of life. Nothing is given prior to the citizen's practice of self- 
determination other than the discourse principle in as much as what will count as a matter 
of common concern will be contested and decided by discussion. (See Habermas 
1996[1992]: 314; Fraser 1992: 127) One important insight which such a view offers, and 
from which we can learn a great deal, is the fact that in complex societies, the public and 
private spheres do not correspond so much to institutional spheres as to the concrete 
conduct of, or decisions made by, social actors, whether individual or collective.81 It 
implies, inter alia, that the political agency of the plural social subject extends beyond the 
boundary of state, and thus “the social” is envisaged as a “terrain of political contestation”. 
(McClure 1992: 123) This insight helps us to rediscover civil society and the public sphere 
(as opposed to state) as the locus of what Habermas called “potential”, as opposed to 
“existing”, political legitimacy. (See, e.g. Habermas 1992b: 447-448, 452-457)
(iii) Constitutionalisation of the political system: the requirement of "democratic procedures" 
We have sought to demonstrate in the previous section that a radical system of rights is 
required to reconstruct a workable programme of double democratisation. However, this 
contextual, flexible concept of rights alone cannot preserve civil society and the public 
sphere from deformations and cannot guarantee the permanent exercise of citizens’ political 
rights as one core of a democratic polity. Since the self-referential act that legally 
institutionalises civic autonomy cannot stabilise itself, it needs to become permanent by 
means of the further juridification of the political order to which both private and public 
autonomy look for their enforcement. In other words, as we have suggested, the autonomy 
of both the public sphere and civil society presupposes the democratisation of the state, a 
goal that can be achieved only when the political system is constitutionalised. (See 
Habermas 1996[1992]: 132-134) The role of state in stabilising autonomy gives rise to the 
need for the legitimisation of the political order as well as the exercise of political power.
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Yet, as we have seen, this requirement of legitimacy should not entail the kind of 
asymmetrical primacy of social power over political power, which was envisaged by 
Schmitt. Nor, on the other hand, should its potential side effects be exaggerated in the 
manner of certain systems theorists who seek to justify the self-reproduction of political 
power. Rather, we should be able to find a balanced alternative in the constitutionalisation 
of the sanctioning, organising, and executive powers of state itself.
If we are correct in assuming that the political has to concern in a balanced way with both 
the state and the public sphere, realms that are conceptually distinct and differently 
organised, then the resulting implication is that the political power pertaining to each area 
equally distinct. According to Habermas (1996[1992]: 136), political power is differentiated 
into “communicative power” and “administrative power”. The former springs from 
interaction between govemmentalised-opinion- and will-formation {i.e., the institutional 
political) and culturally mobilised publics {i.e., the non-institutional or informal political). 
The latter stems from the state, or more specifically from the state’s power to implement its 
policies. Insofar as we recognise the interdependence between state and civil society, a 
reduction of the principle of popular sovereignty to "subjectless communications" 
notwithstanding, administrative power should not be allowed to reproduce itself on its own 
terms but should be regenerated by the conversion of communicative power. (See 
Habermas 1996[1992]: 150) Communicative power cannot, on the other hand, directly steer 
the administrative system as it is able to operate only via the "transmission belt" of the 
govemmentalised public sphere. Only law formulated through this rational democratic will- 
formation can invest government with political power or impose limits on it. Therefore, 
Habermas (1996[1992]: 150) suggests that the idea of constitutionalism be construed as the 
requirement that "the administrative system ... be tied to the lawmaking communicative 
power and kept free of illegitimate interventions of social power".
S ')According to Habermas, this idea of the constitutional state manifests itself in the 
concrete principles for the juridification of the network of discourses and negotiation: “the 
principle of comprehensive legal protection for individuals, which is guaranteed by an
81 Two illustrative articles on the legal status of intermediary associations in Germany and Britain demonstrate 
this point with force and clarity. See Teubner 1993b; Black 1996.
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independent judiciary; the principles requiring that administration be subject to law and to 
judicial review; the principle of the separation of state and society, which is intended to 
prevent social power from being converted directly into administrative power, that is, 
without first passing through the sluices of communicative power formation.” (1996[1992]: 
169-170) This opens up the possibility that law can be instrumentalised for the strategic 
deployment of power and could, therefore, assist the state to “colonise” society. To counter 
such instrumentalisation, in Habermas’s view (1996[1992]: 168-169), the state apparatus 
must, in turn, be organised in such a way that any publicly authorised power must be 
legitimised by law.
However, it should be borne in mind once again that this juridification of political power 
cannot refer to the predetermined will of citizens but to the safeguarding of specific 
processes of the democratic formation of opinion and will. In complex societies, as 
Habermas argues, "a homogeneity of background convictions" cannot be assumed now that 
a presumptively shared class interest has given way to “a confused pluralism of competing 
and equally legitimate forms of life". (1992b: 445) In this situation, any attempt to assume 
ideological hypotheses regarding "emancipation" or "progress" and to morally qualify the 
material results of participation runs the risk of "political repression" in the sense of 
"exclusion" from representation. (See Offe 1983: 234)
(iv) Democratisation of civil society: publicly responsible self-regulation
(a) A paradox of democratic autonomy: the problem of voluntary non-participation
As we have suggested, democratisation as a double-sided process means that the 
autonomy of civil society and the public sphere cannot be absolute and thus not immune 
from regulation. A paradox of constitutionalised democratic autonomy is that despite the 
recognition of a system of rights grounding the status of free and equal active citizens, there 
is no way to compel them to make public use of their communicative freedom. Even 
legitimate law, enacted according to democratic procedures, cannot obligate its addresses to 
use their rights in ways oriented to reaching mutual understanding, even if political rights 
call for precisely this kind of public action. This implies, as Habermas (1996[1992]: 131)
82 It is important to see that this idea of government by law illuminates the political side of balancing major 
forces of “macrosocial integration” such as money, administrative power, and solidarity. See Habermas 
1996[1992]: 150.
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points out, that apart from legal institutionalisation of participation, citizens' spontaneity, 
regenerated by "traditions" and preserved in the "associations of a liberal political culture", 
is still an essential part of democratisation. The ideal of self-regulation is essential to 
encouraging such spontaneity and maintaining the diversity of public opinion tied to the 
multiplicity of forms of social life.
(b) Social equality as a condition of democracy 
Neither the impossibility and undesirability of compulsory participation nor the 
advantages of unrestricted communication can justify any attempt to negate the need for, 
and the possibility of, external regulation of centres of civil power, which is exactly what 
neo-conservatism has assumed. Nancy Fraser (1992: 118-121) shows that social equality is 
a necessary condition for political democracy and that there can be no "unrestricted" 
communication unless unequally distributed social power, which has the repressive and 
exclusionary effects, is tamed. (See also Held 1989: 185-186) In conceiving the informal 
processes of opinion-formation in the public sphere as one pillar of communicatively 
generated power, Habermas agrees with Fraser by saying that
The informal public sphere must, for its part, enjoy the support of a societal basis in which equal rights of 
citizenship have become socially effective. Only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from 
the confines of class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation can 
the potential of an unleashed cultural pluralism fully develop - a potential that no doubt abounds just as 
much in conflicts as in meaning-generating forms of life. (1996[1992]: 308)
As the public sphere should be critical of state, there is no reason to rule out in principle the 
possibility of a regulatory idea, in the light of which the dark side of civil society can be 
publicly scrutinised. The existence of a common framework of regulatory rules, envisaged 
to facilitate satisfactory interaction within civil society and between associations and their 
members, does not necessarily lead to a loss of spontaneity. Such regulatory rules can be 
conceived as "enabling conditions" rather than as "restricting conditions" for 
democratisation, encouraging both social equality and social spontaneity. Therefore, civil 
society, which involves the political public sphere, is required to operate within a context of 
constitutional values manifested mainly in constitutional rights of citizens and associations. 
This is to say that the formula for civil society is transformed from almost absolute self­
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regulation (based on the liberal negative concept of rights) to "publicly responsible self­
regulation" (based on a more flexible and contextual concept of rights).83
(c) Two-track constitutionalisation 
Although both the state and civil society have to be constitutionalised, the nature and 
degree of their constitutionalisation are distinct. This difference can be ascribed to the 
conceptual distinction between state and civil society and the concomitant two differing 
tracks of deliberative politics, that is, decision-oriented deliberation and discovery- and/or 
thematisation-oriented deliberation. The separation of civil society from the state 
presupposes that the self-imposed task of civil society is not to provide co-operative 
solutions to practical political problems which can be more appropriately dealt with by the 
success-oriented action field, i.e. the political system. Rather, civil society is envisaged as 
contributing to the discovery and thematisation of such problems in a way of mediating new 
ways of looking at them to the communicative structures of the public sphere as a "far-flung 
network of sensors". This confined role of civil society, on the one hand, means the 
pheripherisation in the political process of the general public - as what Fraser (1992) called 
the "weak" public, as opposed to the "strong", statised public sphere. On the other hand, 
uncoupling civil society from power-driven, decision-oriented action fields tend to allow it 
to be subject to a lower degree of constitutional obligations than the political system. 
Constitutional obligations are imposed on civil society only insofar as they can facilitate 
unrestricted communication and encourage an unleashed cultural pluralism. They are not 
envisaged to amount to strongly articulated regulation, for example, what Habermas called 
"democratic procedures" which are required in decision-oriented deliberations such as 
parliamentary procedures. Instead, the normative key in the democratisation of civil society 
lies in the autonomy and spontaneity of the "horizontally" associated network, based on a 
"mature pluralism of forms of life, subcultures, and worldviews", rather than their "vertical" 
mediation between the overarching state and the individual. Therefore, unlike the statised 
political public sphere, the focus of the democratisation of civil society should be the 
maintenance of its autonomy and the preservation of spontaneity in a way of securing 
"unconstrained" channels of communication. By "unconstrained" is meant that there is no
83 Hence, even the boundary of civil society is per se open to public debate.
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institutionalised procedural regulation of opinion-formation such as that provided by 
parliamentary procedures. (See Habermas 1996[1992]: 314)
As we have argued earlier, any threats to rational opinion-formation per se should be 
blocked. The greatest threat in this regard comes from the activities of the mass media and 
large organisations or institutions. They, like the state, and in contrast to the more loosely 
organised actors emerging from the public, have organisational power, resources, and 
sanctions with which public opinion is manipulated. Therefore, their power should be 
neutralised and subject to public scrutiny in order to secure "unconstrained" channels of 
communication that maintain the required quality of debate and represent the plurality of 
social life forms. What is required, therefore, is the curtailment of the power of large bodies 
to constrain and influence the political agenda; the restriction of the activities of powerful 
interest groups to pursue unchecked their own interests; and the erosion of the systematic 
privileges enjoyed by some social groups at the expense of others. However, the 
neutralisation of such power cannot be achieved in the same way as the constitutionalisation 
of state power. Unlike the constitutionalisation of a political order, the substantive content 
and degree of public regulation of civil society should refer to the concrete conduct of, or 
decisions made by, it rather than simply to its institutional background. The exercise of 
social powers does not have to be empowered by the constitution but they should, from the 
public's own perspective, be implemented to protect the communication rights of social 
actors. In particular, the rights of social actors (especially, those of small publics) to access 
the opinion-formation process within large organisations should be protected. This means 
that the legal recognition of some actors within civil society is inevitable. Such legal 
recognition can limit not only state power but also the power of institutions within civil 
society.
Naturally, this formula of ‘publicly responsible self-regulation’ on the part of civil 
society - i.e. the efficient and effective regulation of self-autonomy within the 
‘constitutional’ framework, does imply a certain loss of differentiation. The state, as the 
core of the political system, is concerned with designing a common framework of 
regulatory rules that are meant to facilitate satisfactory interaction both within civil society 
and between associations and their members. It can also monitor the self-regulation of civil 
society operating within constitutional values. As we have seen before, the state in this
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regime is not viewed as having only a negative, alienating, "reifying" character as 
traditional liberalism has presupposed but, as political pluralists84 have seen, as possessing 
a positive, "arbitrating" character. This positive conception of the state owes its legitimacy 
to an interdependent or "reflexive" relationship between state and civil society, in the sense 
that state policy relies not only on the administration’s preparatory work and further 
processing but also on the context of discovery provided by a "procedurally unregulated" (i.e. 
informal and autonomous) public sphere. (See Habermas 1996[1992]: 307; Offe & Preuss 
1991: 166) A more democratic order cannot be built simply through state power, but 
without state power, it cannot be built. (Keane 1988a: 23, 237. See also Habermas 1992b: 
444-445) To sum up, any loss of differentiation, generated by the self-limited, but 
interdependent, relationship of civil society and the state, is a very modest price, given that 
this double-sided process significantly strengthens the democratic process.
5 Conclusion
We have so far examined a reconstruction of civil society and reform of state in such a way 
that we can now construct a common normative fabric, linking rights, associations, and 
publics together within an ethos of pluralisation. This project is what I have termed 
‘constitutionalised democratic autonomy’.
It comprises three basic elements. First, it focuses on the autonomy of public spheres that 
are the institutional core of the modem lifeworld. Such social autonomy presupposes a 
multiplicity of social life forms in Habermas’s sense. Underlying this emphasis on autonomy 
is the acknowledgement of the limitation of state regulation and the recognition of the 
importance of self-regulatoiy techniques.
Second, it involves the ideal of democracy founded upon such a pluralised and decentred 
image of society. This new democratic ideal is characterised by a balance between medium- 
steered action domains and communicative action domains in Habermas’s sense. This ideal, 
in turn, requires a new conceptual framework different from that of existing liberal democracy 
and the alternative participatory democracy. It aims, as we have seen, to combine merits of
84 On the English pluralist understanding of the nature of the state, see, e.g. Nicholls 1994; Idem 1974; Magid
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both schemes by means of the reconstruction of the state-civil society distinction. For this, 
there are two preconditions worthwhile noting. First, it is admitted that non-participation 
per se is not a priori a problem. (Murphy 1990:155-156) Therefore, “freedom from 
politics” is accommodated here as an essential part of the contemporary democratic 
heritage. Citizens are entitled to decide that extensive participation is unnecessary in certain 
circumstances.. (See Held 1989:185) They can use their energies more happily outside the 
realm of politics. Therefore, what is equal among citizens is not power but rights of access 
to power. (See Walzer 1983: 309) Second, at the same time, the enhanced political 
participation is embedded in a legal framework that protects and nurtures individuals as 
‘free and equal’ citizens. In this regard, law should not be perceived, in Habermas’ 
terminology, merely “as a medium” but also “as an institution”. (Habermas 1985) In 
particular, a set of new rights is necessary, mainly addressed to the creation of new 
circumstances which will allow citizens to enjoy greater control of their own projects. In 
short, even though citizenship has no absolute primacy over other actual and possible 
memberships, it has a certain practical pre-eminence over them because the state is the most 
important instrument of the political struggle. (Walzer 1992: 105)
The final element, which is closely related to the previous two, is our project’s emphasis on 
the role of law in democracy. A newly reconstructed version of the rule of law plays an 
important role in institutionalising and stabilising the new vision of democracy. In a nutshell, 
all political strategies need to be constitutionalised. Such constitutionalisation depends upon a 
proceduralised concept of law, which is flexible, strategic and contextual. (See Habermas 
1996[1992]: esp. Ch.9 ; Idem 1988; Teubner 1993b: esp. Ch.5; Idem 1992a; Idem 1983) It 
serves as an organisational principle combining social autonomy with democratic control in a 
way that requires a network of social actors to operate within a context of constitutional 
values that are indirectly and strategically implemented.
In what follows, relying upon this basic model, we shall, first, examine the nature and 
role of political parties which are essential elements for the new democratic paradigm, and 
then move on to consider what requirements are necessary for their constitutionalisation.
1966; Barker 1942.
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Chapter 4
A New Perspective on Party Organisations in a New 
Democracy: Political Parties At the Crossroads of Civil Society 
and the State
1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine what implications the project of ‘constitutionalised 
democratic autonomy’, developed in the previous chapter, has for the nature and legal status 
of political parties. To begin, I examine the ways in which the conventional theory of 
political parties has conceived the development of party organisation, (sec. 2) In this 
section, the characteristics of political parties are examined in relation to their three 
traditional models. Despite the dual relationship of political parties vis-a-vis the state, on 
the one hand, and civil society, on the other, these old perspectives have viewed them 
primarily with reference to their relationship to civil society. One important consequence of 
this is that although political parties wield para-governmental integrative power, by 
shielding themselves behind the principle of private autonomy, they do not have to submit 
to the usual responsibilities incumbent on public authorities. Therefore, there is a need for a 
new perspective on the status of political parties that will tackle this disjunction between 
political reality and constitutional ideal. This new perspective should be designed to bring 
about an appropriate framework in which political parties can properly be located within the 
ever more pluralised social order, (sec. 3) This issue will be dealt with in the light of both 
the division of labour within the political system and the “cartelisation” of political parties. 
This chapter will conclude that given the emergence of a new paradigm of politics, party 
organisations, which are at the crossroads of civil society and the state, are becoming ever 
more flexible, contingent and strategic, and this gives rise to a number of problems relating 
to their unitary status, (sec. 4)
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2 Old perspectives on the development of party organisation
2.1 Political parties as a linkage between the state and civil society
As recently as 1976, the majority opinion of the Houghton Committee on proposing 
financial aid to political parties observed that:
Without [political parties] democracy withers and decays. Their role is all pervasive. They provide the 
men and women, and the policies for all levels of government - from the parish council to the European 
Parliament. The parties in opposition have the responsibility of scrutinising and checking all actions of the 
Executive. Parties are the people's watchdog, the guardian of our liberties. At election times it is they who 
run the campaigns and whose job it is to give the voters a clear-cut choice between different men and 
different measures. At all times they are the vital link between the government and the governed. Their 
function is to maximise the participation of die people in decision-making at all levels of government. In 
short they are the mainspring of all the processes of democracy. If parties fail, whether from lack of 
resources or vision, democracy itself will fail. (Houghton 1976: para.9.1. Emphasis added)
This confirms the conventional theory of political parties in that their raison d’etre in modem 
liberal democracies lies in their function of enabling the governed to take part in the political 
process. (See, e.g. Schattschneider 1942:1) In liberal democratic regimes, political parties 
need to convince the electorate that they are uniquely suited to represent the complex interests 
of civil society. This suggests that current increasing distrust of existing political parties, 
reflected in an ever growing interest in new forms of political participation such as a cyber 
democracy and new social movements, is directly attributable to a breakdown of the party 
system as the bridging structure between the state and civil society.
For examining the conventional perspective on the development of party organisation, 
Britain affords the best example. In his “Reflection on the party system” (1952), Ernest 
Barker suggests that one of the possible ways of considering the development of the British 
party system is to examine the nature and role of political parties in terms of the state-society 
distinction. In his view, while society is the area of voluntary groups and voluntary effort, the 
state is that of legal rules and actions under those rules. Barker was aware of the dual 
character of political parties which bridge these two realms. (See Barker 1942:39) He also 
notes that the state-society distinction is useful in pointing up the unique aspect of British
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political and legal development, which gives an important role to political parties.85 For 
Barker (1952:193), these unique features of British life and history include a relatively strong 
initiative on the part of voluntary organisation in the formation of all aspects of life coupled 
with a relatively weak confrontation between “voluntary society” and “legal state”. He 
assumes that the absence of any legal regulation of political parties reflects a British tradition 
in which “collective action outside of the central state and guild-like self-regulation” were 
more pronounced “in the emergent modem period” than in other societies. (Murphy 
1990:151) This rather crude view provides a classic perspective on the development of party 
organisation:
Party began in the area of society, and in that area it may already be traced as early as the Middle Ages. It 
was in its origin, and it still remains in its core, a social formation. A party begins as a set of connected and 
coherent political ideas, formed and enunciated in the process of social discussion. It becomes, in the 
course of its development, a body of persons permanently united in entertaining such a set of ideas: a body 
of persons, forming a social group in the area of Society, who discuss and clarify their common ideas 
among themselves, formulate them in a policy or programme, and defend that programme in discussion 
against other similar groups in the same social area. Finally, and in the culmination of its development,... 
party becomes an organisation, with its own recognised leaders, for the purpose of carrying a programme 
into effect, first by securing a majority of the votes of the political electorate, and then by proceeding to 
turn its leaders into the political government. It thus serves as a mediator between the process of social 
discussion and the practice of political action. (Barker 1952:193-194)
Thus, a party is a “social formation”, the basic task of which is to present the demands of 
society to the state, and then to secure the responses of the state to these demands. A party, as 
a mediator, has to perform two distinct but complementary functions. First, it serves as a 
social sphere where individuals exchange their common interests and gather a set of 
integrated political ideas from social discussion. Secondly, it works as a political sphere 
where the ideas so exchanged and collected flow from the “lifeworld” into the political 
system. The state, with its various mechanisms (organisations and institutions), provides 
political measures responding to social demands. Hence, political parties are the interface 
between the social and the political, in the overlapping area between society and the state.86
85 For the background to Barker's position, which makes a serious effort to explore the Britishness of political
and social structures, see Stapleton 1994.
86 Alessandro Pizzomo suggests that the cause of emerging modem political parties can be found in a lucid 
change in the political thought from late nineteenth century onwards. After itemising diverse currents of 
political and legal thought which anticipated the advent of the pluralist and corporative system, Pizzomo states 
that “One common theme ... was recognition that the idea of a direct relationship between the state and 
individual was unrealistic; that conceptual models and institutional projects should be worked out to cope with
114
2.2 Characteristics o f the three conventional models ofpolitical parties
According to Katz and Mair (1995), at least four “ideal types” of party -  the elite party, 
the mass party, the catch-all party, and the cartel party - are feasible in the history of its 
development. Each type is classified in terms of how it envisages the relationship between 
civil society and the state. The conventional concept of political parties, as a linkage 
between civil society and the state, has prevailed until the advent of the fourth, cartel-party 
model. In particular, the mass-party model, which since the nineteenth century has been the 
most widely accepted model, most clearly reflects such a conventional approach.
2.2.1 The elite party model
The elite party model is that which existed before the introduction of universal suffrage. 
It is the model corresponding to the stage of social stratification in which party competition 
or conflict was based on the ascribed estate and political goals related essentially to 
distribution of privilege, though superficially national interests were on the agenda. In this 
era, since there was no clear boundary between the state and politically relevant civil 
society, such a question as to who was authorised to voice requests from civil society to the 
state was simply unthinkable. (See Pizzomo 1981: 249-250; Katz & Mair 1995: 19)
2.2.2 The mass party model
As, thanks to the widening of suffrage coupled with the constitutionalisation of 
monarchy, the estate system gave way to representative government, a new model of party 
became dominant: the mass party. According to the mass-party model, political parties were 
generally regarded as a vital means by which the individual participates in the political 
process. Therefore, most studies of political parties have concentrated on the relationship of 
parties to wider society and the role of parties in government. Division of interests became 
routinised, thereby politics became primarily about competition, conflict or co-operation 
between these interests. Political parties were regarded as representatives of pre-defined 
sectors of society and, thus, the dominant form of mass participation. (Katz & Mair 1995: 
6-7) In this view, parties were assessed primarily in the light of how successfully they
the reality of more or less independent intermediate bodies, of organised interests and, in general, of groups
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implement the will of the represented or how accountable they are to the people,87 for, lying 
outside the state, they belong to civil society. The analytical focus was mainly on popular 
control of state policy via political parties. Organisational strength of parties was measured 
primarily in terms of the size of the membership, the ideological purity, and modes of 
internal representation and accountability. (See Mair 1994: 2; Pizzomo 1981: 250-256) 
Thus, this model essentially characterises political parties as ideological and collective.
2.2.3 The catch-all party model 
Katz and Mair’s third model, that of the catch-all party, was first thematised by Otto 
Kirchheimer (1966). He contended that western party politics has today become more or 
less “Americanised”, in that “mass integration” parties seeking “surface integration” have 
now turned into electoral agencies. Generally, three causes for this transformation can be 
detected. Firstly, the changes in social stratification systems and cultural attitudes provide 
an explanation. Since the late 1950s, society has become ever more socially and culturally 
pluralised and complex, and this, in turn, has affected the complexion of political interests. 
Consequently, collective identities that were formerly readily discernible are no longer quite 
so visible and therefore not susceptible to party control. Secondly, as welfare statism, 
backed by economic growth, became the norm, parties across the political spectrum, to win 
elections, were forced to accommodate the general welfare of all the electorate rather than 
particularised sectional interests. As a result, parties’ gravitational centre had to shift from 
their members to the electorate. Thirdly, the technological development of public 
communications has enabled party leaders to appeal to the electorate at large and, thus, to 
be more independent of both party members and local organisations. Noticeable in this 
development is the increased importance of professionals with specialist knowledge. As the 
party focus has shifted from mass mobilisation to the advertising and selling of its policies 
via the media to the electorate, so the role of advisers and spindoctors has superseded that 
of the traditional party bureaucrat. Focusing on this point, Angelo Panebianco (1988[1982]: 
264) suggests that the term “electoral-professional party” would be more apt description of 
the new type of party rather than the phrase “catch-all party”.
capable of autonomous collective action.” (Pizzomo 1981:248)
87 This is part of the reason why most British public lawyers examine the role of political parties within the 
context of the responsibility of government. (See, e.g. Turpin 1990: ch.8)
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Yet, even though the catch-all party represents a distinct modality88, it may be said to be 
in the same line as the mass party and, thus, continues to be viewed primarily with reference 
to its relationship to civil society. Parties no longer belong to civil society but are still 
regarded as lying in between the individual and an overarching state. One consequence of 
this is that the establishment of party government notwithstanding, political parties, as 
“consensus purveyors”, remain as private associations and continue to be controlled by the 
norms of private law. That is to say that a centre of power is almost free from public 
supervision.
2.3 The conventional perspective and the concept o f democracy
The conventional models of the political party, outlined above, are connected to 
particular concepts of democracy. Clearly, the elite-party model, which was not based on 
the mediation of social demands to the state, is not tied to the modem conception of 
democracy. It was not until the advent of universal suffrage that the combination of 
parliamentarism and democracy was established. As the franchise was extended to the 
middle and working classes, the mass-party model became dominant. In this era, political 
parties were conceived as the normal channel through which people participate in the 
political process. It was accepted that without parties, it was unthinkable to aggregate and 
mediate social interests. Tight party discipline was a necessary condition for the model and 
the role of people in this system became a passive, legitimising one. In other words, the 
electorate was regarded as an object of political mobilisation. Excessive participation of 
people outside the party politics was regarded as a threat to democracy itself. In short, the 
normative conception of democracy associated with the mass-party model is at bottom an 
elitist one.
This elitist tendency has been reinforced by the emergence of the catch-all party, which 
does not need even to mobilise the electorate. Indeed, it regards such a procedure as 
harmful to the effective working of its organisation. Parties have become the domain of
88 Both the convergence of party programs and growing indeterminacy in party policies differentiate the catch 
all party from the old form of integration party. As Kirchheimer (1966: 197) stresses, the “catch-all party will 
do its utmost to establish consensus to avoid party realignment” while the integration party tends to “count on 
majority political mechanisms to implement its programs only to find that hostile interests frustrate the 
majority decision by the economic and social mechanisms at their disposal”.
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professional politicians and the role of the ordinary citizen is merely to accept whatever 
political goods they proffer.
Is, then, the elitist liberal theory of democracy alone conducive to such conventional 
perspectives on party organisation? Advocates of participatory democracy seeking to reform 
the existing “elitist”-party-centred democracy, in fact, reinforce this elitist element which, 
as we have seen, is inherent in all the conventional models. In the theory of participatory 
democracy, non-participation is considered a priori a problem and, thus, increased 
participation is, generally speaking, the primary goal of all forms of democratisation. (See 
Panebianco 1988[1982]: 273-274) For example, an early work of Habermas (1989[1962]), 
tracing the structural transformation of the public sphere within the liberal political system, 
tried to discern a radical democratic momentum in the constitutional guarantee of the 
principle of publicity and its concomitant intra-organisational democratisation. 
(1989[1962]: 209ff). However, recently, Habermas has acknowledged that this earlier 
attempt failed and criticises Norberto Bobbio’s89 continuing attempt to anchor the cause of 
radical democracy in similar, and equally inadequate, premises and strategies. What 
Habermas now recognises is that any attempt to confine the primary function of the political 
public sphere to that of a conduit for demands from civil society to the political system is 
doomed to failure. The public sphere can, thus, never be simply characterised as a 
“constraint on power” because it is impossible to develop a theory of public opinion “as a 
medium for the potential rationalisation of power altogether”. (See Habermas 1992b: 440- 
441; 1996[1992]: 303-304)
It is now apparent, as Pomper (1992) notes, that the concept of the political party is both 
historically and logically bound up with particular norms of democracy. In other words, each 
conventional party model represents a particular stage within what is an ongoing dialectical 
process in which they interact together and, thus, stimulate further development. Thus, our 
task is to reconstruct the notion of party in such a way that it fully embraces the pluralism and 
complexity of our present situation.
89 Habermas referred to especially Bobbio’s The Future o f Democracy (Oxford, 1987).
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3 A new perspective on the development of party organisation
3.1 The division o f labour in the political process reappraised
3.1.1 Corporatist challenges to a stable and rigid division of labour in the political system
In traditional political and sociological theory, a stable and rigid division of labour within
the political system was invariably taken for granted: “interest groups transmit ‘pragmatic 
specific’ demands to parties; parties aggregate these demands, integrate them into a general 
program, and mobilise support for them; and parliaments and bureaucracies enact them as 
policies and laws and implement them.” (Berger 1981: 9. See also Kirchheimer 1966: 189) It 
was also presumed that such a rigid division of labour was essential to the stability of the 
political system.
However, with the spread of corporatist patterns of representation, there is no longer any 
notion of a stable division of labour among parties, interest groups, and government. What is 
noticeable is what Claus Offe (1985: 817) calls the “fusion of political and non-political 
spheres of social life”, or what Luhmann (1990: 34) terms “political inclusion”. Interest 
groups now undertake various tasks, which were once the preserve of parties and government: 
“socializing citizens, organizing consensus, making policy, implementing laws, and so forth.” 
(Berger 1981: 10) As Suzanne Berger (1981:10) puts it, “the question of the forms of interest 
representation ... is reformulated... as a question about the possible ‘trade-offs’ among parties, 
pressure groups, and government and about the consequences of different divisions of labour 
among these institutions.” (See also Teubner 1993a: 570) The more the stabilising effect of 
the rigid division of political labour is called into question, the more the party-parliamentary 
arena comes under attack, for in a highly fragmented society it is seen as either, at worst, 
paralysed or, at best, inadequate as the medium of interest representation. Indeed, the most 
important advantage that liberal democracy, based on party competition, could have is that its 
principle of “exclusion” is well suited to limit the demands of civil society to a manageable, if 
distorted, level. (See Offe 1985: 823) Therefore, it is hardly surprising that given greater 
political inclusion in the welfare state, a number of political and sociological commentators 
predict party decline.90 However, given that the factors determining which notion of the 
political party is most appropriate to highly differentiated societies do not derive from changes
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in civil society alone, but also from changes in its relationship with the state, notions such as 
that of party paralysis cannot in themselves explain the whole picture. (See Katz & Man- 
1995: 15-16)
Katz & Mair (1995) argue that overemphasis on the social sphere of political parties can 
force us to close our eyes to their political sphere. If we accept Offe’s assumption (1983) 
that there is real tension between the organising principles of social power and political 
power, then, clearly, the traditional view is obsessed with the primacy of the former over 
the latter. Therefore, the key theme of the new approach is to depart from this obsolete, 
narrow, view towards a more comprehensive, balanced, paradigm in which not only 
responsiveness to social demands but also the efficient and effective management of the 
political system have to be taken into account.
Two interrelated features of this new paradigm are notable. On the one hand, as political 
parties are now closely associated with the bureaucratic administration, they have ceased to 
be the dominant form of mass participation. On the other hand, demand articulation 
becomes mainly the province of interest groups. (See Katz & Mair 1995: 23; Offe 1983: 
233-236) In short, the traditional one-dimensional view of the relationship between the 
political and social spheres has to change.
3.1.2 A new paradigm of politics
Claus Offe (1985) seeks to examine the emergence of a new paradigm of politics against 
the background of the socio-economic changes that have taken place since the second world 
war. He defines the paradigm of “old politics” as that of a “comprehensive growth- 
security” alliance which, he argues, has been dominant since the second world war. 
According to Offe, this paradigm emerged during a period in which, despite social and 
political conflict at regional level, there was a "post-war consensus" that avoided conflict at 
national level. In short, the old paradigm is the product of what Offe (1983: 228) calls 
“democratic capitalism” in that real tension between democracy and capitalism is, he 
presumes, temporarily concealed by means of two mediating principles: firstly, political 
mass parties with their competition, and, secondly, the Keynesian welfare state.
90 This is most negatively dramatised in the phrase of “a refeudalised public sphere of civil society” by early 
Habermas (1989[1962]: 200).
120
As a result, all the issues, actors and institutional modes of conflict-resolution are 
correspondingly accommodated within the comprehensive society-wide agreement.
Overall economic growth, advances in individual and collective distributional positions, and legal 
protection of social status were the central concerns. Specialised, comprehensive, and highly 
institutionalised interest organisations and political parties were the dominant collective actors. Collective 
bargaining, party competition, and representative party government were the virtually exclusive 
mechanisms of the resolution of social and political conflict. All of this was endorsed by a “civic culture” 
which emphasised the values of social mobility, private life, consumption, instrumental rationality, 
authority, and order and which deemphasised political participation. (Offe 1985: 824. Emphasis added)
By contrast, since the end of the 1950s, a number of destabilising phenomena have 
emerged that are characterised by complex social issues, highly pluralised modes of 
conflict-resolution and collective actors of complex entity. (See Offe 1985: 824-832) This 
change can be seen as a shift from “conjunctural” to “structural” modes of political 
rationality. According to Offe (1981: 127), conjunctural policies centre on political output 
and social demand management, while structural policies focus on the shaping of political 
input and social supply. This means that the political system no longer confines its role to 
the maximisation of the efficiency and effectiveness of political strategies by regarding 
social demands from civil society as ‘given’. Rather, the political system is required to 
focus on “political redesign” that will establish institutional parameters determining the 
acceptable level of social demands vis-a-vis the available political resources.91 One 
consequence of this change is that the focus of democratic theory is shifted “from the 
macro-democracy of representative and authoritative political institutions to the micro-level 
of the formation of the collectively relevant will within the various contexts of civil 
society”. (Offe & Preuss 1991:168)
As a result of these trends, political demands involve not only the realisation of popular 
will, i.e. representation of interests, but also social autonomy. At first glance, these two 
goals seem incompatible. Hence, western political thought is marked by a longstanding 
confrontation between liberalism and communitarianism. On the one hand, 
communitarianism centres on an “offensive” understanding of politics directed against the 
state apparatus by developing the image of society as an “ethical” community 
institutionalised in the state. The essence of this view lies in the citizens’ “opinion- and
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will-formation” forming the medium through which society constitutes itself as a political 
whole. On the other, the liberal view does not deny a certain value in the democratic will- 
formation of self-interested citizens, but regards it simply as one element in a complex 
constitution. The liberal view focuses on the potential risk that an arbitrary political power 
can disrupt the whole system and, thus, hinder autonomous consensus formation within 
civil society. Therefore, the constitution, which provides rules to govern such consensus 
formation, is vitally important.
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the most important issue facing highly complex societies 
is the question of how to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory trends. Another 
difficulty is that this reconciliation must be achieved not only without subordinating civil 
society to the state but also without destroying the stability of the political system.
The new paradigm of politics, tied to our project of constitutionalised democratic 
autonomy, incorporates elements of both communitarianism and liberalism; it stresses the 
importance of public opinion- and will-formation but requires at the same time that this 
goal should be achieved, not by depending upon the reconstruction of a “collectively acting 
citizenry”, but by basing the institutional designs of modem democracy upon the “principle 
of reciprocity”. (Offe & Preuss 1991: 169) The goal of constitutionalised democratic 
autonomy is both the interplay of institutionalised deliberative processes with informally 
developed public opinion and the institutionalisation of the corresponding conditions of 
communication. Hence, we have suggested that politics should not be confined to the 
systemic action area but extended to civil society, the core of the lifeworld. (See Chapter 3, 
Section 4) This is what Offe probably has in mind when suggesting that we need to divide 
the universe of “action” into three spheres, i.e. “private vs. non-institutional political vs. 
institutional political”. (Offe 1985: 832) In this view, the sphere of “political action within 
civil society” needs to be reformulated as a space from which both private and institutional- 
political practices (and institutions) can be challenged. According to Habermas 
(1996[1992]: 354ff), this sphere can be categorised as the periphery of the political system, 
as opposed to the core sphere wielding formal decision-making powers and actual 
prerogatives, i.e. the parliamentary complex and the administrative complex in the political 
system. (See also Chapter 3, Section 4.1.2) Yet, this periphery is the “impulse-generating”
91 That is, in the new paradigm, the scope of the available resources and strategies of problem solving are
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one that “surrounds” the political centre, for it affects all parts of the political system and is 
the essence of an extraordinary mode of problem solving when the routinised part of the 
political system is thrown into crisis. (Habermas 1996[1992]: 442)
3.2 The changed character ofpolitical parties in a new paradigm: the advent o f the cartel 
party
For Habermas, political parties, which have their origin in civil society, have taken 
possession of the core areas of the political system through the conversion of public opinion 
into “communicative power”:
The political system, which must remain sensitive to the influence of public opinion, is intertwined with 
the public sphere and civil society through the activity o f political parties and general elections. 
(Habermas 1996[192]: 368. Emphasis added)
However, the role of political parties in the new paradigm represents more than mere 
mediation between the political system and civil society, as they are concerned with para­
governmental functions. Habermas said:
[Political parties] exercise paragovernmental integrative functions, indeed in three ways: (a) through their 
powers to recruit personnel, powers that extend to the administration, judiciaiy, mass media, and other 
social sectors; (b) by shifting political decisions from committees with formal responsibility to the back 
rooms of informal agreements and interparty arrangements; and (c) by instrumentalising the public sphere 
to gain access to administrative positions. (Habermas 1996[1992]: 434)
Apparently, from the conventional perspective which centres on political parties’ origin in 
civil society, their assimilation into the state apparatus is unacceptable and has to be 
resisted.
However, such conservative reaction to the govemmentalisation of political parties 
hinders us from developing an appropriate insight that would reflect the paradigmatic shift 
discovered in the search for a new conception of democracy tailored for complex societies, 
i.e. constitutionalised democratic autonomy. The contemporary postmodern situation does 
not allow political parties to function solely as catalysts of public opinion. To the extent that 
the parties have themselves become an integral part of the political system, two different 
functions that parties exercise simultaneously both as a social sphere and as a political 
sphere are no longer kept separate. (See Habermas 1996[1992]: 443) This does not, of
required to be seen as a fixed variable.
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course, mean that political parties become simply “arms of the state”; the mediating 
function of political parties is still of central significance for a “constitutionally regulated 
circulation of power” within the political system. (Habermas 1996[1992]: 384, 442). In 
short, neither the governmental nor the communicative function of political parties can 
claim primacy.
The changed function of political parties in relation to the state-civil society distinction 
requires a new concept of party organisation. In what follows, we shall seek to demonstrate 
how such a new concept can be achieved with reference to our project of constitutionalised 
democratic autonomy.
3.2.1 Cartelisation of political parties
As political parties become largely fused with the state, what Katz and Mair (1995) 
called "the cartel party" as the fourth model begins to replace the conventional party types. 
Katz and Mair pinpoint several key characteristics of this newly emerging party type. First 
of all, it is marked by a high degree of self-referentiality in terms of the political goals and 
limited inter-party competition. (See Katz & Mair 1995: 19) The range of political aims and 
struggles are contained to ensure the stability of the political system, instead of being 
extended to achieve social change with a progressive agenda. As party politics becomes less 
purposive and thematises less their representative capacities, it becomes increasingly a 
“skilled” profession, a “job” rather than a “vocation”, which is primarily marked by the 
logic of administration and power. (See Katz & Mair 1995: 23)
One consequence of this is a change in the patterns of electoral competition. In the cartel 
party model, competition between parties becomes contained and managed in the sense that 
they share with their competitors a mutual interest in collective organisational survival. 
(Katz & Mair 1995: 19-20) This is the outcome of two noticeable trends. Firstly, the 
“govemmentalisation” of political parties makes them relatively independent vis-a-vis their 
members in terms of the means of legitimisation. Secondly, the nature of party work, 
including campaigning, becomes ever more capital-intensive, professionalised and 
centralised. Indeed, the internal bureaucratisation of political parties, which is one major 
characteristic of Kirchheimer’s “catch-all-party”, is still more reinforced in this model. Now 
that differences between rival party agendas have lessened, the focus of party work has
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shifted from the gathering of the political will of the people to the creation of an efficient 
and effective form of propaganda aimed at the dynamic political market. To deal with the 
almost infinite image of factors that may determine the electoral outcome, political parties 
increasingly rely on professional and managerial personnel. These professional advisers and 
spindoctors have acquired their knowledge and experience in managerial and organisational 
action fields such as business or public administration, advertising agencies, and the
Q<)
media. Not surprisingly, they are not primarily concerned with ideological coherency or 
purity and focus their attention on the efficient management of the party organisation and 
effective propaganda. Furthermore, this professionalisation creates a need for greater 
resources and, thus, in turn, leads parties to seek more financial support from the state. (See 
Chapter 8)
The implication of all these features is that the status of civil society vis-a-vis parties is 
viewed not simply as the source of legitimacy but also as the object of propaganda. 
Stressing this aspect, the systems theoretic view of the modem politics reduces the 
boundary of the political to the functional subsystem, uncoupled from intersubjective 
strategies. Luhmann (1990: 178) argues that despite “political inclusion”, the people can 
never be one of the two responsible forces within the political system, but merely a third 
force. Therefore, the public is “/e parasite ”, which can benefit from the performance of the 
two responsible forces but is incapable of directly carrying out its will without destabilising 
the political system itself. In this view, political parties are forced (or privileged) to locate 
themselves either as the “government or opposition” at the top of the differentiated political 
system. This line of thought could give the impression that underlying this cartel party 
model is an elitist theory of democracy. However, as we shall see later, despite such an 
impression, this model has a potential value in developing a notion of party, which can 
accord with our constitutionalised democratic autonomy. Its unique “stratarchic” modes of 
intra-party organisation (we shall turn to this feature in the ensuing section) provide a 
framework which can reconcile a demand for social autonomy with the need for efficient 
control of party organisation. The inner differentiation of party organisations coupled with
92 As far as British politics is concerned, it is enough to recall two appointments in the modernisation of the 
two major parties. Peter Mandelson, an architect of New Labour, was recruited from the media while Archie 
Norman, as the designer of the modernisation of the Conservative Party, was from the business sector.
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their rationalisation is essential to overcoming the risk of elitism inherent in a cartelised 
party system.
3.2.2 Party organisation in a new paradigm: Stratarchv 
One major feature of the cartel party model is what Katz and Mair (1995: 21) style the 
“stratarchic” mode of intra-party organisation. "Stratarchy"93 means the relative mutual 
autonomy between the "organised" party on the ground {i.e. local office-holders) and the 
national party elite. Given the cartel party, the blurring of the distinction between members 
and non-members results in the atomistic conception of party membership, which is usually 
manifest in the "individualisation" of power structures of political parties. Party elites still 
need to legitimise their position in their relationship to members, but at the same time their 
autonomy is enhanced since they are no longer dependent solely on members or local 
activists. Indeed, with the advent of the cartel party, two contradictory trends can be 
witnessed in terms of the character of party membership. On the one hand, given the 
increased demand for intra-party democracy or participatory democracy, members are 
allowed to take part more directly in the process of leadership selections or party 
conferences so that they may enjoy even more rights than those of the conventional parties. 
On the other hand, individual members are more likely to exercise their rights as 
individuals rather than through delegates. We can see this trend, for example, in Labour’s 
recent endeavour to modulate their, mainly trade-union, interest-group relations in such a 
way as not to discourage potential voters who are reluctant to identify themselves with any 
specific interest. (See Chapter 6, Section 4.4) This trend, combined with the increasingly 
blurred distinction between members and non-members, sometimes leads to a reduction of 
privilege and influence on the part of members in matters pertaining to decision-making. 
This atomisation of memberships results in making it easier for party leaderships to 
undercut the role of local intermediaries by preferring direct appeal to a large and formally 
empowered individual membership and/or the electorate at large. On the other hand, local 
activists also have an advantage in being allowed corresponding local autonomy, which is 
more likely to encourage involvement and participation on the part of local members. In
93 In reviewing Katz & Mair (1995), Koole (1996: 518-519) was uneasy about this term, arguing that it tends 
to ignore the organisational link between higher and lower strata and proffers a more moderate term 
"federalisation".
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short, the assimilation of parties into the state apparatus leads to the functional 
fragmentation of party organisation itself.94
3.2.3 Sub-differentiation of party organisation
The changed (and enlarged) function of political parties necessitates some further 
changes to their internal structure. It is necessary to move away from the conception of 
party as a unitary actor, and especially from almost exclusive concern with the relationship 
between parties and civil society. Peter Mair (1994) provides a feasible framework in this 
regard. He suggests that party organisations can be disaggregated into at least three different 
elements - the party in public office, the party on the ground and the party in central office. 
(Mair 1994: 4ff) In his view, the party in public office means the party in government and 
parliament. The party on the ground means the membership organisation. The party in 
central office is organisationally distinct from the party in public office but forms a link 
between it and the party on the ground.
The conventional party models (in particular, the mass party model), emphasising the 
origin of political parties in civil society, tend to regard the party on the ground as the 
essential element. That is, both the party in public office and the party in central office are 
regarded as complementary elements to the party on the ground and, thus, as a means of 
social control over the state. More specifically, the party in central office was seen as the 
"voice, or guardian" of the party on the ground, and as the means by which the party in 
public office could be held accountable to the mass membership. However, as both the 
party system and individual party become cartelised, this conventional view has to change. 
One consequence of cartelisation is that the balance between the party in public office and
94 It may be true, as Katz and Mair (1995: endnote 4 at 25) argue, that Britain is a “curious” case in which the 
behaviour associated with the cartel party model is becoming less prevalent. As Webb (1994: 130) points out, 
the adversarial nature of the party system, based on majoritarian alternation, tends to conceal the reality of 
cosy collusion. The “iron law of centralisation” across the party divide also tends to hinder party 
organisational change towards the cartel party model. However, it can hardly be denied that, as we have seen 
in Chapter 2, the primacy of the parliamentary party over its extra-parliamentary wings would appear to 
facilitate the formation of a cartel. For example, traditionally both Conservative and Labour parties have been 
reluctant to seek constitutional reform, especially electoral reform, which would inevitably change the political 
order. Recently, Labour has been moving towards constitutional reform but is still very cautious about 
changing the electoral system. More importantly, the increased relevance of parties to the state, coupled with 
increasing pressure for the democratisation of public institutions, will affect party organisations in such a way 
that their functional differentiation will become dominant. (See Webb 1994: 129-130) For example, the 
creation of a Scottish Parliament, a Welsh Assembly and a London regional government will inevitably 
accelerate the federalisation of party organisations, which is a major feature of the cartelised party system.
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the party on the ground shifts in such a way as to favour the former. This, in turn, alters the 
role of the central office from that of the representative or guardian of the party on the 
ground to one seeking on behalf of the party leadership and the party in public office to 
mobilise the support of the electorate at large. This change explains why much of the work 
at central office is being carried out increasingly by professionals and consultants, rather 
than traditional party bureaucrats or activists. Naturally, these changes are looked on with 
apprehension or disapproval by theorists wedded to the conventional views of party.
However, if we look at this from a different perspective, then, we see political parties are 
merely changing and no overall party decline is apparent. Even the party on the ground 
cannot be said to be in fundamental decline. Despite some shift of power away from it, the 
empowerment of individual members, for example, their enhanced role in the selection of 
candidates for public office or party leaders, is meant to arrest any excessive centralist 
tendency. What the party system is losing is nothing but the image of the dominant form of 
mass participation. (See Offe 1983: 233-236)
The party in public office can be regarded as the institutional core of an "organised 
public" and belongs to the realm of the state, while the party on the ground can be viewed 
as an organisational link between the “core area” of the political system and its “outer 
periphery”. Yet, the relationship between the party in public office and the party on the 
ground is an internal one, while both components are involved with the general public, the 
one at national, and the other at regional or local levels. The conventional concept of party 
remains mainly that of the relationship between the party on the ground and the public. The 
raison d'etre of the party on the ground lies in its characteristic role as a necessary 
intermediary for people to participate in the political process. To that extent, the image of 
the mass membership party as the catalyst of public opinion is still useful even in the cartel 
party model. (See Scarrow 1996)
3.2.4 The cartel party and democracy
(i) Another version of elitist democracy?
At a glance, the cartelisation of the party system with its "stratarchic" or "federalist" 
modes of intra-party organisation gives the impression that this party type is tied to a 
revised form of elitist democracy, in that the essence of democracy is understood to lie in
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the ability of voters to choose from a fixed menu of political parties. (See Katz 1990: 159) 
Parties, as recruiting machines for the political system, are dominated by “groups of 
leaders” who compete for the opportunity to occupy government offices and to take 
responsibility at the next election.
For those who regard the direct participation of citizens in the decision-making process 
as an essential standard for democracy, this new model is even worse than the liberal elitist 
one. Given this new model, political parties are far less concerned than previously about 
being thrown out of office by the voters. (Katz & Mair 1995: 22. Cf. Kirchheimer 1966: 
187-188) This new sense of security could be construed as implying that they are less 
responsive to social demands. Indeed, the notion of a “cartel” of political parties 
presupposes that there is certain limitation in political manoeuvring on the part of the 
people. Even when the "extraordinary mode of problem solving" is called upon, the 
possibility that the people can permanently replace established parties with other channels 
of political activity is very low. Election is no longer regarded as an arena in which a full 
list of political choices is put before the electorate. Rather, it is seen as a limited political 
competition between political parties, among which the electorate can choose which will 
form the government and the opposition. Therefore, the cartelisation of political parties 
does not necessarily assume that electoral competitions become less fierce, for increased 
complexity in social formations and extension of suffrage both add to the vulnerability of 
parties and to the importance of their electoral campaigns. However, there is no apparent 
evidence that this increasingly intense party rivalry adds to the real substance of 
competition in a way that matters to voters. Rather, as the collective identities of political 
parties diminish, and their campaigns move away from contentious issues towards a 
programme of agreed goals, material differences especially among major parties are less 
discernible.
(ii) Balanced, inclusive and stable pluralist democracy
It is true that the cartel party model runs a risk of justifying an elitist democracy in the 
way outlined above. Indeed, despite their empirical insight, Katz and Mair (1995), who first 
proposed the notion of the cartel party, do not increase the normative implications of this 
new model but simply confine its theoretical implications to the fundamental reorientation
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of parties and elections. Thus, their conception of democracy contains only one-side of the 
picture and accepts the same sceptical line as systems theory vis-a-vis a normative 
democracy by saying that:
Democracy lies in the currying of public favour by elites, rather than public involvement in policy-making.
... Democracy becomes a means of achieving social stability rather than social change .... To put it another 
way, democracy ceases to be seen as a process by which limitations or controls are imposed on the state by 
civil society, becoming instead a service provided by the state for civil society. (Katz & Mair 1995: 22)
The role of the people in the political system is essentially a passive one as they should be 
concerned with policy output rather than input.
The problem with this one-sided view was explored in the previous chapter. (See Chapter 
3, Section 4.1.2) Katz and Mair’s cartel party model confines the boundary of politics to the 
state and regards the asymmetrical dependency of civil society on the state as a prerequisite 
for a well-functioning democratic system. However, as this state-centred view of politics 
cannot fully avoid the problem of democratic legitimacy, we need a view of politics as a 
dual process interconnecting the state and civil society. What is required, therefore, is a new 
balance between system integration and social integration, i.e. the recognition of party 
politics as embracing both an organised public and a non-organised public in civil society. 
The cartelisation of political supply could cause what Offe (1983: 234) terms “political 
repression”, namely, a gradual transformation of democracy into some form of 
authoritarianism, what Lord Hailsham (1978: Ch. XX) called “elective dictatorship”. To 
avoid this, notwithstanding their fusion with the state, parties need to continue to perform, 
if only indirectly, their traditional function as channels of communication between civil 
society and the state. This is a normative expectation towards political parties in our project 
of constitutionalised democratic autonomy. In the same vein, Habermas (1996[1992]: 379) 
argues
Political parties would have to participate in the opinion- and will-formation from the public’s own 
perspective, rather than patronising the public and extracting mass loyalty from the public sphere for the 
purposes of maintaining their own power. (Emphasis added)
As long as parties perform para-governmental functions, they also need to institutionalise a 
procedure for the purposes of democratically regulating the conditions of their common life. 
Only in this modified form can the cartel party model imply a fundamental reorientation of
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the role and nature of political parties coupled with an acceptable democratic theory in 
complex societies.
Obviously, our quest for this balanced, inclusive, pluralist democracy does not support 
anti-partyism. Such a negative assessment of the party-parliamentary politics is as deficient 
as the unitary conception of parliamentary democracy which resulted in elective 
dictatorship. Such challenges to the cartel party as the social movements and neo­
corporatism, emerging as alternative means of communication between civil society and the 
state, might well lead to the destruction of the political system per se. These transitory and 
somewhat strident organisations directly and adversely influence the settling of competing 
interests and power claims at the political level. (Cf. Schedler 1996) As we have seen, the 
role of non-institutional politics should be confined to the ‘discovery’ of problems at the 
micro-level of politics. However, different organising principles are required at the macro­
level of politics where long-term political transactions involving a large number of actors 
take place. At this level, there is still a strong need for a class of identifiable mediators 
sensitive not only to normative demands for social integration from civil society but also to 
the formal and functional criteria necessary to operate the political system. Political parties, 
with their durable structure overlapping state and civil society, are not enemies of a fully 
fledged democratic order, as advocates of what Schedler (1996) terms “anti-political- 
establishment parties” would argue. Rather, they should be regarded as a kind of essential 
constitutional institution, which is envisaged as guaranteeing both effective political 
mediation and legitimate government. Based on this prospective, Lipow & Seyd (1996: 
278) state, “In their need to aggregate a range of opinions and interests, parties are more 
likely to balance options, while elected legislative bodies which are properly resourced and 
able to weigh evidence in a given case may yield results more consistent with the public 
interest.” Therefore, the autonomy of political parties, both as a social sphere and as a 
political sphere, is as important as that of other social actors within civil society. Instead of 
replacing the party-parliamentary system by alternative ad hoc mechanisms, it is much 
more realistic to seek a new balance between these two mechanisms by reconstructing a 
“loose network” embracing a weak public and a strong public. It is necessary that our 
envisaged constitution institutionalise such a network to safeguard the autonomy of the 
social and political spheres rather than directly to seek a power equalisation between, and
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within, these realms. In short, political parties presenting themselves in terms of the cartel 
party model, can still, given a new constitutional design, play an important role in 
democratic governance, albeit a rather different one from that which they have played up to 
now following more conventional models.
4 Conclusion: Complex entity, complex status, and a need for more flexible policy
It is important to see that the reformulation of party organisation, via the cartel party 
model, is nothing but a reflection of the changed division of political labour discussed in 
the early section of this chapter. The shift from a stable, rigid division of political labour to 
a more flexible and contingent one is paralleled by the “internalisation” of political 
processes within political parties (and other intermediary organisations). The functional 
differentiation of party organisation, combined with the flexible division of political labour 
in general, means that a political party no longer can be seen simply as a unitary actor, 
externally co-ordinating the political system with the social system. Rather, this requires it 
to be seen as a complex entity, integrating ‘within’ itself differing social demands with 
political decision-makings. This is what some socio-legal theorists have in mind when they 
suggest that in a pluralised society, intermediary associations play a fundamental role, 
acting not as brokers between rulers and ruled, but rather as intermediaries linking different 
parts of society. (See Teubner 1993a: 556ff) In other words, political parties are at the 
crossroads of civil society and the state.
This implies that in Britain practical and legal policies relating to political parties need to 
be reoriented. The starting point for this has to be a recognition that the law governing 
political parties can no longer solely depend upon the traditional internal-external 
distinction. There is a need to depart from the conventional approach which considers the 
legal status of political parties purely in institutional terms and to focus on the concrete role 
that they play in complex and pluralised socio-political contexts. Above all, the legal status 
of political parties, which has so far been covered by private law, needs to be reformulated 
in the light of the changed situation in which, performing integrative para-governmental 
functions, they have become a complex entity.
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Chapter 5
Law and Political Parties in Britain
1 Introduction
This chapter will be divided into five main sections. First, we shall explore in what ways 
the present legal system sees political parties, especially in terms of their legal status, (sec. 
2) What follows is an appraisal of both the constitutional basis of political parties and its 
implications, (sec. 3) This is followed by more specific research (secs. 4 - 5) on the 
regulation of political parties covering common law supervision and statutory regulation. 
The final section (sec. 6) will critically analyse the status quo based on liberal 
associationalism, and will argue the case for the institutionalisation of political parties.
2 The legal status of political parties in Britain
2.1 Political parties as private associations
As discussed in Chapter 2, the British version of parliamentary government lacks a 
theoretical account of the proper place of political parties in the constitutional order. 
Despite the fact that they play an important role as the centre of political power, the law 
makes little distinction between a political party and a tennis club. Political parties are 
generally regarded as “unincorporated associations” of like-minded people under private 
law,95 which operate on the strength of the contractual, organisational, and economic 
relationships between their constituent parts.
95 See Committee on Standards in Public Life 1998: para.9.2. This general description cannot be applied to a 
political party, which decides to be incorporated. The Referendum Party organised by Euro-sceptics before the 
1997 general election provides this sort of exception. This party depending upon the late Sir James 
Goldsmith's financial donations was incorporated for the sole purpose of operating as a political party.
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Yet, it is important to note that the courts have seen the constituent elements of the 
political parties as “separate” entities. (See John v. Rees [1970] Ch. 345, 389) Thus, the 
local and national parties are basically regarded as separate unincorporated associations in 
their own right. This implies that how the relationship between the national party and the 
local constituency party is treated in law varies according to the different rules and history 
of the particular party organisations.
2.2 Common law relating to the legal status o f political parties
There have been two Court of Appeal cases dealing directly with the legal status of the 
two major political parties, i.e. the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. In Lewis v. 
Heffer [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1061,96 the court regarded the Labour Party as an “unincorporated 
association”. ([1978] 1 W.L.R. 1061, 1071) Lord Denning MR compared the relationship 
between the national and the local parties to “a ship of a fleet”, “a regiment of an army”. 
That is, despite the fact that the national and local parties are “separate” entities, they are 
inextricably “tied” together. (1 W.L.R. 1061, 1071) He held that the legal bonds between 
them are as tight as rules can make them.
But, in Conservative and Unionist Central Office v. Burrell [1982] 1 W.L.R. 522, the 
court, basing its ruling on the peculiar constitutional history of the Conservative Party, 
refused to see the Conservative Party as a formal entity in itself. This case was an appeal by 
the Crown against the decision of Vinelott J, overruling the levy of corporation tax by the 
tax commissioners on Conservative Central Office. The Crown’s appeal alleged that the 
Conservative Party, as an “unincorporated association”, was within the ambit of the 
relevant section of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970. However, Lawton LJ 
dismissed this appeal upholding Vinelott J’s ruling that, to be an unincorporated 
association, the bond of union between the members has to be “contractual”. “Contractual” 
here meant that an association was composed of “two or more persons bound together for 
one or more common purposes, not being business purposes, by mutual undertakings, each 
having mutual duties and obligations, in an organisation which has rules which identify in 
whom control of it and its funds rests and upon what terms and which can be joined or left 
at will”. ([1982] 1 W.L.R. 522, 525) In the Conservative Party, it was held, there was no
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such “contractual and direct” link between members of local constituency associations and 
members of Parliament. {Ibid.) Lawton LJ did not deny that there were many “political” 
links between the parliamentary party and both members and associations at local 
constituency level. In his judgement, however, these political links can be seen merely as 
“factual” relations which cannot be viewed as “constitutional” and are, therefore, outside 
the ambit of ‘legal’ regulation. ([1982] 1 W.L.R. 522, 525) One implication of this, so far as 
the Conservative Party is concerned, is that the relationship between the ordinary members 
of extra-parliamentary organisations and the parliamentary party is outside even private law 
and, thus, altogether beyond state intervention, whether positive or negative.97
2.3 The nature o f the autonomy ofpolitical parties and its implications
That political parties are basically governed by the principles of private law and thereby
have no legal status apart from that of their individual members98 raises a number of private
law issues. As an unincorporated organisation, a political party, in principle, cannot enter
into legally enforceable contracts and sue or be sued in its own name. It has been a general
principle that no action can be commenced by or against a body which lacks legal
capacity.99 (See Gledhill 1996: 67) It may also be prohibited from owning real estate in its 
100own name.
96 This case was essentially concerned with a factional dispute in the local Labour Party at Newham North-
East and its relationship with the national Labour Party.
97 This does not, of course, deny that extra-parliamentary organisations and the parliamentary party are likely
to be respectively regarded as unincorporated associations like the Labour Party.
98 This was explicitly confirmed by Megarry J in John v. Rees when he held that a political party cannot be an 
artificial or juristic person unless it is incorporated and, therefore, is not a separate entity from its members. 
The rules of a party constitute “a contract” which binds its members to each other. {John v. Rees [1970] 1 Ch.
345, 387)
99 It is noteworthy that when applying the rule of capacity to sue in cases involving unincorporated 
associations, the courts have reached very different decisions. Recently, four cases expressly considered 
whether or not an unincorporated association has the capacity to bring an action, especially by way of judicial 
review. The decisions were divided evenly. In R. v. LB Tower Hamlets, ex parte Tower Hamlets Combined 
Traders’ Association [1994] COD 325 and R  v. Traffic Commissioner for the North Western Traffic Area, ex 
parte BRAKE (CO/1107/95), Sedley J and Turner J have held that an unincorporated association may bring an 
action. While in R  v. Darlington Borough Council, ex parte Association o f Darlington Taxi Owners and 
Darlington Owner’s Drivers’ Association [1994] COD 424 and in R  v. Leeds City Council, ex parte 
Alwoodley Gold Club (1995) 15 September, Auld J and Harrison J held that an unincorporated association has 
no capacity to bring an action. Yet even the rulings allowing capacity to sue are based on the conventional 
dichotomy of private and public law. (See Turner J’s ruling in R  v. Traffic Commissioner for the North 
Western Traffic Area, ex parte BRAKE (CO/1107/95) quoted in Gledhill 1996: 70) A recent report on judicial 
review by the Law Commission (Law Com. No. 226, para. 5.41) also took a similar position recommending 
that the capacity of an unincorporated association to apply for judicial review in their own name via their
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However, what requires our attention is the fact that this state of affairs raises some 
public law issues. The other side of the lack of legal personality is that political parties, in 
reality, enjoy full autonomy in their activities. This manifests itself in the discretion of 
political parties over the control of admissions and expulsions and in their freedom 
regarding the creation of internal rules for administration. As a result, some of the internal 
affairs of a political party that have important political and constitutional significance, such 
as the selection or resignation of leaders and parliamentary candidates, are regulated purely 
as a matter of private law and are thereby almost free from public scrutiny, not to mention 
administrative or legislative pressures and controls. The laissez-faire approach of the courts 
is well illustrated in Burrell case ([1982] 1 W.L.R. 522), which concerned the legal status 
of the Conservative Party. Preoccupying himself almost entirely with the question of 
whether a "contractual" link existed between the parliamentary party and other party 
elements, Lawton LJ was able to avoid offering any normative interpretation of the role of 
the party in the constitutional order. For instance, the court focused on the de/’;[-0632gree 
of "reasonable certainty" of agreement necessary to create an unincorporated association 
meeting the requirement of justiciability. ([1982] 1 W.L.R., at 527) The rules and 
procedures for the selection of the leader of the party were taken to be outside the scope of 
judicial scrutiny. Therefore, the court simply held that “no member of a local constituency 
association, basing his claim on contractual rights, could ask the court to protect those 
rights in respect of the parliamentary party’s election of a leader”. {Ibid., at 527. Emphasis 
added) In short, judicial preoccupation with the contractual basis of political parties tends to 
ignore the fact that they are the creatures of a public autonomy101 that is essential to 
democracy.
This approach gives rise to theoretical questions of constitutional importance. Why 
should “contractual” relationships be the basis for determining the legal status of political 
parties when, in reality, they are an essential part of British constitutional arrangements?
members should be allowed. One problem of this approach is that it deals with the issue of capacity in relation 
to the theoretically unrelated issue of standing. As Cane (1995: 286) observes, the question of whether an 
action can be brought by unincorporated bodies cannot be separated from the question of whether an action 
can be instituted against them and, therefore, it is important to see that such questions arise from wider 
problems involved in recognising unincorporated associations as legal persons.
An interesting satire of this aspect is found in Herbert 1969: ch. 10, "Which is the Liberal Party?"
101 David Feldmann (1990: 11) terms such rights related to public autonomy “higher order rights” as opposed 
to "lower order rights" that mainly concern private autonomy such as freedom of contract and property.
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Why should political relations between extra-parliamentary and parliamentary wings of a 
major political party not be constitutional and therefore legally significant? What legal ideas 
and political theory, if any, would provide justification for the judicial underestimation of 
the constitutional significance of the political links between elements of a political party? In 
answering these questions, and before any critical analysis, we need to describe the rules 
governing political parties under the present system. That description will lead to the 
critical analysis in the final section.
3 Freedom of association as a constitutional basis for the organisation of political 
parties
In Britain, freedom of association provides the constitutional basis for the organisation of
political parties. It is generally accepted that freedom of association is one of the
cornerstones of modem democracies. This has been reflected in a variety of international
and domestic legal documents dealing with the basic rights of the citizens of a free society.
Article 11(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “Everyone has
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”
In Britain, this freedom has until now not been a result of guarantees in a written 
100constitution but the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of ‘private’ persons 
in particular cases brought before the courts. As a result, as with civil liberties in general, 
the nature and scope of freedom of association has depended upon the judicial attitudes of 
the day. In Britain, judicial attitudes towards freedom of association have been embedded in 
conventional liberal political theory.103 As a result, the courts confine their role to enforcing 
private autonomy rather than public autonomy, ignoring the constitutional role of political 
parties as collective actors in the political process.
The British people will soon enjoy general protection of this freedom since the Human 
Rights Bill incorporating the European Convention is under reading in Parliament. (See
102 The European Convention has not so far been incorporated into English domestic law. See R v. Home
Secretary, ex p. Brind[ 1991] 1 AC 696.
103 See the previous section 2 and the later sections 4 and 6.
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Secretary of State for the Home Department 1997) Given little statutory regulation of 
political parties, this change in terms of source of law will strengthen the role of the courts 
in enforcing freedom of association. The Bill makes it unlawful for public authorities to act 
in a way which is incompatible with the Convention so that ordinary people can invoke 
their rights against public authorities in normal court proceedings. Furthermore, if the 
higher courts consider that Acts of Parliament are inconsistent with rights guaranteed under 
the Convention, they will be able to issue a formal declaration to that effect so that the 
matters can be rectified by the government and Parliament. The vital role of the courts in 
determining the nature and scope of freedom of association has some institutional 
implications as described below.
3.1 The relativity offreedom o f association as a political liberty
The efficacy of freedom of association, especially as a vehicle for the reform of the party 
system, relies upon certain constitutional ideas, political as well as jurisprudential, which 
the courts adopt. In other words, the idea of democracy or constitutional model adopted by 
the courts, and the ways in which they treat the relationship between political, legal and 
power relations in society, play a vital role in determining the scope and nature of any 
particular definition of freedom of association. Although other classical civil liberties also 
ultimately rely on the courts for their enforcement, the very fact that freedom of association 
has such a close relationship with the political process places it in a more uncertain, indeed 
fragile, position.
3.2 The paradoxical character offreedom o f association
What makes the situation more complex is the “paradoxical” character of freedom of 
association. (See Dicey 1904: 514) Freedom of association has two dimensions, which 
inevitably give rise to a certain amount of internal tension. (See Ewing 1994: 240-241) The 
first dimension is that of the individual. Liberal political theory centres on the individual as 
the basic unit of conduct and, therefore, it regards the protection of the individual’s interest 
in self-realisation as the essence of civil liberties in general and freedom of association in 
particular. The second dimension is that of the collective, namely, the ‘autonomy’ of the 
group in securing its collective integrity to promote its common interests. The paradox of
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freedom of association lies in the fact that individual liberty, which an autonomous group 
seeks to promote, can be undermined by the nature of collective action. There is always, for 
example, a danger of the persecution of individuals within the group. Therefore, the 
question of whether the collective dimension exists in its own right or is merely an 
extension of the individual, is vital in determining both the scope of freedom of association 
and the degree of the protection given to it. If the autonomy of the group is subject to 
external intervention, then, the scope of its freedom of association is, thereby, restricted, 
and this freedom becomes a poor vehicle for the fulfilment of individual liberties. On the 
other hand, it can be argued that the autonomy of the group must be constrained, for 
unconstrained freedom of association can lead to the manipulation of the individual rather 
than to greater freedom.
These concerns lead to more specific questions as to whether, and to what extent, legal 
personality shouid be afforded to an association; and, then, what legal principles should 
govern such a personality. These questions give rise to a very complex set of problems, 
which add to the contingent, vulnerable, nature of freedom of association.
3.3 A search for the realisation o f the positive conception offreedom o f association
The introduction of a Bill of Rights may, though not necessarily, provide opportunities to 
reassess the traditional approach regarding freedom of association. Since it is likely that 
constitutional reforms will include the regulation of political parties,104 a question of how to 
strike a balance between the individual and collective dimensions of freedom of association 
will arise. If the British legal regime continues to adopt the conventional approach - that 
freedom of association, like all other civil liberties, is rooted in personal, rather than public, 
autonomy -, it is unlikely that freedom of association can provide an effective vehicle for 
reform of the party system, such as the constitutionalisation of political parties. This is 
because the nature or role of political parties in the constitutional order together with its 
legal status is defined by such narrow and negative features of freedom of association.
In a basically elitist parliamentary regime in which the constitution depends more on 
political than juridical mechanisms, the legitimacy of the polity relies on how open the 
political process is to all the political forces and actors seeking fair access to the political
104 See Chapters 6 and 8.
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arena. In particular, of great importance is the creation of a situation in which “groups of 
individuals may make their political claims and seek to persuade governments to accept 
them”. (Griffith 1977: 18) Yet, contrary to Griffith’s anti-rightist claim,105 central to the 
protection of open political processes is the ‘positive’ conception of freedom of association, 
for example, the recognition of group rights, the public autonomy and appropriate control of 
political parties.106 Without such substantial freedoms backed by regulation, the demand for 
democratic standards including the principle of publicity (which Griffith 1977), arguing for 
the “political constitution”, seems to have in mind) will remain nothing but an empty 
promise on the part of politicians and bureaucrats.
In what follows, we shall move to explore in what specific ways the negative conception 
of freedom of association has been applied to political parties.
4 Judicial control of political parties: the private law approach
4.1 Contract as the basis o f judicial intervention
The legal status of political parties as private associations, which was touched upon in 
Section 2, suggests that at the most basic level political parties are subject to judicial 
scrutiny under private law principles and procedures. That is, the courts can intervene in the 
affairs of parties only to ensure that their activities are in accordance with their own rules 
which are regarded as a sort of contract.
The High Court confirmed this view in John v. Rees [1970] 1 Ch. 345.107 Megarry J took 
it for granted that the general rules governing unincorporated associations were applicable 
to political parties by repeating the reasoning given in his judgement in Fountaine v. 
Chesterton [1968] 112 S.J. 690.108 (See [1970] 1 Ch. 345, esp. 398 ff) John v. Rees was 
endorsed by Lord Denning MR in Lewis v. Heffer [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1061 where it was held
105 In the sense that he treats what others call “inherent rights” merely as political claims. (See Griffith 1977: 
17,18; Idem. 1997: e.g. 301-302, 304 ff)
106 See Section 6.2.1.
107 This case combined three actions which arose out of political feuds between constituency party members 
as a result of the expulsion of an MP from the Labour Party. It was concerned, among other things, with the 
legal question of whether the chairperson of a party meeting has an inherent power to adjourn the meeting for
disorder.
108 In this case, Megarry J reviewed an avowed expulsion from the National Front.
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that the internal affairs of political parties must depend on their own “rules” which are 
constantly being added to, or supplemented by, “practice or usage”, (at 1071,1072)
4.2 The supervision ofpolitical parties under principles o f good administration
Despite the courts’ basic stance described in the previous section, the courts in general 
have applied to political parties certain principles which are similar to those applied in cases 
of public law, including the principles of natural justice109 and the rule that the powers 
related to expulsion or suspension must be exercised without any abuse or for any ulterior 
motives.110 In fact, this development of common law concerning, to use Oliver’s (1987: 
559) words, “a private law supervisory jurisdiction”, was not confined only to political 
parties. It applies equally to private decisions in areas such as private licensing,111 
expulsions112, the “right to work”113 and so on. Galligan (1982: 261) called these 
substantive principles - which can be grouped together when the courts exercise a 
supervisory jurisdiction beyond the private-public law distinction - “principles of good 
administration”.
However, it would be wrong to suppose that the judiciaiy has applied the same principles 
to both private and public bodies. The judiciary applied these principles to political parties 
only as secondary sources of law. Thus a private law supervisory jurisdiction is often 
achieved by implying contractual terms in the rules of those bodies. So an ouster clause 
contained in the rules could in theory exclude the exercise by a court of its supervisory 
jurisdiction. Judges have sometimes attempted to examine the validity of contractual terms 
purporting to exclude, for example, natural justice on the ground of public policy. In Lee v. 
Showmen’s Guild o f Great Britain [1952] 2 Q.B. 329, 342, Denning LJ expressed doubts 
about the validity of any stipulation excluding the application of the rules of natural justice 
to a domestic tribunal on the ground that it would probably be contrary to public policy. 
However, Megarry J in John v. Rees ([1970] 1 Ch. 345, 399) regarded Lord Denning’s
See John v. Rees [1970] 1 Ch. 345, 396-404.
110 See Lewis v. Heffer [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1061,1073 - 1074.
111 See Mclnnes v. Onslaw-Fane [1978] 3 All E.R. 211.
112 See Glynn v. Keele University [1971] 1 W.L.R. 487.1 n See Lee v. Showmen’s Guild o f Great Britain [1952] 2 Q.B. 329.
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interpretation in Lee as “obiter [dicta]” which was not shared by the other members of the 
court.114
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that there exists a full-blown private law 
supervisory jurisdiction. The court’s supervision of the private decision making powers is 
very limited and the exercise of this supervision has been restrained. This judicial restraint 
was expressed with force by Megarry VC:
The courts must be slow to allow any implied obligation to be fair to be used as a means of bringing before 
the courts for review honest decisions of bodies exercising jurisdiction over sporting and other activities 
which those bodies were far better fitted to judge than the courts. (Mclnnes v. Onslow-Fane [1978] 3 All 
E.R. 211,223)
A supervisory jurisdiction in private law is exercised only if there are reasonable grounds 
on which a court can justify interference into the private decision making powers to prevent 
bias, unfairness, arbitrariness or capriciousness in the decision making process. Even where 
such grounds are established, the courts have not always applied principles of good 
administration to private bodies. The nature of the interest affected is one important 
standard against which the judiciary assesses whether these principles should be imposed 
on a decision of a private body: it is the decision to expel which attracts the greatest 
likelihood of judicial intervention. (See John v. Rees [1970] 1 Ch 345, 397) There is an 
obstacle to applying natural justice to cases where an applicant has been refused 
membership. In Faramus v. Film Artists Association [1964] A.C. 925, 941, Lord Pearce 
remarked that “cases of expulsion without a fair hearing come in a different category from 
cases of refusal of an application for membership”. Even in the case of suspension, the 
application of these rules is qualified by the courts. They do not apply natural justice to 
suspension of membership which is made in the cause of good administration. In Lewis v. 
Heffer [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1061, Lord Denning MR distinguished suspension which is 
inflicted by way of punishment from suspension of an administrative character in that the 
latter cannot be subject to the rules of natural justice.115
114 This does not mean that Megarry J. negated the possibility that public policy can be used at the final stage 
to override the rules of private associations. See John v. Rees [1970] 1 Ch. 345,400.
115 In this case, one issue was whether or not the NEC of the Labour Party unlawfully or invalidly intervened 
in the conflict of two factions in the Newham North-East Constituency Labour Party when, pending the result 
of inquiries over the conflict, it suspended the executive committee and officers of the local party from party 
membership. It was held that the suspensions which were made, as a holding operation, pending inquiries were 
not subject to the rules of natural justice; “no one has ever questioned such a suspension on the ground that it
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Recently by focusing on the distinction between private and public law, the courts have 
consistently expressed the view that at the most basic level their supervisory jurisdiction 
can be exercised only if there is a “governmental” interest in the decision making power in 
question.116
In conclusion, the judicial response to the question of whether and how to regulate the 
internal affairs and the decisions of political parties is based on the public-private law 
division, thereby subjecting these decisions to the private law regime.
4.3 Some problems with the private law approach
This traditional approach of the courts, focusing on the private status of political parties, 
causes certain problems, the most important of which we have already discussed. (See 
Section 2.3) In this section, we shall undertake a more structured analysis of this issue in 
the light of a possible judicial review of the activities of political parties. The possibility of 
public law supervision can be looked at in two different dimensions. On the one hand, 
problems of standing and privity might arise if the courts continue to adopt the present 
private law approach in dealing with the activities of political parties. This issue touches 
upon the relationships between political parties and the public as non-members. On the 
other hand, we may question the private law regime itself. Then, a central question is 
whether and to what extent judicial review under public law principles can be extended to 
the activities of political parties viewed as private entities. This issue can also be looked at 
in a broader perspective which questions whether any public supervisory jurisdiction is 
available to contractual relations.
4.3.1 The problems of privity and standing
One respect in which public law and private law are supposedly very different relates to 
the rule of standing. Contractual privity in private law is much narrower than a “sufficient 
interest”117 in judicial review proceedings. As there are no contractual relationships 
between the public as non-members and political parties, there is, in principle, little, if any,
could not be done unless he is given notice of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself and so 
forth.” (at 1073)
116 See Simon Brown LJ in R v. Chief Rabbi, ex p. Wachmann [1993] 2 All E.R 249.
117 See the Supreme Court Act 1981, s.31 (3).
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legal basis on which, before the courts, the public can question the activities of political 
parties regardless of their factual or political relationship with them. This, under the old 
rules of the Conservative Party, was exactly the position of the extra-parliamentary wings 
vis-a-vis the Conservative Parliamentary Party, for, as we have seen (See Section 2-2), the 
court ruled that no contractual relationship existed between them. Obviously, this implies 
that the extra-parliamentary bodies could not apply for judicial review of the decisions of 
the parliamentary party concerning, for example, reform of the power structures of the 
Conservative Party. On this basis, the 1922 committee, which until recently was solely 
responsible for electing the party leader, could have blocked any reform allowing the
1 1 o
party’s rank and file to have a say in this matter. Were this to have been the case, it 
would have been impossible for either the National Union or individual members to seek a 
judicial review of such a decision.119
Recent changes to the rules on privity and standing in the private sphere seem to have 
moved in the direction of increasing the possibility that someone may raise issues about the 
conduct of legally private entities, even though he has no contractual relationship with 
them.120 However, critics have increasingly maintained that the courts, while trying to 
extend judicial intervention to domestic bodies, have failed to develop any clear conceptual 
and policy development. (See Black 1996: 32-43) To rectify this situation, the judiciary 
needs to realise, as Peter Cane (1996: 59-61) notes, that standing rules, whether in private 
or public law, tend to be used as a mechanism for restricting the role of the courts to 
adjudication while leaving to the administration and the legislature the role of weighing 
competing interests in society. It should abandon its traditional adherence to the ‘individual 
interest representation’ view of judicial review and, adopting a more positive stance, seek a 
new, non-adjudicative role in the administrative process.121 (See Cane 1995; Cane 1980: 
327-328; Galligan 1982: 276)
118 In reality, in March 1998 the 1922 Committee agreed to adjust the old procedures to the new demands 
from the party grassroots and The Fresh Future (1998), a white paper for the party reform, allowed ordinary 
members to have a final say in selecting the party leader.
1 IQ Lawton LJ clearly expressed this possibility in Burrell case. See [1982] 1 W.L.R. 522, 527.120 See Mclnnes v Onslow-Fane [1978] 3 All ER 211; Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2
QB 175.
121 The most radical suggestion in this regard is one raised by Cane (1995: 283 and 285) concerning public 
interest litigation: “it is, in my view, right as a matter of principle that if public interest actions are to be 
allowed at all, all members of the public of full age and capacity should be able to bring them. ... In general,
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4.3.2 The problems of consensual submission to jurisdiction
The question of whether political parties are subject to judicial review arises, of course, 
more acutely where contractual relationships between political parties and their members 
pertain. As noted in the previous section, the recent recognition in British administrative 
law of the public-private distinction122 implies that there will be less room for what is called 
“a private supervisory jurisdiction”. Relying on a technical public-private division 
emanating from the Order 53 procedure, the courts tend to view the existence of a 
contractual relationship as a prima facie indication that judicial review is not available.123 
One theoretical rationale for this exclusion of private entities from judicial review is their 
political and operational autonomy. (See Black 1996: 38 ff)
However, such a rationale, like the technical position of the courts, is unsatisfactory. 
Both ignore, among others, the complex nature of the ‘public’ sphere and the real 
significance of its autonomy. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Section 4.2, the public sphere 
forms an intermediary structure between the state and civil society and has to be publicly 
responsible within the broader constitutional framework. Given that political parties, 
despite their origin in civil society, play a public (or semi-public) role in a democratic 
polity,124 present rules governing judicial review of political parties should be reassessed,
the only limitation which ought to be placed on public interest standing is that the claim should not be 
“frivolous” and that the applicant before the court should be “sincere”.”i yy
See O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237; Law v. National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd [1983] 1 
W.L.R. 1302.
123 See R v Disciplinary Committee o f the Jockey Club, ex p. Aga Khan [1993] 2 All E.R. 853; R v
Disciplinary Committee o f the Jockey Club, ex p. Massingberd Mundy [1993] 2 All E.R. 207.
124 Recently, in a libel case in the Queen's Bench Division, the judiciary recognised, albeit indirectly, the 
publicness of political parties in a democratic society. In Goldsmith and Another v. Bhoyrul and Others (The 
Times, 20 Jun 97), the late Sir James Goldsmith and his Referendum Party jointly claimed for damages and an 
injunction for libel against Sunday Business Newspapers and related individuals. Buckley J. held that, so far 
as the Referendum Party was concerned, the plaintiffs claim should be struck out on the ground that it was 
contrary to public interest for a political party to have any right at common law to maintain an action for 
defamation. It was held, firstly, that the said party's peculiar legal status as a corporation did not affect its 
identity as a political party, and, secondly, that a political party, like institutions of central and local 
government, is one of those essential institutions in a free and democratic society, which must always be open 
to criticism.
The leading case cited in this respect was Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd ([1993] 2 
WLR 449) where central and local governments were denied a right at common law to bring an action for 
defamation on the same ground. Although Derbyshire Council focused upon striking a balance between 
freedom of expression and protection of the authority's reputation, Lord Keith of Kinkel's holding underlined 
two factors. Firstly, the electoral process nowadays is conducted almost exclusively on party political lines.
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for, as they stand, these rules focus almost entirely on the organisational origin of political 
parties. Judicial control can be a means of public supervision which is required to ensure 
that the activities of political parties meet certain constitutional standards.125
5 The negative design of statutory regulation
The negative approach to the nature of freedom of association in Britain is reflected in the 
negative design of statutory regulation. There is no general law on political parties, which are 
barely recognised by law, even the electoral law. As a result, there is an almost total absence 
not only of regulation of political parties but also of party privilege. What little regulation does 
exist is primarily in the form of ‘indirect’126 control, i.e. it barely recognises political parties 
per se. This indirect regulation can be divided into two categories. One is primarily concerned 
with restrictions relating to public peace and national security, which can naturally impinge on 
the life of political party. The other is concerned with regulating aspects of civil society that 
have direct bearing on political parties.
5.1 No general law on political parties
One major feature of the negative conception of freedom of association in Britain is that, 
unlike, say, Germany, no ‘political party law’, which is the most direct form of state 
intervention, exists. There are several additional reasons for this state of affairs, and while we 
shall not attempt to list them all, some do warrant our attention. One factor that made 
regulation unnecessary was the introduction of a number of successful electoral reforms in the 
late nineteenth centuiy. Such reforms as the introduction of the secret ballot127 and effective
Secondly, the process of forming any governmental body should be open to uninhibited public criticism, (at 
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Indeed, these cases show an increasing judicial understanding of the nature of political parties and the 
reality of the political process, regarding them as different from other types of private association and
corporation.
125 As we shall argue later m Chapter 6, the taking note of grassroots’ opinion in the election of the party
leader is one fundamental requirement for the party to claim to be democratic and constitutionalised.
126 The sole exception is the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, as we shall see in Section 5.3.
127 The Ballot Act of 1872.
146
curbs on election expenditure of candidates128 led to a significant decline in electoral
corruption. (See Ware 1987: 91; Butler 1989: 371-372)
One may suggest, as another reason why regulation did not arise, the early establishment of
a parliamentary tradition. There are two basic reasons that necessitate a ‘party law’. Firstly, as
in the United States, the legal regulation of parties is a safeguard against any abuse on the part
of the party machine. (See Epstein 1989: 244) Secondly, as in Germany, a general law on
parties ensures the stable democratic development of the state itself against anti-democratic
1 00forces both within and without. In Britain, however, the parliamentary tradition has 
successfully presented itself as a representative democracy.130 Therefore, what is dominant is 
the fear that any regulation of political parties could encourage state-party relations of a sort 
incompatible with the practice of representative democracy. As a result, political parties, 
which are essential in this type of democracy, are forced to remain private. As we shall see, 
this fear has led Britain to adopt some piecemeal and indirect devices for the regulation of its 
political parties.
5.2 Non-recognition ofpolitical parties in general elections 
As we have said, British electoral law has, as yet, not recognised the role of political 
parties in the legal process of election, and it, thus, almost perfectly reflects Lord 
Hailsham’s remark (1978: 37) that “political parties are no part of our constitution, but no 
part of our constitution can ignore their existence”. Present ongoing electoral reforms 
may change this situation. For example, the introduction of a full, even partial, party list 
respectively for the European elections and those to the proposed Parliaments of Scotland 
and Wales would make the registration of political parties inevitable. However, since a 
reform of general elections has yet to come, the policy of non-recognition remains mostly
no
E.g. the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883.
129 The German constitution has a provision (Article 21) which obliges the parties to both intra- and inter-party 
democracy. Lack of any cultural basis for the consensual formation of political will, coupled with an unfortunate 
recent political history marred by Nazism, has brought about a strong constitutional curb on the activities of 
political parties. For an illustration of the Finnish party system regulated by a similar standard to German's, see
Sundberg 1997.
130 However, as Murphy (1990:151-152) notes, its consensual components can not be said to be democratic.
131 Indeed, informality and secrecy are the main features of the British political institutions, and thereby even 
the office of Prime Minister and the role of the Cabinet are dependent upon political conventions rather than 
legal arrangements. It is difficult to say that this lack of formality alone is responsible for the democratic
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intact at national level. That is to say, in British democracy a divergence still remains 
between the idea of the non-recognition of political parties as official institutions and the 
reality manifest in Benjamin Disraeli’s observation, “Without party, parliamentary 
government is impossible”. (Quoted in Blackburn 1995: 4)
5.2.1 Separation between candidate selection and nomination
One result of the non-recognition policy is the legal distinction between the ‘nomination’ 
and ‘selection’ of candidates. According to Ranney (1981: 12), ‘nomination’ is the legal
179process by which election authorities certify that a person is a qualified candidate for 
public office and print his or her name on the ballot, while ‘selection’ is the extralegal 
process by which a political party chooses its own candidates. Therefore, from a legal 
perspective, it is not necessary for candidates to have gone through the party selection 
procedure. Since 1969, a change to the electoral rule allows the ballot paper to include a 
description of a candidate’s political affiliation.133 But this change does not mean that the 
electoral law recognises the entity of political parties as it does not require them to register 
for electoral purposes. As a result, political parties still remain outside the legal process of 
election.
5.2.2 No regulation of national party expenditure
Another consequence of the non-recognition policy is the absence of any requirement to 
publish the campaign expenses of political parties.134 It is the election agents of 
parliamentary candidates, not constituency parties, that must provide details of campaign 
budgets.135 The most striking fact is that the national campaign expenditures of parties are 
unregulated by the election legislation.
deficiency in the British constitution. However, it would be safe to say that such informality per se can justify
neither the status quo nor any objection to the movement towards the institutionalisation of political parties.
132 The details of nomination procedures for candidates in general elections are laid down in Parliamentary
Elections Rules, i.e. Rules 6-17 in Schedule 1 to the Representation of the People Act 1983.
133 Each candidate is allowed to formulate this description in no more than six words. See Parliamentary 
Elections Rules, s.6(3).
134 However, the main parties voluntarily publish their financial accounts each year, though there are 
considerable differences between these publications in their format. But this is not enough to avoid a strong 
demand for legal regulation of the annual auditing of accounts as well as for a common standard relating to the 
disclosure of large donations. See Blackburn 1995: 330.
The Representation of the People Act 1983, s.81.
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In fact, mainly due to the legal campaign limit, there has been no significant inequality in 
the expenditure of candidates of the two major parties at general elections. Furthermore, the 
extreme disparity in the resources of the two main parties -  sharply evident in the early 
1980s, in particular at elections - has been for the time being eliminated. However, there is 
still a great asymmetry of resources especially between the two major political parties and 
small parties. It is true that there is no irrefutable evidence that massive spending has any 
impact on the final parliamentary outcome. This does not mean, however, that money is of 
no importance to the election campaigning efforts of the political parties, and that there is 
no room for a tightening of regulation in this area. The increasing election expenditure of 
the two major parties is of some concern here. For example, in the 1997 general election, 
Labour spent £17 million, £10 million more than in the 1992 election. (See The Guardian 
6.1.98, p.3) Over £7 million was spent on advertising in the press and on posters during the 
year 1996/97. (See Table 12.3 in Butler & Kavanagh 1997: 242 and Table 7.4 in Blackburn 
1995: 354) Given the principle that the business of politics should be to strengthen 
democracy’s control over money, and the fact that national expenditure tends to hugely 
outstrip local expenditure, this focus on individual candidates rather than national parties is 
no longer tenable. (See Chapter 8, Section 3)
5.2.3 The absence of party privilege
(i) Political polarisation 
In the Westminster model, where no legal checks exist to avoid ‘elective dictatorship’ 
and where at the same time the judicial commitment to positive democratic rights is 
questionable, the autonomy of political parties, as the essence of the democratic political 
process, can be easily undermined. The political safeguards on which the British system 
depends to cope with this problem have turned out to be inadequate, at least since the 1970s 
when the “post-war consensus” began to crack. In his Britain against Itself, Samuel Beer 
(1982b: esp.15) argues that the post-war settlement which resulted in adversarial party 
politics and a relatively high level of social welfare has had paradoxical effects. Political 
stability, based on adversarial party politics, has deprived the electorate of a real choice 
between different views of the "common" good by limiting the scope of choice to a narrow 
range of "particular" interests with which the two major parties are aligned. The steady
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growth of pressure groups has resulted in the two main parties now simply competing for 
group support with no other objective than gaining office. This has given the greater scope 
for expansive competition in the name of a Keynesian welfare state, all of which, since the 
1960s, has turned what was a post-war consensus into a "swamp of pluralistic stagnation". 
The only political response to this situation has been yet more polarisation and an ending of 
consensus politics.
(ii) Partisan legislation and its effects on political parties 
No one political party can, of course, be blamed for this trend towards polarisation.136 
However, in this regard, the Conservative attitude to the crisis of consensus politics has had 
the most deleterious effect on the party system as a whole. This is partly because the party 
has been in power for most of the time since the late 1970s. During her long premiership, 
she had attempted to substitute ‘conviction’ for ‘consensus’ politics. (See Jenkins 1987: 
Part I, esp. ch.3) By conviction, she leant towards the ideology of the New Right. As some 
political scientists137 suggest, one tenet of the Thatcherism was its fundamental 
individualism, which undermined the premise of the collectivist polity and, as a result, 
eroded the status and autonomy of intermediary institutions ranging from trade unions to 
local authorities.138 Indeed, in an interview to The Sunday Times in 1981, Thatcher herself 
made this clear:
What's irritated me about the whole direction of politics in the last thirty years is that it's always been
towards the collectivist society. People have forgotten about the personal society Economics are the
method; the object is to change the heart and soul. (Quoted in Jenkins 1987:159)
136 For a period of some twenty years, the Labour Party suffered an ideological crisis which we shall examine 
later. (See Chapter 6, Section 4) For an interesting comparison of Tony Benn, a radical Labour MP, with Mrs. 
Thatcher in terms of their similar reactions from different political viewpoints to the post-war consensus, see 
Jenkins 1987: ch.3.
137 For example, Beer (1982b: 180) and Grant (1989: 10-11).
138 Grant’s survey (1989) shows that the Thatcher government's actions against a range of intermediary bodies 
were not accidental or random but informed by a particular political design. It also shows that the scope of 
institutional restructuring was not confined to the well-known changes in relation to local authorities and trade 
unions but was extended to the management side of industry and the Church of England. Yet, it should be 
pointed out that the Thatcherite reform drives have generated a new type of intermediary institution, what is 
usually called the QUANGO, though this institution is somewhat different from its predecessors since it relies 
on public choice theory and atomistic individualism rather than collectivism.
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In carrying out her radical reform of traditional British institutions, the political system 
itself was not exempt. In breaking the old constitutional mould, Mrs Thatcher's longer-term 
political objectives included a restructuring of the party system in favour of a two-party 
system in which the parties would be committed to economic freedom. Perceiving that it 
was the post-war settlement that paved the way for a socialist era, regarded by Thatcher 
(1993: 7) as in every respect a "miserable failure", her consistent attack on socialism aimed 
at bringing to an end a particular type of socialist party in the British politics:
I have always regarded part of my job as ... killing Socialism in Britain. ... Socialism has only one 
direction in which to go, and that is further left; because there is a welfare state and there will continue to 
be a welfare state, and the only way Socialism can demonstrate ... is to go much further left, into making 
people depend on government for everything: their housing, their welfare payments, everything and deny 
them fundamental independence. That is the kind of Socialism that I want to kill because ultimately it 
denies freedom.... The new conventional wisdom is that that is not on for Britain ever, it is not British, it is 
outside their character... You then get to two parties for which that kind o f thing is unacceptable and then 
you have two parties which I  believe w[sic] in fundamental keeping with the character o f Britain, and that 
is part o f my role and I  will not be satisfied until I  have done it." (interview in Financial Times, 14 Nov 
1985, p.28. Emphasis added)
The most important measures for implementing this political goal were enshrined in the 
subsequent trade union legislation of the 1980s, which impacted both implicitly or 
explicitly, on the Labour Party. The Trade Union Act 1984 (now the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations [Consolidation] Act 1992) introduced two significant restrictions on trade 
union donations to political parties. Under this law, political funds of trade unions were 
required to be periodically reviewed by members. (Now Secs. 73-81 of the 1992 Act) In 
addition, as the scope of political objects expenditure of trade unions has been considerably 
enlarged, more legal controls on trade unions' political activities are made possible. (Now 
Secs. 71-72 of the 1992 Act. See also Secs. 82-84) Although trade unions were, to be sure, 
the direct targets of attack, when these legal regulations was proposed, it was also generally 
accepted that, given the historical and organisational link between unions and the Labour 
Party, another target sought by such legislation was the Labour Party itself. (See Grant 
1987: 59) In her autobiography, Thatcher (1993: ch. X, esp. 272 - 276) revealed that the 
regulation of unions' political levy was part of a political aim to “disarm” the Left. Indeed, 
more than 50 per cent of the Labour Party’s finances were until then made up of trade union 
donations. In the circumstances, it was natural that the then Shadow Employment Secretary,
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John Smith MP, argued that the proposed legislation "represents a transparent attempt to 
cause financial difficulties to the Labour Party and to undermine the Opposition's 
effectiveness." {Hansard [H.C.], Vol. 48, Col. 171: 8 Nov 1983)
(iii) A need for party privilege
The impact of this legislation on trade unions and their relationship with the Labour Party 
was quite contrary to the Conservative hope so that the Thatcher government can be said to 
have scored "an own goal". (See Grant 1987: 60, 69-71; Steele, Miller & Gennard 1986: 
460-464) Ballots held as required by these regulations turned out in favour of the 
maintenance or introduction of the political levy,139 and the unions' organisational 
relationship with the Labour Party was not damaged but, on the contrary, legitimated. 
Indeed, these measures, combined with greater trade union democracy, including a secret 
ballot for union elections and ballots before strikes, are acceptable to a broad spectrum of 
political opinion as part of the rationalisation or modernisation of the British political 
system. In fact, support for such reforms was not confined to the Conservatives, for the 
newly formed Social Democratic Party (SDP) was even more anxious to achieve such 
changes. In its political pamphlet Reforming the Unions, SDP demanded even further 
change, i.e. 'contract-in' procedures rather than the existing 'contract-out'.140 Moreover, the 
Labour Party has since the 1980s itself tried to reduce the power of unions over the party as 
part of its modernisation plan, and in the 1997 general election campaign it promised not to 
overrule the Thatcherite legislation.141 In retrospect, the Thatcherite trade-union legislation 
can, in fact, be seen as having provided Labour with a crucial opportunity to overhaul and 
modernise its power structure.
However, neither this unforeseen development142 nor other desirable aspects of such 
reforms can entirely diminish our concern regarding the potential dangers inherent in the
1-1Q
For the results of trade union political fund ballots, 1985-1986, see Ewing 1987: 197-200.
140 In fact, it was this SPD’s proposal that the Conservative Government favoured in its green paper 
Democracy in Trade Unions, Cmnd. 8778 (Secretary of State for Employment 1983: paras. 88-98), published
a year before the enactment of the Trade Unions Act of 1984.
141 “Key elements of the 1980s trade union reforms to stay”, The 1997 Labour Manifesto -  Help Create 
Successful and Profitable Businesses, page 3 - reproduced in http://www.labour.org.uk/views/manifesto/
britain/profit%5F3.html. See also Chapter 6, Sections 4.4 - 4.5.
142 For an illustration of how much impact political consideration of the Thatcher government in relation to 
the political levy had on the final content of the Act, see Grant 1987: 60-63.
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lack of party privilege. What matters here is the fact that the autonomy of a major political 
party was threatened by a form of partisanship, with which the present non-recognition 
policy was unable to cope. It is important to note that an introduction of certain measures to 
protect parties is essential to the good working of the party system and, thus, goes hand in 
hand with a modernisation of the British constitution in general and a reform of the political 
funding system in particular. A number of legal safeguards against partisan institutional 
change having bearing on the life of political parties include the setting up of an 
independent body, one important task of which will be to take charge of such matters, and a 
scheme of state funding to support their basic democratic activities. (See Chapter 8)
5.3 The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 : the sole direct regulation o f the activities o f  
political parties
Although in Britain legal control over the affairs of political parties is extremely limited, 
it does not mean that there is no statutory regulation of their activities. One statute dealing 
directly with their affairs is the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The Act has been so far seen 
as aiming at relieving rather than imposing legal obligations. (See Ewing 1987: 6) For this 
Act has an exemption provision (Section 33) for political parties in order to permit “special 
provision for persons of one sex only in the constitution, organisation or administration of 
the political party”. Therefore, it has been interpreted, for example, that the special 
women’s sections of the Labour Party can continue in spite of the Act's general provisions. 
(See Walker 1975: 133)
However, in a recent case, Jepson and Dyas-Elliott v. The Labour Party [1996] IRLR 
116, where women-only shortlists of the Labour Party were contested on the ground of sex 
discrimination, the Industrial Tribunal confined the scope of this exception by holding that 
Section 33 is not intended to endow political parties with a “clear" general exemption from 
sex discrimination claims. {Ibid., para. 10 at 117) In the tribunal’s view, Section 33 is 
intended to offer a special exception only in relation to one specific section of the Act, i.e. 
Section 29 of Part ID applying to discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities, and 
services. The tribunal’s interpretation was that Section 29 was intended to cover “situations 
where persons or bodies provide goods, facilities and services to the public, that is to say 
what may broadly be described as ‘trade’ or matters similar thereto”. (Ibid., para.24 at 118.
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Original emphasis) As a result, it held that women-only shortlists of the Labour Party was 
contrary to Section 13 of the Act which makes it unlawful for a qualifying body to 
discriminate against applicants on grounds of sex. In short, the scope of party exemption 
under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 became highly circumscribed.143
Whatever scope of party exemption the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 envisages, 
however, it can be seen as having at least one constitutional significance, in that it 
distinguishes a political party from other voluntary bodies. Voluntary bodies are exempted 
from Section 29 by a separate section (S.34). Whether or not this separate treatment 
recognises the special status of a political party is open to debate. Walker (1975: 133) 
argues that over and above the exemptions granted by Section 33, a political party is also 
entitled to benefit from Section 34 as British law regards a political party as a voluntary 
association. If this view is correct, political parties can restrict membership to persons of 
one sex as provided in Section 34(2). However, although, as seen above, political parties 
can under common law be organised for almost any purpose, there is no reason why the 
exemption section intended to cover voluntary associations should be so widely interpreted 
as to enable political parties to restrict their membership to “persons of one sex 
(disregarding any minor exceptions)”. (See Davis 1995: 214) The Sex Discrimination Act 
should, on the contrary, be interpreted as recognising the special role of political parties in 
the democratic process, something which is rarely found in the present legal system. This 
interpretation accords with its definition of a political party as a body having as “its main 
object, or one of its main objects, the promotion of parliamentary candidatures for the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom”. (Section 33(1 )(a)) Indeed, in Jepson case, the tribunal 
stresses the ‘public’ role of political parties by declaring that the Sex Discrimination Act 
aims to realise “the rights of individuals to have equal opportunities in an area o f 
considerable public interest {Jepson case, [1996] IRLR 116, para. 7 at 117. Emphasis 
added).
5.4 Some indirect restrictions
It should also be pointed out that some indirect restrictions have been made on the affairs 
of political parties. Restrictions of this kind fall into two categories. The first category is
143 The tribunal's stance seems to be in accordance with the rules and policies relating to sex discrimination in
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related to restrictions affecting the very existence of political parties. As a result of the 
negative conception of freedom of association, these restrictions mostly manifest 
themselves in the regulation of the individual’s freedom of association. They are related 
primarily to certain considerations of public order and national security. The second 
category concerns the regulation and control of those parts of civil society which are of 
particular relevance to political parties. It includes, among other things, restrictions on 
political broadcasting and the regulation of those interest groups involved in party politics.
5.4.1 Restrictions related to the existence of political parties
(i) Restrictions on the basis of public order
The Public Order Act 1936, Section 1 provides that “any person who in any public place 
or at any public meeting wears a uniform signifying his association (a) with any political 
organisation, (b) or with the promotion of any political object, shall be guilty of an 
offence.” It was originally intended to counter the rise of fascism in the 1930s. However, in 
later years, members of the Ku Klux Klan and supporters of the IRA were treated under this 
section. (See Ewing 1994: 244) This section does not make it an offence to be a member of 
any particular association or party, but it certainly does aim to restrict the activities of 
political associations. This Act (Sec. 2) also makes it an offence to organise and either train 
or equip members or supporters of any association which uses or might possibly use 
physical force to promote its political objectives. Thanks to a growing threat of terrorism 
over recent decades, legislation has been enacted which specifically limits the right to 
organisation. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 makes unlawful not only membership 
but also participation in the activities of terrorist organisations, the list of which is 
determined by the Secretary of State.144 Yet, considering the fact that, in the case of 
terrorism, the organisation per se causes public disorder, this exceptional Act cannot be 
construed as a change to the general policy relating to freedom of association.
(ii) Restrictions on the basis of national security
There are also restrictions for the purpose of defending the sovereignty of the state from 
the threat of subversion and fears for external security, though, with the end of the Cold
the European level. In this regard, see Davis 1995: 211-212.
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War, most of these restrictions have become redundant. (See Bradley & Ewing 1997: 609- 
610) This form of restriction includes the purge and the positive vetting procedures in the 
civil service. (See Bailey, Harris & Jones 1995: 492-499) Firstly, members of a “subversive 
group” are to be transferred or sacked from sensitive civil service posts. It is for the minister 
to determine whether a group is “subversive”, aiming to “undermine or overthrow 
parliamentary democracy in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by 
political, industrial or violent means”.145 Secondly, the positive vetting procedures seek 
from the start to keep members or supporters of disapproved organisations out of all posts 
vital to national security. These restrictions, like those relating to public disorder, are not 
primarily directed against organisations per se. But, by not allowing members the right of 
participation in the civil service, they are obviously aimed at curbing any association 
regarded as harmful to national security.
(iii) Comparison with the German approach: pluralist versus liberal regime
These restrictions relating to public order and national security are aimed at preserving 
the free constitutional order per se. Thus, they can be said to play a similar role to the 
provisions in the German constitution intended to prevent the subversion of free 
constitutional order. Indeed, they have a similar significance in terms of practical effect, 
though different in terms of both the direct object and source of law. In the 1950s, the 
German Constitutional Court banned the Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP), a neo-Nazi 
organisation, and the Communist Party (KPD), under Article 21 [2] of the German 
Constitution forbidding parties to “impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to 
endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany”.146 (See Currie 1994: 215-220) 
Therefore, both Britain and Germany have adopted the same policy embodied in Milton’s 
view that the enemies of freedom are not entitled to its blessings at least as far as freedom 
of association is concerned. (See John Milton, Areopagitica, in 4 The Works of John 
Milton 349 [Frank Allen Patterson et al., eds. 1931] referred to in Currie 1994: 213)
144 See Secs.1-2. See also Bradley & Ewing 1997: 609,682-688; Bailey, Harris & Jones 1995: 301-320.
145 See 1985 Security Procedures, Prime Minister Statement, 3 April 1985, introduced in Linn 1990:59. On 
this widened definition of “subversive” activities, see generally Linn 1990; Ewing 1994: 245.
146 For a summary of the cases and valuable notes, see Kommers 1997: 218-224.
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However, despite this practical similarity regarding freedom of association, the way in 
which Germany treat political parties is significantly different. In Germany, the 
constitutional party regulation forms part of so-called 'party privilege'. In the wake of the 
second world war, German Basic Law institutionalised political parties as essential parts of 
the political process and thereby they became entitled to more privileges than other private 
associations. This was the result of a movement away from a liberal constitutional ideology 
which refused to recognise the existence of intermediary associations between the free 
individual and the will of the entire people.147
On the other hand, given the British scenario, the organisation of a political party, even 
one having a high propensity to cause public disorder, cannot be prohibited unless there is a 
specific statute or statutory provision for that purpose.148 In Verrall v. Great Yarmouth 
Borough Council [1980] 1 All ER 839, Lord Denning MR held that the fact that a party has 
a political objective, which could be interpreted as striving to encourage racial hatred, 
cannot prevent it from working as a political party. Law only begins to be concerned with 
such an organisation when it abuses those freedoms afforded to it as a political party, for 
example, when it seeks to promote violence, propagate racial conflict or undermine the 
structure of society itself. (See [1980] 1 All ER 839, 842 and 844-845)
Yet, it is important to note that this seemingly wide freedom given to political parties is 
not a result of a rational effort aimed at endowing them with particular privileges. It is a 
practical consequence of a liberal constitution, depending on what Waltman (1988: 121) 
called “faith in a genteel political style”, coupled with a negative conception of freedom of 
association. This background, as we have seen, is also what has given rise to a policy of 
non-recognition of political parties. Thus, there is no requirement for parties to register, 
conform to democratic principles in the decision-making process (as required by the 
German Constitution), or disclose information on income and expenditure. Neither is there
147 See the opinion of the German Constitutional Court in the Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP) case [1952] 2
BVerfGE 1, extracted in Kommers 1997: 219.
148 See Roskill and Cumming-Bruce LJJ’s opinions in Verrall v. Great Yarmouth Borough Council [1980] 1 
All ER 839, at 848: “unless and until some political organisations are proscribed as unlawful or legislation 
such as the Public Order Act 1936 is extended to make their activities unlawfiil, it is the duty of the court to 
treat all political parties as equal before the law ...” {per Roskill LJ); “If there is a case for silencing a group 
which wishes to organise a political party, it is for the Crown in Parliament by statute to restrict the right of 
free speech or free association.” (per Cumming-Bruce LJ)
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any statutory control of party rules and programmes, or any direct restrictions on either 
raising or use of funds.
5.4.2 Restrictions related to control of civil society having relevance for political parties 
(i) Regulation of political parties through media control
(a) The media and the political system
In modem society, the importance of political communication is rapidly increasing.149 It is 
apparent that the modem mass media have not only a negative but also a positive influence on 
society. On the one hand, the media makes it possible for the public to gain access to a variety 
of information thus facilitating its ability to make choices in the political and social markets 
and thereby to investigate critically the political and social mechanisms surrounding it. On the 
other hand, the media tends to promote “manufactured publicity” by way of increasing 
selective constraints on communication and thereby forcing the public to be politically 
indifferent “consumers”. (Habermas 1989[1962]: 216; 1996[1992]: 376ff) It is hardly 
surprising that political parties, which are forced to sell policies to an anonymous public in 
order to gain power, are interested in what Pinto-Duschinski (1981: 253) calls “the most 
powerful advertising medium”.
(b) Regulation of political parties' use of television in Britain 
Broadcasting as a public service
Although the effect of the media on politics is complex and not easily measurable, the 
system for control of the British media focuses largely on the possible negative effects of 
partisan broadcasting or the political manipulation of media. While the practice of newspaper 
partisanship continues with no dramatic change (see Seymour-Ure 1996: 214-224), what is 
conspicuous in broadcasting is that it is set up to be a form of public service, which serves to 
prevent this relatively new medium from becoming a tool for political propaganda.150 This 
ideal has been maintained even in the face of widespread commercial broadcasting. Thus,
14Q
See generally, Watts 1997: Introduction.
150 It was John Reith, the first General Manager of the BBC, who had a crucial role in consolidating the BBC 
as a public service by converting the originally commercial company into an established national institution in 
1927 under a Royal Charter. (See Barnett & Curry 1994: 6 ff; Briggs 1961: ch.5) For a view focussing on the 
importance of political and social change rather than any individual influence, see Curran & Seaton 1997: 
ch.8.
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since its inception in 1954, commercial television has been placed under the close scrutiny of 
a licensing body, now under the Broadcasting Act 1990 the Independent Television 
Commission (ITC).151
The ban on commercial political broadcasting and free party political broadcast
One obvious device for the regulation of the potentially negative aspects of broadcasting is 
the banning of political commercials. The Broadcasting Act of 1981 banned the buying of 
advertising space for political purposes via systems of electronic mass communication. The 
Broadcasting Act of 1990, which replaced that of 1981, strengthened the control of the 
broadcasting by putting the Broadcasting Standard Council and Broadcasting Complaints 
Commission on a statutory footing.152 Moreover, it empowered the ITC - which had replaced 
the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IB A) before the 1990 Act - to ensure that a licensed 
service for commercial broadcasting companies must not include "(i) any advertisement 
which is inserted by or on behalf of any body whose objects are wholly or mainly of a 
political nature or (ii) any advertisement which is directed towards any political end". (See
i
Sections 8 (2)(a). Emphasis added).
However, this does not mean that access to broadcasting for political purposes is denied 
altogether. Rather, air-time is made available to the parties by the broadcasting authorities on 
the basis of an agreement drawn up by the Government, the Opposition and the BBC in 1947. 
(See Ewing 1987: 109) The Broadcasting Act of 1990, Section 8(3) permits commercial 
broadcasting companies to allow any legal party to broadcast as part of a licensed service, and 
in this they opted to follow the informal practice established by the BBC. Section 36 of the 
Broadcasting Act 1990 requires the ITC to provide rules with respect to party political 
broadcasts and the ITC Programme Code provides such rules. According to the current format 
of the Code, the political parties represented in the House of Commons and the Scotland 
National Party in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales may use, free of charge, broadcasting 
facilities under an agreement between the political parties and the broadcasting companies in
151 Another classical justification for the regulation of broadcasting is fact that there are a limited number of 
airwaves and thus inevitably they are monopolised by a limited number of broadcasting companies. See Elliott 
1981: 684. With a number of cable and satellite facilities now available, that justification for rigorous
broadcasting regulation becomes much weaker. See Barendt 1993:96.
152 The Broadcasting Act 1996 merged the two bodies to one body known as the Broadcasting Standards 
Commission.
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the Committee on Party Political Broadcasts. In the case of the annual series, which are 
currently at a maximum of five broadcasts per party, the number allotted to each party is 
determined by the number of votes cast for it in the previous general election and this reflects 
a long-standing convention of equality of time between the Government and Official 
Opposition since 1962. (Section 4.1(i)) In the case of party election broadcasts, apart from 
electoral support at the previous General Election, the number of candidates nominated is 
considered. (Section 4.1 (ii))153
The principle governing this arrangement is clearly one of impartiality and balance. The 
crucial issue is the distribution of time among eligible political parties. However, there have 
been only a handful of political or legal disputes regarding air-time partly because the 
established parties themselves have taken part in bargaining in an ad hoc Committee on Party 
Political Broadcasts.154 As Alan Boyle (1986: 578) points out, this arrangement has the merit 
that it exposes the broadcasters to less risk of criticism and controversy by involving the 
established parties in the decision-making process. Yet, from the electorate's point of view, 
the outstanding demerit of this arrangement is that it can be used to prevent a free flow of 
communication. Boyle (1986: 574 ff) argues that this system has consolidated British 
broadcasting's bias in favour of the existing model of parliamentary government by confining 
the application of impartiality to the parliamentary model of politics and thus making the 
difference between parliamentary groups and political groups outside Parliament absolute. 
However, this party privilege in relation to political broadcasting per se is not a problem. As 
Barendt (1993: 170) suggests, the unique public nature and role of political parties in the 
democratic process, especially elections, provides a strong justification for such party 
privilege as a way of meeting their political expenses.
The fundamental problem lies in the total ban of political commercials which inevitably 
raise issues concerning freedom of expression. (See Barendt 1993: 169-170) Even though
153 In January 1998, proposals to cut party political broadcasts were made jointly by television and radio 
chiefs. The plans include scrapping the tradition of party political broadcasts between elections (including 
post-Budget transmissions) and cutting the number of parties allowed to make broadcasts. They proposed that 
political broadcasts be made only at election time and minority parties which contest fewer than one sixth of 
the total number of seats would no longer be granted air-time. (See The Times 21.1.98, p.8) Given the ban on 
political commercials, these changes mean the abolition of the only opportunity for political parties to 
communicate with the public without editorialising by journalists. Obviously, such proposals, if accepted,
would constitute a serious diminution of freedom of expression.
154 Yet the right to decide how much time party political broadcasting can be allowed rests formally with the 
broadcasters themselves.
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political commercials undoubtedly have some negative effects, such an extreme policy can 
encroach upon the foundation of a free society by making it difficult for minority groups with 
unpopular opinion to get access to broadcasting. Given that a constitutional right of access to 
the broadcasting media is not generally recognised,155 this problem can be counteracted only if 
broadcasters are willing to provide the public with enough political information through 
balanced political programmes and news reporting.
Regulation of television political reporting
Regulation of the electronic media is not confined to commercial political broadcasting. 
Considering the limited time given to party political broadcasting, the most important area 
affecting the political pendulum is news and current affairs broadcasting which allows less 
room for external influence and mostly depends on the editorial judgement of broadcasters. 
The British regime governing this area prefers a loose regulatory device combining self­
regulation and external regulation156 to a more positive approach allowing the public 
enforceable access rights.
Impartiality and political broadcasting
Both the BBC and commercial television companies are subject to regulation, to ensure 
their political impartiality, although the basis and form of their regulation are different. 
Commercial television is subject to the principle of impartiality stipulated by the Broadcasting 
Act 1990. The BBC, on the other hand, has no statutory duty to act with impartiality in 
political matters.
Under the Broadcasting Act 1990, the ITC is required to ensure that "any news given (in 
whatever form) in [commercial television] programmes is presented with due accuracy and 
impartiality”. (Section 6(1 )(b)) Apart from this general principle, the 1990 Act specifies a 
particular requirement of impartiality in relation to political programming, in that the ITC 
must ensure that "all the expressions of the views and opinions of the person providing the
155 The European Commission on Human Rights rejected a challenge of one British political group against the 
refusal of the BBC and IB A to broadcast its political programmes. See X  & Assoc. ofZv.  UK, 38 Collection 
of Decisions 86.
156 E.g. regulation based on the principle of impartiality. See the ensuing section.
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service on matters which are of political or industrial controversy or relate to current public 
policy" are excluded from programmes. (Section 6(4))
The BBC, on the other hand, is subject to public regulation on the basis of the Royal 
Charter (BBC Charter) and the associated agreement (BBC Agreement)157 between that body 
and the government, first made in 1926 and renewed every ten years or so. Based on the 
requirement for impartiality in Sec. 7 (l)(f) of the Royal Charter, the present agreement158 
introduced159 obligations equivalent to those pertaining to independent broadcasters under the 
1990 Act.160 This new agreement, effective until 2006, contains additional requirements that 
the governors establish an impartiality code giving programme makers clear guidance on the 
standards expected of them. (See BBC Charter, Sec. 7 (l)(f); BBC Agreement [Cm 3152], 
Sec. 5.3) However, this does not mean that the BBC becomes subject to an explicit legal duty 
to act with impartiality in political matters. Under the old agreement of 1981, Hutton J. 
regarded the BBC as having no legal duty enforceable by the courts to act with impartiality 
in political matters.161 Indeed, under the circumstances governors of the BBC are virtually 
judge and jury in their own affairs and there is little room for any external legal regulation 
in that respect.162
Statutory requirements of reasonable standards of broadcasting 
The broadcasters are also bound by statutory duties to ensure that programmes be fair and 
just in their treatment of individuals or collectives and protect their privacy. (See the 
Broadcasting Act 1996, Sec. 107 (1)) They are also subject to the supervision of the 
Broadcasting Standards Commission in relation to violence, sexual conduct and matters
157 In legal theory, a Royal charter is granted by the Crown under its non-statutory powers so that it is noted to 
Parliament for debate but need not be approved by the latter. The associated agreement needs to be approved
by Parliament but its approval is on an all or nothing basis and thus MPs are unable to move amendments to
its terms.
158 This was approved on January 25,1996 by the House of Commons and came into effect on May 1,1996.
159 Even before this introduction, the BBC had a self-imposed rule, recognised by Resolutions of the 
Governors. (See Barendt 1993: 103)
160 See BBC Agreement [Cm 3152], Section 5; Hansard [H.C.], Vol. 271, Col. 1172 ff: 15 Feb 1996; Hansard 
[H.L.], Vol. 568, Col. 1007:27 Jun 1996.
161 See Lynch v. BBC , [1983] 6 Northern Ireland Judgements Bulletin.\f/y
Boyle (1986: 591) argues that the BBC's founding by charter is to give it a measure of political 
independence, not to immunise it from judicial scrutiny and therefore a way should be open for challenging 
the BBC in the courts. However having regard to the reluctance of the judiciary to act as censors of 
broadcasting, it is unlikely that this view will be taken up by the courts at least in the near future.
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relating to "taste and decency". (See the Broadcasting Act 1996, Sec. 109 (2); BBC 
Agreement [Cm 3152], Sec. 5.1(d))
Self-regulation and impartiality: freedom from government interference?
It is important to note that the burden to comply with these duties is placed on the 
broadcasters rather than individual programme makers, and also that a certain amount of room 
is left for government interference which may bring the notion of impartiality into question. 
(The ITC Programme Code, Section 3.2(i)) Ironically, this responsibility may give rise to 
controversy over the censoring of party political broadcasting. During the 1997 general 
election campaign, Channel 4 refused to show a British National Party election broadcast in 
full on the ground that some scenes degrading identifiable black people infringed Independent 
Television guidelines requiring their permission to be filmed. (See The Independent, 25.4.97, 
p. 11) Underlying such a technical justification for censorship is clearly an intent to censor 
party broadcasting promoting racial hatred. According to Section 4 of the ITC Programme 
Code, editorial control of the content of party political broadcasting rests with the originating 
political party. However, the section also provides that this editorial freedom of the party does 
not rule out the broadcasters’ duty to ensure that the broadcasts conform with the 
requirements of the Broadcasting Act. The High Court held up this right (or duty) in a case 
brought by the Prolife Alliance challenging a BBC decision to remove almost half its five- 
minute party political broadcast on the ground that it would offend public taste under the 
Broadcasting Standards Commission Code. (See The Independent, 25.4.97, p .ll; The Times, 
25.4.97)
What concerns us here are the institutional implications of this system giving almost 
complete discretion to broadcasters. Despite its flexibility and responsiveness, there is a 
danger that, unchecked, this discretion could unduly limit freedom of communication. Indeed, 
the complex relationship of the broadcasters, programme makers, consumers and government 
raises a number of no less complex questions in terms of the fair and balanced provision of 
information. (See Barendt 1993: ch. II) On the one hand, the autonomy of the broadcasters 
vis-a-vis external interference is essential to the maintenance of both the credibility of political 
programmes and informed democracy. On the other hand, this same autonomy can lead to a 
serious loss of public accountability on the part of broadcasters.
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Politicisation of broadcasting 
The trend towards politicisation of the media can only reinforce the fear of a diminished 
accountability. John Keane (1991: 95) asserts that we are entering a new era of political 
censorship, the “age of the democratic Leviathan”, in which key parts of life are structured by 
unaccountable political institutions equipped with old and new ‘pens’ of various shapes and 
sizes, ranging from emergency powers, armed secrecy, lying and state advertising. On the 
other hand, government control of appointments to both the ITC163 and the governing body of 
the BBC164 makes broadcasting vulnerable to manipulation by partisan politics. The 
traditional practice of making appointments to these bodies, which was calculated to maintain 
a balance of party political interests, broke down under the Thatcher government. Barnett & 
Cuny (1994: 17-20) and O'Malley (1994: ch.8) argue that "balanced politicisation" has 
deteriorated into "unbalanced politicisation" since her time in office. However, potentially a 
greater source of fear lies with those legal powers which up to now have rarely been invoked.
Legal powers of government to interfere in broadcasting 
As far as commercial television is concerned, the ITC has the right to vet programmes to 
ensure that they are neither biased nor offensive. Section 10 of the Broadcasting Act 1990 
gives the Secretary of State or any other Minister of the Crown the power at any time to order 
the ITC to prohibit its licensees from transmitting any item or programme. In relation to the 
BBC, similar government powers are now contained in Section 8 of the agreement associated 
with the BBC Charter. Thus, in 1988 the Home Secretary could order the BBC and the IBA 
not to transmit interviews with members or supporters of Sinn Fein, the alleged political wing 
of the IRA but also a lawful political party. Interestingly, even after this ban was loosened, the 
real voices of Sin Fein members and others covered by the order, were banned. In the case of 
the BBC, there is an additional power in the hands of the government to ask the corporation to 
"broadcast and transmit" whatever such Ministers request. (Cm 3152 [1996]: Sec. 8.1) Any
163 The commissioners of the ITC, no less than eight nor more than ten exclusive of a chairman and a deputy
chairman, are appointed by the Secretary of State. See the Broadcasting Act 1990, Sec. 1 (2).
164 The Governors of the BBC who are in charge of the formulation of broadcasting policy and who undertake 
certain self-regulatory functions are appointed by the Crown in Council in legal sense, but in reality by the 
Prime Minister. See BBC Charter 1996, Sec. 8 (1).
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partisan abuse of this additional power has been restricted since 1969165 by the establishment 
of an automatic right of reply to broadcasts by the opposition.
Indirect government influence on current affairs programmes 
Apart from this legal or contractual power, the use of which may be rare due to the high 
potential risk of such action, there is huge room for more subtle political influence on 
programme makers and broadcasters. In 1985, the then Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, put 
political pressure on the Board of Governors of the BBC to ban its programme, "At the Edge 
of the Union" dealing with the political and military strife in Ulster. The Board's historic 
decision to ban the broadcast shows that the independence of British broadcasting was open to 
indirect political censorship.166 So far as the BBC is concerned, as Barnett and Curry (1994: 
260 ff) suggest, what makes the problem worse is the arcane constitutional status of the BBC. 
By being constituted by a Royal Charter rather than an Act of Parliament, the BBC appears to 
be independent of government or political pressure. But as Viscount Caldecote argued in the 
House of Lords' debate on the BBC Charter, the existence of the associated agreement 
endowing the Secretary of State with substantial powers in relation to the workings of the 
BBC makes its independence somewhat "spurious". (See Hansard [H.L.], Vol.568, Col. 20: 9 
Jan 1996) One popular solution to this problem is to construct a device to secure genuine 
political accountability through Parliament. This includes scrutiny by the National Heritage 
Select Committee rather than a simulated accountability by way of ministerial whim and the 
newly167 introduced direct but less effective accountability to audiences. So far as the 
constitution of the ITC and the appointment of BBC governors are concerned, the relevant 
procedures need to be more open and democratised; for example, as Barendt (24 Jun 1992, 
The Independent) suggests, by allowing a variety of groups such as the churches, the CBI, the 
TUC and even the major political parties to take part in constituting those bodies.
165 In this year, an aide-memoire, an agreement between the parties and the BBC in relation to this type of 
political broadcast, was formulated. (See Barendt 1993:182)
66 For an illustration of the case and implications, see Barnett & Cuny 1994:29-35.
167 Sec. 7 (l)(e) of the Royal Charter.
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British broadcasting's bias in favour of the parliamentary model of politics
Another set of problems is raised by the fact that British broadcasting is operating within 
the boundaries set by the parliamentary model of politics. As has been stated above, there is a 
danger that social and political minorities with unpopular views tend to be in a prejudiced 
position which makes it difficult for them to gain access to broadcasting time.168 In addition, 
in practice, the main parties, particularly government ministers can easily secure publicity for 
their activities by way of press conferences or interviews on current affair programmes. How 
and to what extent these events are broadcast are matters for the broadcaster's discretion. This 
formula makes it technically difficult to secure the equally important immediate right of reply. 
As Barendt (1993:169,183) points out, these dangers are inherent in a system of broadcasting 
regulation preferring general principles of impartiality and fairness to enforceable access 
rights.
However, broadcasting bias does not always function in one direction. Apart from those 
criticisms relating to minority opinions, there is another criticism that the present arrangement 
involving the established parties in decision-making hinders the broadcasters from recruiting 
some worthy additions to "the arsenal of democracy" (The Times, leader, 2 May 97) For 
example, in the 1997 general election campaign, the idea of televised debates between the 
leaders of the two main parties was widely supported at least within the media but it never 
happened. One major obstacle was political partisanship. John Major as the leader of the 
Conservative Party dropped his initial objections because the debates would be the last chance 
for him to lift his campaign. For Tony Blair, on the other hand, there was no reason to risk his 
massive lead in opinion polls. The Liberal Democrats threatened court action if their leader 
was excluded, which as a The Times Leader (2 May 97) pointed out, the broadcasters took 
more seriously than a strict reading of the law might imply.169
168 Neither British law nor European Human Rights law provides the right of access for a political group to 
broadcast its arguments on television. Yet it should be pointed out that there is an exception at election time 
under the European Human Rights law. See Barendt 1993: 181.
169 The relevant legal documents explicitly indicate that there is room for editorial judgement by stipulating that 
the principle of due impartiality does not require "absolute neutrality on every issue" or "detachment from 
fundamental democratic principles". (BBC Agreement [Cm 3152], Sec. 5.5; the Broadcasting Act 1990: Sec. 6 
(6)) In fact, the 1990 Act and the BBC agreement further provided that "a series of programmes may be 
considered as a whole". (See the Broadcasting Act 1990, Sec. 6 (2); BBC Agreement [Cm 3152], Sec. 5.2) The 
recognition of broadcasters' editorial judgement was confirmed in a Scottish case where the Scottish National 
Party moved to seek an interim interdict in the Court of Session on the ground of the breach of impartiality if their 
leader were excluded from television head-to-head debates between the main party leaders. (See Scottish National 
Party v. Scottish Television pic and Grampian Television pic, introduced and analysed in Munro 1997: 528)
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Regulation under Section 93 of the Representation of the People Act 1983
Section 93 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 significantly restricts political 
broadcasting of constituency elections. The section stipulates that before any particular 
programme on constituency elections is to be broadcast, the relevant television and radio 
broadcasters should get the consent of other candidates of the same constituency. (See 
Blackburn 1995:258)
This restriction is different from other restraints, such as the prohibition of political 
commercials and the limitation on party political broadcasting discussed above, in that it 
offers a legal right of veto to a politician who wishes to prevent television coverage of his 
opponents while the other forms leave the initiative with the broadcasters.170 However, they 
all have one thing in common, in that they are in accordance with the basic policy of the 
English legal system relating to political parties and elections, in which the focus of legal 
regulation is on individual candidates rather than political parties. The free use of the air-time 
and the absence of restrictions on both programmes about the policies of the parties and 
reporting the national campaigning can be interpreted as a rare reflection of the public nature 
of political parties. Yet a truer explanation is that such a system is a by-product of an electoral 
law regime which regards elections as a battle ground between individual candidates rather 
than political parties.
As Blackburn (1995: 258-261) argues, this regime has at least three problems. Firstly, a 
more comprehensive and balanced reporting of election campaigns for the benefit of the 
electorate is hindered by prominence being given to an insignificant candidate. Secondly, it is 
absurd that only programmes reporting local campaigning should be regulated. Thirdly, it can 
be unfair that prominent national or regional politicians may enjoy a relative privilege in easy 
access to broadcasting programmes during the election campaign only because they stick to 
party policy rather than constituency matters.
170 It is true, of course, that the Committee on Party Political Broadcasts plays a role in the allocation of 
broadcasting time. But it should be pointed out that the ultimate responsibility for that rests with the 
broadcasters, especially when the existing parties fail to agree among themselves. For example, it was well 
known that the doubling of the election broadcasts of Plaid Cymru and the SNP in 1974 and the grant of 
broadcasting time to the SDP before the 1983 election were done on the initiative of the BBC and IBA. See 
Boyle 1986: 578, & 76.
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(ii) Restrictions on the activities of interest groups and their relevance for parties 
Britain also demonstrates the relevance of the regulation of interest groups for political 
parties. Under the law of charities, charities are expressly forbidden from taking part in 
election campaigns.171 The Police Federation is also required to refrain from engaging in the 
political process to ensure public confidence in the political neutrality of the police.172
But the foremost concern in this area is, as we have seen (See Sec. 5.2.3), the regulation of 
the activities of trade unions. A series of reform acts dealing with the activities of trade unions 
were initiated by the Conservative government after 1979. It is generally accepted that the 
Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 and the Trade Union Act 1984 aimed not only to weaken 
trade union strength but also to regulate the relationship between unions and the Labour Party. 
These laws revised the Trade Union Act of 1913, which accepted for the first time that trade 
unions had a right to take part in the political process to secure their goals through 
parliamentary representation, by imposing controls on trade unions which were unprecedented 
in English Law since the 1913 Act. The new scheme which, as we have seen, now contained 
in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, requires trade unions to 
review periodically their authority relating to political funds by means of a members' ballot. 
(Secs. 73-81) In addition, it introduced certain restraints on the ways in which political 
activities are financed by those unions with political objects. The redefinition of political 
objects in wide and expansive terms imposes a tighter constraint on the scope of activity 
which unions used to feel free to engage in. (Secs. 71-72. See also Secs. 82-84) For example, 
no union without a political fund can lawfully take part in advertising or influencing an 
election. Under the new regime no union is to add any property to its political funds other than 
(1) sums representing contributions made to the fund by members or any other person, and (2) 
property which accrues to the fund in the course of administering its assets. (Sec. 83)
It is apparent that these trends, controlling the political activities of interest groups, matter 
whether or not such groups are granted an important role within the internal power structures 
of political parties. They may also change the mode of party competition in a way that a
171 See The Charity Commission, “Political Activities and Campaigning by Charities” (1995), esp. paras. 40,49, 
reproduced in Picarda 1995: 1085-1093; Webb v O ’Doherty, The Times, 11 Feb 91. For a general account of 
“politics and charities”, see Picarda 1995: Ch. 14.
1 2 See Police Federation Regulation, S.I. 1969 No.1787, Regulation 19(1) delegated now by the Police Act 
1996, Sec. 60.
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particular party is deprived of the opportunity to make alliances with particular interest 
groups.
6 Problems and an alternative: Towards the institutionalisation of political parties
In this section, we shall examine more specifically the basic problems relating to the 
present laws governing political parties and argue, as a desirable response to these 
problems, for the incorporation of the pluralist reality within the legal framework, i.e. the 
legal institutionalisation of political parties. The first step towards such institutionalisation 
is to recognise their group identity, namely, that they are collective actors within the 
constitutional order. The ensuing parts will attempt to consolidate the case for the legal 
institutionalisation by exploring, first, the public nature of political parties as an essential 
element of the British political process, and secondly, the govemmentalised aspects of party 
organisations. This effort is hoped to complement the rather abstract theoretical description 
of the advent of the new politics and its implications in Chapter 4.
6.1 Lack o f institutional tools for reform o f the British political system
The major problem inherent in present legal policy relating to political parties is that it 
lacks rational and coherent mechanisms for controlling their external and internal activities. 
This lack of legal recognition makes it almost impossible to draw a reasonable line between 
the autonomy of political parties as constitutional institutions and the need for legal 
intervention in their activities.
6.2 The usefulness o f group personality o f political parties in terms o f their external 
relations
The liberal theory of association can seriously undermine the efficiency and integrity of 
political parties and consequently the totality of individual members whose interests they 
exist to serve. The root of this problem is no doubt traceable to an unrealistic liberal 
conviction that political parties cannot be viewed as organised actors within political 
society. Underlying this liberal view is the notion that a political party is no more than the
169
sum of its individual members and, therefore, its institutionalisation might cause adverse 
side effects. Two problems are generally cited in this regard. Firstly, such 
institutionalisation undermines the whole process of representation by placing a barrier 
between the people and government, creating artificial divisions between groups of citizens, 
and inhibiting the free expression of their opinions. Secondly, it threatens the autonomy of 
individuals to determine their own affairs for the ultimate purpose of personal fulfilment. In 
this line of argument, there is no room for a premium placed on the autonomy of political 
parties to regulate their own affairs.
6.2.1 The single-mindedness of anti-pluralist thought
One cannot seriously discount the importance of individual choice within the political 
market unless the political system is professed to be undemocratic. The rigid party machine 
can function as a means of political manipulation or effective social control rather than a 
catalyst of political communication. However, it is equally true that liberal associationalism 
not only failed to arrest the increasing party penetration of the state without increasing civil 
society involvement in the working of the party system but also paradoxically contributed to 
the consolidation of such an unexpected result by continuing its unrealistic hands-off 
policy. What is problematic is the single-minded preoccupation of the dominant liberal 
theory with both the negative conception of liberty and the market-oriented conception of 
efficiency (or control). On the one hand, although the legalisation of political parties has the 
demerits feared by liberals, it equally has certain advantages. On the other hand, even 
public-choice-oriented control has its limits.
On the advantage side, as even the liberal view reluctantly admits, the management of a 
variety of individual choices in an orderly political process is inevitable in a modem 
society. Well-organised political associations, in particular the party system, provide 
individuals with a stable mechanism for the realisation of political demands at a reasonable 
level, though the maximisation of those demands is not necessarily guaranteed.173 For this 
functional reason, liberty of association is one of what Feldmann (1990: 11) terms "higher 
order rights" or what Cohen and Rogers (1995: 18) define as "the fundamental liberties in a 
democratic order, with a place of pre-eminence in political argument". Apparently, this
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conception of high class liberties departs from the negative conception of freedom as the 
absence of restraint and veers toward the positive one defined as the absence of 
impediment. In other words, stringent protection of this high class liberty is consistent with 
regulations of, and restrictions on, market choice in order to ensure political equality. To 
make this conceptual transformation effective, as Hirst (1996: 102) suggests, such 
"particular liberty" should be given not only to individual citizens but also to those bodies 
essential to the stable workings of the political system. An additional assumption of this 
theory is that intermediary associations of this kind have personality, whether real or 
artifactual.174
6.2.2 The unequal political market 
As to the limits of market-based political control, it should also be pointed out that, apart 
from the systematic difference between the political system and the economic system, there 
is a theoretical defect inherent in the liberal preference for public choice and the invisible 
hand. Under a regime of laissez-faire which rules out the legal recognition of political 
parties and thereby dismisses an effective tool for rationalising political competition, 
inequalities, rooted in different inherited political fortunes, proliferate. Apparently, these 
inequalities considerably distort individual choice. Indeed, the current system is open to the 
criticism of failing to see that there are discrepancies between the ideas of fair competition 
and self-regulation among parties under equal conditions and the asymmetrical reality 
caused by de facto inequality in terms of resources and institutional barriers allowing 
certain parties to enjoy a privileged position compared to other political groups. Hence, in 
seeking an appropriate method to modify the formidable rigidity of the party system, what 
is of greater relevance is the unrepresentative electoral system and the substantial financial 
inequality between even the main political parties, which have undermined the foundations 
of liberal associationalism. That is, the ugly reality of the unequal political market is in
173 In a simplest way, the stability of the system is achieved at the cost of the constant maximisation of 
interests.
174 Whether this personality is real or artifactual partly depends on what background view is taken on the 
desirable relationship between the state and civil society. In suggesting a consequentially similar view of the 
positive role of secondary associations in democratic governance in a modem society, Hirst (1995: 111-113) 
criticises, with the reference to early English pluralist thought, Cohen and Rogers’s view (1995: 27,31,33), 
saying that by stressing the artifactuality of organisations and ignoring their real personality, Cohen and Roger 
give excessive credit to the state as a neutral actor rather than the voluntary initiative of civil society.
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tension with a fundamental ideal of democracy, itself essential to justifying the importance 
of individual choice which liberal associationalism values. As we shall deal with these 
specific issues later, it is enough here to mention that the essential prerequisite is to 
recognise the usefulness of the legal personality of political parties and thereby the need for 
their institutionalisation. The non-recognition policy is an obstacle when we wish to 
propose legislation which confers rights or duties on political parties as part of the political 
process. For example, a reform of political funding which would require the introduction of 
a number of measures such as a duty to disclose, a right to public funds and a spending limit 
in elections, would be very difficult to achieve without giving political parties a clear legal 
status apart from that of their individual members.
6.3 The public nature ofpolitical parties as an essential element o f the political process
6.3.1 Elections as a battleground for political parties 
It is apparent that the law in relation to political parties does not reflect the fact that the 
British electoral system has become almost entirely a battleground for the political parties. 
The great rarity of successful independent candidates would verify this reality at least at 
national or regional level.175 No 'genuinely'176 independent candidate has been elected as an 
MP since 1974. In addition, MPs who lost their party’s whip almost invariably lost their
177seats at the next election. All these facts show that electors are more concerned with 
parties than candidates when casting votes and, therefore, political parties play an essential
175 In the local government elections, there have been some independent candidates elected. But whereas their 
numbers are decreasing, a considerable per cent of them were in fact members of political parties who 
nevertheless had chosen to fight as “independents”. See H.F.Rawlings 1988: 124 - 125. For a steadily
increasing party politicisation of local government, see Game & Leach 1995: 7-12, 31-33.
176 It is important to note that the case of the only independent candidate returned as MP in the 1997 general 
election, Martin Bell, cannot be taken seriously in this context. His election resulted almost entirely from the 
anti-sleaze campaign against the former Tory minister, Neil Hamilton, thanks to which the other main parties 
withdrew in support of Mr Bell. See, for the results of elections before 1997 general election, Butler and 
Butler 1994: 167-168.
177 Only four of the SDP defectors retained their seats at the 1983 election. (See Cowley 1996: 220). At the 
1992 general election, those MPs rejected from both Conservative and Labour Parties, for example, John 
Browne at Winchester (Conservative) and Dave Nellist at Coventry South East (Labour) failed to keep their 
parliamentary seats by standing as independents. (See Blackburn 1995: 214) The 1997 general election was 
not an exception in this regard. Sir George Gardiner MP who after his deselection defected from the 
Conservatives to the Referendum Party failed to retain his seat. The fact that Alan Howarth, who crossed the 
floor in 1995 from the ruling Conservative Party to Labour, returned as MP for Newport East cannot be seen 
as an exception. This is because his defection was made to a major party, and one which was destined to win 
the forthcoming election and was offering him one of its safe seats. That is, both his success and Sir George 
Gardiner's failure are mainly due to the persistent party political line rather than their personal appeal.
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role in elections. (See Blackburn 1995: 5) It is, therefore, hard to disagree with Julian 
Critchley’s claim
the independence of MPs, their freedom to kick over the traces, has been continually compromised by the 
whips" office. .. Are we the creatures ofparty, or the tribunes o f the people? Today it is impossible to be 
elected to Parliament without a ticket to ride, and it is the political parties who publish, print and sell the 
tickets. ... MPs are frequently tom between different notions of duty: to country, constituency and to 
political party. I have, I think, placed these obligations in their proper order, but it is not one that is 
universally agreed. (The Times, July 19,1990. My emphasis)
6.3.2 The changing function of general elections
The importance of parties in elections becomes even clearer when we realise the true 
function of a general election in Britain. A general election is not only to elect MPs to the 
House of Commons. It is also to choose a government and decide which party leader 
becomes a Prime Minister. As Blackburn (1995: 2) puts it, in Britain “a single vote cast by 
each eligible elector in the country controls both the personnel of Parliament and the 
personnel of government”.
Given this function of a general election, the essential role of political parties in electing 
a Prime Minister confirms their public feature. The Crown which has a legal power to 
appoint the Prime Minister is obliged to ask the leader of the political party which wins a 
majority of parliamentary seats in a general election to form a government. This is to say 
that with the established procedures for the election of leaders within the main political 
parties, the Crown’s choice is compromised by the internal rules of these parties, the 
political influence of which is measured by a general election result as a barometer of 
public will.178 In addition, under an adversarial political system, those who achieve political 
office mostly owe their position to the political party to which they belong. As Brazier 
(1998: 59) points out, it is the political parties that have filled a “political vacuum” which 
stemmed from the Burkian theory of representation freeing Members of Parliament from 
any threat of being mandated by their constituents.
178 From this perspective, so far as the changing function of general election and the importance of political 
parties in the formation of government are concerned, the debate on the true nature of the British polity is 
irrelevant. A relevant question may be, is the United Kingdom is what Bagehot called 'a disguised republic'? 
Or, is the Crown, contrary to Bagehot's observation, still the "efficient" element of the British constitution? 
Hennessy (1996: ch.2) doubts the reality of Bagehot's observation but as he (1996: 49, 63) also admits, it 
cannot amount to the negation of the republican (as opposed to monarchical) character of the British 
constitution.
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6.4 Political parties as mini-collective systems o f government
Another problem of the current system is that it overlooks the reality that, as 
organisations, political parties are in effect mini-systems of collective government. As 
previously stated, they impose conditions of membership and expulsion. They also 
formulate their own rules and impose their own discipline. Furthermore, as confirmed 
above, political parties are distinct from private interest groups, being communitywide in 
orientation. From this perspective, political parties themselves are para-governmental 
bodies. This tends to interfere with individual members’ interests in order to advance 
general public interests. Two particular aspects deserve closer attention.
6.4.1 The virtual monopoly of political parties in the institutionalised political process
The character of political parties as mini-systems of collective government is reinforced 
by the fact that in Britain the major political parties as a whole enjoy a de facto monopoly in 
recruiting political personnel. Few who wish to take a ticket to political office can achieve 
their objectives without the membership and support of one of the main political parties. 
Under such circumstances, party discipline is as powerful and effective as any obligations 
under public law.
Given the virtual monopoly of political parties in the institutionalised political process, 
our attention is drawn to a recent Court of Appeal case in which the court placed a premium 
on group discipline to enable intra-party groups to function more coherently. The ruling 
Labour group in Greenwich London Borough Council removed from the housing 
committee some councillors who had voted against its proposed increases in rents for 
homeless people. The membership of the housing committee was reduced from 24 to 18 via 
the successful motion by the governing Labour group and the committee was reconstituted 
according to the new rule. An application for judicial review of this motion on the grounds 
that it was ultra vires the council was dismissed by the Divisional Court. The applicant 
appealed against the dismissal, contending that standing orders of the Labour group 
concerned, requiring one of its members to resign from the council if he or she intended to 
vote contrary to group policy, are not in accordance with the principle of independent 
representation. Neill LJ held that
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A councillor is always under some pressures from outside. The risk of not being re-elected at the next 
election is one obvious constraint. It seems to me however that at the present day, when local government 
is organised on party lines, some additional constraints resulting from the existence o f a party line or 
strategy on particular issues are inevitable. Penalties by way of punishment must clearly be avoided or 
any action which is vindictive or malicious. But a political party is entitled to take steps to ensure its 
cohesion and I can see nothing intrinsically wrong in a decision to change a party’s representation on a 
committee or subcommittee so as to advance the policies which the party considers desirable. In this sense 
‘group discipline’ does not connote punishment but an attempt to keep the party group together. (R v. 
Greenwich London Borough Council, ex parte Lovelace [1991] 3 All ER 511, 523. Emphasis added)
The implications of this case become even greater if it is considered that in local politics, 
the intensity and scope of party whipping systems have been less extensive than those in 
national politics, because, as Game and Leach (1995: 39) point out, a relatively high 
proportion of committee business is essentially ‘non-partisan’ in nature and because 
relatively greater importance is given to candidates who are more familiar with the electors 
than is the case in parliamentary elections. Once we accept the necessity of party discipline, 
what is inevitable is a question of the legal, as well as moral or political, accountability of 
political parties. Despite their paragovernmental functions and their performance as a kind 
of mini-collective government, political parties are not sufficiently subject to the principles 
of public accountability under the current legal system.
6.4.2 The internalisation of the political process within political parties
(i) The meaning of internalisation and its effect
If we consider that the internalisation of the political process within political parties 
requires the organisation to be more sensitive to the logic of administration, then some 
external supervision of internal affairs is inevitable. For example, the right to join political 
parties and regulation of the expulsion process can be more coherently dealt with when 
political parties are institutionalised.
The internalisation of the political process means, inter alia, abandoning a conception of 
the political party as a ‘unitary’ actor while adopting the changed nature of political parties 
that now come to cover not only social demands but also requirements of systemic 
integration. The nature of the mediation which political parties provide is different from the 
conventional conception of mediation as an opinion linkage between civil society and the 
state. As discussed in Chapter 4, political parties no longer locate themselves in a vertical
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framework which has the state at the top and the individual at the base. Rather, they can be 
seen as a network within which different social discourses interact in the logic of politics, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, systemic political propaganda is diffused in a organised 
form to attract the general public. This implies that a political party is not merely an 
association of like-minded people in a general sense but also a pluralised sphere where a 
number of groups compete with one another to achieve their own interests under relatively 
qualified rules. These groups within a party are not a permanent entity but highly fluid and 
provisional in the sense that they can be organised and dissolved as a number of single 
complex issues are raised and resolved.
Therefore, it is almost inevitable for political parties to perform similar activities to the 
government administration. As a result, there is no reason why political parties should be 
free from a public law review applicable to the state’s governmental activities. In other 
words, the demand for the public supervision of political parties arises out of the need for 
the integration of public and private interests, which results, in turn, from the internalisation 
of the political process within political parties.
This internalisation poses a new problem of legitimisation. It transforms the location of 
such a problem from the external relationship between political parties and civil society to 
the internal relationship between individual members or groups and their leadership. This 
means that the demand for intra-party democracy or democratic procedures needs to be 
constitutionalised to a similar standard as that which official governmental activities are 
required to meet. The constitutionalisation of some operating procedures of political parties 
may, in turn, provide a constitutional mechanism in which individuals or groups within a 
political party have the right to challenge decisions taken by their party leaders. The courts 
may intervene in the internal order of political parties to the extent that such 
constitutionalised values permit.
(ii) A review of Burrell case: the Conservative Party as a legal entity
From the broader perspective on party organisations, suggested in Chapter 4 and briefly 
above, the judicial view in Burrell ([1982] 1 W.L.R. 522) denying the constitutional and 
legal - as opposed to factual - relationship between organisational elements of the 
Conservative Party should be open to a critical review. One may argue that in examining
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the legal status of political parties, the link between elements of the party need not be both 
contractual and direct. Rather, evidence of functional links between them co-operating with 
each other, with a common purpose to win general elections is enough. Few can question 
the functional link between the parliamentary party and other party components, which is 
essential to the working of a democratic polity.
Yet this does not mean that despite the unique historical development of the 
Conservative Party, we should revive the conventional mass party model and seek the rigid 
unitary identity of political parties. Indeed, with the acceleration of the govemmentalisation 
of political parties, the advent of functionally differentiated party organisation is inevitable. 
(See Chapter 4) As a result, what should be acknowledged is a rather loose internal order in 
which not only the party in public office (the parliamentary party) but also the party on the 
ground (voluntary party organisations) enjoy enhanced autonomy. But this complex entity 
does not provide any justification for the argument that the party as a whole no longer 
exists. Despite the functional differentiation of the party organisation itself, the relationship 
between the party in public office and other elements of the party as a whole is internal. No 
one doubts that there is an organic relationship between those components moving toward a 
common goal, for example, to win a general election. This means that the trend towards the 
differentiation of the party organisation goes hand in hand with the internalisation of the 
political process within the whole party.
One result of this is that the conventional private law perspective on political parties 
should be replaced by the a perspective placing party organisations at the crossroads of 
public and private law. The significance of this shift of perspective lies in a new style of 
autonomy for political parties. The autonomy of political parties as entities in their own 
right no longer means a lack of external interference but rather a rationalised autonomy 
subject to constitutionalised basic democratic procedures. In short, the regulation of 
political parties coupled with restrictions on their internal affairs is consistent with the 
stringent protection of their autonomy in order to ensure that political equality and fairness 
which constitute the core virtues of our version of pluralist democracy.
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6.4.3 The required democratic control of the internal affairs of political parties
Taken together, the activities of political parties should be undertaken in the interests not 
only of themselves and their members but also of the public at large. Thus, it should be 
borne in mind that the rules of political parties, like governmental administrative decisions, 
are not merely an instrument of exchange underpinning contractual relations but constitute 
a device for political organisation and regulation. There is no justification for the 
conventional view that the activities of a major political party are outside the law or, more 
specifically, outside the principles of public accountability simply because no contractual 
relationship exists, something that would be required under the conventional law of 
association.
Yet this does not mean that political parties have to be subject to the principles of 
conventional public regulation. Needless to say, the forms of regulation can vary, depending 
on a wide range of factors from the nature of activities subject to regulation, coupled with 
the institutional arrangements surrounding them, to cultural and historical peculiarities 
which may affect certain types of regulation. From this perspective, of course, the judicial 
supervision of the affairs of political parties under the conventional rule of public law is 
merely one of a number of ways of pursuing good administration.179
7 Conclusion: The nineteenth century framework at the dawn of the twenty first 
century
We may conclude that the law governing political parties is at the heart of the clear 
divergence between constitutional theory and practice. Such divergence can be attributed to 
liberal associationalism, which does not admit that a political party is more than the sum of 
its individual members. This idea manifests itself in the form of a political market without 
the incorporation of intermediary associations as collective actors. All legal mechanisms
179 Hence, we disagree with Youngs’ (1996: 233) view that an emphasis on the application of constitutional 
rights and principles can impoverish political debates and thus may leave issues which should be decided in 
the democratic arena to be resolved by the courts instead.
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relating to the political process, especially elections, are constructed without any 
recognition of the role of those intermediary associations operating within it.
From this perspective, political parties are (or should be) regarded merely as social clubs 
of like-minded people without public status. As far as Westminster politics are concerned, 
the elected member is not the representative of a specific interest, constituency or 
association but the representative of national interests as a whole. Hence, free competition 
between individual candidates is the basic idea behind the current system. This backs up the 
principle of the independence of MPs. The principle provides, in return, a persuasive 
justification for some MPs* decisions to “cross the floor” of the House of Commons 
without resigning their seats and fighting a by-election under their new political colours. 
(See Cowley 1996)
However, the status quo is a product of the nineteenth century in which political parties 
could be seen from an old perspective that focused on the idea of representation rather than 
that of power. The political system of contemporary Britain has been restructured in such a 
way that the old perspective is now able to explain and control only a relatively small part 
of this restructured political market. A first step towards a new constitutional framework 
has to be the institutionalisation of political parties within a constitutionally regulated 
boundary.
The outdated character of liberal associationalism can be extended to the internal affairs 
of political parties. The realisation of govemmentalised aspects of political parties and the 
significance of the internalisation of the political process within political parties require a 
new framework for the rationalisation and democratisation of their internal order.
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Chapter 6
Required Democratic Procedures: 
the Issue of Intra-Party Democracy with reference to the 
Modernisation of the Labour Party
1 Introduction
The case for the legal institutionalisation of British political parties, which was suggested 
in the previous chapter, will affect certain aspects of conventional legal constitutional 
theory and practice. The liberal theory of parliamentary democracy, regarding political 
parties purely as private associations and denying substantial legal control of their affairs, is 
particularly prone to the refusal of any rational movement towards intra-party democracy. 
This attitude needs to be evaluated against the background of our new democratic ideal, i.e. 
constitutionalised democratic autonomy, eager not only to recognise the institutional rights 
of political parties as autonomous institutions but to conceive, in return, the 
constitutionalisation of politics.
As suggested in Chapter 3, the constitutionalisation of politics does not necessarily imply 
the legal regulation of political parties in any great detail. The institutional reform of the 
British political system in the name of greater democratic autonomy180 will inevitably 
require the registration of political parties, and for them not only to produce more open
I Q I
accounts but to rationalise their modi operandi. However, it is wrong to assume that this 
legalisation will unduly curb the necessary autonomy of political parties. Rather, it is meant 
to bring about ‘publicly responsible self-regulation’ of political parties. (See Chapter 3, 
Section 4.2.2 (iv))
180 For example, as we shall suggest in the ensuing chapters, electoral reform recognising the role of political 
parties as basic actors in elections and the public funding of political parties.
181 It may also require the creation of an independent commission on elections and political parties. See, e.g. 
Ewing 1987: 192-196.
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The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. Firstly, it aims at exploring the different 
conventional views of intra-party democracy. Secondly, some paradigmatic problems 
inherent in these ideas will be examined. Finally, we shall seek to outline those internal 
democratic procedures within political parties, which, under our project of 
‘constitutionalised democratic autonomy’, are not only most desirable, but to which the 
close attention of the law should be given. In so doing, we shall make use of the debates 
concerning the Labour Party’s movement towards a new model of intra-party democracy, 
something which the party has sought to realise via constitutional reform since the 1970s. 
This is because this movement within Labour has put forward highly practical criticisms of 
British liberal democratic theory and practice and is now beginning to change the face of 
the British political system.182
2 The implications of intra-party democratic controversies in the Labour Party
Since its formation at the turn of the century, the issue of intra-party democracy has been 
a long-standing and recurring theme within the Labour Party and has often led to serious 
internal disputes. This is understandable if we consider the party’s unique history. As David 
Coates (1996: 68) succinctly points out, “the Labour Party has always been a broad 
coalition of social reformists (keen to subordinate the power of private capital to 
progressive social ends) and bourgeois radicals (keen to modernise the local industrial 
base)”.183 On the one hand, the politics of Labour’s social reformists, known as its left 
wing,184 has reflected the tradition in which collective decision-making, for example, 
through mandated delegates, had become well established. The politics of Labour’s
182 As we shall indicate in relevant places in this chapter, the organisational reform of the Conservative Party 
after its 1997 general election defeat is one example of the influence of the Labour model. See, generally, 
Conservative Party (1998a).
183 This categorisation would provide a more clear view, concerning the difference between the two sides, than 
Patrick Seyd’s (1987: 1-2) ‘socialist’-‘social democrat’ dichotomy, which corresponds respectively to ‘social 
reformist’ and ‘bourgeois radical’. The old Clause IV which enshrined ‘common ownership’ and which was 
recast at the Special Party Conference on 29 April 1995 forced the two sides to compromise in order to 
achieve an ambiguous unity. Recently, a wide ranging and heated debate between the two factions over 
constitutional reform, including a recast of the original Clause IV, the introduction of ‘one-member-one-vote’ 
and the reconsideration of the party-union link, has brought the ‘moderniser-traditionalist’ dichotomy to the 
fore.
184 For a contingent but feasible consistency within the factions, see Seyd 1987: 2-3.
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bourgeois radicals whose ideological tendency has been described as its right wing, on the 
other hand, has preferred the autonomy or supremacy of the parliamentary party over its 
extra-parliamentary organisations. (See Shaw 1994: 21)
However, it should be pointed out that the issue of intra-party democracy has never been 
simply an internal problem of the Labour Party but was also directed against British 
parliamentary democracy per se. As we have seen in Chapter 2, modem British democracy 
has persistently been accused of being somewhat oligarchic, elitist and authoritarian in 
character. Naturally, ongoing demands have been made for a balance to be struck between, 
on the one hand, the ‘Tory’ emphasis on hierarchy and the independence of government 
and, on the other, a new view of government encouraging both greater popular participation 
and discussion. In this chapter, in our search for more satisfactory notion of intra-party 
democracy, we shall consider both the unique character of a political party situated at the 
crossroads between the state and civil society and the normative implications of ‘dual 
politics’. (See Chapters 3 and 4)
3 Two forms of intra-party democracy
There are two main forms of intra-party democracy: one indirect, the other direct. The 
indirect form of intra-party democracy is, among other thing, concerned with the question 
of whether ordinary party members should have the opportunity to take part in leadership 
elections and the selection of candidates. This arrangement is indirect in the sense that it 
does not presuppose members’ direct involvement in the party’s policy-making process. On 
the other hand, the direct, or strict, form of intra-party democracy is what is usually called 
the ‘doctrine of the mandate’. The general idea of this doctrine is two-fold: firstly, public 
office holders, in particular members of Parliament, should be committed to the policies of 
the party as a whole since it is thanks to the party they owe their positions; secondly, any 
government should be committed to manifestos of the party which constitutes it. The
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former is usually dealt with under the heading of the principle of mandated delegates while 
the latter, the most controversial doctrine, is known as the doctrine of manifesto.185
4 Is direct intra-party democracy incompatible with democratic government?
4.1 The case against direct intra-party democracy and its rationales 
In “Power in the Labour Party: the Issue of Intra-Party Democracy” (1982), 
R.T.McKenzie put forwarded once more his lifelong belief, first outlined in his masterpiece 
British Political Parties (1964), that an ‘archaic doctrine of intra-party democracy’ is in 
fact incompatible with the democratic polity as a whole, i.e. parliamentary democracy.187 (at 
195)
4.1.1 The difference between political parties and interest groups
His main contention is that oligarchic control by the party leaders of their party 
organisation is indispensable for the well-being of a democratic polity. The basic 
assumption is that the function of political parties in a democratic political system is 
fundamentally different from that of interest groups.
The all-important distinction between political parties and interest groups lies, of course, in the fact that 
the primary function of the former is to sustain groups of political leaders who offer themselves as 
potential governors of a political community, while the function of the latter is, in Elders veld’s phrase, to 
‘aggregate, articulate and transmit group demands’. (McKenzie 1982: 195)
According to McKenzie (1982: 198), in all other forms of organisation, ‘the iron law of 
oligarchy’ represents a threat to the working of a democratic political system by hindering
185 Dawn 01iver(1989: 126-127) divided the doctrine of manifesto into two forms: a strong and a weak form. 
What is more frequently identified with that doctrine is, in her view, a weak form meaning that the manifesto 
produced by a party for a general (or local) election is regarded as a standard legitimising the pursuit of those 
policies. However, so far as intra-party democracy is concerned, the strong version of the doctrine has more 
relevancy in that the election manifesto is regarded as a binding statement of policy by the whole party, which 
is both contractually and morally binding on ‘the party in public office’. This doctrine is a narrow, restricted 
one, which focuses only on the party platforms proposed in an election.
186 It is in 1955 that this book was originally written but is still cited as an authority in this field.
187 In fact, this sort of objection to intra-party democracy is not novel since it was raised on a number of 
previous occasions, the most oft-quoted being Winston Churchill’s during his general election campaign in 
1945. See Miliband 1958: 172-173.
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their appropriate functions, i.e. the effective transmission of group demands. On the other 
hand, the party in public office, particularly in government, should be accountable to the 
electorate rather than the wider party to which it belongs. Some commentators support this 
view on the ground that, in balancing a variety of domestic as well as international 
considerations with the doctrinal aims of their party, it cannot be reasonable for 
parliamentary leaders to be subject to instructions or threats from extra-parliamentary 
organisations which, in formulating their decisions, have no accountability to the electorate 
at large. (See, e.g. Birch 1989: 96-97) According to this view, the autonomy of the 
parliamentary representatives represents the sole constitutional mechanism by which policy­
makers can be held accountable to the electorate. What this view presumes is that any 
closer tie between the parliamentary leaders and extra-parliamentary organisations would 
inevitably “transcend” the organs of government, as is generally the case in totalitarian 
systems. (See McKenzie 1982: 196) In short, it is argued that the doctrine of intra-party 
democracy is wholly unconstitutional because it is contrary to the British constitution under 
which political and legal responsibility for the making and implementing of policy 
decisions rests primarily with the Parliamentary government.
4.1.2 The problem of faction
This criticism of a rigorous form of intra-party democracy, as both impossible and 
unworkable within a parliamentary democracy, is strengthened by a further practical 
consideration. This is the ‘problem of faction’ or the ‘over-empowering of activists’. Some 
lament that only a few hundred thousand people control the overall mass organisation. (See 
Oliver 1989: 124-126; Kavanagh 1982: 206) Party activists are open to criticisms of 
blocking real grass-roots demands which, in theory, they represent. (See Shaw 1994: 16) 
The recent introduction of the egalitarian principle of ‘one member one vote’ and the partial 
abolition of the ‘block vote’ in the Labour Party, both of which will be considered later, can 
be seen as a response to this criticism.
4.2 The case for direct intra-party democracy and its rationales
One classical argument in support of intra-party democracy can be found in a concise 
article written in 1958 by Ralph Miliband. In relation to the supposed supremacy of extra­
184
parliamentary organisations over parliamentary leaders, he emphasised two points: firstly, 
the flexibility of intra-party democracy and, secondly, the usefulness and desirability of 
active minorities.
4.2.1 Flexible relationships within party organisations 
It is stressed that extra-parliamentary organisations do not necessarily work on the 
principle of stare decisis and, therefore, their resolutions can be reversed as social and 
political situations change. (Miliband 1958: 173) As a result, the relationship between a 
government and its extra-parliamentary wing is not rigid and unilateral but fluid and 
bilateral. The commitment of a government to its extra-parliamentary organisations, in 
particular party conferences, is not necessarily incompatible with a democratic polity. 
Secondly, and more importantly, he argues that intra-party democracy is vital to securing a 
political “dialogue” between leaders and followers, which is the ‘essence of democracy’ in 
the age of mass politics.
The leaders of the Labour Party are at least required to argue the case with their followers and seek to 
persuade them, from reason and not from authority, that the course of action they wish to see pursued is 
indeed inopportune. The leaders of the Party in office carry national responsibilities; but their assumption 
of office does not divest them of their responsibilities to their followers. (See Miliband 1958: 173)
This defence of intra-party democracy does not necessarily imply that parliamentary leaders 
should be the “puppets” of their party. As Miliband (1958: 173) admits, parliamentary 
leaders should be allowed a certain degree of independence and initiative. For Miliband, 
however, the independence of leaders should not be tantamount to their supremacy over the 
decisions of the party to which they belong. In the Westminster model of democracy, the 
political sovereignty of the electorate - which is a “necessarily amorphous mass” (Miliband 
1958: 173) - is dormant at least between elections. In the circumstances, some political and 
institutional devices are required for obstructing abuses of governmental independence. 
These devices are catalysts facilitating democracy and there is no reason why they should 
be seen as incompatible with a democratic polity.
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4.2.2 The usefulness of the active minority 
As to the argument that the activist minority is unrepresentative of the grass-roots, 
Miliband suggests a very clear counter argument. The deplorable situation that only a 
minority of members have taken part in the management of the Labour Party cannot justify 
the curtailment of the powers of its rank and file activists. (See 1958: 172) It is difficult to 
see why the active minority should be penalised for the apathy of the majority. (See 1958: 
172) The right remedy to the passivity of the majority is, surely, to provide appropriate 
institutional devices for enhancing their participation without in any way limiting the scope 
of the active minority.
4.3 Analysis and criticisms
4.3.1 Conception of intra-partv democracy as part of the whole project of democratisation 
It is apparent that differing conceptions of democracy, and concomitantly the differing
nature and role of political parties, underlie the foregoing debates. On the one hand, the 
theory of anti-intra-party democracy, supported by such theorists as McKenzie, depends 
basically upon a unitary conception of liberal representative democracy. A supplementary 
idea to this is that some qualitative variation exists between intermediary organisations and 
thereby political parties should be regarded as different from interest groups. On the other 
hand, the case for intra-party democracy is basically in harmony with a rational movement 
towards participatory democracy, though Miliband’s defence for intra-party democracy is 
less hostile to the role of activists than that of some more radical protagonists of 
participatory democracy.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we have already analysed and criticised these approaches in detail 
and put forward our own project with an accompanying perspective on party organisation. 
Some essential, albeit brief, arguments backed by empirical evidence are however 
warranted.
4.3.2 The actual meaning of the qualitative difference between political parties and other 
political associations
(i) Qualitative difference between political parties and other political associations
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There is a qualitative difference, as McKenzie argues (see Sec. 4.1.1), between political 
parties and interest groups. With modem pluralised societies, the monopoly over the 
political process held by political parties can no longer be maintained due to the increasing 
role of other forms of organisation in the political system. This blurring of the social and the 
political does not necessarily mean that the political system should be replaced by novel 
forms of representation such as new social movements. On the contrary, a new paradigm of 
politics, based on dual politics, recognises the equal importance of both legitimisation 
problems and steering problems. (See Chapter 3) Liberal institutional devices need to be 
cherished rather than discarded in our project of constitutionalised democratic autonomy. 
Whilst the state should be exposed to the political public sphere, the extent of dependence 
of the state on public opinion should not amount to a usurpation of the decision-making 
power by social power. In being transformed into administrative power, social power 
should be filtered through parliamentary procedures, elections and party competition. This 
implies that a relatively privileged position should be given to political parties (in 
particular, the party in office), which are essential for the proper, stable workings of such 
democratic procedures.
(ii) The real implication of the pluralisation of politics
We disagree with the way in which McKenzie uses the qualitative difference between 
political parties and other forms of organisation to bolster his argument. Apparently, he was 
not fully aware of the real implications of the pluralised political and social reality, which is 
why he was over-preoccupied with the conventional idea that government does not have to 
abide by any decision other than that of Parliament. In modem societies, politics can no 
longer be monopolised by rigidly defined conventional institutions but should open itself up 
to hybrid collective actors representing a variety of social discourse. (See Chapter 4) As a 
result, the conventional presumption that a clear division of labour exists among 
government, parties and interest groups is undermined and these relationships are seen to be 
more complex and contingent. The status and the role of political parties in this new 
paradigm is unique, in that their self-conscious task is not only to mediate social discourse 
between the state and civil society but also to become arms of the state vis-a-vis civil 
society. (See Chapter 4)
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Hence, the qualitative difference between political parties and other forms of 
organisation does not justify McKenzie's assertion that a policy-making system bound by 
extra-parliamentary organisations is illegitimate in a multi-party system. What he presumed 
is that extra-parliamentary organisations are basically unrepresentative, being dominated by 
a single, specific interest. However, the need to transform the party organisation into a 
catch-all party has intensified as forms of social life have become increasingly pluralised. 
The presumption that a significant discrepancy exists between the electorate and the 
ordinary membership is thus diminished. Therefore, the unique nature of political parties, 
which perform certain para-governmental functions, does not necessarily imply that the 
party organisation as a whole should be oligarchic. On the contrary, the ‘public’ nature of 
political parties, which is the cause as well as the effect of their govemmentalisation, would 
justify a greater democratisation of their decision-making processes. This is particularly so 
when one remembers that no matter how loose the relationship between ‘the party in public 
office’ and ‘the party on the ground’, there is an organic interaction between them even in 
the time between elections. (See Chapter 5, Section 6.4.2 (ii)) The whole party is constantly 
working together in an effort to catalyse public opinion. The party in public office should be 
as open to its extra-parliamentary organisations as it is to various pressure groups. This 
applies all the more where political parties are conceived as a network made up of varied 
social discourse and not as unitary actors only concerned with a specific interest. (See 
Chapter 5, Section 6.4.2.(i); Section 4.5.2. (iii) of this chapter)
(iii) The autonomy of a political party and intra-party democracy 
Given the pluralist nature of the present socio-political reality, the transformed nature of 
the state (or government), and the importance of the constitutionalised autonomy of 
political parties, it cannot reasonably be argued that a party’s voluntary commitment to 
intra-party democracy per se is incompatible with a democratic polity. On the contrary, it 
would be reasonable to suggest that the ‘govemmentalisation’ and ‘professionalisation’ of 
political parties can happily go hand in hand with the democratisation of their organisations. 
The party functioning within the core complex of the political system has, of course, to be 
protected from the vulgar and capricious promptings of civil society. However, at the same 
time, to be democratic, it should be subject to the principle of “publicity”. A practice of
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rational public debate should, therefore, be an institutionalised element within the decision­
making process and the party in public office should, in turn, be open, if only indirectly, to 
both the critical supervision of its extra-parliamentary wing and external public opinion.
In suggesting the constitutionalisation of political parties, it is immaterial whether or not 
parliamentary leaders are ‘directly’ subject to the decisions of the party to which they 
belong. What is material is whether procedures for opinion- and will- formation should 
ensure that there is no political repression or exclusion. It may be argued, as Miliband 
(1958: 172) does, that the active minority should not be penalised for the apathy of the 
majority. However, it is unlikely that power structures and organisations, permitting 
particular groups to wield greater political or social power than the interests, which they 
represent or communicate, warrant, would be stably egalitarian and democratic. This is all 
the more true where the policy preferences of such groups significantly diverge from those 
of the unenthusiastic, but nevertheless politically entitled, majorities they represent.
In conclusion, autonomy should be granted to the party in public office, at least in 
matters pertaining to the implementation of its policies. But, the reason why it should be 
afforded such independence is not that the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty regards 
external pressure unconstitutional, but simply because such pressure would hinder, in 
Habermas’s phrase, “systemic integration”. In other words, external pressure would 
seriously hamper not only practical negotiations of players within the core complex of the 
political system but also the effective functioning of the self-regulated party organisation.
(iv) Constitutionalisation of direct intra-party democracy
We need to specify what constitutional guarantees should be introduced to secure both 
the autonomy and publicity of political parties. A crucial requirement is a written 
constitution, a binding framework, within which the workings of the whole party can be 
properly co-ordinated. This framework is different from a private contract between 
individual members because it enshrines democratic principles which cannot be overridden 
even by a majority of members. It should provide rules and regulations institutionalising 
rational debate concerning party policy and programmes. It should also make provision for 
a number of political forums, including an annual conference, where debate over policy 
issues is guaranteed. The right of minority groups to propose policy agendas should be
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guaranteed to ensure that no one section or faction can dictate the policy-making process. 
By the same token, members (who take a different line to that of the party as a whole) are to 
be protected from arbitrary punishment, especially expulsion. This means that proceedings 
for the expulsion of members need to be institutionalised and the members concerned be 
allowed to appeal to independent tribunals including the High Court.
4.4 The case o f the Labour Party
4.4.1 Intra-partv democracy under the Labour left’s initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s.
The 70s and 80s represent the heyday of both Labour left wingers and their endeavour to 
create intra-party democracy. However, to understand the Labour Party during this period, it 
is necessary to have a firm grasp of its underlying structure and organisation. It was 
organised on federal lines and had developed a unique pluralist power structure, both of 
which helped distinguish it from not only its main rival, the Conservative Party, but also the 
established British constitution. A written party constitution188 distributes rights and powers 
to a range of institutions: the parliamentary party, constituency parties, affiliated trade 
unions, the National Executive Committee (NEC), and the party conference. This 
institutional dispersal of rights and responsibilities has created an arena in which power 
struggles can take place, especially between the parliamentary party and the extra- 
parliamentary institutions such as the NEC and Conference. The emergence of the NEC as 
an autonomous power in the 1970s reinforced the tension between “the party in the 
country” or the unions, on the one hand, and the parliamentary leadership, on the other. 
(See Benn 1981: 191) The political pendulum has tended to swing between these opposing 
camps. Between 1979 and 1983, the political balance lay by and large with the extra- 
parliamentary wing which, in the wake of the party’s 1979 election defeat,189 launched an 
aggressive campaign for intra-party democracy. During this time, the parliamentary 
leadership lost its grip over the NEC which had power to prepare policy statements for the 
annual conference. Conference adopted many controversial policies in this period of
188 Of course, this is another sign of challenge to the status quo based on an unwritten constitution.
189 In fact, pressure for intra-party democracy dates back to 1973 when the Campaign for Labour Party 
Democracy was set up by groups of grass-roots activists. However, it is clear that the general election defeat 
coming in the wake of a loss of confidence vote in the House of Commons in 1979 added an important 
momentum and pushed the issue to the top of agenda, and all of which resulted in conspicuous constitutional 
reforms.
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confrontation, including nuclear unilateralism, withdrawal from the EC, and the extension 
of public ownership. It also introduced a number of constitutional reforms such as the 
mandatory reselection of MPs, the supremacy of the NEC over the parliamentary leadership 
in the drafting of the manifesto, and the extension of franchise for leadership elections. The 
left wing’s triumph, albeit partial, in the internal power struggle caused the defection of 
some leading right wing figures, in particular the ‘gang of four’190 to form a new party, the 
Social Democratic Party.
4.4.2 The problems with the Labour left’s reform
However, the Labour left’s movement towards intra-party democracy was flawed.
(i) A side-effect of the supremacy of the extra-parliamentary party over the party in public 
office
In arguing the rank and file should control the leadership, the Labour left was not frilly 
aware of the consequences of such empowerment of the extra-parliamentary wings. In fact, 
such empowerment is a valuable strategy for democratisation and, thus, should not be 
underestimated. However, this strategy must not be stretched too far. It should be bome in 
mind that without a right balance between the different resources for democracy,191 no 
radical reform could easily avoid a number of pathological effects. Indeed, the Labour left’s 
reform tended to strengthen, not grass-roots democracy, but that of the activists, by 
redistributing power from the parliamentary to the extra-parliamentary elite. Thus, things 
went from bad to worse, in that so far as the extra-parliamentary elite was concerned, no 
constitutional machinery existed for securing the accountability of the decision-makers. In 
effect, what the politics of left proposed was not a workable alternative system of 
government but a utopian system in which neither the extra-parliamentary wings nor the 
parliamentary party can effectively manage the organisation. This eventually resulted in a 
“crisis of governance” which considerably weaken the party’s electoral chances. (See Shaw 
1994: 22)
190 Viz., David Owen, Roy Jenkins, Bill Rodgers and Shirley Williams.
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(ii) The lack of discussion about manageable participation
The Labour left’s movement towards radical intra-party democracy in the 70s and 80s 
lacked any serious discussion about how effectively greater participation on the part of the 
rank and file could be managed. What matters in this regard is not whether conference 
should hold a supreme power in the policy-making process,192 but whether the policy­
making process as a whole is fair, open and manageable. The process has to be one in 
which rational public debate can take place. In other words, the decision-making power has 
to be responsive to ‘communicative power’ generated by the grassroots or even the Labour 
electorate. Such are the standards against which the Labour left’s reform should be critically 
evaluated.
(iii) The neglected importance of open and egalitarian systems of opinion formation
Constitutionally, conference has ultimate control of the party’s organisation and
procedures in that it performs the twin functions of policy-making and policy-endorsement. 
Until the organisational reforms, set in motion in the late 1980s, policy-making process of 
conference was dominated by an out-of-date mythology. This mythology developed in the 
tradition of unionised labourism during the late nineteenth century and had, by the early 
twentieth century, firmly established itself. It involved such practices as vote-buying, 
weighted suffrage and the block vote. Resolutions were submitted by constituency parties 
and trade unions and then, after the formal processes of amendment and debate, those 
backed by two-thirds majority were incorporated into the party programme. Votes were 
distributed to affiliated organisations according to the size of their membership.
However, it was always open to doubt as to whether votes taken at conference reflected 
the ‘real’ demands and opinions of the grass-roots. More importantly, it was doubtful 
whether decisions were arrived at by rational debate. Indeed, as conference retains the 
ultimate control over the party’s organisation and procedures, its representative 
shortcomings have always been subject to bitter criticism. In the first place, excessive 
influence was given to affiliated trade unions. Until the 1990 conference which reduced
191 Namely, as we have seen, the democratisation of a political party has to consider not only the practically 
oriented demands of the grass-roots but also a proper systemic logic which may manifest itself in the 
organisational effectiveness and efficiency.
192 From a comparative perspective, it is not odd that the democratic sovereign with formal supreme right is 
the party congress, which is convened at regular interval. For a German case, see Poguntke 1994: 206.
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overall vote of unions to a maximum of 70 per cent of the total conference vote,193 almost 
90 per cent of the voting was by union delegates. Though votes, in theory, were distributed 
according to the number of members, in practice, they were assessed solely on the overall 
fees given by an affiliated organisation. This system has been criticised not only because a 
considerable number of either ‘ghost’ or involuntary members exist but also because trade 
unions were, in fact, able to ‘buy’ votes at conference. Until 1993 when, in crucial parts of 
the decision-making process, the block vote was abolished, votes were cast in blocks by 
unions, constituency parties and socialist organisations. The block vote represented a 
system of winner-take-all and, therefore, did not reflect the divisions of opinion within 
membership. Like its counterparts the first-past-the-post electoral system and the whipped 
party vote in the House of Commons, as Kavanagh (1982: 212) pointed out, the block vote 
is likely to produce a result which is quite unrepresentative of the aggregate votes of the 
individual electors.
Furthermore, with the block vote, the major union leaders have been made ‘barons’ of 
intra-party politics who as Labour history shows, have generally been staunch allies of the 
non-left Parliamentary leadership. Of course, this old practice did have the merit of creating 
a bulwark against the far left. (See Minkin 1992: 647) However, in our highly pluralised 
and volatile society, such an asset can no longer be seen as outweighing the need for a 
greater egalitarian democracy.
(iv) A failed crusade for intra-party democracy
To summarise, there are at least two reasons why the left’s drive lost its purchase. Firstly, 
it failed to recognise the limitation of a separation of power strategy. Secondly, it 
overlooked the importance of an open and egalitarian system of opinion formation capable 
of reflecting the diversity of social discourse.
From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that despite such significant constitutional 
reforms and policy changes, the Labour Party suffered another electoral debacle in 1983, 
which was eventually led to two more general election defeats in 1987, 1992. The
193 See The Guardian, 28.6.90, p.20 by Michael White. In 1993, the NEC was authorised progressively to 
reduce the union’s share of the conference vote from its present 70% to 50%, provided that individual 
membership reached 300,000. See Alderman & Carter 1995: 454.
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movement towards the modernisation of Labour was a natural response to this unpleasant 
reality.
4.4.3 The modernisation of Labour
(i) The change in power structures
In the wake of the party’s crushing 1983 election defeat, the newly elected young leader, 
Neil Kinnock, launched a number of cautious194 attempts to reverse the political pendulum 
out of the hands of a hard left-led NEC and towards the parliamentary leadership. Soon 
after the 1983 election campaign, specific proposals for organisational reform came on the 
party agenda, which were ostensibly focused on the establishment of a process of joint 
policy determination between the representatives of the parliamentary and extra- 
parliamentary parties. A limited number of joint policy committees, consisting of an equal 
number of members from the NEC and Shadow Cabinet plus a few additional trade 
unionists and advisors, superseded the NEC’s power to propose policy statements to 
conference. (See Kinnock 1994: 539) This meant that the parliamentary leadership secured, 
for the first time in Labour’s history, an “institutionalised” role in the Party’s policy-making 
machinery. (See Shaw 1994: 110)
In fact, the real consequences of this reform may well be far-reaching. Some research 
(See, e.g. Minkin 1992: 409) shows that by 1986, the Parliamentary leadership had largely 
taken charge of responsibility for policy innovation. In Shaw’s words (1994: 110), the NEC 
was in effect transformed into an “adjunct of the parliamentary leadership”. What has 
reinforced this shift of power since the middle of the 1980s is the growing role of party 
strategists and communications specialists.195 What now became key vantage points in the 
party machine were not purely ideological, class-based social reform plans but so-called 
realistic alternative policies compatible with current public opinion. (See Shaw 1994: 111)
194 In his presentation in the Institute of Historical Research seminar on Twentieth Century British History on
8 December 1993, Neil Kinnock explained why this attempt should be cautious: “[Without] long preparation 
and a variety of actions to push and persuade people and organisations into changed positions, the status quo - 
or something worse than that - would have prevailed. ... [In] the Labour Party, the leadership had no 
instrument for inaugurating and pursing change on the scale and in the direction that was needed. There was 
no tradition of the PLP or the Shadow Cabinet instituting and processing comprehensive change and neither 
was there any means available for doing that. ... change of all kinds would have to be pursued by very 
thorough and calculated means.” See Kinnock 1994: 536,538.
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This is part and parcel of the modernisation of the party machine, focusing on the 
importance of winning elections, which the opponents of this movement have termed a 
“contaminating bacillus called ‘electoralism’ ”. (Kinnock 1994: 540. See also 545)
(ii) Individualisation of organisation 
After a fourth defeat in 1992, an even stronger modernisation drive was made by two 
successive leaders, the late John Smith and Tony Blair. The thrust of this recent 
modernisation may be called the ‘individualisation of organisation’. What were once central 
themes of liberalism, such as self-regulation and individual choice coupled with competent 
and accountable government, become regarded as indispensable principles which the party 
must embody in a reformed power structure and organisation.196 Two communitarian 
notions supplement this move towards individualisation. Firstly, there can and should be 
more to politics than the aggregation of preferences given in advance. Secondly, the 
reduction of democratic politics to its ‘group basis’ should be abandoned. Since 1993, the 
block vote, which has been seen as the main cause of the unrepresentativeness of the party 
policy-making process, has been virtually abolished. A maximum rate of the total 
conference vote cast by the unions was set up and ‘one-delegate-one-vote’ replaced the 
‘unit vote’ so that union delegations can split their votes.197 These reforms are intended to 
temper the imbalance of vote strength favouring the unions as well as to curtail the 
influence of activists by empowering the more moderate rank and file members. (See 
Mandelson & Liddle 1996: 217; Shaw 1994: 117)
195 See Kinnock 1994: 542. For example, Peter Mandelson, an architect of the modernisation of Labour, was 
first appointed as Director of Campaigns and Communications of the Labour Party under Neil Kinnock’s 
leadership.
196 That is why, given equally noticeable change within the LDP, some political commentators hastily 
suggested convergence between the two main opposition parties. See, for example, Peter Kellner’s column in 
The Independent 26.1.92, p. 19. Cf. Russell 1996.
197 In between 1984, when the proposal for ‘One Member One Vote (OMOV)’ was defeated at the conference, 
and 1989, when OMOV was made mandatory, its use in the constituencies had been increasing -  which, as 
Kinnock (1994: 543) recalled, was a key condition for the modernisation. However, the most important area in 
which the introduction of OMOV has a real significance is that of leadership elections. Individual members 
are now entitled to have a voice in the election of the leadership/deputy leadership electoral college, which is 
equally distributed to trade unions, constituency parties and MPs/MEPs. The selection of parliamentary 
candidates is now carried out by a ballot of the CLP membership on an OMOV basis. Moreover, voting rights 
in this selection process is accorded to a new category of ‘registered party members’ under the ‘levy-plus’ 
scheme, which requires the union members to pay a further subscription to the party to cast a vote.
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Individualisation of the party organisation can also be traced in a change in established 
policy-making procedures.198 Growing discontent with policy-making processes at 
conference resulted in the creation of a new policy-making tier: Policy Forum and Policy 
Commissions. Policy Forums are based not only at the national level but also at the regional 
level and draw membership from all sections of the Party, including MPs, unions, local 
government, constituencies and regional parties. Seven Policy Commissions are drawn 
from the membership forums and charged with the detailed examination of particular policy 
areas and presentation of policy statements to the forums. The creation of this tier aims at 
enabling greater number of members to discuss policy in a more considered way. The NEC- 
Shadow Cabinet Joint Policy Committee considers the statements discussed and amended 
by the forums. Conference is the place where such statements are voted upon without 
further amendment. (See Mandelson & Liddle 1996: 221)
Supporters of such reforms claim they will enhance good communication between the 
party in public office and the party on the ground. To maintain a “constructive two-way 
dialogue” between the membership and the leadership even when the party is in 
government, the party has already established a programme of political education and an 
independent supplementary organisation called ‘Progress’. (Mandelson and Liddle 1996: 
223-224) Mandelson and Liddle (1996: 223-224) suggested that the purpose of this 
programme is “to promote political discussion, sensible debate and skills training among 
party members, ensuring, alongside party HQ, that the parliamentary leaders remain in close 
touch with the grass roots at all times”.
4.4.4 Analysis of the modernising Party plan: greater democracy or more managerialism?
The full consequences of such reform projects is not yet clear. On the one hand, it seems 
plausible that they will enhance participation and improve the quality of policy-formation. 
(See, e.g., Mandelson & Liddle 1996: 216-223). On the other hand, some critics argue that
198 Apart from procedural change, there have been considerable substantive changes in party policies through 
the policy review process which has paralleled the structural transformation towards individual empowerment. 
They include the abandonment of the closed shop and the ditching of the Party’s long-standing commitment to 
‘public ownership’ which had been enshrined in the original Clause IV of the Party Constitution since 1918. 
For a comprehensive analysis of this change, see T. Jones 1996. For a debate over the political implication of 
Labour’s policy review, see Hay 1994 and Martin Smith 1994.
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they will lead to manipulation by the parliamentary elite, as a useful means to get legitimacy 
of its political power. (See, e.g., Russell 1996; Lipow 1996: 1, 58)
The latter, pessimistic view is supported by the fact that, despite increasing 
empowerment of the membership, it is parliamentary leaders and their professional advisors 
that generally have the initiative in the policy-making process. (See Leggett 1995: 70. Cf. 
Kinnock 1994: 544-545) Participation of the membership in the policy-making process 
rarely means real debate and discussion but rather a “one-way traffic” in ideas and policies, 
emanating from the central party. Moreover, a case study of the influence of this ‘new 
Labour’ project on the commitment and participation of members shows that it is at best 
uncertain whether such new leadership strategies will fuel renewed commitment and active 
participation. (See B. Jones 1996: 530) It can hardly be denied that, so far as the role of 
activists and the political influence of unions are concerned, recent reforms contribute to the 
strengthening of the leadership’s autonomy, in that it is now capable of gaining direct 
legitimisation from ordinary individual members.
On the other hand, however, this move to curtail the influence of both activists and 
unions might well cure the institutional problems inherent in a power redistribution 
strategy. This strategy has created what Habermas (1992b: 445, 451) called ‘generalised 
particularism’, i.e. a privileged status being given to local and sectional interests. Thus, 
there is no point in arguing against enhanced participation on the part of the ordinary 
membership per se. What matters is how to reduce the potential manipulation of the 
membership by the leaders, or, in other words, how to strike the right balance between 
centralism and localism.
4.5 A need for a balanced realism: beyond individualism and collectivism
Given the equal importance of enhanced egalitarian participation and coherent policy­
making, the immediate question is how, in practice, to tackle the difficult, but necessary, 
task of striking a right balance between these two goals.
A comprehensive analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, 
some essential issues do need to be examined. In so doing, we may again benefit from the 
example offered by Labour’s recent reforms. In the case of the Labour Party, the 
individualisation of the party machine may, paradoxically, mean the centralisation of its
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power structure. (See Webb 1994) As Shaw (1994: 120) argues, “the opportunities and 
incentives for institutionalised horizontal communication are being diminished and replaced 
by the growth of direct vertical communication between the centre and the rank and file.” In 
analysing this aspect, we need to separate two forms of representation or participation: the 
territorial and the functional.
4.5.1 Qualitative change of territorial representation
So far as territorial representation is concerned, it would be wrong to assume that 
increased direct connection between individual member and central authorities has forced 
constituency-wide organisations to atrophy and, thus, left little room for such intermediate 
associations within party politics. Insofar as the central control of certain activities of 
territorially based organisations become strengthened, their powers may actually diminish. 
It does not follow, however, that the role of local activism as a whole is being denied. 
Rather, it simply allows local parties to be more committed to their own ‘local’ affairs and, 
in this sphere, to enjoy much wider autonomy.199 Furthermore, as Seyd and Whiteley (1992: 
218) suggests, “re-energising” the party through the extension of “new” participatory 
incentives to “foot soldiers” or “ambassadors” is essential for the electoral future of the 
party.200 Of course, such incentives ought not to mean a return to the conventional local- 
activist-centred notion of party organisation. As long as nation-wide issues are concerned, a 
considerable part of territorial participation can be given to secondary associations 
dedicated to a sort of functional representation in a professionalised and fluid organisational 
form.
4.5.2 The implications of postmodern functional representation
(i) New forms of participation in the information-oriented society
So far as functional representation (and newly reorganised territorial participation) in 
party politics is concerned, we may start with some post-modern projects aimed at
199 The recent constitutional reforms such as the creation of separate Parliaments for Scotland and Wales and a 
new Mayor of London may offer more opportunities for local parties to play an autonomous part in local 
politics.
200 The recent Conservative reform of party organisation takes the same perspective so that one major 
principle of this reform is the decentralisation of decision-making while allowing the centralised institution, 
named the Board, to control local organisations. See the Conservative Party’s The Fresh Future (1998).
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rigorously changing forms of political participation. Geoff Mulgan put forwards an idea of 
‘lean democracy’ as an antidote to the contemporary political crisis which is, he believes, 
caused by the huge gap between “democracy as an ethos and culture and democracy as a set 
of institutions.” (Mulgan 1994b: 16) 'Lean democracy' “gives the governed more direct 
control over governors, and makes politics more transparent and responsive, more effective 
and more accountable”. {Demos No. 3 1994) Mulgan’s presumption, with which we might 
agree, is that the old style of representative or participatory democracy cannot meet the 
paradoxical social change that simultaneously requires egalitarian empowerment and self- 
determination, on the one hand, and professional management, on the other. However, in 
suggesting possible alternatives to the present representative democracy, he stresses that 
this contemporary political crisis stems from a democratic deficit, i.e. too little influence on 
the part of the majority of citizens over public decisions. (See Mulgan 1994a: ch.l; 1994b: 
17-18; the cover story of Demos, No 3/1994; Adonis & Mulgan 1994: 2) Therefore, the 
practical side of lean democracy, with which we may not totally agree, aims at introducing 
rigorous direct democracy by way of a wholesale redefinition of the nature of politics and 
reconsideration of the role of politicians. ‘Weak power’ politics, relying on a decentralised, 
horizontal, cellular and mosaic power structure, will replace ‘strong power’ politics which 
is structured as a pyramid and depends on vertical lines of authority and accountability. (See 
Mulgan 1994a: ch.6) “Less deferential” but “more demanding” citizens become more active 
in the new model campaigns based on highly effective localised ‘guerrilla’ groups, loosely 
linked in networks, but their relationship with the state is made through ‘electronic forms of 
decision-making’. (See Mulgan 1994b: 18) What makes this new201 version of populism 
possible, for Adonis and Mulgan (1994: 7), is the advance of information technology over 
the past decades. The physical legislature will be replaced by “electronic forms of decision­
making” in which a number of practices, in the form of referendums, rights of initiative and 
recall, and voter vetoes of parliamentary legislation, are adopted in order to strengthen the 
democratic process. (See Adonis & Mulgan 1994: 4-9) An array of new types of 
participation, such as deliberative polls, citizen’s juries, electronic town halls and referenda, 
reinforces the cellular nature of a modem state. (See Mulgan 1994b: 18) In such a highly
201 In a sense, this version is the oldest because its idea can be traced back to ancient Greece as we can see 
from the title of one of his articles: A. Adonis & G.Mulgan, “Back to Greece: the scope for direct democracy” 
(1994)
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fragmented politics, the individual, not representative organisations, will provide moral 
authority. As a result, the image of politicians will shift towards “convincing story tellers”, 
and away from priest-like managerialists whose self-imposed task is to guide society in the 
light of predefined natural rules. The major role of politicians is to “stand in favour of 
closeness to experience, of judgement, of ecological thinking” in a multiplied network of 
communication. (Mulgan 1994a: 33)
(ii) Some problems with new styles of participation 
One cannot easily dismiss all these measures, especially as they are focused on the 
pluralist tendency of modem society and the potential value of electronic forms of policy­
making. Such new ideas, combined with the influence and role of the mass media provide a 
very useful device to explore a new trend in politics and suggest a paradigm better fitted to 
recent societal changes. Indeed, the changed form of political communication has a 
remarkable impact on the nature of political action, as Dan Clifton (1994: 85) states: 
“Despite the electoral value of local activists, it is incontrovertible that modem political 
communications are dominated by the mass media and particularly television. ... As 
political communication has changed, so has the popular perception of what it means to be 
politically active. ... In the modem world, the nature of political action has shifted away 
from the collective, towards the individual.” However, notwithstanding the merits of 
Mulgan’s post-modern projects, some real problems emerge out of his proposed styles of 
participation.
(a) A devaluation of political institutions 
We disagree with Mulgan’s view that the individualisation of politics should be 
understood as “the death of political parties” and the advent of a new era of “techno­
populism”. (See Lipow and Seyd 1996)
Above all, it does not recognise the value of the state-society distinction at all. Adonis 
and Mulgan (1994: 2) diagnosed the divorce of politics from society as one of the most 
fundamental weaknesses of contemporary western democracies. However, as we sought to 
demonstrate in Chapter 3, the problem is not the separation per se but the loss of balance 
between them. The critics like Mulgan too easily set aside Habermas’s (1992b: 444)
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warning that communicative power should not be allowed to override systemic power.202 
As we saw in Chapter 4 and briefly above, we cannot underestimate the essential role of 
party organisations in politics. What techno-populists overlook is the obvious importance of 
organisations or what Offe (1996: 96) called the “institutional means”, in so far as they 
enable society purposively to influence its own development and subject it to control.
There are a number of additional, hidden, dangers in techno-populism. Firstly, Offe 
(1996: 96) warns that a devaluation of the “institutional means” tends to undermine rational 
deliberation of the political issues by subjecting the political decision-making process to 
“innate resentment or an individual instinct for greater wealth”. In other words, a potential 
danger of techno-populism lies in its tendency to over-empower the “partiality” of “private” 
interests and passions. Offe (1996: 100) warns
the mere possibility of a plebiscite-related procedure being available would, in the case of a series of 
legislative themes, immediately trigger latent wishes and provoke passions that would in all probability 
and with great damage potential stand in the way of well-considered decisions. (Original emphasis)
The field most vulnerable to this danger is one in which citizens' direct interests are so 
strongly affected either favourably or unfavourably that it is not possible to rely on their 
ability to distance themselves from these issues when weighing them up. One example Offe 
(1996: 100) provides in this respect is fiscal law. It is claimed that to subject fiscal law to 
plebiscites would be like granting a free license that categorically privileged the income 
interests of the majority vis-a-vis the minority claims to welfare support.203
Secondly, it would not be appropriate to follow the extremely atomised decision-making 
process in ‘temporal’204 institutions; because direct democracy, based on electronic 
decision-making, does not provide power, in particular for the marginalised in society. 
Lipow and Seyd (1996: 283) advise us to see what an enormous burden such direct 
decision-making process places on the non-wealthy and the marginalised to defend 
themselves against selfish decisions. They point to the American experience where popular 
initiatives and petitions for referendums have, almost entirely, been called for by a wealthy
202 That is, communicative power should not “directly carry over into democratic procedures for the settling of 
competing interests and power claims on the political level”.
203 The unease surrounding the Blair government’s proposal for welfare reform, including the cutting of lone- 
parent benefit, can be one example of this difficulty.
204 As Offe (1996: 94) points out, one main advantage of parliaments as opposed to temporally assembled 
institutions like citizen’s jury or referendum is that they are subject to the “law of reencounter”.
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minority who could afford to place costly propositions on the ballot-paper. Harlow (1985: 
80) cautiously suggests that “only a centralised government with untrammelled legal power 
can hope to carry through a substantial programme of social change by constitutional 
means”.205
(b) Problems with the individualisation of the power structures within political parties
The same consequence can be anticipated in the individualisation of power structures 
within political parties. Too extreme a drive towards the individualisation of their power 
structures will only exacerbate the atomisation of party organisation as a whole and 
eventually result in what Lipow and Seyd (1996: 281) term a new form of 
“plebiscitarianism”. They stress that such plebiscitarianism is a prescription for 
manipulation rather than democracy. (1996: 283) Democratic governance needs a process 
of representation or discourse in which all interests have substantively equal chances of 
participation. In other words, competition between factions within a party organisation (i.e. 
collective interest representation) coupled with their social autonomy does not inevitably 
generate managerial oligarchy. On the contrary, it can help bring about the ‘democratic’ 
governance of political parties. The individualisation of power structures can be a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of democratic governance. In addition, the new 
technologies should be harnessed properly so that processes of communication and 
decision-making can be undertaken in such a way that a desirable balance between 
‘communicative power’ and ‘systemic power’ can be struck.
(c) A balanced democracy: beyond collectivism and individualism
What the above view suggests is no less than a new division of labour between political 
parties (in particular the party in public office) and other forms of organisation. As we have 
sought to demonstrate in Chapter 4, despite the blurring of the social and the political, the 
‘non-institutional’ political needs to be differentiated from the ‘institutional’ political. The 
importance of public opinion- and will- formation should be balanced by the equally 
important need for systemic integrity or stability and, therefore, active popular participation
205 Corrigan (1993: 64) argues, from his personal experiences as a Labour activist, that merely propelling ideas 
and making instant choices on single and localised issues cannot bring about any politically meaningful social 
change at all, though such activities have their own merits at problem-discovery stage.
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cannot justify direct empowerment of the citizen in such a form of “plebiscitarianism”. Offe 
(1996: 96) says that “democratisation can be effected not only from “below” through forms 
of participation involving plebiscites, but also ‘internally’ (participatory rights in political 
parties) and ‘externally’ (via public opinion)”.
We need to recognise that there are (or should be) many ‘non-institutional’ political 
associations, for example, single issue pressure groups such as roads campaigners, the 
women’s movement, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and Amnesty International. People 
want to be part of, and active in, such associations. However, this is not to say that everyone 
needs to be active in the ‘institutional political’ sphere, for example, a political party. 
Therefore, what is vital for a party, claiming to be democratic, is not the way in which it is 
obliged to be subject to the predetermined will of its members or the electorate at large, but 
how it ensures that its decision-making process guarantees proper conditions for 
communication geared towards fair negotiation and free debates. In other words, the 
democratic nature of a party’s decision-making process has to be evaluated against how 
open it is to social discourses and thereby porous or permeable to the different demands of 
the ‘non-institutional’ political sphere.
All in all, therefore, the individualisation of the party machine per se is not necessarily a 
problem, but rather a condition for democratisation. But if this individualisation brings in 
majority rule without a practice of rational debate, an ideal precondition of which is the 
inclusion of all social discourses, it may bring about oligarchic and undemocratic 
institutions. In other words, this individualisation should be complemented and interlocked 
by secondary associations representing a pluralist culture of participation that is essential to 
the construction of a variety of personal “communal” allegiances and roots.
(d) The important role of the media in a balanced democracy
The influence of the media on any reinvention of democratic governance also provides an 
important justification for a balanced realism between the individualisation of organisation 
and a pluralist practice of participation. One cannot seriously claim that the ever increasing 
power, which the media has over people’s lives and choices, works solely for either good or 
bad. So far as the democratisation of political processes is concerned, the mass media plays 
a vital role in providing ordinary citizens with information relevant to their choices.
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‘Political inclusion’ of the masses in a pluralised society is unthinkable without such media 
information. In a post-Fordian age where, as Mulgan (1994a: 117,132) stresses, authority 
derives from knowledge or ability rather than from position, the media, by dismantling the 
socially defined boundaries, enables the individual to take part in a broader everyday 
discourse.
However, there are obvious objections to this positive view. The media, combined with 
newly empowered party membership, may spread its own bias to less critical members and, 
thus, work to the disadvantage of the marginalised interests. Given the introduction of ‘one- 
member-one-vote’ as the principal method for decision-making within Labour, an 
understandable anxiety has arisen that the media dictate could well replace a rational choice 
among the membership. The obvious role played by the media in the recent Labour 
elections can only serve to strengthen this worry. In the party’s leadership election of 1994, 
the media apparently replaced the traditional party organisation, whether official or 
unofficial, as the forum of discourse to select a front-runner. As some commentators 
pointed out, judgements on the part of the media as to the popular appeal and telegenic 
attributes of various potential candidates appear to have influenced the early withdrawal of 
some promising candidates, including Gordon Brown.206 The historical evidence shows that 
few practical remedies are available to curb such media power that do not generate other 
equally serious problems. (See Keane 1992: esp. 123) But what is clear is that the 
institutionalisation of rational debate and discussion, based on a pluralist culture of 
participation combined with the principle of publicity, would at least moderate the negative 
aspects of media power.
(iii) The problem of dominant interests within party politics: the case against the Labour- 
Union link
How can ‘collective representation’207 effectively meet the problem of oligarchy which 
might well emerge as a result of the individualisation of the party machine? One may argue 
that the need for group pluralism within party organisations should be supplemented by 
some measure to ensure that equal conditions of participation and the free flow of
206 See, e.g. Alderman and Carter 1995: 452. For a comment on Gordon Brown’s resignation as leaderhsip 
contender, which takes the similar line to Alder and Carter’s view, see Sopel 1995: ch.8.
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communication are preserved. As far as the democratisation of party organisations is 
concerned, a central question is, how should dominant interest groups within the power 
structures of political parties be treated?
(a) The institutional link between the Labour Party and Trade Unions
Since 1992208 the Labour movement has been exercised by the major problem of the 
party’s link to the unions. The uniquely powerful role played by the unions within Labour’s’ 
power structure is what distinguishes the British Labour Party from its continental 
counterparts. What is more peculiar is, as we have seen, their powers in the decision 
making process of the party. Thus, the implications of this institutionalisation may well be 
far-reaching. Despite some attempts by the ‘modernisers’ to reduce the power of the unions, 
a considerable amount still remains in their hands. Unless there is a divorce between the 
party and the unions, debate about over-empowered factionalism will continue.
(b) The unique history of the Labour-Union link
The unique circumstances within which the British party system and the Labour Party in 
particular have developed make this issue more complex. So far as union powers are 
concerned, there are two contrasting aspects. In the first place, it may be an irony, as Shaw 
(1994: 121) points out, that the crucial role played by the unions as “powerful, organised 
and constitutionally autonomous” bodies represents a major barrier to a fully oligarchic 
system. The fact that critical voices remain entrenched within the unions can provide a 
braking mechanism constraining oligarchic tendencies on the part of the leadership. 
However, as we have seen, except for a short period between 1979-1982, the excessive 
power of trade unions has tended to be used to reinforce oligarchic control by supporting 
the PLP leadership in its attempt to control radical elements within local parties. This 
stabilising function, what Minkin (1992: 647) terms “the protected character of the Labour
207 That is, competition between factions within a political organisation plays an important role in facilitating 
participation and constructing a major impediment to domination by the leadership.
208 Although the debate over the party-union link is not entirely new, it was after the general election of April 
1992 that the direct pressure for reform of the link drew increasing attention on the grounds that the defeat had 
been more to do with ‘identity’ than with policy, values or leadership. For example, the NEC established a 
working group on party-union links in June 1992. See Labour Party 1993a: 3. The debate on this issue began 
to be fully aired after that time. See, for example, Fabian Review, Vol. 104, No.4 (1992), focusing on the 
union link.
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Party conflict”, has been put forward as a justification for a continuing, though reformed, 
Labour-Union alliance. (Webb 1995a: 4) Thus, while, in theory, union powers form part of 
the braking mechanism controlling party leadership, in practice, they tend to support 
oligarchy.
(c) Two reasons for a friendly divorce between Labour and unions 
Beyond this question of union support or otherwise for oligarchy, there are a number of 
other, more important, factors pointing to a need for a reform of the Labour-Union link.
A speculative reason: the identity problem of the Labour-Union link
The first reason is a speculative one. Some analysts take into account the electoral 
implications of the link. There has been a strong hypothesis that Labour’s four general 
election defeats in a row were the result of a widespread perception of its ‘incompetence’ to 
govern, and a perception exacerbated largely by its union link.209 From the point of view of 
winning political power, the organisational bond between the party and the unions is not 
helpful because it can give the impression that the party cannot effectively deal with the 
unions. (See Walsh & Tindale 1992: 10) Indeed, the bitter memories of the 1978-1979 
‘Winter of Discontent’ might well be responsible for many people’s image of Labour as 
incompetent. In this circumstance, the emergence of a co-operative relationship between 
fraternal unions and a constitutionally autonomous party might well be an attractive
*71 nalternative to present arrangements.
Yet, the problem remains that a ‘friendly divorce’ might not necessarily lead to Labour’s 
electoral success. What needs to be borne in mind is that politics is still largely a game of
209 See, for example, Peter Kellner’s column in The Independent 12.6.1992, p.19. Pippa Norris’ (1994: 186) 
evidence shows that despite a considerable reconstruction of party organisation and shift in policy, Labour’s 
modernisation project failed, at least until the 1992 general election, to change the electorate’s image of the 
party, something which Kinnock, the then party leader, freely acknowledged. (See Kinnock 1994: 546)
In fact, until recently, a rather successful informal relationship existed between the Conservatives and 
business interests. After Labour’s fourth general election defeat in a row, one Labour MP commented, “The 
unions must realise by now that they don’t need votes to wield influence with us. The CBI does not have a 
block vote at Tory party conference, but somehow the Tories do all right by them.” (See Patrick Wintour’s 
column in The Guardian 28.4.92, p. 19) Prior to the rise of Mrs. Thatcher’s ‘conviction politics’ and its recent 
rows on European issues, the Conservatives displayed less enthusiasm for ideological debate and arguments 
about social representation than the Labour Party and developed a very pragmatic approach to politics. (See 
Barnes 1994) Therefore, despite an undeniable link between the Conservatives and business (see Ewing 1987: 
ch.2), the lack of any organisational link made it possible for the Conservatives to be seen as a more 
competent economic manager, in particular when dealing with the unions.
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resources, rather than a forum of principles. The fact that Labour relies heavily on the 
unions both financially and organisationally underlines the potential cost of a divorce, for 
the party would undoubtedly find itself greatly impoverished in both respects. But, that 
having been said, Donald Sassoon (1993: 33) points to a much more profound problem, 
namely, that “political parties, the basic institutions of a democracy, should be forced to 
depend so much on private interests”. He maintains that any reform Labour undertakes has 
to embrace a reform of British political system as a whole. Sassoon (1993: 33) makes it 
clear that the separation of the Labour Party from the trade unions cannot be merely 
“another effort to make Labour more electable” and thereby cannot be seen as a “purely 
internal” matter. The Labour-Union divorce is not to be taken as an endorsement for a more 
hidden, secretive and corrupting relationship between the party and private interests, along 
the lines of the old Conservative-Business relationship. On the contrary, it is to be “part and 
parcel of the reform of the British political system”, the crucial aspect of which is to the 
regulation of undesirable political ‘paymasters’. One practical alternative to the status quo 
is to introduce legislation that would provide state funding to political parties and outlaw all 
donations to them, over and above a certain amount. Such a mechanism could be further 
enhanced, were they to publish accounts in a prescribed statutory form. (See Chapter 8)
A result of the required publicity of political parties in a pluralised society
The second justification for the Labour-Union link lies in the pluralisation of British 
society. As society becomes functionally differentiated, a party concerned mainly with one 
element of social representation and autonomy cannot easily forge an identity as a 
competent party of government. As the boundary between the political and the social, or the 
non-institutional and institutional political, is reorganised, political parties need to be more 
inclusive in order to facilitate diverse social discourse no less important than that of the 
unionised interests. All of this is summed up decisively in a neat journalistic phrase, “You 
will search long and in vain today to find somebody who will say that Labour exists to 
represent Labour.” (Martin Kettle, The Guardian, 12.6.93, p.23) Tony Blair has explicitly 
endorsed this view over and over again; “I want the Labour Party to include all kinds of 
people in its membership. In addition to having more members, plans are in hand to give 
them greater say in conference decisions.” (Tony Blair, The Guardian, 6.7.95, p. 19);
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“[P]atently in today’s world [the Labour Party] must be more broadly based than [ordinary 
working people], especially as so many people are not in trade unions.” (Tony Blair, The 
Guardian, 27.7.95, p. 13) Looked at from this point of view, any claim that reform is 
preferable to organisational divorce is that much less plausible. A reduction of the unions’ 
voting strength to 50 per cent211 within conference cannot materially alter their dominant, 
albeit conventionally restrained, position. The levy plus system, paralleled by OMOV, has 
to be seen as purely cosmetic unless the electoral college of the unions is abolished. The 
present party voting system makes it possible for many ordinary members to cast multiple 
votes as trade unionists, members of various socialist societies and constituency members.
In short, an important condition for the legal institutionalisation of political parties is that 
their relationship to dominant social groups has to be carefully regulated, and, practically 
speaking, they should be constitutionally separated from private interests.212
5 Should party members take part in the election of their leaders?
5.1 The importance o f indirect intra-party democracy
5.1.1 The similarities and differences between our project of intra-party democracy and 
McKenzie’s
Practically speaking, our advocacy of a balanced form of intra-party democracy seems, at 
a glance, to be very little different to McKenzie’s liberal vision, in that both regard the 
doctrine of mandate as immaterial to intra-party democracy. However, as previously noted, 
the way we arrive at our conclusion is significantly different to that of McKenzie. This, in 
fact, amounts to a difference in perspective, which, in turn, gives rise to a number of quite 
distinct ideas in relation to intra-party democracy.
In effect, we disagree with McKenzie’s (1982: 200) view that, in a competitive political 
system, the sole criterion on which one can judge whether or not a party is ‘democratic’ is 
whether it abides by the rules governing its external relationship to other parties, especially 
those pertaining to electoral competition. McKenzie seems to assume that even the
211 I.e. the unions casting just under 50 per cent as some reformists, such as the majority of the Archer 
Committee of the Fabian Society (1993: 10) and Minkin (1992: 385), suggest.
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regulation of relationship between party and private interests is immaterial in this respect. 
But, as we have seen, such regulation is essential if we consider the public role of political 
parties and the need for their institutionalisation.
5.1.2 The necessity of indirect intra-partv democracy 
Our argument that the relationship between political parties and special interests has to 
be organisationally separate does not, however, constitute the sole difference between 
McKenzie’s liberal ideas and our democratic paradigm. In the light of their institutional 
implications, the fundamental difference between them is to be found in their distinctive 
approaches to the indirect form of intra-party democracy. Contrary to McKenzie, we argue 
that participation by the membership in the selection of its leaders and party candidates 
should be an element of party democratisation, underwritten by law.
(i) Participation in the leadership election process 
The case for greater participation in the leadership election can be argued with particular 
force in the context of British politics. The fact that the Prime Minister as head of the 
executive is accountable not only to the electorate but also to the party to which he or she 
belongs already furnishes an excellent basis for such open participation.213
Over the past decade, the then ruling Conservative Party has had to endure three 
leadership elections, two of which were of considerable constitutional significance.214 The 
1990 contest, instigated by Michael Heseltine, resulted in the reluctant resignation of the 
then Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher.215 The 1995 election set a precedent, namely, that the 
incumbent Prime Minister, by passing traditionally recognised mechanisms of either a vote
212 Chapter 8 will argue that this radical transformation has to go hand in hand with a state funding system for 
political parties, which, as we have said, are the ‘backbone’ of modem democracy.
213 In principle, the same practice can apply to the leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition. His office has been 
confirmed since the enactment of Ministers of the Crown Act of 1937 which gave a salary to the leader of the 
opposition.
214 Sir Anthony Meyer’s challenge against Mrs Thatcher in 1989 was not only unsuccessful but also raised no 
significant constitutional issues.
215 Apart from the constitutional issue dealt with below, Mrs Thatcher’s fall is significant in terms of the nature 
the British system of government. Crossman has argued that Cabinet Government has been transformed into 
Prime Ministerial Government. (See Crossman 1993[1963]: 52 ff) Marshall (1991), on the other hand, argues 
that the Conservative leadership struggle in 1990 showed that the British Cabinet, unlike the American 
cabinet, still possesses the power to affect the political fate of the head of the executive. See also Hennessy 
1996: Ch.3.
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of confidence in the House of Commons or a general election, opted for an intra-party 
leadership contest to quell political opposition.
The central issue raised by these contests is whether a political party which has no 
constitutional status has the power to change the head of the executive.216 Hennessy (1996: 
11-14) argues that there are no problems in recognising such a power because it is fully in 
line with past precedent. He is here referring to Harold Wilson’s resignation in 1976 to 
make way to James Callaghan. Brazier (1995: 525; 1991: 478-479) has a similar view. He 
argues that the key question is, not which body or group has the constitutional authority to 
remove a Prime Minister, but rather what is a politician’s right to be the Prime Minister. 
For him, the principle is the generally accepted constitutional one: the person best able to 
command a stable majority in the House of Commons is entitled to be Prime Minister. 
Thus, he argues that intra-party leadership re-selection accords with that general principle, 
adding “The cohesion of party has merely speeded up the processes of parliamentary 
democracy”. (Brazier 1991: 479) Brazier’s (1988: 22) basic presumption is that, now that 
all the main parties have leadership election machinery, constitutional responsibility for 
prime ministerial selection has by and large shifted from the Sovereign to the political 
parties.
However, we disagree with both Hennessy’s and Brazier’s views. As to Hennessy’s view, 
we argue that the existence of past precedent does not provide an adequate rationale for 
parties between elections to either select or change the Prime Minister. For one thing, since 
the conventional liberal constitutional arrangements are under radical review, past 
precedent per se, inevitably corresponding to this old system, cannot provide a convincing 
rationale for the constitutionality of the intra-party transfer of premiership. We need a 
logical justification that corresponds to the new constitutional framework in a pluralist 
society.
In relation to the arguments of Brazier, we argue that formal ballots for party leaders, 
which, in legal terms, are no different from the election process in a tennis club, do not 
alone provide sufficient rationale. Firstly, we suspect that, without the adequate legal 
institutionalisation of political parties, intra-party leadership elections could very well come 
to replace confidence votes in the House of Commons or even general elections. Under the
216 For other constitutional issues, see Blackburn 1992: 36ff.
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present constitutional arrangements in which little recognition of political parties exists, 
even in the electoral process, the intra-party reshuffle of the head of the executive deepens 
the discrepancy between political reality and constitutional ideal. The liberal principle of 
minimal regulation of political parties is based on two related presuppositions inherent in 
the British version of parliamentary democracy. The first is that Parliament is the only 
centre of political power and that this cannot be usurped by any other body. The second, 
which presupposes the first, is that the power to determine who will be Prime Minister is 
vested in individual MPs who, as representatives of the nation as a whole, are supposedly 
above any particular party line. However, in reality, this power of selection is wielded by 
political parties. In response to this de facto constitutional power of political parties, this 
anomaly should be remedied by the regulation of the leadership election process. Only 
when parties are legally institutionalised so that, unlike tennis clubs, their leadership 
contests are subject to public scrutiny, can this internal process claim to replace either the 
confidence vote or the general election. In short, the question whether a political party 
should possess the power to change the Prime Minister cannot be separated from that of its 
constitutional recognition.
Secondly, we argue that the regulation of intra-party leadership contests should be 
underpinned by the principle of democratic governance. The independence of MPs, as 
representatives of the whole nation, underpins a confidence vote in the Commons as an 
alternative constitutional device to a general election. In parallel, the constitutionality of the 
intra-party leadership election depends upon how democratic this election is. The 
constitutional power of parties to change a Prime Minister should go hand in hand with 
certain parallel duties. Above all, the manner in which such power is used should be subject 
to legal rules ensuring, inter alia, that the intra-party process reflects the opinions of all 
party components. This requirement fully accords with our vision of constitutionalised 
democratic autonomy. In the light of the required balance between systemic power and 
communicative power, the formal voice of members in the election of the leader is the only 
nexus linking both powers within a party. As Habermas (1992b: 452) suggests, 
communicative power, based on social autonomy, should not override systemic power, but 
should be allowed to “influence” it. The basic form of this influence is the “procurement 
and withdrawal of legitimisation” and the membership’s participation in the election of the
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party leader for fixed periods is a vital, though not the sole, means of expressing that
217purpose.
(ii) Participation in the selection of party candidates
So far as the selection of party candidates is concerned, we need to examine the tension 
between the central party and the local parties. The inclusion of the electoral process within 
political parties means that almost inevitably this process of selection has to be subject to 
democratic principles and should, therefore, receive the close attention of the law. The 
choice of party candidates in any constituency or for a party list should broadly represent 
the spectrum of party opinion both at local and national levels. The proposed electoral 
reforms reflect this view and are designed to incorporate political parties into the 
institutionalised part of electoral processes. (See Chapter 7) This being the case, there is no 
clear reason why the candidate-selection process should be treated differently from the 
election of representatives of the electorate as a whole.
However, since this inclusion process goes hand in hand with the govemmentalisation of 
political parties and the recognition of their legal personality (see Chapters 4-5), some 
managerial control of the selection processes is inevitable to ensure the integrity of the party 
as a whole. This is why, after its humiliating defeat in the 1997 general election, the 
Conservative Party is eager to set up a form of screening within the candidate selection 
process. The Conservatives realise that the almost absolute autonomy of their constituency 
parties prevented the leadership from coping swiftly with the sleaze allegations surrounding 
a number of candidates. This failure to respond quickly did great damage to the integrity of 
the Party.
This case for the central control of the selection process is consistent with proposed 
electoral reform. As we shall suggest in the next chapter, our project of constitutionalised 
democratic autonomy prefers a hybrid electoral system in which party machines are 
designed to play a constitutional role. One consequence of this would be that political
217 As discussed in Section 4.5.2, recently the impact of political communications on the power structures of 
political parties has increased. As Heffeman and Stanyer (1997) suggest, such exercises in political public 
relations as spin-doctoring, coupled with the professionalisation of campaigning, tend to contribute to the 
‘personification’ of politics in the sense that the party leader becomes the primary focus of the party identity. 
As a result, the role of the leader tends to unduly dominate other party components. The primary constraint on 
this centralisation is, no doubt, the possibility of change of leadership through intra-party elections.
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parties played a much more active role in general elections. This would, in turn, mean that a 
much better balance existed between democratic autonomy and the required reasonable 
management of party operation.
5.2 Objections to the required indirect intra-party democracy
Our eclectic stance, seeking a balance between democratic autonomy and systemic 
integrity, may not of itself persuade either the proponents of liberal or participatory 
democracy to change their views. On the one hand, theorists like McKenzie (1982: 198- 
199) may question the importance of the formal voice of members and suggest that there 
are other ways in which the requirement of legitimisation may plausibly be met. However, 
apart from the need for more open, accountable government, the ‘political inclusion’ of the 
masses and the govemmentalisation of political parties would make this view (which relies 
on secretive, informal mechanisms of legitimisation) somewhat archaic.
On the other hand, to enthusiastic proponents of participatory democracy, extended 
suffrage in the intra-party elections may seem merely formal, symbolic, indirect or limited. 
They may claim that “the choice of representative is no substitute for the choice of policy”, 
(Sir Douglas Wass quoted in Harlow 1985: 79) or that “[Voting] is only the thin end of the 
wedge of contemporary political activism”. (Adonis & Mulgan 1994: 3) However, they 
should bear in mind a number of factors that surround this issue. Underlying the choice of 
policy is an inherent ongoing tension between centralism and localism. The best, though not 
the only, answer to this problem is to strike a balance between them through a pluralist 
framework. So far as political parties are concerned, our project of constitutionalised 
democratic autonomy suggests that they become complex entities within a more 
functionally differentiated political system and, thus, become ‘stratarchicaT in form and 
organisation. (See Chapter 4) While diverse organisations committed to single issues and 
local matters are to be encouraged, at least in so far as national or supranational policies are 
concerned, a premium in the problem-solving process, as distinct from the problem- 
discovering one, needs to be placed on the central organisation.
The legitimisation of the decision-making power has to be two-dimensional. On the one 
hand, it depends on there being a guaranteed institutionalised practice of rational debate in 
the problem-discovering processes. On the other hand, the chosen policies are legitimised
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by the fact that the leadership in charge of the problem-solving processes is elected via 
democratic procedures. Obviously, the first dimension is concerned with direct intra-party 
democracy, the second with indirect intra-party democracy. In short, the greater voice given 
to members in leadership elections is a constitutional device for curbing not only ill- 
considered radicalism on the part of activists but also managerialist oligarchic tendency on 
the part of the leadership.
5.3 The democratic nature o f the electoral college 
From our perspective based on a balanced realism, it would be wrong to assume that a 
strictly direct ballot of every member218 would be more democratic than an indirect ballot 
such as that adopted by Labour in 1983. Since underlying this issue is a conflict about the 
nature of democracy, any attempt to arrive at a clear consensus on this issue may prove 
impossible. However, as we sought to demonstrate earlier, public opinion cannot be 
ascertained purely on the basis of numerical calculation. It is equally necessary to take an 
overall view of social discourse. A party’s grasp of public opinion can also be severely 
distorted by its own power relations. There are obvious advantages for large political 
organisations, such as mainstream political parties, in federalising their leadership election 
processes by adopting a system of electoral college. For example, there are a number of 
good reasons why MPs and MEPs should retain a relatively greater say in leadership 
elections. Firstly, it should be considered that they are selected by not only party members 
but also the electorate at large. Secondly, the fact that their constitutional duty and right is 
to exercise public office under a leadership chosen by the same selection process adds 
obvious weight and significance to their judgement. For the same reasons, the practice of 
selecting the party leader from within the parliamentary party is perfectly compatible with 
democratic principles. However, one might, rightly, maintain that it is undemocratic for 
ordinary party members to be excluded from this process, as they were under the old 
Conservative system in which the electoral college for leadership contests consists of only 
MPs. How one wonders are those local parties, with no MP of their own, to voice their
910concerns in this matter?
218 For example, the system of leadership election of the Liberal Democratic Party.
219 William Hague will be the last Conservative Party leader who was elected by the old system excluding a 
formal say of grass-roots in the leadership elections. The Conservative reform adopted a new procedure in
214
It is also important to note that such federalisation should go hand in hand with greater 
individual participation. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that within each electoral 
college, each individual voice counts equally. The system whereby a separate electoral 
college is conceded to a specific sectional interest, e.g. the unions, has to be seriously 
reconsidered. This is all the more so when we recall the possibility of multiple votes by 
trade unionists, coupled at the constituency level with considerable indirect influence being 
wielded through the levy-plus scheme. (See Alderman & Carter 1994: 333)
5.4 The problem o f cost
Another factor, one which was raised after the recent Labour Party leadership elections, 
is the great expense of elections now that OMOV has been introduced. It is claimed that 
the individual membership ballots cost a lot of money which could be put to better use. 
Indeed, the high cost of such elections was offered by two unions {i.e. NUM and UCATT) 
as reason for not participating in the Labour leadership election of 1994. (See Alderman & 
Carter 1995: 449) This issue is closely related to the state funding of political parties. It 
would be an irony if the extension of democracy were to be hampered by such financial 
considerations.
6 Conclusion: Constitutionalising intra-party democracy
In this chapter, having sought to show what procedures need to be introduced to facilitate 
intra-party democracy and thereafter the legal institutionalisation of political parties, we 
arrived at two basic conclusions.
Firstly, although direct intra-party democracy per se is not incompatible with democratic 
government, the implementation of radical democratic principles within the power 
structures of political parties is to a certain extent limited. The democratic principle itself 
cannot justify attempts to in any way undermine the autonomy of the party in public office 
and so force it to carry out particular policies.
which the election of party leader will take place in two stages. The first stage will include only Conservative 
MPs, who will present a choice of candidates to the second stage, which will take place by way of one member 
one vote. See the Conservative Party’s The Fresh Future (1998).
215
Secondly, indirect intra-party democracy, i.e. a greater voice on the part of the grassroots 
in leadership elections is a necessary constitutional device for achieving a well-balanced 
democracy.
Two contrasting arguments were used to justify this balanced approach. On the one hand, 
the need for systemic integration, reinforced by the govemmentalisation or cartelisation of 
political parties, was suggested as a rationale for requiring a limitation of the democratic 
principle. On the other hand, there is also a need for legalisation covering intra-party 
structures, for example, to facilitate rational will-formation, to protect minority opinions, 
and, thus, to curb the managerialist oligarchy’s ability to abuse the argument for systemic 
integration. In this chapter (Secs. 4.4-4.5), both old and new Labour initiatives for intra­
party democracy were critically analysed from these points of view.
These conclusions should lead to the constitutionalisation of intra-party democracy. This 
has two aspects. One aspect is concerned with the need for a written constitution to create 
an internal framework. The other aspect is concerned with the institutionalisation of 
political parties within wider constitutional arrangements. This would be just a part of a 
wider programme of constitutional reform, including electoral reform, directed at the 
modernisation of the entire political system. As constitutional entities, political parties 
would be required to meet certain constitutional standards, including the protection of 
human rights, especially political rights, of party members. As a result, a party’s written 
constitution would have to accord with these constitutional values.
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Chapter 7
Reform of the Electoral System and 
the Institutionalisation of Political Parties
1 The present electoral system under challenge
A reform of the electoral system is indispensable to the institutionalisation of political 
parties in Britain. This is because, as Arend Lijphart (1994: 2) notes, the electoral system is 
the most specific manipulative instrument of politics, and the difference between various 
electoral systems is of special importance in determining both the nature of democracy and 
the status of political parties in a given country. (See also Plant 1991: 16)
1.1 Primary criticisms o f the “first-past-the-post ” system
The present “first-past-the-post” system (FPTP) has long been a target for attack by those 
seeking to reform the current constitutional settlement. This majoritarian system has been 
generally accused of producing an “unfair”, distorted representation and a “single party 
mandate”. (See Plant 1991: 11-14) As H.W.R.Wade (1989:10) puts it, “If it is accepted that 
a democratic parliament ought to represent so far as possible the preference of the voters, 
this system is probably the worst that could be devised.” He lamented the absence of 
interest in electoral reform on the part of lawyers who, in his view, ought to take a much 
more serious professional interest in the idea of “justice”. (1989: 25) In other words, he
220 In fact, as Pippa Norris (1995: 69ff) points out, a movement for electoral reform emerges in the British 
political history whenever constitutional change forms part of the mainstream political agenda. Yet, as Gareth 
Smyth’s research (1992) shows, electoral reform has not always been associated with general concern for 
constitutional reform and some partisan considerations have also been responsible for this debate. On the other 
hand, it needs to be noted that the current movement for electoral reform does not solely stem from the change 
in the domestic political situation. As Vernon Bogdanor (1992: 2) notes, British membership of the European 
Community is another factor which puts pressure on Britain, the only member state not to use a proportional 
system in elections to the European Parliament, to conform to the Treaty of Rome, Article 138 (iii) of which
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feels that lawyers ought to be among the first to recognise the unfair nature of what he 
terms an “absurd” and “crude” majority system. (Wade 1989: 9, 10) The most frequently 
cited “absurdity” is that the present system tends to give grossly exaggerated representation 
to the two major parties by simply focusing on who tops the poll and ignoring the size of 
the majority. It has become the norm that few governments are formed by the party with the 
electoral authority of a majority of the electorate’s vote. Robert Blackburn (1995: 364) 
suggests that “because of the huge number of ‘wasted votes’ of ordinary citizens in every 
constituency, ... it can also be claimed that the British electoral system in reality 
disenfranchises many millions of voters within the country.” The major victim of these 
wasted votes is the smaller party whose vote obtained, across the local constituencies, 
cannot be translated into the seats in Parliament. In particular, it is noticeable that since the 
1970s the centre parties have been increasingly penalised by this majoritarian system. For 
example, in the 1997 general election, the Liberal Democratic Party won 17.2 per cent of 
the votes cast but obtained merely 6.98 per cent of the seats in Parliament.221 This 
obviously distorts popular representation in terms of the proportionality of “national” 
preferences. Such a system of distortion can only operate where the essential role played by 
political parties in the electoral process is largely ignored.
1.2 Analysis o f some practical problems with the case for electoral reform 
In dealing with the issue of electoral reform, we need to pay attention to a number of 
practical factors affecting the discourse for a full and immediate reform.
1.2.1 The reluctance of the two major parties 
The two major parties, upon which the success of any reform depends, have persistently 
defended the present system, though there has been strong support for reform from 
minorities in both parties.222 The simplicity, decisiveness and political stability are seen as
requires a “uniform” electoral procedure. The Plant Report largely supports Bogdanor’s view. See Plant 1991:
11.
221 See The Sunday Times the 1997 Electoral Map of Britain. It should be pointed out that, thanks to the so- 
called ‘tactical vote’, the disparity in the votes-seats ratio in the 1997 election is actually moderate, compared 
to that of the 1992 election where the Liberal Democrats won merely 3.1 per cent of the seats from 17.9 per 
cent of the votes.
222 It is important to see that Labour has now, albeit in a rather hesitant and lukewarm way, espoused electoral 
reform simply because, under the present system, the Conservatives managed to secure victories in four
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the main virtues of the present plurality system. As Rodney Brazier (1998: 74) stresses, 
these virtues appear to be implemented by “a recognition that general elections are as much 
about conferring power as achieving accurate representations, and the rooting of Members 
of Parliament in constituencies". In short, defenders of the status quo prioritise the need for 
a “manufactured” (Norris 1995: 66) or “artificial” (Dunleavy & Margetts 1995: 48) 
majority, which is ‘capriciously’ created by translating a relatively small lead in votes into a 
much larger parliamentary majority.
The other side of the coin, so far as the present system is concerned, is that Parliament is 
ignored as a deliberative sphere while its legislative or governmental functions are over­
stressed. As early as 1915, Dicey (1982[1915]: lxxxvii) proclaimed that “the House of 
Commons is no mere debating society. It is an assembly entrusted with great though 
indirect executive authority; it is, or ought to be, concerned with the appointment and the 
criticism of the Cabinet.”
However, the need for the stability and efficient management of the core complex of the 
state does not mean that the organisation of Parliament has nothing to do with the 
democratic principle, in that it should reflect wider social discourse. It is true, as Dicey 
(1982[1915]: lxxxvii-xci) and his followers argue, that it is neither possible in practice nor 
even theoretically desirable that every opinion should gain a hearing at every stage of the 
decision-making process. Yet it is equally true that few governmental decisions, which fail 
to reflect wider social discourse, can be effectively implemented or produce a stable and 
sustainable democracy. This latter aspect would, of course, become all the more serious if, 
thanks to the ongoing pluralisation of society, the two main parties were no longer capable 
of mediating the diverse aspects of social discourse and, furthermore, tended to block the 
inclusion of an influential third force backed by significant electoral support. As Iain 
McLean (1991: 186) submits, it is hard to defend a system that makes it possible for 
legislation opposed by nearly five sixths of voters to be carried through. Considerations of
successive elections. (See Dunleavy & Margetts 1995: 19; Bogdanor 1992: 2) Nevertheless, as Norris (1995: 
72-72) points out, Labour has benefited more from the growing disparity in the size of constituencies than the 
Conservatives. (See also Plant 1991: 47-50) Given this fact, it is hardly surprising that in the wake of the 1992 
general election, Labour’s working party on electoral reform, the Plant Committee, merely put forward a 
variant of the existing majoritarian system, i.e. what is called a supplementary vote system. (See Labour Party 
1993b: 11) For a concise review of Labour’s traditional attitude to electoral reform, see Linton 1993: esp. chs. 
1-3.
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this kind necessitate that a balance be struck between the demand for fair, proportional 
representation and efficient government.
1.2.2 No general consensus on the best alternative system
Even were there to be a consensus on the need for electoral reform, there would surely be 
little agreement on how it was to be achieved. However, as David Butler (1993: 79) 
suggests, such a consensus regarding the way forward is crucial to success of any kind of 
electoral reform. Indeed, as Bogdanor (1981: 129-135; 1992: 3) points out, the best chance 
for the introduction of proportional representation in British political history was lost in 
1917-18, when the then reformers could not agree on whether to adopt the single 
transferable vote or the alternative vote. Reformists remain divided on which among a 
range of possibilities is the best, and so prospects for reform are still uncertain.223
Apart from this lack of unanimity, Pippa Norris (1995: 76) puts forward two other 
reasons why the prospect for reform is uncertain: (a) the primarily elite-driven characteristic 
of the movement and (b) the absence of constitutional provisions for binding referenda 
open to the public. However, as Lord Plant points out, the most fundamental problem is still 
that it seems impossible to find a theory to underpin an ideal electoral system that will 
attract unanimous consent across the political spectrum. (Plant 1991: 19-20. See also 
McLean 1991, esp. 186-189) Dunleavy & Margetts (1995: 17) claim that no electoral 
system has any clear-cut advantages or disadvantages and, therefore, any evaluation of these 
alternative systems would necessarily be “far more complex” than the “casual” 
justifications offered by practising politicians and the conventional wisdom of political 
scientists. However, despite such difficulties, the British people should not be expected to 
tolerate the obvious shortcomings of the existing system, which has, in Bogdanor’s (1981: 
25) words, failed “to produce a government which is either representative or strong in any 
other sense than that of enjoying a majority in the House of Commons.”
223 The political mood for electoral reform could not be better than now. The Blair Government accelerates the 
pace of electoral change in favour of Proportional Representation (PR). The European Election in June 1999 
will adopt the party list system. The new parliaments and assemblies for Scotland, Wales and London will be 
elected in accordance with the German mixed system. A Lab-Lib joint commission for the House of Commons 
on the electoral reform, chaired by Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, will recommend an alternative to the present 
majoritarian system. However, despite the increasing recognition of the merits of PR, the choice of methods 
varies. In particular, which system the Jenkins Commission will recommend in 1999 is still open to 
speculation, partly due to Tony Blair’s well-known scepticism of PR, at least in general elections.
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Indeed, these problems have eventually to be resolved by political judgement. Therefore, 
although the question of which system would be most acceptable to the major political 
parties is doubtless important in discussions of electoral reform, academic analysis needs to 
concentrate on the more basic issue of which system is inherently superior, or would at least 
offer a clear advance on the existing system.
In what follows, we shall explore the various suggestions put forward by reformists and 
then assess their implications for the institutionalisation of political parties. In so doing, we 
shall specify which system seems most desirable in the light of our project of 
constitutionalised democratic autonomy.
2 The alternative electoral systems
There are basically two alternative electoral systems around which discussion revolves: 
list systems and preferential voting systems.
2.1 List systems
The essence of the list system lies in the crucial role afforded to political parties, as, in 
this system, voters make their choice from a list of candidates presented to them by the 
parties. Depending on the use made of the party list, two forms of the system emerge: a 
purist one and a mixed one.
2.1.1 The purist list system
The ‘purist’ form, which has operated in Israel since the establishment of the state in 
1948, does not leave room for constituencies. Votes for each party’s list are calculated on a 
nation-wide basis. (See, generally, Diskin & Diskin 1995) Parliamentary seats are allocated 
directly in proportion to a party’s votes in the country. Few serious students of electoral 
reform in Britain would support this purist form. For one thing, they could not seriously 
ignore the deeply embedded tradition of British local representation with its peculiar 
advantages.
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2.1.2 The German mixed system
(i) The outline of the German system
The German mixed system is a variant of the list system, invented in response to the 
weakness of the purist form, namely, its lack of territorial representation. This mixed 
system aims at combining the advantages of the list system with those of single-member 
constituencies. Half of the representatives are elected from single-member constituencies, 
and half from national or regional lists of party candidates. In this system, each voter has 
two votes. One vote is cast for the preferred candidate in a constituency. Like the present 
British system, a constituency candidate who gets the highest number of votes is declared 
elected. The other vote is cast for the party of the voter’s choice. Whether or not it puts up 
constituency candidates, every party is entitled to present a list of candidates ranked in an 
unalterable order of preference. The number of non-constituency MPs returned from each 
party’s list is determined not only by the level of support given to a party but also by the 
number of seats that it has already won in constituency elections, which are calculated first. 
The overall level of electoral support for a particular party is secondarily used to 
compensate the disproportionality of the constituency seats which fail to reflect 
proportionately regional or national party preferences. This adjustment is undertaken by 
allocating, from the party lists, additional seats to a party which won a disproportionately 
low number of constituency MPs. In response to the criticism that proportional 
representation tends to bring about a ‘weak government’ coupled with the mushrooming of 
small parties, there is in the German system an exclusion threshold which prevents small 
parties failing to secure more than 5.0 % of the votes cast for the party lists or three direct 
seats, from obtaining additional seats. (See Padgett & Burkett 1986: 289)
(ii) Three main objections
There are three main objections to this system.
(a) The remote MP-constituency link
If the system were introduced in Britain, it is inevitable that either each constituency 
would have to be doubled in size or the number of MPs doubled. The second alternative has 
never seriously been considered because an assembly of more than 1250 parliamentary
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representatives would be unworkable both practically and financially. So far as the first 
alternative is concerned, it is generally assumed that the present link between MPs and 
constituencies would be adversely affected. One may pay attention to the fact that MPs’ role 
as “recipient of complaints and a channel of communication for their constituents” is more 
comprehensive here than in Germany where such a role is limited since there is a federal 
system of government. (See Oliver 1983: 117; Bogdanor 1981: 225). However, proponents 
of an introduction of this system to Britain would claim that the scale of such an increase of 
constituency quota is not such that the existing MP-constituency link would be lost. (See, 
e.g. Blackburn 1995: 378) Considering the benefits from proportional representation, 
whatever cost such a change might entail would on balance be worthwhile. The recently 
accelerated move towards devolution would doubtless moderate the cost of such change, in 
that the role of MPs as “recipients” of local complaints would be reduced. Moreover, the 
degree of change would be far less than that which would be created by another widely 
popular system of proportional representation, i.e. the single transferable vote system, 
which requires much larger constituencies.
(b) The exaggerated role of the pivotal party and the hypothesis of weak coalition 
governments
The German system is, like other systems of proportional representation (PR), open to 
the criticism of giving unreasonable political influence to the pivotal party. Some opponents 
of PR maintain that while, under the present plurality system, the function of electing a 
government is in the hands of the voters at a general election, in a regime of PR, this 
function would shift to the smaller parties which, taking advantage of a hung Parliament, 
could alter governments between elections. (See Brazier 1998: 76-77) Underlying this 
argument is a bias towards strong single-party majority government, as opposed to 
consensus or coalition government. Most opponents of reform tend to equate PR with weak 
coalition government, while defending the present plurality system as the sole guarantor of 
strong government. However, common sense as well as historical and comparative evidence 
show that such a presumption is without significant foundation. Few could seriously argue 
that the German electoral system, based on PR, tends to return an unstable government
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lacking the ability to implement necessary radical solutions.224 The conventional hypothesis 
of a trade-off between electoral systems and certain features of government assumes that 
proportional representation provides more accurate representation while the majoritarian 
system provides more decisive and effective government. According to Lijphart (1994), the 
former wisdom turns out to be true, but the latter hypothesis is proved empirically wrong, in 
that, countries having the plurality electoral system do not outperform the PR countries with 
regard to either the maintenance of order or macro-economic management. The British are 
patently proud of their own political culture which does not hesitate to favour coalition 
government in times of national crisis such as the two world wars 225 
More importantly, as Robert Blackburn (1995: 407-408) points out,
The additional-member system will not preclude single party government in Britain. ... What adoption 
of the additional-member system will preclude, however, is one party, in isolation from others, claiming a 
false mandate on the electoral authority of substantially less than half of votes cast in a general election, 
and then being in a position to wield unlimited governmental and legislative power for a period of up to 
five years.... Political circumstances vary, and under some conditions single-party rule may be preferable. 
But under other conditions - including where (a) no single party has anything like the support of a majority 
of the country for its programme; or (b) a grave national crisis requires two or more of the parties to co­
operate; or (c) it is clear (and evident from public opinion) that none of the parties is fit to govern on its 
own - then coalition government is likely to be the popular choice and the most effective form of 
government.
There is, thus, no evidence to support the notion that flagrant minority rule should be 
maintained solely because coalitions are presumed to embody certain weaknesses. Indeed, 
the mixed phenomena of political inclusion, a pluralisation of forms of life, the cartelisation 
of party politics, and the changed role of political parties as catch-all networks, dismantle 
the conventional boundaries of party politics. (See Chapters 3 and 4) All political parties 
inevitably become political public spheres that embrace a broad spectrum of discourse, with 
preferential or ideological gradients that may overlap party barriers. Indeed, the uniquely 
piecemeal development of British politics allows the main political parties to contain within 
themselves many conflicting currents of opinion. (See Norton 1982: 261-294) Given there
224 From the Irish experience adopting the single transferable vote system, Bogdanor (1981: 244) puts forward 
the same argument.
225 During both 1915-18 and 1940-5, Britain had a coalition government drawn from across the political 
spectrum. (See Blackburn 1995: 408) Yet, we need to recognise, as Bogdanor (1981: 253) points out, that 
these coalitions were “departures” from the “political norm” and not genuine attempts at “power-sharing” by 
parties which fail to obtain an overall majority.
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is no prior assumption that co-operation between different sections of opinion can only 
successfully take place within a single party, there is no obvious reason why inter-party 
coalitions should not succeed. (Cf. Mount 1992: 173) Furthermore, considering the recent 
polarisation or partisanisation of British politics, we might argue that PR is conducive to 
more flexible government, with more realistic policy-making-cum-implementation to 
achieve greater continuity in public policy in a rapidly changing society. As long as a 
practice of rational discussion and bargaining is guaranteed, there is no obvious reason why 
coalitions should be less desirable than single-party government.
(c) Mistrust of political parties 
The last principal problem of the German system, raised not only among the opponents 
of reform but also among less prejudiced supporters of reform, is related to the role of 
political parties, in particular those at regional or national level. One symbolic trend, 
showing the deep-seated British fear of political parties, lies in the use of the title of an 
increasingly popular model of PR over recent decades, the additional member system 
(AMS). In fact, the prototype of the AMS is the German system, which entails single­
member constituencies, party lists and proportional representation. But since the Blake 
Report of 1976 - the Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Electoral Reform -, a 
modified model of AMS began to be put forward as a variant of the German system. This 
involved replacing lists with the additional seats allocated to the “best losers”, that is, 
among defeated candidates of the underrepresented party. It means that every elector has 
only one non-transferable vote. In addition, the seats are unevenly divided between the 
constituency members and the additional members to the effect that the number of the latter 
is one third or one fourth of the former. It is apparent that this modified version aims to 
preserve more strongly the territorial basis of representation. As a result, in Britain, AMS 
means this modified version which, as we have seen, deviates considerably from the 
German system.226 (See Bogdanor 1992: 8-13; Oliver 1983: 118. Cf. Blackburn 1995: 376- 
379)
226 Bogdanor (1992: 10-11) submits an interesting argument that the Hansard Society Commission’s AMS is, 
conceptually, a “closed” list system. In his view, its assumption of sharply defined party preferences - that 
voters are less concerned about the personality of candidates than with the popularity of the party which they 
represent -  leads it assume that the ‘best’ losers are selected not by the electors, but by their constituency 
parties. However, it cannot be regarded as a genuine list system because, allowing no additional vote for the
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What Sykes (1990: 55) styled “obsessive and fatalistic mistrust of political parties 
themselves”, which underlies general reluctance to introducing the German system, was 
deeply embedded in liberal political theory. Ostrogorski submitted that “the distributive 
justice to be realised in representation is first and foremost to the electors and not to the 
parties.” (Quoted in Bogdanor 1981: 207) Dawn Oliver (1983: 125) claims that the fact that 
the parties would be responsible for drawing up the party lists would involve a substantial 
increase in power of the party organisations, in particular the extra-parliamentary machine. 
For such theorists, the problem is that these organisations are not directly accountable to the 
electorate. (See Bogdanor 1992: 8)
However, this liberal view is for a number of reasons not really tenable. Firstly, the fact 
that the party machine is not directly accountable to the electorate is largely the direct result 
of liberal policy which denies political parties a public role. In addition, the meaning of 
‘direct’ accountability is obscure, as Sykes (1990: 55) argues saying that “Being ‘directly 
answerable to the electorate’ really means no more than that if your MP presents himself for 
re-election you can vote either for him or against”. At any rate, if such lack of 
accountability is really a problem, then what is necessary is the introduction of certain 
measures to enhance accountability. Simply placing political parties outside of any legal 
regulation is not a wise strategy.
Secondly, the emergence of a cartelised party system in our pluralist society means that 
the conventional perspective on party organisations is not only archaic but unreliable. The 
govemmentalisation of political parties, together with the fact that they are now responsible 
for major parts of the political process, clearly calls for their legal institutionalisation. As a 
result of this institutionalisation, parties would have to submit to legal regulation, which, in 
turn, would greatly improve their accountability to the electorate.
Thirdly, it is important to note that electoral reform is part and parcel of a larger process 
of reform since all the proposals for a new constitutional settlement in Britain are closely 
intertwined. As one political scientist notes, since the plurality electoral system serves to 
buttress the Westminster model of strong Cabinet government, with a unitary state and 
parliamentary sovereignty, if one element were to be changed, then the rest, as with any 
delicately balanced mechanism, would inevitably fall apart. (See Norris 1995: 68)
party of voter’s choice, it cannot accurately and directly reflect overall national party preferences, including
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2.2 Preferential voting systems 
Preferential voting systems are, like FPTP, based on geographically defined 
constituencies. They differ from FPTP, in that voters indicate their choice of candidates in 
order of preference, which will either ensure that the eventual winner receives more than 50 
per cent of the first preference votes cast (the alternative vote system and the supplementary 
vote system), or produce a high measure of proportionality between seats and votes (the 
single transferable vote system).
2.2.1 The alternative vote system (AV)
The alternative vote system (AV) is, in effect, a majoritarian system, the principal aim of 
which is to elect representatives by absolute majorities. Voters are required to rank their 
preferences. The numbers of votes are counted in order of preference until a candidate 
receives at least 50 per cent of the votes cast. To do so, the lowest-placed candidates are 
eliminated in turn until one candidate emerges as the overall majority winner. The positive 
features of AV result from its realistic perspective on reform. Rodney Brazier (1998: 81) 
sees this system227 as the most reasonable, though interim, alternative on the ground that, 
being the least radical of the different proposals, it could gain, albeit hesitant, support from 
the main parties, and all the more because it would retain the same constituencies. Over and 
above embodying the advantages of FPTP {e.g., its decisiveness, simplicity and 
contribution to stable government), it could be argued that AV would also rectify the major 
shortcoming of FPTP, i.e. governmental illegitimacy, because a successful candidate could 
claim to be representing the majority view of the nation. However, AV is generally228 
criticised for failing to bring about national proportionality between votes and 
parliamentary seats because it takes no account of ‘wasted’ votes and there is no room for 
voters’ regional or national party preferences.
the voter’s choice of coalition partners.
227 Brazier (1998: 81) sees AV as a variant of the second ballot system.
228 See Sykes 1990: 6-7. Even Brazier, a serious supporter of AV, admits this. See Brazier 1998: 80-81.
227
2.2.2 The supplementary vote system (SV)
The supplementary vote system (SV) is an “idiosyncratic” (Butler 1993: 77) variant of 
AV, which has never been actually used to elect any legislature. Dale Campbell Savours, a 
Labour MP, first proposed this system to the Plant committee. This committee was divided 
on the issue of electoral reform but finally recommended SV as an alternative to the 
existing system. It is similar to AV, in that it retains the role and nature of constituency 
representation, and takes into account the ordering of preferences. However, under this 
system, instead of being able to rank the names of all candidates, the voter is required to list 
only first and second preferences. Another difference from AV is that the second preference 
only comes into play when determining which of the two highest scoring candidates in the 
first stage is to be chosen. Arguments for and against this system are understandably very 
similar to those directed at AV. However, as the final version of Plant Report (1993: 6-7) 
admits, SV would not necessarily ensure proportional representation overall or 
proportionality between parties, nor, unlike AV, would it necessarily ensure that all 
candidates would be elected on a majority vote in the constituency.
2.2.3 The single transferable vote system (STV)
(i) Outline and advantages of STV
Amongst preferential voting systems, STV offers a system of genuine proportional 
representation and has been the first choice of the majority of electoral reformists at least 
until AMS began to attract growing support from some political commentators and 
reformists.229 According to Bogdanor (1981: 232), the principal characteristic of STV lies 
in its liberal notion of representation, in that the task of the representative is to represent the 
opinions of electors rather than either the community in which they live, as in the plurality 
system, or their party allegiance, as in the list systems. Hence, STV prefers ‘personal’ 
representation to territorial representation and thereby introduces a minority representation 
system by transforming the existing constituencies into larger, multi-member constituencies 
to minimise wasted votes. Voters are, as in AV, asked to rank their preferences on the ballot 
paper. There is no limitation on the number of candidates which each political party may
229 STV is already used in Northern Ireland for elections to the European Parliament, to local government and 
to the new assembly set up in 1998. It, in fact, had a precedent in the university parliamentary elections
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put up and each voter may indicate his or her preference even between candidates of the 
same party. Bogdanor (1981: 233) points out that STV aims at minimising the influence of 
party organisations in the interest of securing greater individual choice, a feature which 
distinguishes it from the rival German system which, as we have seen, makes use of the 
party list.
Yet, under STV, the process in which the returning officer declares the winning 
candidates is very complicated. There is a quota established by dividing the total number of 
votes cast by the number of MPs to be elected plus one. Candidates are declared elected as 
and when they reach this quota. As it is most unlikely that all places are filled on the count 
of first preference votes, the method of counting the transferred preferences is important. 
The next stage of counting is to redistribute the “extra” votes of candidates who have 
already reached the quota. These extra votes are transferred to the next best ‘continuing’ 
candidate but at a fraction of their value. If the second stage fails to produce the requisite 
number of members, the votes for the least successful candidates are eliminated in turn and 
then are redistributed at their full value to the next best preferences until the required 
number of winning candidates is achieved. If all the above stages fail to elect the requisite 
number of winning candidates, any candidate who has a plurality of outstanding votes is 
returned as MP.
The advantage of this system is that the views of the voters are more accurately reflected 
in Parliament due to the complicated counting method designed to minimise wasted votes. 
Dawn Oliver (1983: 123) points out that “with five230-member constituencies, at least 83 
per cent of the votes cast would be effective - 83 per cent of the voters would have an MP 
for whom they had actually voted”. In addition, Bogdanor (1981: 258) emphasises that it is 
the instrument best designed to make British political parties more responsive to popular 
opinion. It is claimed that by contrast with either the existing plurality system or the 
German system, STV allows no candidate the luxury of a safe seat, as the choice of 
candidates is given to the electorate rather than the party organisation. This also means, as 
Bogdanor (1981: 257) says, that the voter has potentially a choice both of policy and of 
personnel wherever there is a multiplicity of opinion or factions within a party. As a result,
between 1918 and 1948. For many advocates of STV, the fact that it has already been tried and tested in U.K. 
is one of its greatest merits. See Best 1993: 80.
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it is generally acknowledged that STV meets the demands both for representation of local 
minorities and for better proportionality between the parties.231 Furthermore, as Oliver 
(1983: 125) notes, the legal regulation of parties would not be necessary, as STV does not, 
by definition, entail close involvement of political parties in the electoral process.
(ii) Two major objections 
However, there are equally strong objections to STV. The two most fundamental are as 
follows.
(a) The odd implications of the complex counting system 
It has sometimes been argued that STV raises insuperable technical difficulties and is 
incomprehensible to the ordinary voter. (See Plant 1991: 30-31, 100) However, the 
complexity of the counting system cannot in itself be sufficient reason to discount this, 
otherwise popular, alternative system. The Irish experience, rejecting proposals to change 
the voting system from STV to the British plurality system, shows that what matters is, not 
whether every voter can understand in what way the votes cast are counted, but whether the 
result accurately reflects citizen’s opinion. (See Bogdanor 1981: 250)
Thus, we need to locate the less obvious, but more serious, problems inherent in STV. 
Leslie Sykes argues that the basic dilemma of STV lies in the fact that each voter is entitled 
to cast only a single vote for electing multiple-members. Three major strategies have had to 
be devised to make this system workable: preferential voting, transferability and quotas. 
Some advocates of preferential voting systems stress their efficiency by pointing out that 
voters do not have to return to the polls to express further preferences. (See Brazier 1998: 
80) Others suggest that STV is the least manipulative system in that no voter could begin to 
predict the final outcome of such a complex system. (See McLean 1991: 187) However, as 
Sykes (1990: 5) points out, preferential voting by a single vote cannot accurately reflect 
voters’ real preferences which are subject to a whole range of variables arising out of the 
process of transfer. For example, unlike 'the exhaustive ballot', STV inevitably denies 
voters knowledge that might influence their preferences, such as which candidates had been
230 The number of members who would be returned by each constituency is flexible, ranging from three to 
nine, but five is regarded as the optimum number under STV. See Sykes 1990: 1; Oliver 1983: 122.
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eliminated as the first-preference candidate or how other candidates had fared at the first 
count. As we shall see, STV is also open to pre-election manipulation by party machines.
As to the transferability of votes, Sykes (1990: 7-8) questions whether it is reasonable for 
votes cast for the lowest-ranking candidates to be transferred at full value in the ensuing 
counts. There is no convincing answer to the question of “why preferences that are not 
equal in the minds of voters should be treated as if they were”. (Sykes 1990: 8)
Sykes (1990: 16-17) also seeks to demonstrate that the use of a quota in a system that 
perceives candidate, not political parties, as the basic player in elections, would sometimes 
generate self-contradictory preferences. In reallocating the extra votes, no attention is paid 
to parties to which candidates belong. Consequently, under certain circumstances, a lower 
preference can count against the highest one. Suppose that a voter were to give his first and 
second preferences to Conservative candidates but his third to a Liberal Democrat. It could 
ironically turn out that should his third preference become effective, it would be deemed to 
count against his initial preferences in favour of the Conservative Party.
(b) Some problems with larger multi-member constituencies 
Over and above the technical problems just outlined, the main stumbling-block to the 
introduction of STV in Britain is the fact that it has to replace existing single-member 
constituencies with larger multi-member constituencies. (See Oliver 1983: 122) The 
primary problem with such enlarged constituencies is that they inevitably weaken the 
relationship between MPs and their constituents. As early as 1867, Walter Bagehot warned 
against Thomas Hare’s proposal for STV in this respect. Bagehot (1993: 165-172) pointed 
out that the fact that there are several MPs in one large constituency would give MPs the 
feeling that they need only represent those who voted for them and who are likely to 
reselect them only if their interests have been well served.232 Secondly, it is likely that if the 
number of MPs were to remain at about its present level, the electoral size of constituencies 
would have to be increased five-fold from about 60,000 to 300,000 voters. This would 
mean a reduction in the number of constituencies from 651 to 130 and, thus, the
231 Let alone the factual consequence that the centrist third party is the best beneficiary of STV, these 
advantages have led the Liberal Democrats to being the most persistent political force supporting STV.
232 Bagehot (1993: 166) had a view that the multi-membership constituency would produce the required 
number of “voluntary” constituencies in the sense that voters were allowed to organise their own 
constituencies, as distinct from “compulsory” constituencies, defined by law.
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dismantling of the now established MP-constituency link. (See Plant 1991: 29-30, 100) The 
fact that this system has never been used in any large advanced industrial society233 shows 
its anomalous character. One may argue that the importance of such a link should be 
discounted in an era of globalisation where decentralisation (or localisation) is paralleled by 
supra-nationalisation and where the role of territorial representation in national politics is 
being replaced by a new style of participatory representation, coupled with the emergence 
of electronic democracy. However, such changes notwithstanding, considering the 
“ordinary citizen’s sense of political community” which the MP-constituency link affords, 
this relationship should not be sacrificed in the name of proportionality. (See Chapter 6, 
Section 4.5.1) If a way could be found to secure such advantages without the loss of the 
benefits of proportionality, it would clearly be more attractive than STV. This is why the 
German mixed system, in the eyes of many proponents of PR, will proved to be the best 
option.
The need for larger constituencies creates another anomaly in the drawing up of 
constituency boundaries. Oliver (1983: 122-123) admits that substantial variations in size 
and population between constituencies would be necessary in order to ensure that an STV 
system could accommodate either the present parliamentary boundaries or, a situation in 
which each constituency was to return an equal number of members. In addition, the 
evidence shows that STV is very vulnerable to the temptation to gerrymandering. It is well 
known that Irish electoral history has witnessed a number of partisan boundary revisions 
transforming three-member constituencies into four-member constituencies where the 
governing parties are weak. (See Bogdanor 1981: 247) Thus, the flexibility of STV is the 
source of several new anomalies.
3 The implications of the alternative electoral models
Electoral reform must match “Britain’s own indigenous political structure and traditions, 
and seek to improve the efficiency of its system of parliamentary democracy”. (Blackburn
233 Bogdanor’s survey (1981: 233) shows that only two countries retain this system for the election of the 
lower chamber of their legislatures: the Irish Republic and Malta. The Australian Senate has adopted this
232
1995: 404) For Blackburn, the principal goals of the electoral system are govemability and 
proportionality. He suggests that we should evaluate every proposal for electoral reform 
using a number of criteria including proportionality, representation of local communities, 
citizen participation, popular credibility, effective government, effective political parties, 
and an effective Parliament. (1995: 404-405) As far as these general criteria are concerned, 
we may argue that the German system and STV are the most suitable systems for Britain. 
Both systems would secure proportionality, which the present system fails to provide. 
Under each system, we may expect that ‘elective dictatorship’ would be markedly 
contained. However, these general similarities cannot outweigh the important differences 
between the two systems.
3.1 The difference between STV and the German system: recognition o f the positive role 
o f political parties in the democratic process
As we noted, underlying the difference between the German system - a list system- and 
STV - a preferential voting system - is a different view of the role of political parties in the 
democratic process. The former concerns the proportionality between parties while the 
latter concerns the proportionality of voters’ views. These proportionalities are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, STV focuses on the views of the voters in large constituencies but 
may, in practice, produce a high measure of proportionality between national votes and 
party representation, though it does not, of course, purport to be completely proportional.
However, so far as the institutionalisation of political parties is concerned, there is a 
fundamental difference between these alternatives. On the one hand, the German system 
presupposes the legal institutionalisation of political parties. Its legitimate concern is that 
political parties are essential to a democratic political process and, therefore, should be 
incorporated as public institutions, especially in the electoral system. Another feature of the 
German system is its tendency towards what Rawlings (1988: 232) called the 
‘nationalisation’ of the electoral system. That is to say that the introduction of a list system 
may lead to the curtailment of the autonomy of constituencies and the increasing power of 
the national party in the selection of candidates. Oliver (1983: 124) warns, as we have 
noted, that electoral reform in favour of the list system would increase the influence of the
system since 1949 but one needs to pay attention to the functional difference between the lower and upper
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extra-parliamentary party machine. These considerations are inevitably linked to the legal 
control of political parties. In Germany, the internal affairs of political parties, in particular 
the basic relationship between central and local party organisations within electoral process, 
is subject to close legal attention.234 (See The Law on Political Parties [Parteiengesetz], Part 
II) The process of selecting candidates is also regulated by law (See ibid., Part III), as are 
their external activities. For example, electoral expenditure at national level is regulated 
and political parties are provided with public funding. (See ibid., Part IV)
On the other hand, STV is no different from the present plurality system in the sense that 
neither system necessarily conceives political parties as basic to the political process. This 
does not mean that the proponents of STV do not recognise the relevance of political parties 
at all. Rather, as the First Interim Report of the Plant Committee 1991 notes, even under 
STV, “in practice what is being represented is a political party”, (at 17) While recognising 
that parties remain the central vehicles of representation, Oliver (1983: 124-125) focuses on 
the question of how their influence can be tempered. However, since she accepts the non­
recognition of political parties and a concomitant laissez-faire policy as given factors which 
can hardly be reversed, her remedy is to strengthen the initiatives of voters in choosing 
different candidates belonging to the same party. As Turpin (1990: 533) points out, under 
STV, a general election can also function as the “primary” election of those who will be a 
party’s representatives in the legislature. Bogdanor claims that STV would be superior to 
the model of primary election adopted in the USA in terms of enhanced popular 
participation. He provides two reasons:
The first is that where a separate primary is held, as in the United States, the winner of the primary 
becomes the party’s sole nominee. Supporters of other candidates, therefore, have to vote for a candidate 
who is not their first preference. Under STV, by contrast, the minority is not disenfranchised. In a multi­
member constituency voters can still support a candidate who may not be the first choice of their party and
chambers.
234 See generally, Kommers 1997, esp. 200-217: Ch. 5; Youngs 1996; Currie 1994: 207-227; Poguntke 1994; 
Nicholls 1984. For a comparative analysis of political ideology underlying German law relating to political 
parties, see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1, (iii).
235 Under Article 21 of the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court can decide on whether the organisation 
and activities of political parties accord with the Basic Law. As we have seen, at an early stage in the Federal 
Republic’s history, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) were 
declared unconstitutional under this clause. (See Currie 1994: 215-220) Article 2 of the Law of Political 
Parties stipulates that a party can lose its status as a party if it fails to take part in either Federal Parliament or 
Land Parliament elections. Recently, this article was used to deprive the National List (N.L.) and the Free 
German Workers Party (FAP) of their privileged status as political parties. (See Youngs 1996:226-228)
234
can hope that he may win with the support of uncommitted voters or transfers from candidates of other 
parties. Secondly, a primary election is open only to dues-paying or registered party members, and not to 
the electorate as a whole. Under STV, on the other hand, the primary election is open to every elector who 
chooses to vote. (See Bogdanor 1984: 90)
Such a system is both attractive and adequate if, in practice, the electorate is able to 
evaluate the quality and views of the candidates and thereby discriminate among candidates 
of a particular party or those belonging to different parties.
3.2 The naive illusion o f the advocates o f STV: Does STV really strengthen voter’s rather 
than party’s choice?
However, we doubt that the advantages of STV would be as substantial as its advocates 
expect. To the extent that political parties are involved in the electoral process and a party 
government continues to exist even under a reformed democracy, the purposes of STV are 
to a considerable degree subverted to the manipulation of party organisation.
In the first place, it has to be pointed out that candidates will be chosen by a party 
selection process in a political culture that is basically unsympathetic to independent 
candidates. (See Chapter 5, Section 6.3.1) Thus, the elector can only choose between 
candidates that have been previously screened by the parties. In addition, under STV, as 
Bogdanor (1981: 246) recognises, electoral realism tends to force the party organisation to 
employ a number of tactical devices to secure as many parliamentary representatives as 
possible. One tactic is to limit the number of party candidates in an attempt to win a 
uniform level of first preference support for all of its candidates. (Sykes 1990: 26) 
Otherwise, there is a strong possibility that less popular candidates will be eliminated at the 
early stage of the count, thus making their votes available for transfer. This means that 
lower-preference votes could pass to candidates of other parties. This kind of party control 
in the selection of candidates implies that the choice of candidate open to the electorate is 
much more restricted than the advocates of STV would have us believe. Indeed, now that 
the election is mainly about competition between parties rather than that between factions 
within parties, the ideal of the so-called ‘balanced slate’236 is far less realistic. It is highly 
likely that at least so far as elections are concerned, any manifest disunity would negatively
236 That is, the candidates of a party can be recruited from ‘all’ factions, thus enabling voters to choose from 
the full range of available options. See Sykes 1990:27.
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affect a party’s image. As Sykes (1990: 37-38) points out, the true merit of proportional 
representation is that it can measure electoral support for “indivisible political parties” 
rather than support for “vaguely defined factions” within them.
In addition, as even proponents of STV recognise (Bogdanor 1981: 246), it is not rare 
that ‘dummy’ candidates are occasionally put up to ensure that the party’s favoured 
candidates are elected. This all implies that wherever there is room for the party machine to 
manipulate the system, voters’ choice, the most cherished aspect of STV, is seriously 
diminished.
This was pointed out as early as 1915 when Dicey (1982[1915]: lxxxvi-lxxxvii) warned 
that “The more complicated any system of popular election is made, the more power is 
thrown into the hands of election agents or wire-pullers. This of itself increases the power 
and lowers the character of the party machine; but the greatest political danger with which 
England is now threatened is the inordinate influence of party mechanism.” Hence, the idea 
that STV will diminish party politics is illusory and quite out of touch with present reality. 
Therefore, the only remaining option for a genuinely strengthened voter's choice is to 
recognise the role of political parties in the electoral process and to institutionalise them to 
ensure that their activities can be democratically organised within boundaries determined by 
clear constitutional principles.
The naivete of the ideal of the voter’s choice is brought home by oft quoted but barren 
argument of Hare and Mill, the classical proponents of STV, that the system would improve 
the quality of the candidates. (See Bogdanor 1981: 248) Apparently, this argument stems 
from a suspicion that the list system produces an inferior class of candidates. But, the 
evidence shows quite the opposite. For example, in the Republic of Ireland, STV has not 
produced a superior class of legislator because the “spirit of loyalty” lies so deeply 
entrenched in “Irish cultural life”. (See Bogdanor 1981: 248) Yet, it seems that it is not only 
this cultural peculiarity but the electoral system itself that has to be blamed. As we have 
seen, what Bagehot (1993: 166) called ‘voluntary constituencies’ would produce MPs who, 
regardless of competence, would put particular constituency interests before other wider 
interests and then reduce elections to a “trade”. (Bagehot 1993: 168. See also Oliver 1983: 
125-126) On the other hand, one cannot seriously argue that German party list candidates 
are inferior to those selected by British or Irish constituencies. In fact, in contrast to the
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hopes of Bogdanor (1981: 249-250, 257-258), cross-party voting, combined with a multi­
member system, may turn elections into personal popularity contests rather than 
competitions between policies. As Sykes (1990: 32) points out, unless voters in general 
become competent enough to judge the political implications of their votes in a complicated 
electoral system like STV, the importance of the issues and policies will diminish in favour 
of the photogenic qualities of candidates.
4 Conclusion: Matching the electoral system with the institutionalisation of political 
parties
As seen in Chapter 5 (Sec. 6.3.1), the goal of a general election is not merely to constitute 
the House of Commons but to form a government, and political parties are the very 
backbone of this important procedure. We need to be realistic enough to see, in Bagehot’s 
(1993: 160) words, that “there never was an election without party. ... The House of 
Commons lives in a state of perpetual potential choice; at any moment it can choose a ruler 
and dismiss a ruler”. Bogdanor (1981: 256-257) insists that the “decision of the elector”, 
expressing a view on any issue which cuts “across party lines”, should be guaranteed and 
STV provides the best chance for that purpose. We doubt that in any complex society in 
which there are multiple cleavages of opinion, a single vote, which is transferable at least 
three or four times, can reflect all the potential opinions on any given issue. A general 
election is not a referendum. It is not only the representation of opinions but also the 
representation of people. This means that so long as parliamentary democracy is not totally 
denied, political parties are the sole channels through which the political verdict of the 
electorate can be expressed. One important implication of this is that as far as elections are 
concerned, the right of the voter must be equated with his right to support a political party. 
Consequently, as Sykes (1990: 39) has it, “PR’s sole concern should be with the 
relationship between the number of votes each party has received and the number of seats it 
has been awarded”.
As we have sought to demonstrate, once we recognise the positive role of political parties 
in the democratic process, the best way to respond to the archaic status quo is to abandon
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the antiquated liberal policy which denies them a public role. The power to select 
candidates needs to be given to political parties to the extent that the exercise of this power 
is in line with democratic requirements resulting from legal regulation. (See Chapter 6) It 
would be wrong to imply that this institutionalisation of political parties necessarily means 
giving ‘excessive’ weight to the party machine, as some opponents of the party list assume. 
(Cf. Bogdanor 1981: 250) On the contrary, it should be interpreted as a ‘balanced’ measure 
designed to reflect as accurately as possible the reality of political power. It is also 
important to see that the role of MPs is not confined to national politics and thus the 
conventional MP-constituency link is a valuable one which should be retained. Thus, the 
best way to do this, without sacrificing the equally important principle of proportionality, is 
by means of a “hybrid” system designed to strike a balance between local representation 
and national, or functional, representation via the party organisation.
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Chapter 8
Juridification of the Funding of Political Parties
1 Introduction
The incorporation of political parties within constitutional and legal arrangements 
requires a new party funding system appropriate to their public functions. This chapter will 
undertake this task in three main sections.
The first section will sketch the present situation of the financial affairs of political 
parties and the legal framework governing this situation. The second section will critically 
analyse the present system by examining the liberal ideas supporting this system and their 
deficiencies. The basic background argument of this section will be that there is a strong 
need for legal regulation of certain part of party finance to ensure that money cannot distort 
the public’s genuine choice and democratic governance. In the third section, we shall look 
into the pros and cons of state aid to political parties. This debate is concerned mainly with 
the fear of the state control of free political will-formation, which is also related to legal 
regulation of party finance. Our position will be based on our project of constitutionalised 
democratic autonomy and its concomitant principles of realistic balance between the state 
and civil society.
2 The present legal framework governing party finance
As Johnston and Pattie (1993: 148) notes, “the legal framework covering British party 
finances is the product of over a century of legislation; much of it is obsolete and marked by 
major anomalies.” Indeed, it may be more correct to say that no legislative framework has 
ever been established in Britain to regulate ‘party’ finance. Existing law on British political
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finance is focused on the ‘electoral’ expenditure of individual ‘candidates’ in 
constituencies, not on political parties at national level.
Recently, there are some changes in the disclosure of party accounting and large 
donations. Major political parties make a rule to open voluntarily their accounts and 
promised to make their commitment to the publication of the names of donors whose 
donations exceed a certain threshold. However, there are still increasing demands for 
statutory accounting237 and the public disclosure of the sources of large political donations.
So far as state financial support is concerned, there are some legal entitlements given to 
the political parties. The Representation of the People Act 1918 introduced for the first time 
some significant indirect state aids in election campaigns. These aids in the form of 
subsidy-in-kind, which are now contained in the 1983 Act, include a free postal delivery of 
candidates’ addresses, free use of public meeting rooms to candidates at election time and 
the provision of returning officers’ fees.238 However, like expenditure limits in 
campaigning, these aids are, at least in theory, given to candidates, not political parties.
On the other hand, there is direct cash subsidy now made available to Opposition parties. 
Yet, it is important to point out that the principle that Opposition parties were entitled to 
state financial support began with individual office-holders. The leader of the opposition 
has received a salary from public funds since Ministers of Crown Act 1937. On 1993 
onwards, a fund of £100,000 is also available for opposition front-bench travel, which will 
be uprated annually. (See Home Affairs Committee 1994: vi, fii.9) MPs have been entitled 
to a salary from public funds since 1911. It was as recently as 1975 that cash subsidy, which 
is intended to be given directly to political parties, was introduced. However, this money 
known as the Short money is given only for Opposition parties to assist them with their 
parliamentary work according to the number of seats and votes in the previous general
237 I.e. annual accounts are required to be drawn up in a prescribed form, fully audited and covering a similar 
financial year to help the public’s scrutiny of party finances.
238 As the Home Affairs Committee on Funding of Political Parties (1994: paras. 11, 12) points out, the scope 
and form of state subsidy to political parties may vary according to different opinions over the true nature of 
state provisions. Other forms of state aid may include the work of local authorities in registering electors, the 
free policing provided at party conference and a favourable tax treatment of legacies to political parties.
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election. There is still no public funding for political parties to support them with their 
extra-parliamentary works essential in a pluralist democracy.239
The overhaul of these arrangements is now being undertaken. The Committee on 
Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Neill of Bladen, QC, is reviewing issues in 
relation to the funding of political parties and will recommend possible reforms of present 
arrangements by the summer of 1998. In the following sections, we shall suggest in what 
way the reform should direct with reference to our project of constitutionalised democratic 
autonomy.
3 Some problems with the present situation
It is apparent that ‘liberal associationalism’ provides the theoretical basis for the absence 
of the legal framework for regulating and supporting party finance in Britain. (See Chapter 
5, Section 6) However, this vacuum of relevant legal principle has given rise to some 
significant problems. One salient problem is a substantial financial ‘inequality’ between the 
main political parties. Financial disparities can be treated from two, though interrelated, 
perspectives: inequality in expenditure and gross resource disparities between political 
parties. The former leads to a debate about expenditure limits upon party campaigning 
while the latter gives rise to a number of controversies over reform of financial donations to 
political parties and the issue of public funding. These controversies are also related to 
another fundamental problem, namely, the ‘inadequacy’ of party funds to meet the 
minimum requirements for their desirable functions in a pluralist democracy.
In the following, we shall look into those problems by way of, inter alia, criticising the 
liberal ideas inherent in the present system.
3.1 Problem I  - The lacuna o f legal regulation o f national electoral expenditure
The present regulation of election expenditure is based on concern in the later nineteenth 
century about the cost of elections and widespread bribery. However, although there has
239 At around the same time when the Short money was introduced, the Houghton Committee recommended 
the introduction of a system of state financing of political parties for their activities outside Parliament but 
failed to be implemented.
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been considerable changes in modem electioneering, including the undeniable importance 
of national campaigning, the basic formula and principle governing expenditure limitation 
remains intact. Electoral law pays no attention to national electoral expenditure spent by 
political parties, which was virtually non-existent in the nineteenth century.240
The underlying concern about national expenditure is that it can cause imbalance in the 
campaigns of one major party over another. As a Conservative-led Home Affairs 
Committee on party finance (1994: xviii) admitted, the evidence shows that historically the 
Conservatives has outspent two rival parties. This inequality of political ammunition241 may 
threaten the foundation of fair electoral contests between participants. This is more so if we 
consider the growing ‘nationalisation’ of election campaigns. A qualitative change of 
territorial representation in recent decades requires a new relationship between local and 
central party organisations. (See Chapter 6, Section 4.5) Despite the continuing importance 
of local organisation at least in the crucial area of election campaigning under the present 
constituency-based electoral system, it is clear, as Paul Webb (1995b: 312) points out, that 
local organisation is increasingly dependent upon the co-ordinating role played by the 
centre. This is underpinned by the organisational professionalisation of parties which 
manifests itself mainly in the strengthening of research, communications and campaigning 
structures 242 Johnston and Pattie (1993: 145-147) points out that the ever-growing 
influence of resources from the central parties, in particular in marginal constituencies, 
renders the present system seriously out of date. From this perspective, it can be claimed 
that the absence of national expenditure limits is undermining the purpose and effect of the 
expenditure restrictions on constituency campaigning under the existing election law. As 
Blackburn (1995: 354) points out, money from the central party is used to promote the
240 It was only since 1970s that central election expenditure has been rapidly expanded mainly due to the 
increasing use of large-scale national press advertising and the development of new communications 
technology.
241 It is true, as Hansard Commission’s Agenda For Change (1991: Ch.4, esp. para. 75) stressed, that the 
degree of imbalance in the national campaigning has been diminished due to the introduction of the state 
subsidy-in-kind in the early twentieth century and, more importantly, de facto free party broadcasting. (For our 
analysis of party political broadcasting, see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2) In addition, it is not easily deniable that 
the practical impact of large-scale spending on billboard advertisements and the national press is hard to 
quantify. However, as we shall argue later, imbalance in national election expenditure cannot be detached 
from a huge gap in party spending on permanent costs. The long-term impact of this gap, especially that 
between the two major parties and small parties, on the public’s choice in political market may not be 
discounted, though it is still difficult to quantify the degree of the impact.
242 For an illustration of Labour’s professionalisation which offered the clearest example of “political 
marketing”, see Scammell 1995: 243-247.
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election of particular candidates within each constituency, by way of advertisements, direct 
mail and other propaganda promoting political parties.
3.2 Analysis o f the case against national expenditure limits
Many objections have been raised to the introduction of national expenditure limits. Of 
them, two principal arguments continually appear.
3.2.1 Too radical to be planted in laissez-faire British political arrangements?
The first objection comes from the conventional liberal conception of political parties 
stressing their civil society origins. The Hansard Society report, Election Campaigns: 
Agenda for Change, presumes that the control of central expenditure entails a radical 
change in British political arrangements, especially electoral structures, the crucial branch 
of which is the regulation of political parties. (Hansard Society 1991: 37, paras. 67,68) This 
report implies that regulation is not in accordance with the British liberal tradition that is 
manifested in the lack of legal recognition of political parties. As we shall see in detail later, 
in suggesting reform of party finance, the dual nature of political parties and the desirable 
relationship between the state and society in a new democracy need to be properly taken 
into account and accordingly, the status quo which itself is part of the target of reform 
cannot be convincingly suggested as a reason for opposition.
3.2.2 Control of expenditure limits and freedom of expression
The second, more specific, objection is that control of central expenditure would generate 
a number of formidable technical and practical problems. The first problem of this kind is 
that such a reform tends to be circumvented by other political organisations such as 
campaigning groups and even by the editorial material in the Press. What bodies are to be 
bound by a limit on the amount that may be spent in national election campaigns? (Oliver 
1992: 128) This question is related to other technical questions. What is a political party? 
What is political expenditure? Where can the appropriate line be drawn between purely 
academic or journalistic activities and politically driven campaigns?
Central to the debate is the potential harm to freedom of expression. This can be seen in 
three ways.
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(i) Expenditure caps and freedom of expression of political parties
One may claim that control of national spending would breach the right of political 
parties to communicate with the electorate, which is essential for their proper operation. 
This argument is taken by a Hansard Commission of 1991 (at p.3), chaired by a former 
Conservative minister, Christopher Chataway.243
However, the right of political parties cannot be reasonably claimed if unrestrained, 
unbalanced party expenditure damage the democratic process. For this collective right can 
be justified only under condition in which political parties contribute the well workings of 
the democratic process. In other words, in so far as national expenditure limits are useful to 
strengthen the democratic process, its restrictive effect on the freedom of expression of 
political parties can be justified.
Based on this, the purpose of spending ceilings cannot be confined to the prevention of 
possible corruption and fairness in the distribution of political resources 244 Expenditure 
limits also aim for the reduction of “wasteful and excessive campaign spending”245. Such 
spending tends to contribute to an ever-growing, mindless flood of negative campaigning 
propaganda rather than to the informed choice of voters. (See Scammell 1995: 261-264) As 
Butler & Kavanagh (1997: 240) point out, the problem of negative campaigning lies in its 
high dependency on a ‘knocking’ message in a sentence or slogan than a positive one. This 
does not go along with our democratic ideal based on the establishment of a rational will 
formation. In addition, as we shall see in (iii) below, despite the non-qualifiable effect of 
excessive campaigning, political parties cannot always resist to the temptation to rely on 
sensational negative advertisements, the increasing cost of which may nearly bankrupt each 
party. This wasteful spending raises further problems with the way in which political parties 
raise funds.
243 Recently, in Colorado Republican Federal Campaigning Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 116 
S.Ct. 2309 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Federal Election Commission Act provision that 
limited political parties’ “independent” spending that was not co-ordinated with particular candidates on the 
ground of the violation of the right of political expression safeguarded by the First Amendment. This case 
extended to political party spending the same constitutional protection previously afforded independent 
individual’s spending since Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). For a brief comment on this 
issue, see Harvard Law Review’s “Leading Cases” of 1996,110 Harv.LRev. 135, at pp.236-246.
244 The expenditure limit at local level since the 19th century focuses on this purpose.
245 J. Breyer’s opinion, Colorado Republican Federal Campaigning Committee v. Federal Election 
Commission, 116 S.Ct. at 2317.
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In conclusion, despite the still difficult technical problems, including the difficulty in 
deciding reasonable level of expenditure and preventing avoidance, the case for capping 
national election expenditure is compatible with the freedom of expression of political 
parties and so cannot be easily discarded.
(ii) Effects on third-party expenditure and freedom of expression
It is apparent that a limit on the freedom of non-party organisations or individuals to 
advertise or campaign for a party or a set of ideas is a substantial inroad into freedom of 
speech and political activity. Obviously, arbitrary and unjustifiable limits on third-party 
expenditure - so-called “independent expenditure” - are not acceptable.246 The freedom of 
expression of ordinary citizens and non-party organisations is the backbone of a democratic 
political system so that a limitation on this freedom requires a compelling public interest.
This principle is confirmed by the European Human Rights Commission and Court in 
Bowman v. U.K241. The Commission and the Court declared that Section 75 of the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 has violated Article 10 (freedom of expression) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 75 prohibits the third-party 
advertisements and campaigns at an election, which are not authorised by election agent. 
Exceptions include advertisements not exceeding £5.00 (as amended) and the media 
coverage. In Bowman case, the applicant was charged of a criminal offence under Section 7 
of the 1983 Act on the ground that she distributed 25,000 leaflets in Halifax shortly before 
the 1992 general election, outlining the views on abortion of the three main candidates. 
Both the Commission and the Court ruled that having regard to the nature of freedom of 
expression as a “bedrock of any democratic system”, £5.00 limit is not proportionate to the
246 In a landmark case, R  v. Tronoh Mines, Ltd., [1952] All.E.R. 697, the High Court refused to extend 
expenditure limit under the Representation of the People 1949 (now section 75) to the third-party political 
advertisement at national scale. At stake was a company’s political advertisement inserted in The Times 
criticising the Labour government’s anti-business policies, especially a scheme of dividend restraint and 
calling for the election o f ‘a new and strong government with ministers’ who are more sympathetic to business 
enterprise and initiative. The court held that general political propaganda was outside the boundary of the 
section, even if it indirectly affect “an election for a particular constituency” which is the objective of the 
section. Yet, it should be pointed out that this case is not based on the freedom of expression discourse but 
relied upon statutory interpretation, and therefore it can be differentiated from Bowman jurisprudence directly 
depending upon freedom of expression argument.
247 (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. CD 13 for E.H.R Commission Judgement; The Times Law Reports, 23.2.98 for E.H.R 
Court Judgement.
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legitimate aim of securing equality between candidates.248 In particular, the Court made it 
clear that in viewing a limit on the unauthorised independent campaign as disproportionate, 
a special attention had been drawn to the fact that there is no national expenditure limit 
imposed on political parties. (See The Times Law Reports, 23.2.98)
However, few can seriously argue that this freedom is absolute so that no restriction can 
be allowed. Article 10 (2) of the Convention provides that a restriction on freedom of 
expression can be allowed, provided that it is “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a 
democratic society” for one or more of the legitimate aims specified. In Bowman case, the 
Commission and the Court confirmed the established essential principles underlying the 
application of, in particular, the “necessity” test in Article 10(2) of the Convention. This 
test implies that if any restriction on freedom of expression is “proportionate” to the 
legitimate aim and there are “relevant and sufficient” justifications for that restriction, 
contracting states have a certain margin of appreciation in implementing freedom of 
expression in domestic jurisdictions 249 Moreover, the Court holds that the right to free 
elections protected by Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention can justify certain 
restrictions on political expression so that there is the need of striking balance between two 
rights. It is important to see that in striking this balance, admittedly, the Court has paid a 
special attention to whether there are other restrictions placed upon political parties to 
advertise at national or regional level. (See The Times Law Reports, 23.2.98) This approach 
may imply that if there were national or regional expenditure limits placed upon parties, a 
limit on independent expenditure to reasonable amount would not necessarily be 
disproportionate to the aim of securing equality between candidates. In other words, if the 
whole British electoral law consistently dedicated to the legitimate aim of securing equality 
between candidates or political parties, there is no reason why certain restrictions may not 
be placed upon independent expenditure which can distract voters from the political 
platforms which are the basis of national party campaigns. According to Butler & Kavanagh 
(1997: 242), the Conservatives were helped by the press advertisements of Paul Sykes 
(£827,000) and Entrepreneurs for a Booming Britain (£868,000) while Labour by Unison 
(£1,112,000). Since these third-party expenditures at national level tend to help almost the
248 See (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. CD 13, at pp. CD 16-18 for E.H.R Commission Judgement; The Times Law 
Reports, 23.2.98 for E.H.R Court Judgement.
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two main parties, the discrepancy between them and other parties may become even worse. 
This would be inconsistent with the legitimate objective of national electoral system to 
channel currents of thought, which should not be distorted by the wealth of political forces.
In conclusion, the Court’s jurisprudence expressed in the Bowman case should not be 
extended to ban all the restrictions on party expenditure and independent expenditure which 
can exploit any new legislation governing party expenditure.250
(iii) The right way to enhance informed choices of voters 
The most persuasive argument raises questions about the nature and aim of the political 
system. Oliver (1992: 129) claims that control of national expenditure would result in the 
reduction of campaigns, and this would generate less public interest in the campaign and 
might reduce turnouts. What are the democratic political devices, in particular election 
campaigns, for? Oliver's answer to this question relies on an anti-pluralist view in the sense 
that her concern is with the “fortunes of the electors and the community”, not “fairness to 
and the fortunes of a party or movement as such” (See Oliver 1992: 131, 134). More
249 In Britain, there are already some specific restrictions on political expression in the form of banned 
commercial broadcasting. See Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2.
250 A comparative concern may lead us to American Supreme Court cases. First, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 
(1976), annulled a limit on independent expenditure. Secondly, Colorado Republican Federal Campaigning 
Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (1996), struck down a limit on party expenditure. 
Both cases were based on the right of political expression safeguarded by the First Amendment. However, it 
would be wrong to assume that the Buckley rule can be transplanted into Britain. While both regimes are based 
on a liberal conception of democracy, there is a conspicuous difference in political reality between the U.S. 
and the U.K.. As Calabresi (1994: 1533) notes, the unique virtue of the American structural constitutional 
systems of checks and balances and federalism makes British-style “party government” almost impossible in 
the U.S. The American system focuses on the protection of liberty by setting governmental power against 
itself. Yet, the great virtue of its transatlantic counterpart lies in the well-established unitary Parliamentary 
system in which political parties not only play an essential role in making government accountable for what it 
does but also influence, as centres of political power, policy-making. In the U.S., political parties are 
considered mainly as a kind of electoral commission and the political fortunes of the party’s presidential 
candidates and congressional candidates are separate. As a result, the elected representatives enjoy relatively 
stronger independence from not only the party machine but also government than their counterparts in Britain. 
Therefore, in the U.S., there is less need for the regulation of expenditure of political parties as such as well as 
that of individuals and other political organisations, with a view to promoting the election of a particular 
political party.
The second, more concrete, difference between the two regimes is that in Britain, unlike the U.S., there are 
already specific restraints on political expression in the form of banned commercial broadcasting. For some, 
this fact provides a strong justification for the existing U.K. system on the ground that by providing relatively 
equal broadcasting opportunities to major parties, the case for national expenditure limits to put parties on an 
equal footing is weakened. (See Pinto-Duschinsky 1981: 272) However, this claim is less convincing because 
the production costs of party broadcasts are met by each party and party broadcasting is, despite its 
importance, only one method of campaigning. In short, it is clear that the freedom of expression jurisprudence 
is less convincing in Britain which has already adopted a scheme of regulation.
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specifically, so far as election campaigns are concerned, in her view, a central question is 
how adequately information is provided to enable voters to make informed choices about 
who should represent them. (1992: 131-2) From this perspective, she goes on to argue that 
“fairness to parties” or “fair rivalry between political parties” should not be regarded as a 
positive goal, which the state should have a vital role in achieving in modem societies. 
Rather, these are merely a consequence of a political system, which purports to ensure a 
flow of as much information as possible. Hence, it is claimed that to control the resources 
available in election campaigns is not desirable and in conflict with the national interest 
because it could damp down public debate and reduce public interest in electing 
representatives.
However, we may rebut this view in two respects. Firstly, it is naive to presume that 
expenditure limits would seriously affect the public interest in campaigns and the voter 
turnout in elections. In practice, full information about the parties and their candidates 
which is required for voters’ best choice is not necessarily secured by unrestrained party 
expenditure. It is not the question of lack of information but of “fairness” to the parties in 
terms of political resources available to them. As Oliver (1992: 132) stresses herself, the 
most serious problem of the present system lies in the two main parties’ “unresponsiveness” 
to new ideas and to a variety of public opinion. Apart from broader problems embedded in 
existing political arrangements, the imbalance in expenditure between parties, especially 
when the expenditure of small parties is compared with that of the two main parties, 
contributes to the unresponsive nature of the established parties. Indeed, some less well- 
funded parties are not in a position to worry about the side-effects of the limit on 
expenditure. The privileged position of the two main parties in raising far more money than 
the others and in running more high-profile campaigns has enabled them to manipulate the 
debate on policy options by marginalising other discourses mediated by other parties. 
Furthermore, expenditure beyond reasonable limits would not always encourage a flow of 
high quality information. Rather, the imbalance in party war-chests and excessive campaign 
spending tend to massively distort the terms of political debate. Campaigns dominated by 
the two well-funded parties tempt them to conduct personal attacks on party leaders rather 
than policy propaganda, or to incur huge costs by making them dependent on the
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‘demonstration effect’ of sensational political advertisement.252 As we shall see below, 
voters’ free choices should be made about different political programmes and should not be 
excessively affected by the imbalance of wealth of party supporters.
Secondly, the case against national expenditure limits in order to ensure an unrestrained 
flow of information overlooks one important fact. The political process, especially election 
campaigns, exists not only for the representation of public opinion but also for the 
formation of government. The latter relies heavily on the party system. Bearing in mind that 
elections are a battlefield for party competition to form the next government (see Chapter 5, 
Section 6.3), it is clear that the provision of full information to the voter is only “one” goal 
of electoral campaigns and fair rivalry between political parties is another equally important 
goal. In short, the question of political finance should be assessed not only for the voters’ 
sake but also from the point of view of the political parties.
3.3 Problem II - The financial disparity between political parties
National election expenditure limits by themselves would not guarantee equity between 
parties. Unless income disparities and concomitant inequalities in the permanent 
expenditure involved in maintaining the central and regional party organisations are 
redressed, genuine financial equality cannot be achieved. Indeed, while the difference 
between the two major parties in general elections has narrowed in terms of the funding of 
the campaign itself, there remains a huge gap in party spending relating to permanent costs. 
A Labour witness for the Home Affairs Committee on Funding of Political Parties points 
out that while in 1992 the Conservatives spent £11.4 million and Labour £10.6 million on 
the election itself, during the whole election year, the Conservatives spent £27 million 
while the Labour spent £14 million. (See Home Affairs Committee 1994: xviii) It is 
reasonable to argue that this financial inequality tends to undermine the foundations of 
British democracy by preventing all parties competing on a more equal footing. In
251 They include the absence of public rights of access to official information, a highly disproportionate voting 
system, and other absurd aspects of party finance as dealt with in this section.
252 It is very difficult to prove that such advertisements could affect public opinion and the result of elections 
but it is safe to say that some politicians would believe it is true and therefore they tend to pour a huge amount 
of money for that purpose. For example, as dramatically illustrated in Mark Hollingworth’s Memoirs, The 
Ultimate Spin Doctor, extracted in The Observer 16.2.97 (at p.3), Mrs Thatcher was one of them, and 
benefited by advertising skills of some spin doctors like Sir Tim Bell and employed a full-time advertising
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particular, in association with a non-proportionate electoral system and a significant 
imbalance in institutional donations, significant financial inequality between the two main 
parties and small parties generates a situation of unfair rivalry.
3.4 An analysis o f voluntarism as the rationale for unregulatedfundraising
The main objection to the criticism of unfair rivalry between political parties is the 
principle of voluntarism established in British politics. From this standpoint, it can be 
argued that if the gross resource disparities are a result of purely voluntary support of the 
membership and friendly donors, there is little point in criticising this imbalance in 
resource. Such a financial gap can itself be an important criterion against which the public’s 
support for political parties is evaluated.
However, despite the superficial plausibility of this claim, it is neither persuasive nor 
convincing. We may suggest two primary reasons.
3.4.1 Can money be one essential standard in evaluating the quality of opinion?
It cannot be desirable that the public’s choice can be influenced by the wealth of a party’s 
supporters. It is not difficult to assume that the means of political persuasion, which has 
influence on the public’s choice, rely upon political money. In examining the relationship 
between the public’s choice and the wealth of a party’s supporters, we need to be aware of 
the nature and implications of voluntarism in the context of party finance.
As the Houghton majority (1976: 62) point out, allowing the public’s choice to be 
determined by the fund-raising capacity of the respective parties is not in accordance with a 
democratic ideal that money should not be the standard against which the status of the 
citizen and the quality of opinion are determined. The British electoral reforms of the late 
nineteenth century in effect were designed to ensure this principle by setting the spending 
cap to minimise the probable electoral advantage of a rich candidate over opponents. 
Herbert Alexander (1989b: 9), an American expert on political finance, points out that the 
emergence of mass democracy has helped mitigate the “political” effects of disparities in 
“economic” resources by making it possible for the human resources or voting power of one 
group to match the wealth of another with small membership. However, mass democracy
agency, Saatchi & Saatchi. (See also Thatcher 1993: 295, 570, 585). On Thatcher’s legacy in the light of
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has gone hand in hand with the ever growing importance of mass media backed up by the 
revolutionary development of communications technology which has, in turn, encouraged 
the ‘nationalisation’ of electoral campaigns. Such political and social changes have 
increased not only the role of national party organisations in the political process but also 
the importance of political money for the maintenance of these organisations and effective 
but expensive political propaganda and campaigning. Alexander (1989b: 11) points to this 
aspect of mass democracy: “Coincident with the extension of the franchise and the 
democratisation of the institutional framework, the economic element that makes for 
political power - wealth - has been increasingly concentrated”. It is natural that under these 
circumstances, there is a strong need at national level for a similar legal principle to those 
introduced to regulate local campaigns in the nineteenth century.
3.4.2 Behind voluntarism (IV abuses of the voluntary donation system 
In practice, the liberal principle of voluntary contributions has been distorted, firstly, by 
the abusive sale of honours in return for political donations and the acceptance of overseas 
donations, and, secondly, by soliciting significant institutional payments and donations.
(i) The sale of honours
Constitutionally, the power to grant honours is vested in the Crown and is an aspect of 
the royal prerogative. However, this power is executed on the advice of the Prime Minister, 
who is, in turn, advised by three Privy Councillors acting as the Political Honours Scrutiny 
Committee. Geoffrey Marshall (1986: 23) suggests that the existence of such an advisory 
committee implies that the Crown has no legal obligation to automatically accept Prime 
Ministerial advice. However, we may assume from Peter Hennessy's work (1996: 65) and 
even a century-old observation by Bagehot (1993: 233) that, in reality, so far as the general 
power253to award honours is concerned, the Crown is unable to ignore Prime Ministerial 
advice.254
“political marketing”, see Scammell 1995.
253 Further consideration would be necessary in the case of the "catastrophic" creation of peers to control the 
House of Lords. See Bagehot 1993: 233; Marshall 1986: 24-25.
254 This does not mean that there is no room for attempting to persuade the Prime Minister to rethink certain 
recommendations. Interestingly, the purpose of Hennessy (1996: Ch.2) is to suggest that the Queen's power is, 
contrary to common assumption, much more than "a mere gilded sponge".
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Since 1979, the most of the abuse of the honours system stemmed from the Conservative 
Party than its rival parties.255 According to a study of all the honours lists since 1979 
referred to by The Guardian (16.6.93, p.6), industrialists were ten times more likely to be 
awarded peerages or knighthoods if their firms gave money to the Conservative Party. In 
the same article, it was revealed that of the seven major donor companies, only one had not 
benefited from honours list. Another report {The Guardian 14.4.94, p.2) revealed that 
between the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and the 1993 new year Honours, life 
peerages and knighthoods were given to 76 business people whose companies over the 
same period donated £17.4 million to the Conservative Party or to front organisations 
through which donations could go undeclared. Based on this circumstantial evidence, a 
strong suspicion has emerged that honours were given to raise partisan political funding. 
Recent Observer articles (18.8.96, p.2; 28.7.96, p.7; 21.7.96, pp.1,16,27) about exclusive 
Conservative Party fund-raising organisations offering meetings with Ministers in return for 
political donations, such as the Quota Club, the Dragon Club, the Millennium Club, the 
Premier Club, inflamed this speculation once again. According to The Observer (21.7.96, 
pp.1,16,27), apart from a range of benefits to members, including dinners and lunches at 
Westminster, “detailed briefings” on key issues, and a policy information service, ‘founder 
members’ of the Premier Club could attend two dinners a year with the then Prime Minister 
at No 10 Downing Street on payment of £100,000. While disputing the sum, the party did 
not deny the substance. Such private access to the Prime Minister with his considerable 
power of patronage might well be construed by some as tantamount to the buying and 
selling of influence and honours.
In fact, the abuse of the power of the grant of political honours is already regulated by 
The Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925256, which was introduced following the 
notorious abuse of the system by Lloyd George, the Liberal Prime Minister, though he was
255 Hugo Young pointed out, one reason for this accusation was that the party is in power too long. See The 
Guardian 27.10.94, p.24. Young's assumption regarding the plausible link between donation-related honours 
and being the governing party has been reinforced since the formation of the new Labour government in 1997. 
Until then, the Labour has exploited the speculative linkage between honours and donations to the Tory party. 
However, since coming to power, the Labour Party has done little to disguise its gratitude to those who helped 
finance its 1997 election victory by awarding one fourth of new peerages to them. Michael Levy, the organiser 
of Tony Blair's blind trust, was one such beneficiary. (See, The Times, 25.8.97, p.4; The Sunday Times, 
24.8.97, pp. 1-2)
256 The foil title of this act is “An Act for the prevention of abuses in connection with the Grant of Honours”.
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by no means the first to behave in this manner.257 However, any significant “coincidence” 
between political donations and the granting of political honours clearly undermines the 
alleged virtues of voluntarism. Very much more recently, a number of press allegations 
appeared that Asil Nadir, head of (now collapsed) Polly Peck, gave donations to the 
Conservative Party in the hope of securing a knighthood. (The Guardian, 23.6.93, p.2) A 
growing suspicion has emerged that donations are being made via quangos in return for 
lucrative government contracts. In November 1994, The Guardian (29.11.94) also raised 
the issue of the appointment of board members in return for their substantial contributions 
to party funds. It is surely not without significance that all these suspicions come out in the 
wake of the re-emergence of large personal donations which, as we have pointed out, 
subsided after the introduction of the Honours Act 1925 and the beginning of institutional 
funding in 1920s.258
(ii) The sale of political influence
Regarding the issue of money for influence, The Observer (28.7.96, p.27; 21.7.96, p. 16) 
revealed a candid ‘sales pitch’ on the part of the Premier Club’s membership secretary, at 
Conservative Central Office, to a potential donor: “If there are any specific business 
concerns which (the member) has, you know, we will try and assist in getting that 
answered.”
However, no better example of such devious practice is to be found than New Labour's 
Ecclestone scandal. The new Labour government decided to exempt the Formula One 
motor racing enterprises from a tobacco advertising ban. However, shortly after it was 
revealed that just before the 1997 general election the Labour Party had received a £1 
million donation from Bemie Ecclestone, the head of Formula One racing. (The Times, 
12.11.97) Both Labour and Ecclestone denied any malpractice. However, Sir Patrick Neill 
(now Lord Neill of Bladen), the new chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public 
Life, with whom Labour consulted on the matter, advised that the gift should be returned.
257 See Blackburn 1993: 297-298. According to John Walker (1986: 2), the increasing campaign cost resulted 
from the extension of the franchise and the advent of mass democracy led both Liberal and Conservative 
parties to engage in large-scale honours-touting in the thirty years before Lloyd George became Prime 
Minister in 1916.
258 Pinto-Duschinsky (1981) identifies this development as the transition from the plutocratic period to the 
modem era in terms of party finance.
253
Another criticism in this area concerns the so-called "blind trusts" for politicians, 
especially those in government. These secret trusts were regarded as a legitimate way for 
politicians to raise finance, as they cannot be accused of responding to donations if they do 
not know who the donors are.259 Despite its formal legitimacy, this arrangement does not 
avert suspicions. It is possible that managers of secret trusts who, of course, know both 
donors and the politicians concerned can act as middle men either by securing favours or by 
arranging meetings.
There is a strong possibility that these well-published scandals are, as John Walker 
(1986: 207) maintains, merely “the tip of an iceberg”, for, after all, most political donations 
are made in secret and subject to machinations that are almost impossible to detect. 
Therefore, a strong case can be made for “consistent, transparent and better rules” in this 
important area of fundraising, rules which will safeguard political parties from even an 
indirect degradation of politics, {e.g., The Guardian [23.7.96, p.14]; The Times [18.12.97],
p.10)
(iii) Foreign donations
Foreign donations reuse a serious question about the real nature of voluntarism. In a 
Home Affairs Committee, the Labour-sponsored Institute of Public Policy Research 
submitted evidence that around 20 per cent of Conservative Party income comes from 
abroad. (Home Affairs Committee 1994: xxxii) Moreover, it has been clearly demonstrated 
that some of these controversial donations emanated from a number of highly suspect 
individuals, for example, Greek shipping billionaire, John Latsis (£2 million) and Sir Yue- 
King Pao (£1 million), Li Ka-Shing (£900,000) and Ma Ching-Kwan (£ 1 million). There 
are some not implausible allegations that Li Ka-Shing had an interest in the Hongkong & 
Shanghai bid for the Midland Bank, and that some income tax rules in favour of foreign 
businesses were introduced by the Conservative government in the light of substantial 
donations from these businesses concerned. (See Martin Linton in The Guardian 18.6.93, 
p.22) The most notorious allegation of all is that Ma Ching-Kwan, a Hong Kong publishing 
tycoon, whose family wealth originates from the drugs trade proffered a massive donation
259 According to The Sunday Times (9.3.97), eighteen members of Labour’s shadow cabinet benefited from 
these trusts.
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in return for the freedom of his father Ma Sik-Chun, a suspected drugs trafficker and 
fugitive. (See The Time, 21.1.98, p.4; The Sunday Times, 25.1.98, p. 10)
Even if we may set aside these allegations as mere speculation or political rumour, we 
disagree in principle that foreign businesses with interests in Britain should be allowed to 
make contributions to political parties. Considering the importance of political money to the 
domestic political process, Robert Blackburn (1995: 331) is correct in his assertion that any 
policy which opens the door to political influence for foreign companies, bodies, or foreign 
governments , would undermine national self-government. This would be all the more 
so if foreign donations are unequally made to political parties. The Home Affairs Select 
Committee’s extremely moderate proposal for a voluntary code of practice is inadequate 
primarily because that approach has been already tried by Sir Norman Fowler, the former 
chairman of the Conservative Party, in an attempt to excuse the abuses of voluntarism263 
(See Home Affairs Committee 1994: xxxiii) Interestingly, the Conservatives have 
persistently opposed even moderate state aid to political parties on the ground that it would 
weaken the tie between central party office and the grassroots. (Sir Norman Fowler’s 
evidence in the Home Affairs Committee 1994: xxi) However, it would seem that Sir 
Norman’s strictures apply even more strongly to foreign donations. As any financial 
shortfall is a problem, the best solution, bearing in mind the public nature of political
260 According to John Walker (1986: 90ff), in the early 1930s only one person, Maundy Gregory, has been 
charged under the 1925 Honours Act, subsequent imprisonment and exile.
261 The Conservative Party has even been accused of receiving political donations from the Saudi royal family 
just prior to 1992 election. See The Guardian 23.6.93, p.l.
262 The issue of “Globalisation” or anti-protectionist international free market principles touches on this 
argument. All the more so, as inward investment becomes an accepted phenomenon in the global economy, the 
conception of national self-government itself is under challenge. The logic underlying this view is that if 
certain policies have an impact on those corporations with interests in the British market, then there should be 
no fundamental reasons why they should not be allowed to give money to the party that is likely to form a 
government and will decide such policies. (See Magnus Linklater’s column in The Times, 28.5.98) However, 
as long as a national government exists, there has to be more justifications for foreign donations than sheer 
economic interests. For example, as Fisher (1997:244) points out, whilst trade does cross national boundaries, 
such things as the provision of welfare services to citizens do not. Moreover, political lobbying and direct 
donations to political parties (which in one way or another become organs of the state) should be 
differentiated. If a foreign corporation can donate money to political parties, there is no reason why a foreign 
government with certain interests in British foreign and domestic policies should not be likewise. When with 
the electoral reform accelerated, the role of political parties in elections is becoming even more strongly 
embedded in constitutional arrangements, the basic principle of national self-government manifesting itself in 
a citizen-based voting system may justify certain restrictions on controversial foreign donations.
263 However, it is reported in a newspaper that the former director of the Conservatives’ central board of 
finance, Major-General Sir Brian Wyldbore-Smith, admitted that this alleged code of practice has not been 
implemented properly by saying that “I don’t think a cheque has ever been refused.” See Martin Linton in The 
Guardian 18.6.93, p.22.
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parties, is not foreign donations but public funding. From this perspective, it is quite natural 
that in the wake of the 1997 election, the Neill Committee is moving towards a ban of 
foreign political donations and, in fact, the Conservative Party is likely to agree with this 
reform. (See, The Times, 18.12.97, p.10; Conservative Party 1998: 5)
3.4.3 Behind voluntarism (2): Institutional dependence of the two major parties
The next problem of the status quo is the heavy dependence of the two main political 
parties on institutional money. Despite Labour’s recent success in attracting relatively large 
voluntary sums from new donors, its financial dependence on the trade unions still remains 
high, accounting for two fifth of its central income. (See Labour Party 1998b: 6) More 
importantly, since these new donors include a number of sizeable businesses, their 
dependence on institutional money becomes even greater. (See Fisher 1997: 240-241) 
According to Justin Fisher’s survey (1995: 183, table 2),264 corporate donations to the 
Conservative Party, the champion of voluntarism, in 1992/93 financial year made up of
37.3 per cent of its total income (individual donations amounted to just 30.5 per cent) 265 
Such large proportion of institutional donations undermines the whole basis of voluntarism 
and its egalitarian principle.
So far as institutional dependence is concerned, Bogdanor (1982: 373) is quite correct in 
his assertion that institutional interests whose political money provides a considerable part 
of the two main parties’ income has “excessively” shaped the scope of electoral choice. He 
points to the fact that such high dependency on institutional donations is illustrative of a 
particular type of socio-political cleavage, i.e. class cleavage, unionised labour versus 
industrialist capital, which threatens to overwhelm other equally important interests. More 
explicitly, the victims of such bias are those seeking to represent minority interests, or 
mediate different discourse and visions from those of the two major parties but who are not 
backed by large institutional donations. New Labour’s equal distance policy between 
business and trade unions over recent years can be seen as changing the traditional 
paradigm: business finance of the Conservative Party vis-a-vis trade union finance of 
Labour. However, this does not affect the fundamental aspect of the traditional funding of
264 This is based on oral evidence to the Select Committee on Home Affairs 16/6/93.
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political parties. Institutional donations are mostly given to the two dominant political 
parties in British politics, thanks largely to the first-past-the-post electoral system.
(i) Limited regulation of company donations
Two features worsen this heavy dependency on institutional money. The first is an 
anomaly in the legal framework which by and large operates to the advantage of one party, 
i.e. the Conservatives. Keith Ewing (1987: 73) points out,
the law does not operate in an even-handed way with regard to the funding of political parties. Unlike 
many other jurisdictions, including the United States and Canada, where corporations and trade unions are 
governed by identical rules, in Britain company political donations are for all practical purposes 
unregulated by law, while trade union political expenditure is subject to detailed and restrictive 
legislation.266
Thus, one potential reform in this area should be the regulation of company donations. This 
should include requirement of the consent or approval of shareholders, the equivalent to the 
regular ballot of union members on the continuation of their political levy; and a voluntary 
code of practice for company directors wishing to make political donations. (See 
Constitutional Reform Centre 1985. Cf. Conservative Party 1998: 3-4)
(ii) The organisational and financial link between special interests and the Labour Party 
The organisational and financial link between Labour and trade unions draws criticism
that Labour is institutionally beholden to specific interests. John Major asserted, for 
instance, that “it is only in the Labour Party that donations and money buy influence”. 
(Quoted by Jonathan Calvert and David Leigh in The Observer, 21.7.96, p. 16) This 
criticism is no mere empty gibe on the part of the then Prime Minister. A number of factors 
make the Labour Party particularly open to attack in this area. They include: the Labour 
Party receives huge donations from a relatively small number of trade unions; the actual 
contribution of trade unions to Labour is substantially more than the sum suggested in
265 It is important to note that this figure reflected an apparent growth in large individual donations from both 
home and abroad. That is, despite the recent decline in direct donations from companies, a large proportion of 
Conservative income still comes from businesses.
266 The most conspicuous partisan legislation, which is seen to deprive the Labour Party of its main source of 
income is the Trade Union Act 1984, Part III requiring trade unions to hold regular (at the moment, every ten 
years) ballot on the question of their continuance of a levy.
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Labour’s accounts thanks to, for example, union’s donations in kind and their indirect 
campaigning for Labour; and, most importantly, the trade unions wield direct and 
significant power over party policy. (See Home Affairs Committee 1994: xix) As Donald 
Sassoon (1993: 33) states, it cannot in principle be justifiable that political parties, as the 
basic institutions of a democracy, are under the influence of ‘paymasters’ with vested 
interests.
(iii) Some objections to the regulation of the trade unions' Labour funding
Ewing (1987: 176) warns that any attempt to control institutional dependence on the part 
of political parties may undermine freedom of association which has long allowed an 
interest group to seek to realise its goals through representation in Parliament. The 
democratic and open character of trade unions, in his view, justifies reasonable institutional 
dependence and is not in conflict with a pluralist democracy in which a diversity of 
sectional interests is recognised. Indeed, the pursuit of such interests through the political 
process is rather encouraged. For him, what is material is the question of open, institutional 
accountability thanks to an extension of the duty of disclosure.
One primary reason for this rather cautious approach is that such proposals for regulating 
institutional donations may encounter considerable ‘practical’ obstacles to their 
implementation. Firstly, a total prohibition of institutional donations would be tantamount 
to throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The dissenting discussion of the Houghton 
Committee (1976: 79, [iv]) suggested that prohibition of institutional money need not alter 
a party’s general policies. (See also Ewing 1987: 177) The underlying assumption here is 
that party policy is not directly and comprehensively subject to those providing financial 
support and of even greater significance is those continuing values and beliefs which 
underlie and inform a party. Such ideological underpinnings would remain even if 
institutional donations were to be made illegal. Thus, the best way to deal with the dangers 
of institutional donations is the introduction of quite specific measures which is designed to 
curb any potential abuse. For example, political donations by government contractors267
267 This issue was highlighted by the opposition parties after a newspaper revealed that one businessman short­
listed in a consortium bid to buy Ministry of Defence homes being put up for sale by Michael Portillo, the then 
Defence Secretary, attended a private dinner party with the Prime Minister in return for donations of up to 
£100,000 each to the Conservative Party. See The Guardian 22.7.96, p.4.
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might well be prohibited. In short, there would seem to be no cogent reason for introducing 
a crude blanket ban on institutional donations.
Secondly, as to limiting the size of individual donations, Ewing (1987: 178) argues that it 
would simply serve to the advantage of one party over another. Traditionally, Labour’s 
funding has come from not more than 100 affiliated trade unions while there are around one 
million registered companies which are potential donors to the Conservatives. Obviously, 
what he has in mind is that a limitation on donations would tell most severely against the 
Labour Party in view of its dependence on union donations. We disagree with this particular 
view and discuss in the following section.
(iv) The rebuttal to the case for a special treatment of trade union donations
In reforming party finance, it is difficult to agree with the proposal that money from the 
unions should be treated as a special case. The autonomy of an interest group seeking to 
realise its goals through political representation has to be respected. But this autonomy must 
not be allowed to encroach on that of other less wealthy interests including political parties 
which cannot rely on institutional money. Clearly, such imbalance of freedom is a very real 
danger. Thus, institutional money should not be altogether removed, but rather, political 
money from corporate sources should be regulated to ensure that it cannot be used to 
procure special favours.
If one acknowledged that some limited regulation of institutional donations is called for, 
then Ewing’s argument against introducing a ceiling on individual donations becomes that 
much less convincing. In fact, the traditional formula for political funding has recently 
become much more fluid, given new labour’s repeated initiatives to establish new, more 
even-handed relationships with special interest groups, coupled with the Tory’s new "open 
door" policy which seeks to forge closer links with unions. (See, e.g., The Times, 30.11.97 
[by M. Prescott]; 14.12.97 [by Grice & Higgins])
More importantly, reform of financial donations to political parties should not be seen 
from a partisan perspective focusing on whether, in the short term, a financial advantage or 
disadvantage may be given to one political party over another. A comprehensive 
perspective is called for. As political parties become increasingly govemmentalised and, as 
the basic “institutions of a democracy”, perform various public roles in the interests of the
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general public, they should come to depend much less on “private” interests. Regulation of 
political influence of institutional vested interests should not be partisan, rather, should seek 
to further the cause of a new pluralist democracy which guarantees equality in the political 
arena.
Therefore, if there is any reform of party finance, it should include a gradual reduction of 
party dependency on institutional money, combined with some kind of state aid for political 
parties. The concomitant argument for state funding needs to be critically dealt with in more 
detail and in a broader context where the feasibility of state intervention in party politics 
can be questioned. This will in fact be the task of Section 4 of this chapter.
3.5 Problem III - Secretive political fundraising
The third problem is concerned with the secretive practices of party fundraising. The 
secrecy of party funding can be attributed to the private nature of political parties and their 
concomitant voluntarism. There are no legal arrangements for party accounting or the 
public disclosure of sources of party funding. As a result, the current accounting practices 
of the three major political parties differ widely. Therefore, given the public function of 
political parties in the political process, a case can be made for statutory accounting in order 
to increase public understanding of party finances. However, the most essential component 
in any reform of party finance is a legal requirement for disclosure of the sources of party 
funding.
3.5.1 The case for the public disclosure of donations
Reasons for public disclosure can be advanced from both normative and practical 
perspectives. Normative concerns are twofold. First, secrecy in political finance can breed 
political corruption. Despite Britain’s relatively good fortune in respect of the corruption 
scandals, there is growing concern over propriety in public life, which has led to the 
establishment of an independent Committee on Standards in Public Life. After the 
embarrassing Ecclestone affair, Prime Minister Tony Blair, on 12 November 1997, asked 
this committee to examine party finance and to make any necessary recommendations. 
These recommendations are most likely to include the identification of large donors which 
would enhance public confidence in the democratic political process.
260
The second constitutional reason supporting the identification of donors concerns the 
principle of open government. As Fisher (1997: 242) suggests, since parties are competing 
for public office, the public simply has a legitimate right to know how they are financed. 
Therefore, disclosure is not merely a means of preventing political corruption but an 
essential constitutional device to ensure informed choice at elections.
On a practical level, the requirement of disclosure is not new even in Britain. In practice, 
MPs are required by standing orders of the House of Commons to declare their financial 
interests on a Register of Members’ Interests. Schedule 7 of the Companies Act 1985 
requires all companies to declare direct and indirect political donations over £200. What 
these requirements have in common is that in looking at political donations, they ignore the 
fact that political parties are political actors. However, in terms of size and political 
influence, MP’s personal financial interests cannot begin to compare with those of political 
parties. So far as the regulation in the Companies Act 1985 is concerned, it only focuses on 
a company’s internal relationship with its shareholders but does not impose any 
obligation of disclosure on political parties as its beneficiaries. Clearly, such a regulation 
does little to enhance public understanding of party finance.
Furthermore, the system can lead to evasion and cannot ensure the transparency of 
political money. In the Asil Nadir scandal, a declaration under the Companies Act 1985 had 
not been complied with and, instead, overseas firms with no declaration obligation were 
used. Indeed, The Observer inquiries (28.7.96, p.7) actually revealed some crucial methods 
of evading this declaration requirement. The membership secretary of the Premier Club, 
which, as we have already noted, is a secret fund-raising organisation for the Conservative 
Party, advised potential donors to list their donations as a club membership subscriptions 
which could be subsequently put down as ‘entertainment’ in their company accounts. The 
fact that there are other methods of attracting funds without donors having to disclose them 
as political donations reinforces the need for more transparent accounting of party finance. 
For example, the same Observer inquiries also revealed that ‘parliamentary briefs’, which 
are supplied to MPs, were abused by the Conservative fund-raising team. These papers 
were offered to Conservative supporters for annual sum of £1,280 per year on the pretext 
that they were research materials. Bearing in mind that virtually no extra costs were
268 Disclosure of political gifts is required to be shown in the directors’ annual report to shareholders.
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incurred in producing these papers, these listed subscriptions were in effect donations to the 
Conservative Party. The Observer points out that they formed a considerable part of the 
more than £4 million income received by the Conservative Party under the heading of sales 
of publications and conferences.
3.5.2 Objections to disclosure
There are a number of counter-arguments, both normative and practical. The strongest 
normative objection to disclosure can be found in the Home Affairs Select Committee 
Report of 1994, Funding o f Political Parties. The Committee express the view that 
disclosure would breach the principle of the secret ballot and the right to privacy, and that a 
unacceptably heavy cost would be incurred in ‘regulating most ordinary forms of free 
speech and of legitimate political activities’. (1994: xxx) The report concluded that where 
donations are made from legitimate and identifiable sources, i.e. known to the party, they 
should be allowed to remain private. (1994: xxx)
The Committee also pointed to a number of practical problems. In its view, there are 
particular and substantial difficulties about laying down disclosure rules which are not 
easily enforceable. (1994: xxix) Another practical problem is that a threshold beyond which 
donations should be declared will have a varying impact depending upon the size of the 
party concerned. A lower threshold, for example £1000, would be critical to a small party 
but not to a larger one. Given this point of view, the privacy of the small donor to a large 
party would be contravened.
3.5.3 The need for financial transparency vis-a-vis the public nature of political parties
Underlying all this essentially laissez-fair attitude to reform is a confused view about the
nature of political parties and even the political system itself. The problem, as Justin Fisher 
(1994: 68-69) says, is that growing public suspicion, whether well or ill founded, may 
undermine the party legitimacy and even the political system itself. Objections to disclosure 
also ignore the difference between political parties and other voluntary organisations. 
Anonymous donations to charity are very different from those to political parties given that 
charities, unlike political parties, have no direct political power. The public has a right to 
know who have privileged access to ministers on the basis of their exceptional wealth,
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while the same principle does not apply to charitable associations. As Robin Cook MP, the 
then shadow Industry Secretary, succinctly put it, “the danger to democracy of secret 
donations is that they put public government under private obligations”. (See Patrick 
Wintour’s article in The Guardian 17.6.93)
4 The rationale for state aid to political parties: the effective performance of party 
democracy
Reform of the rules governing donations to political parties is closely related to the issue 
of state aid to political parties. Together with the problem of the imbalance of inter-party 
funding, the inadequacy of party funding is further reason for reform. Indeed, since the 
Houghton Committee put forward its proposals for the state funding of political parties, 
debate has centred most fiercely on the question of the growing inadequacy of their 
resources. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (1981: 286), on the other hand, doubts that such 
additional funding would in any way enhance party performance. Whether or not he is right 
depends, I would suggest, in part on one’s view of the role of parties and of the democratic 
system itself.
4.1 A project o f constitutionalised democratic autonomy and state regulation o f party 
finance
As we sought to demonstrate in Chapter 3, our own project of constitutionalised 
democratic autonomy envisages a pluralist democracy in which all political and social 
spheres enjoy autonomy within constitutional boundaries. Political parties form a distinct 
sphere in which the social and the political are uniquely blended. This unique quality 
demands a careful and complex analysis of their role and status. (See Chapter 4) In this 
analysis, a realistic balance between the political and the social has to be struck. The 
subordination of the state to society or vice versa is undesirable. The govemmentalisation 
of political parties means that they have to be looked at differently from other social 
organisations. This unique status of parties creates the fundamental rationale for their being 
given extensive state aid. In other words, state aid is intended to enhance their steady public
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performance. In 1974, Richard Rose (1974: 278) argued that “the case for public finance for 
party politics is simple enough: parties are an integral part of the British constitution”. In 
1976, the Houghton Committee confirmed Rose’s view by emphasising that the expansion 
of the scope of governmental service in the welfare state requires not only the “finest 
industrial, business and commercial skills, but also the highest standard of political 
discussion and decision” in which the parties have a crucial role to play, (at 53) In this 
view, state aid is a desirable, and possibly the only, way of supporting “the minimum 
standards of political activity and efficiency required to maintain the vitality of our system 
of representative government.” (at xii)
4.2 The opposition to State funding
From this basic perspective, we now turn to some arguments against state aid to political 
parties.
4.2.1 Does state aid for political parties necessarily encroach on their autonomy?
(i) The liberal fear of the colonisation of political parties by the state 
Arguments against public financing of political parties stem from a specific political 
value and conception of democracy, coupled with no less particular conception of the nature 
of political parties. According to Arthur Lipow (1996: 50), state funding is “the breaching 
of the barrier between political parties and the state” and a step toward an “illiberal and 
undemocratic political order in which society - or civil society - is permeated by the state, 
and the state becomes the master and not the servant of society”. The minority opinion of 
the Houghton Committee (1976: 49) orchestrated a similar view that state aid is “only a 
short step from the injection of state funds to direct demands on the party organisations for 
a quid pro quo in the form of radical changes in their rules and practices.” Obviously, 
underlying such arguments are liberalism, as a political value, and the classical conception 
of a unitary parliamentary democracy and a view of political parties as private, voluntary 
associations independent of the state. (See Seyd 1998:202-204)
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(ii) The realistic view of the relationship between the state and political parties and the need 
for state aid
This liberal characterisation of British Parliamentary democracy is obsolete and thus 
inappropriate for a highly pluralised society. (See Chapters 2,3) Despite the absence of any 
legal recognition of political parties, their existence as centres of political power is essential 
to the political process. As Blackburn (1995: 344-355) argues, a “backward-looking 
institutional inertia” which is manifest by a lack of legal recognition of political parties 
cannot obliterate the importance of these institutions to the “operation” of the British 
constitution. Nor does such inertia signify that they should be “immune” from “public 
regulation and support” when circumstances demand it. A new legal framework should not 
be confined to outlining the minimum legal requirements of party finance such as disclosure 
of party accounts. Rather, it should include measures to ensure the democratic operation of 
political parties corresponding to their public nature in the constitutional order, for 
example, the democratic election of party leaders and democratic selection of candidates for 
election.
The claims of the opponents of state funding tend to overlook or consciously ignore 
the nature of the contemporary state while exaggerating the supposed danger of it 
colonising political parties. These opponents overlook that in the modem political world, 
the fate of political parties is inextricably linked to the power of the state. The state both 
sets and executes the rules by which the political process operates. Few can seriously deny 
that there is no democracy without election laws to ensure fair rivalry. It follows, therefore, 
that whether those laws adopt “laissez-fairism” or comprehensive controls on party finance 
plays an important role in determining the parameters of political power and the destiny of 
political parties. As Alexander (1989b: 12) puts it, “government is not necessarily a neutral 
factor but becomes a player that might help or hurt certain other players”.
More specifically, we disagree with Lipow’s (1996: 51) claim that state financing is a 
prelude to the dedifferentiation of the state and society or the subordination of society to the 
state. Some opponents primarily fear what Pinto-Duschinsky (1981: 300ff) called “a danger 
of legal gerrymandering”. The essence of this fear is this: In circumstances in which there is
269 E.g., Seyd (1998) who opposes state funding and regulation of party finances while stressing the 
importance of political parties as intermediaries between the electorate and government in the contemporary 
atomised society.
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a strong possibility of partisan ‘electoral dictatorship’, coupled with a lack of legal 
recognition or any constitutional protection for political parties, the introduction of state aid 
and the regulation of expenditure would serve to increase a danger of authoritarian and anti­
democratic proclivities within the political system. This is because such move could open 
the way for the governing party to abuse its power by seeking to control the life of the rival 
opposition parties. In 1993, the Conservative Party submitted such an argument to a Home 
Affairs Committee on the funding of political parties. They argued that state funding 
“would give a party with a parliamentary majority control of the funding of political parties, 
bringing the danger of self-serving legislation”. (Home Affairs Committee 1994: xxi) It is 
interesting to note that the Conservative government under Mrs Thatcher did not hesitate to 
regulate the internal affairs of trade unions on the ground that there is a public interest 
element in trade union funding. (See Grant 1987; Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3. [ii]) In the same 
committee, Plaid Cymru warned that with state aid, parties would become “clients of the 
state” and their “independence” severely diminished. (Home Affairs Committee 1994: xxi)
However, we cannot agree with these claims. In the first place, the fear of ‘elective 
dictatorship’ or ‘legal gerrymandering’ is less convincing since all constitutional reforms 
are closely related to one another so that reform of party finance needs to be seen in 
conjunction with electoral reform designed to diminish the possibility of elective 
dictatorship.
Secondly, more importantly, the threat to parties’ independence is exaggerated and is 
based on an unjustifiable zero-sum conception of the relationship between the state and 
civil society. The relationship between the state and society cannot be a unilateral one that 
can be analysed within some Schmittian ‘foe-friend’ framework creating a zero-sum game. 
(See Chapter3) The state and civil society are interdependent so that boundary of each is the 
necessary and sufficient condition of the other. The outcome of this is more than likely a 
positive-sum. This argument is reinforced if we recall that the thrust of the reform of party 
finance we have in mind does not lie in a total replacement or abolition of voluntary finance 
but in a modest, secondary supplement to party finance mainly as a replacement for 
institutional money. All the features of modem politics270 (including the dual nature of 
political parties, their cartelisation and a new division of labour between political parties
270 For this, see Chapters 3 and 4.
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and interest groups) cannot necessarily be traded off with the conventional voluntarism of 
political parties and the rights to participate financially, which are guaranteed not only to 
their members but also to the citizenry at large. Indeed, as Ewing (1987:136) points out, the 
opponents of state funding seem to ignore or take for granted that there are a number of 
voluntary organisations, which accept public funds but retain their independence. It should, 
too, be borne in mind that as stated in Section 2 above,271 already certain level of state 
interference exists thanks to several state aid-in-kind which have been set up for the benefit 
of political parties.
4.2.2 Does state aid necessarily undermine the traditional base of political parties?
(i) Fear of the centralisation and bureaucratisation of political parties 
The second argument against state funding is that state aid would tend to undermine the 
nature of political parties as a social sphere by weakening the essential relationship between 
them and their “traditional” sources of support. (Minority opinion of the Houghton 
Committee 1976, at 78; Syed 1998: 204) Arthur Lipow (1996: 58) warns that the 
modernisation of the Labour Party, a vital agendum of which, in association with state 
funding, is the tempering of union influence within its internal party structure, may lead to 
its becoming an “undemocratic” American-style party. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky (1981: 
292) expresses similar concerns claiming that state funding would reinforce the iron law of 
party centralisation to such an extent that the central party would become less dependent 
upon grass-roots’ organisational and financial support. He goes on to argue that “it would 
be greatly against the interests of democratic government if financial aid from public funds 
enabled party machines to dispense with the services of ordinary party members”. (1981: 
296) Another fear expressed by Pinto-Duschinsky is the potential bureaucratisation of party 
organisations. He warns that with state funding, party officials would seek to gain the kind 
of advantages enjoyed by civil servants such as security of tenure, inflation-proof pension 
rights. In his view, such advantages would isolate party machines from ordinary members 
and thus weaken their ability to fulfil their democratic functions. (1981: 296)
271 It is a general view that these subsidies are designed to offset the advantages enjoyed by the party in power. 
(European Parliament 1991: 35) De facto free broadcasting for the political parties is also an important 
benefit, which does not cost the taxpayer anything.
267
(ii) A new paradigm of participation and state aid
Do such plausible fears amount to decisive arguments against state subsidies? Our 
answer is in the negative. In the modem political world, the govemmentalisation and 
cartelisation of certain elements of political parties are inevitable. (See Chapter 4) What we 
need to focus on is how to minimise the side effects of this trend and how effectively to 
cope with a rapidly changing political situation. Furthermore, as Justin Fisher (1995: 191) 
points out, even under the present system, the central collection of funds, whether personal 
or institutional, is the norm than the exception. Critics who warn of the effect of 
centralisation presuppose, and idealise, active mass parties at the constituency level. But the 
plausibility of this presupposition is questionable and the reinvigoration of local politics 
needs to look for a new style of participation different from conventional territorial 
representation. (See Chapter 6, Section 4.5.1) This is not to suggest the abandonment of 
local organisations. At least for the purpose of winning elections, the importance of local 
organisations cannot be underestimated. That is why there is a need for the empowerment 
of the local membership in the policy-making process and the election of party leaders in so 
far as it does not encroach on system stability and efficiency. It would be correct to say, as 
even some reformists like Alan Ware (1987: 231) do, that when state funding is not linked 
to membership or membership activity, then it “certainly” can weaken the parties 
“internally”. Still, the degree of weakening would not be severe enough to justify discarding 
a system of state funding per se. Irrespective of whether there is link between state subsidy 
and membership, as far as political parties wish to win elections, there remains a need for 
local organisation. If this need is combined with the democratisation of power structures 
which is yet another condition for the constitutionalisation of political parties, any 
arguments that state funding would weaken democracy are less convincing. On the contrary, 
public funds to political parties are essential to the democratisation of their power structures 
on which the success of the democratisation of the whole society, in turn, depends.
Try as we might to see political parties as nothing more than a social sphere, the trend 
remains for their gravitational points to shift more and more away from civil society 
towards the core complex of the political system. What, from a democratic standpoint, is 
most material, is how to control any potential abuse of power by political parties and how to 
provide an appropriate framework and resources to help them improve their performance.
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State aid is given in the expectation that public funds can help political parties to improve 
the quality of public life. In a pluralist society, this expectation can best be achieved if 
parties are encouraged to invest more money in research and policy development with a 
view to enhance public access to information and debate. Only then, will political parties 
operate in the interests of the proper functioning of democracy itself.272 (See Home Affairs 
Committee 1994, p.xxii; Houghton Committee 1976: 53-55)
(iii) State aid and extremist political parties
Not surprisingly, underlying this liberal fear of reform is a strong preoccupation with the 
legacy of the British two-party system. The minority opinion in the Houghton Committee 
made it clear that traditional party alignments reflect a “degree of actual conflict in society”, 
given that their alignments are by and large determined by class. To this extent, they 
presumed, any attempt to change the present system would result in instability by allowing 
the emergence of extremist political parties. (See p.79) However, the essential problem with 
the existing political system is that it fails to encompass the ever-growing plurality of 
society. Indeed, this failure would, contrary to the traditionalists’ hopes, tend to weaken the 
foundations of the political system by encouraging a general loss of confidence in it. 
Moreover, as a Hansard Commission of 1981 on the financing of political parties (at 45, 
para. 7.6) points out, the present system, based on one particular form of political cleavage - 
class division -, has a number of further deficiencies. It tends to strengthen not only the 
permanent victimisation of the smaller parties that seek to mediate other interests and social 
discourse but also polarisation between the two main political parties. Although state 
funding alone can never be a panacea that will eliminate all these negative effects, it offers 
at least one practical and reasonable option to bolster the foundations of a pluralist 
democracy.
4.2.3 State aid and the theory of party decline and anti-partv sentiments
(i) The theory of party decline and state aid
The final argument against state aid is that the claims of the advocates of state aid and 
legal controls on party finance are based on a “fundamental misunderstanding of the
272 Labour's recent move to restrict the union's finance for policy and research work can be seen appropriate
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reasons for their decline over recent decades”. (Pinto-Duschinsky 1981: 287. My emphasis) 
According to this view, the real reason for party decline cannot be found in a shortage of 
funds or financial inequality but in a political phenomenon that manifests itself in so-called 
‘anti-partyism’273. Pinto-Duschinsky (1981: 287) goes on to argue that “reforms that ignore 
the essence of the problem and deal only with its institutional manifestations will not 
provide a solution”. For him, the injection of financial help to political parties is like a drug 
that deals temporarily with the symptoms but fails to deal with the disease itself. (Ibid.)
(ii) The real implication of the challenge to party politics and state aid
Pinto-Duschinsky’s argument misreads the real cause and effect of anti-partyism. For us, 
the trend towards mass disillusionment with political parties would justify giving state aid 
to political parties, and all the more so if we recall the ambiguous or dual nature of the 
phenomenon. Pinto-Duschinsky may be correct in asserting that public funding would not 
reverse the decline of public confidence in party politics. However, as some academics 
point out, it is equally true that the absence of state aid will not arrest the trend either. (See 
Ewing 1987: 138; Fisher 1996: 201; Hofnung 1996) The questions that should be really 
asked are as follows: What is it that gives rise to such anti-party sentiment?; What impact 
will this trend have on political parties themselves?; How can the British constitution cope 
with this trend?
As we have seen in Chapter 6 (Section 4.5.2), anti-party sentiment is one aspect of the 
pluralisation of modem society. The erosion of old ideological and sociological conflicts274 
has led to the conspicuous collapse of the conventional division of labour within the 
political system. This in turn implies not only the collapse of the monopoly of political 
representation by political parties but also a loss of confidence in them on the part of 
general public. As a result, other political actors and institutions have taken over some of
from this perspective. (See The Time, 14.12.97 [by Grice & Higgins])
273 This generally centres on popular disillusionment with party government and parties themselves, or more 
restrictedly refers to an academic school stressing this trend and suggesting a new model of democracy. 
According to some, anti-party sentiment is presented in several behavioural indicators such as declining 
electoral turnout, a growth of hesitancy in the electorate, declining party membership, and the growth o f ‘anti­
party parties’. (See Webb 1996: 367, referring to Thomas Poguntke’s research) Paul Webb’s (1996: 374ff; 
1995b) research addresses that a prima facie, though relatively ambiguous, case for anti-party sentiment in the 
UK can be identified and ascribed to a number of factors, including poor national economic performance, the 
erosion of the class cleavage, political convergence of major parties with diverse social background.
274 In Britain, these old conflicts gave rise to a bipartisan representative democracy.
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the functions which parties once monopolised. All of these factors, not least that of a 
decline in party membership , are clearly visible on the British political scene. (See Webb 
1995b: 304-306) For some, this trend is seen as the harbinger of new styles of political 
participation, in particular what Mulgan and his colleagues term ‘lean democracy’ which is 
able to replace parliamentary democracy or party government. (See the cover story of 
Demos 94/3:1; Mulgan 1994a, 1994b)
However, such new trends cannot be seen simply as a result of party dissatisfaction. 
Rather, they should be interpreted as another functional differentiation of the political 
system in general and party organisations in particular. While the former means a new 
division of labour among the various actors in the political system, the latter means a 
transformation of party organisations from unitary actors (historically and normatively 
conceived as merely a part of civil society) to complex actors with a dual, socio-political, 
identity. This gives rise to a new type of party organisation, one referred to by Katz and 
Mair (1995) as the ‘cartel’ party. This new party model is different from the old mass- 
membership party on which the theory of party decline is based. What Pinto-Duschinsky 
sees as a disenchantment with political parties is in reality no more than a transformation of 
party organisations adjusting to a changing political world.276
As far as the British party system is concerned, Paul Webb (1995b: 317) is able to draw 
particular attention to the possibility of adaptation of British political parties to this new 
trend. In the light of the increased importance of pressure groups as an alternative vehicle 
for the aggregation of political demands, Webb is able to point to a number of possibilities 
which offer parties new opportunities for political mobilisation. For instance, pressure 
groups and single issue groups help parties forge links with wider spectrum of social 
discourse. They include issues relating to the environment, women’s rights and ethnic
275 Conservatives from 2.8 million in 1953 to “as few as a quarter of a million members” in 1994 (Butler & 
Butler 1994:132); Labour from a total of over 6 million to under 5 million in 1992, of whom just over 300,000 
at the end of 1994 were individual members (Butler & Butler 1994:. 132; Webb 1994:113) As the erosion and 
increasing age of membership is most marked in the Conservative Party, it is natural that rebuilding the 
membership has become one central aim of Conservative reform especially since the humiliating defeat of the 
1997 general election. See the Party's consultation paper on reform, e.g. Our Party: Blueprint for Change 
(1997: 23-26).
276 Yet as Piero Ignazi (1996) points out, this transformation has taken an “unforeseen” direction; a complex 
cohabitation of an updated version of the “cadre” party and “anti-party”, “anti-establishment”, “protest” or 
“New Politics” parties. This is complex in the sense that depending on historical and cultural mood, the protest 
party cannot obtain a conspicuous place in the political system, and even if it otherwise can, it could produce 
both left-libertarian parties and extreme right parties.
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problems. Nevertheless, political parties continue to dominate the processes of recruitment 
of political elites. Webb’s argument is reinforced by the “surprisingly low” level of anti­
party sentiment in Britain, compared with other western democracies, (see Poguntke & 
Scarrow 1996: 261) As Webb (1996: 379) indicates in his survey on empirical partisan 
identification, loyalty and membership (or voluntary financial support), party penetration of 
society in Britain has become shallower since 1960. Party penetration of the state, on the 
other hand, remains high. This can be ascribed to the fact that the British version of party 
government remains, coupled with a continuing centralisation of party organisation.277 This 
dominance of the British politics by parties is revealed by the relatively low level of other 
anti-party manifestations, thus there is still stable electoral turnout278 and a general lack of 
interest in the so-called anti-party parties279.
All in all, it may be that a pluralist reality, which has so far hidden behind a sovereign 
Parliament, is beginning to move in the direction of greater complexity. But this does not 
mean that such a new paradigm will be able to dispense with the functionality of political 
parties. Despite some changes of political participation in the direction of what Justin 
Fisher (1996: 32) called a “healthy pluralist society” - such as the rise of single issue groups 
and increasing demands for broader decentralisation, only political parties can legitimately 
mediate social discourses into coherent governmental programme. To this extent, in 
examining the need for state funding to political parties, it is immaterial whether or not they 
are able to attract a following in terms of private financial support or membership. (Cf. 
Pinto-Duschinsky 1981: 292; Hansard Society 1981 [Paying for Politics]: 35) What is 
germane is whether they obtain a sufficient level of electoral support to justify their quasi- 
govemmental status. From this perspective, the Houghton majority (1976: xii) was correct 
in its assertion that public funding is a “desirable, and possibly only way of supporting the 
minimum standards of political activity and efficiency required to maintain the vitality of 
[British] representative government”.
277 The most conspicuous evidence of centralisation is the recent reform of the Conservative Party. See 
Conservative Party (1998a; 1997).
278 See Fisher 1996: 29-31. Even the turnout in the 1997 election, which is the lowest since 1950, is still over 
70 percent (71.6%). (See Denver & Hands 1997: 721, table 1) For a different interpretation, see Denver 1994: 
137-144.
279 The fact that in casting their votes, voters clearly pay more attention to party considerations than to appeal 
of individual candidates can explain something here. (See Chapter5, Section 6.3) In addition, it cannot be
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5 Conclusion: the need for the juridification of the funding of political parties in a 
pluralist democracy
The conclusion of this chapter has to be that the problem in political finance in Britain 
can be attributed to the obsolete legal framework. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, 
the present system forces parties to operate under nineteenth century regulations that pay 
little attention to the implications of party organisations or electoral campaigns, especially 
at national level. Consequently, there is an urgent need for party funding to be modernised. 
Only this would bring the system of party finance into line with our new paradigm of a 
pluralist democracy and the changed role of political parties to which it gives rise. Thus, the 
traditional liberal approach of minimal regulation has to give way to a new regime of legal 
regulation. This new regulatory arrangement for party finance should give priority to 
ensuring an equality of political participation and fair elections, essential to all rational 
democratic governance. This new framework should also include measures guaranteeing 
greater transparency of party finance and state aid.
denied that the first-past-the-post system is a very real restraint that does much to account for this. See Webb 
1996: 378-380.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
1 Democracy and constitutional reform in Britain
1.1 Rousseau’s gibe at British democracy
The current constitutional debate about how to refashion the new relationship between 
government and governed recalls Rousseau’s gibe at British democracy of some two hundred 
years ago: “The people of England regards itself as free but it is grossly mistaken; it is free 
only during the election of members of Parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery 
overtakes it, and it is nothing. The use it makes of the short moments of liberty it enjoys shows 
indeed that it deserves to lose them.” (Rousseau 1913: 83)
1.2 Three stances concerning constitutional reform
At one end of the spectrum, one finds people denouncing British democracy in terms 
similar to Rousseau’s, and recommending fundamental reforms designed to enhance civic 
participation and at the same time strengthen the accountability of government. (See, e.g. 
Liberal Democrats 1990; Idem 1993; Idem 1997) Their stance aims at making the British 
people the de jure, not to mention the de facto, masters of the country, especially by 
supporting moves towards a written constitution. (See, e.g. IPPR 1993) At the other end of the 
spectrum, people argue that there is no need for constitutional reform since the British problem 
highlighted by Rousseau is not a result of the existing constitution as such, but is related to 
public concern with the nature of government, specifically, the “rolling back of the state”. (See 
Gamble 1994; 236-237) They claim that the problem can be resolved by diminishing the role 
of the state and accelerating the privatisation of the public sector. (See King 1987: Ch.7) Then, 
there are those who, occupying the middle ground, argue that a number of limited reforms 
designed at restoring the checks and balances of the constitution, especially vis-a-vis the 
balance of power between the government and Parliament, would be enough. (See Ganz 1994: 
137) The third position tends to focus more on politico-cultural than legal solutions, for
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example, the revitalisation of MPs’ independence, greater commitment to open government 
together with a more self-restrained approach on the part of government to controversial issues 
which can in practice all too easily become politicised.
1.3 Problems with the above three views
In this dissertation, I have sought to position myself somewhere between the first and third 
above views, while being mostly critical of the second approach. Let us begin with seeing 
what in our view is wrong with these views.
1.3.1 Problems with the “radical conservative” view
Firstly, we disagreed with the second, what we may call “radical conservative”, view, which 
looks for inspiration to political thinking of the New Right. On the one hand, this view is 
“radical” in the sense that it seeks to change the fundamental relationship between government 
and governed, focusing on what it sees as an “overload” of the state and the ungovernability of 
civil society, and thereby arguing for a transfer of power from the public to the private sector. 
On the other hand, this view is “conservative” in the sense that it intends to achieve this radical 
change without any fundamental constitutional reform. It defends the present unitary system 
of government, and opposes to devolution, a written constitution, a Bill of Rights, and 
electoral reform. (See Gamble 1994: 236-237)280 However, both radical and conservative 
aspects of this position point in the wrong direction. Its radical pole runs the risk of limiting 
the power of the state to bring about social equality while ignoring those problems potentially 
associated with unfettered social power, which the market system is unable to effectively 
control. More importantly, its conservative pole has already proved to have a serious danger of 
producing much more centralised, authoritarian rule by sabotaging those controls which the 
traditional system has normally provided. (See, e.g. Loughlin 1989)
1.3.2 Problems with the “moderate” view
Secondly, we cannot totally agree with the third, what we may call “moderate”, view, 
which relies heavily on genteel statesmanship, i.e. self-restraint on the part of government and 
respect for the independence of individual MPs. Such a political ethos is, of course, important 
for reshaping the relationship between government and governed, but is merely one of a
280 On some dilemmas for British conservatism concerning constitutional reform, see Johnson 1980.
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number of equally important conditions. Indeed, it is naive to assume that a restoration of 
politicians’ independence would be enough to redress the damage inflicted by the party 
machine on the balance between government and Parliament. For one thing, this assumption 
ignores actual historical developments, namely, the fact that the Burkian representative 
democracy, which depends upon such liberal ideas, has in practice resulted in the present 
system of party government. It is also both opportunistic and unduly optimistic to imagine that 
the politicisation of the supposedly neutral British constitution will be suddenly arrested 
without any fundamental institutional changes.
Therefore, it is more realistic to believe that constitutional checks and balances could best 
be restored by a rationalisation of British politics grounded in certain fundamental reforms. At 
the heart of this movement towards rationalisation is the need for both legal recognition and 
regulation of political parties, given that the current rigidity of the party system is believed to 
be root cause of the present democratic malaise. Without this rationalisation of political 
parties, coupled with a reform of electoral system, any minor procedural changes in the House 
of Commons281 would not be enough to guarantee Parliament the necessary power to 
counteract that of the government.
Furthermore, it is vital to see that the restoration of govemment/Parliament checks and 
balances constitutes merely one pillar of the modernisation of the British constitution. The 
reformulation of the overall relationship between government and governed requires for its 
success another pillar, i.e. a revitalisation of the role of the people in the political process. This 
enhanced political participation on the part of the people at various levels of the political 
process, other than that of a general election, is essential to the overcoming of ‘elective 
dictatorship’. In short, the rationalisation of British politics should be concerned not only with 
formal procedures of institutionalised opinion- and will- formation but equally with the 
informal networks of the public sphere.
1.3.3 Problems with the first, “radical progressive”, view
Finally, although we are more sympathetic to the first, “radical progressive”, view, in so far 
as it assumes a purely Rousseauian view of the sovereignty of the people, we cannot 
wholeheartedly go along with it. Does democracy mean that all government policy has to be 
decided by the people? Although any quest for democracy should be based on faith in the
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people, trust between government and governed does not necessarily justify only one way of 
achieving this goal, i.e. direct democracy. Despite the partial validity of various forms of direct 
democracy - referendum, recall, or cyber-democracy -, none of them should be regarded as a 
substitute for Parliament or its backbone, political parties. They cannot offer a panacea for the 
problem of the British constitution, noted by Rousseau. Indeed, this so called British problem, 
bearing on the relationship between representation and government, is in effect endemic to all 
modem societies. In such highly pluralised, complex societies, any Rousseauian attempt to fill 
the gap, without any intermediary, between government and governed is doomed to failure. In 
particular, various forms of direct democracy lack a collective structure in which people and 
ideas interact while novel forms of participation -  e.g. new social movements - fail to provide 
a necessary power structure in which the professional politicians are made to account for their 
actions.
2 Constitutionalised democratic autonomy
Having critically examined and found wanting the above three approaches to constitutional 
reform, we are forced to conclude that the only realistic option remaining is to create a new 
framework that will reconcile demands for legitimate, accountable government with those for 
the efficiency, effectiveness, and stability of government. The realisation of this option can 
best be met by our project of constitutionalised democratic autonomy, seeking a model for a 
balanced dual form of politics, which gives equal weight to state and civil society. The state 
can enjoy autonomy as a subsystem of political society, which specialises in formulating 
collectively binding decisions. Civil society can enjoy autonomy as the social basis of the 
other pole of political society, the public sphere, which specialises in ‘discovering’ problems. 
Although new forms of participation should be welcomed, in so far as they can facilitate 
‘problem-discovering’ within civil society, any usurpation on their part of the state’s decision­
making power must be rigorously avoided. The positive alternative to such misappropriation is 
the constitutionalisation of the state which safeguards its accountability to civil society by 
setting clear limits to its powers, whether they be to sanction, organise, or execute. Thus, the
281 For example, the introduction of a system of secret ballot in the House of Commons. For this point, see Ganz 
1994:27.
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liberal ideal of limited government remains as a pillar of democratic autonomy, though in such 
a way as to accommodate a communitarian ideal of self-government, which is the other pillar.
This reformulation of the liberal ideal is to be achieved by two constitutional devices. 
Firstly, a written constitution is required to delineate not only the form and powers of state 
institutions but also those democratic procedures which are to respond to problems raised 
within the public sphere. Secondly, a Bill of Rights is required to safeguard the civil and 
political liberties of the people. Yet, this Bill of Rights should not be equated with the 
traditional liberal notion of individual rights, which tend to focus on the negative autonomy of 
atomised citizens from any external intervention. Rather, it should connote a new relation- 
based concept of rights, the essence of which lies in a positive autonomy which allows free 
and equal citizens to participate in the political process. This flexible notion of rights is 
essential to the furthering of democratic governance both in the state and in civil society. In 
other words, basic individual and collective rights are to form a counter balance to the power 
of both state and civil society.
Corresponding to the state’s accountability vis-a-vis civil society, civil society should allow 
the state to intervene, whenever such intervention is based upon a compelling need to uphold 
free and fair competition within civil society. In the pluralised society of today, abusive use of 
social power tends to cause as many problems as does the administrative power of the state. 
To ensure fair and free will formation on the part of civil society, it too has to be incorporated 
and regulated within constitutional boundaries. That is to say that the autonomy of civil 
society should not be construed as absolute, but must be subject to public scrutiny. However, 
this scrutiny, rather than restricting civil society, has to be designed in such a way as to enable 
it to function as smoothly as possible in its problem-discovering role.
3 The constitutionalisation of political parties
This dual approach towards the democratisation of the British constitution has significant
implications for the constitutionalisation of political parties. Now that the drive towards
corporatism has impacted on the old, rigid division of labour within the political system, the
role and nature of political parties has changed. Political parties are no longer simply a social
sphere via which social demands flow into the state. They have become increasingly involved
with para-governmental activities and form a cartel within the political system. This trend of
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govemmentalisation and cartelisation requires us to see political parties not only in terms of 
the representation of public opinion but also in terms of the logic of government. In other 
words, recent social change has induced the functional differentiation of party organisations, 
and also forced political parties to adopt a dual role vis-a-vis the state and civil society.
Therefore, in applying our basic principles for constitutionalised democratic autonomy to 
political parties, we need to adopt an approach that is at once cautious and complex. The 
constitutionalisation of political parties concerns two interrelated dimensions: inter- and intra­
party democracy. Firstly, this constitutionalisation effects the ideal of inter-party democracy. 
Since political parties are now responsible for both the formation of government and for 
providing an arena in which various strands of social discourse compete to influence the 
making of public policy, rules governing the interaction of political parties have to ensure that 
fair and equal competition on which our pluralist constitution is based. One necessary 
condition for workable inter-party relations is the legal institutionalisation of political parties, 
i.e. their legal recognition and the setting up of a framework to regulate such matters as party 
funding, and the introduction of an electoral system that will reflect in a positive way their 
democratic nature. Secondly, the constitutionalisation of political parties centres on how to 
achieve intra-party democracy. In so far as political parties become organs of the state and 
operate as mini systems of government, they have to be constitutionalised so as to enhance 
rational democratic governance not only in the wider political system but equally within 
political parties themselves. This latter, internal, constitutionalisation should be governed by 
the principle of “publicly responsible self-regulation”. The constitution of a political party 
together with its implementation is purely a matter for internal party concern. However, given 
the constitutional values of the wider society, such autonomy has to be subject to public 
scrutiny, both legal and otherwise. Further, the nature and degree of their constitutionalisation 
is determined not only by their institutional terms but also by the context in which they 
operate. This means, given the parties’ internalisation of political processes, that the old 
dichotomy between external and internal party relationships, on which the traditional legal 
treatment of them is based, is no longer valid in a pluralised society. The conventional 
approach which sees parties simply as unitary actors that externally co-ordinate the social with 
the political systems, is no longer feasible. Political parties have now to be seen as complex 
entities, integrating within their own organisations varying social demands into processes of 
political decision-making.
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Our proposal for the constitutionalisation of political power, especially that of political 
parties, should not be construed as ignoring the importance of both civic participation and 
political tolerance on the part of professional politicians, which remain essential to the smooth 
co-operation between the state and civil society. We do not believe that the institutional 
elements of our vision of democracy alone can guarantee democratic governance; a written 
constitution and a Bill of Rights can never per se ensure the democratisation of Britain. Such 
constitutional devices cannot directly resolve specific issues raised in the practical world and 
the norms which they enshrine need to be interpreted and implemented by and within the 
political and legal systems. Their successful working depends upon the support of the wider 
socio-political culture, which relies in turn on the spontaneous will of the people and that of 
the political elite. For instance, the functional differentiation of party organisations together 
with their complex institutionalisation aiming at greater “individualisation” runs the risk of 
being manipulated by political elites who, in the face of the “weak public”, seek to strengthen 
their oligarchic rule. This danger of the emergence of oligarchy can be effectively mollified 
only by conditions that encourage a system of the checks and balances among the political 
elite. In this sense, the third “moderate” position concerning British constitutional reform is 
more than helpful. We conclude that solutions of both a legal and non-legal nature are 
important for the furtherance of our ideal of democratic governance.
4 The implications of the constitutionalisation of political parties for constitutional 
reforms
The reasoning, which we have sought to outline above, has implications for a number of
constitutional issues, more especially those of electoral reform and the funding of political
parties. The present regime governing political parties is the product of nineteenth century
liberalism and has yet to adjust to the comprehensive social and political changes of the
twentieth century. We have suggested that this readjustment can most realistically be
undertaken via the process of political rationalisation, especially involving the role of political
parties. Firstly, the electoral system in which political parties play crucial roles should be
restructured to ensure free and fair competition between them. In so doing, not only Britain’s
own indigenous political traditions, enshrining a close link between MPs and their
constituencies, should count but equally the positive role of political parties in the democratic
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process as a whole should be taken into account We argued that both these criteria are best 
met by the German mixed system, which is designed to strike a balance between local and 
national (or functional) representation via party organisations.
Secondly, to meet the demands arising out of the rationalisation of the political system, the 
laissez-fairism underlying the present system of party funding has to be abandoned and 
consequently strong demands are made for its juridification. Any new regulatory framework 
should be designed to ensure an equality of political participation and fair electoral 
competition among political parties. We concluded that these goals are best realised by 
transparent party finances, some regulation of national party income and expenditure, together 
with an appropriate level of state aid.
All these reforms can be justified only under conditions in which political parties are 
democratically organised. However, this democratisation does not necessarily require every 
party to institutionalise a form of ‘direct’ intra-party democracy. As in the project for the 
constitutionalisation of the wider political system, party organisation should strive to strike a 
balance between systemic integrity and democratic demands. While certain constitutional, 
basically procedural, devices for the protection of minority opinion and the facilitation of free 
and rational will formation in the ‘problem-discovering’ process are required, the autonomy of 
the central party in the policy-making process should be acknowledged. Ultimately, both 
internal legitimacy and accountability of such policy-making power have to be secured by 
‘indirect’ intra-party democracy, i.e. greater grassroots participation in the election of the party 
leadership and selection of party candidates for public offices.
Our project of constitutionalised democratic autonomy and some practical conclusions 
pertaining to its effects on political parties do not, of course, claim to hold all the answers 
necessary for the modernisation of the British constitution. However, they do, I believe, 
introduce a number of original arguments and thus make at least a small contribution to the 
constitutional debate.
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